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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this study is to provide comprehensive and up-to-date evidence of 
current corporate governance practices, and their impact on audit quality, in the 
developing economies (the case of Jordan). Given the importance of audit quality in 
increasing investors’ confidence and developing financial markets; the study has a 
motivation to examine the role played by boards of directors, audit committees and 
different ownership types in the Jordanian market in ensuring high audit quality. 
Mixed and inconsistent inferences from previous literature regarding the role played 
by corporate governance across the world provide a motivation to ask whether it is 
reasonable to expect to find a relationship between corporate governance mechanisms 
(e.g. boards of directors and audit committees) and audit quality in one of the 
developing countries where the legal liability and investors’ protection are weak and 
where overall regulations are still underdeveloped. 
The study employs two different methodologies to obtain deep insight into the matter 
under investigation. By using 690 firm-year observations of public non-financial 
firms for the period 2009 to 2014, and by employing different statistical estimation 
methods; the first part of the study highlights the importance of boards of directors’ 
independence, audit committees’ independence and financial experience, family 
ownership, financial institution ownership, government ownership and foreign 
ownership in ensuring high audit quality. However, the results show that gender 
diversity and board size have a negative correlation with audit quality.  
The questionnaire survey provides a clearer understanding of the impact of boards of 
directors, audit committees and different ownership identities on audit quality from 
perceptual viewpoints. This is by taking into consideration the perceptions of the 
important players in corporate governance who are members of boards, members of 
audit committees and external auditors. Analysing the views of the respondents 
supports the hypotheses and reveals that boards of directors’ attributes, audit 
committees’ attributes, and different ownership identities do, to a large extent, play a 
role in promoting audit quality. Furthermore, the respondents suggested some 
improvements/changes to the existing governance code, which could be a valuable 
input for any future governance reform. 
The overall result offers useful feedback for the regulatory bodies to consider the 
current corporate governance practices, and to benefit other interested parties in 
gaining a better understanding of the role played by corporate governance 
mechanisms in audit quality. This feedback can also apply to other developing 
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markets in countries that share similar economic, political, social and cultural 
environment to those in Jordan. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Study overview 
 
Since some researchers named  the 19
th
 century as an entrepreneur century because of the 
establishment of modern corporations, and the 20
th
 century was named as a management 
century as it witnessed an evolution of managerial theories, the 21
st
 century will be the 
century of governance (Tricker, 2012). Although the ‘corporate governance’ term was rarely 
used before the 1980s, during the last few decades it has become one of the most central 
issues addressed by researchers, economists, legislators and economic entities whatever their 
sizes, or their business nature. Corporate governance gained more attention as a protection 
against corporate fraud, especially in the aftermath of economic crashes and fiscal crises 
experienced by many countries of East-Asia, Latin America, Russia and the UK in the 90s. 
The importance of corporate governance was reinforced by yet another international financial 
crisis and scandals at the onset of the current millennium, particularly in the US. 
As a consequence of the financial crisis and the corporate scandals, and also because of the 
substantial effect of corporate governance on corporate success and on overall economic 
health; a number of dramatic regulatory changes have been formed and implemented around 
the world aiming to improve corporate governance and safeguard the interests of all related 
parties in the economic entities. These changes are epitomised in the Cadbury Report (1992) 
in the UK, which was the first published code of corporate governance; the King Report 
(1994) in South Africa; the Dey Report (1994) in Canada; the Bosch Report (1995) in 
Australia; the Vienot Report (1995) in France, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) in the US. 
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The Jordanian economy has been directly affected by the conflict in the Middle East through 
the last century and it arrived at a critical point during the Gulf War II in 1991. As a 
consequence of this war, Jordan suffered from the cost of receiving more than 800,000 Iraqi 
refugees and, at the same time, all external aid from the Gulf and Western countries was cut 
off for political reasons.  To mitigate these economic obstacles, the Jordanian government 
launched an economic reform process at the beginning of the 1990s. Most importantly, 
Jordan launched its privatisation programme which started in 1996 aiming at enhancing the 
efficiency and productivity of the targeted enterprises, creating a suitable investment 
environment to attract external investment, and strengthening the economy and the financial 
market by this long-term investment. 
As a part of its efforts for the privatisation process to succeed, to improve governance and the 
disclosure systems, and to increase confidence in the overall economy and financial 
environment in order to attract more investment, the Jordanian government enacted important 
regulations relevant to the for business and financial environments. These regulations were 
the Companies Act (1997), the Temporary Securities Act (1997), and the Securities Act 
(2002). In addition, the Jordanian Securities Commission (JSC) enacted the Jordanian Code 
for Corporate Governance (JCGC thereafter) in 2008 for shareholding companies listed at the 
Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). The policy makers emphasised corporate transparency, good 
governance, and high-quality financial statements to maintain the market’s reputation and to 
motivate investment in the capital market, as well as to work as a shield against corporate 
fraud. Also, foreign investment is common in the Jordanian market, so retaining current 
foreign investors and attracting further investors are of great interest to regulatory bodies in 
Jordan.  
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The corporate governance regulation in Jordan put many responsibilities on the shoulders of 
boards of directors and audit committees as essential corporate governance mechanisms; 
ensuring audit quality being one of those responsibilities. The roles of these two governance 
pillars are highlighted as a central part of the Corporate Governance Code (2008) as 
monitoring mechanisms to ensure high audit quality which helps in protecting shareholders’ 
interests as well as developing the financial market. Moreover, as they provide a fair 
assurance about firms’ financial positions, the external auditors are considered to be an 
essential component in the corporate governance mosaic and they play an important role in 
mitigating agency conflict (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983; Cohen et al., 2002; Piot, 2001). 
Given this, the study aims to examine whether these corporate governance mechanisms fill 
the anticipated/expected role in being able to ensure high audit quality. Mixed and 
inconsistent outcomes from previous literature, regarding the role played by corporate 
governance across the world, provides a motive to ask whether it is reasonable to expect to 
find a relationship between the most important corporate governance mechanisms (boards of 
directors and audit committees) and audit quality in one of the developing countries where 
the legal liability and investors’ protection are weak and where overall regulations are still 
underdeveloped.  
In addition, given that legal protection for shareholders is relatively poor in developing 
countries, the concentration of ownership is dominant as an effective internal corporate 
governance mechanism in order to protect investors’ interests (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
The study, therefore, has a motive to examine whether the different types of controlling 
shareholders, who are common in Jordanian market, have a positive effect on audit quality.  
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The study employed two different methodologies to obtain a deep insight into the matter 
under investigation and to broaden the generalisability of the results. The study employs a 
secondary data-based method in the first part. In the second part of the research primary data, 
obtained through a questionnaire survey, has been used in order to enrich data quality and 
attempt to fill a gap in the literature.   
The secondary data-based approach enables researchers to use real-world data and to examine 
a large sample size. In this part, the study examined the quantifiable boards of directors’ and 
audit committees’ characteristics that are accessible through the published annual reports, 
which are: board independence, role duality, board size, frequency of board meetings, gender 
diversity on the board, audit committee independence, audit committee financial expertise, 
audit committee size and frequency of audit committee meetings. Furthermore, this part 
empirically examines whether audit quality is affected by the different ownership identities 
that are common in the Jordanian market. To be more explicit there are family owners, non-
financial institutions, financial institutions, government and foreign owners. 
The dataset for this part is observations for different entities over more than one year (six 
years from 2009 to 2014). Given this, the panel data analysis is used as the most appropriate 
method. The panel data approach has a number of favourable characteristics. For instance, 
using panel data analysis plays an important role in avoiding the omitted variables problem, 
i.e. controlling variables which are not observed across entities or variables that may change 
over time helps in controlling the endogeneity problem,  improves the efficiency of 
econometrics estimates, and it can deal with different types of variables like variables which 
change between individuals but are the same over time, such as gender or the industry code; 
variables that change over time but are the same for all individuals in a given time period, 
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such as the inflation rate or the unemployment rate; variables that change between individuals 
as well as over time, such as audit fees, the frequency of audit committee meetings or firms’ 
profitability. 
Different estimation methods have been employed, which are appropriate when a dataset is 
characterised as panel data, e.g. the fixed effects model (that tests the relationship between 
explanatory and outcome variables within an entity), and the random effects model (which 
assumes that the difference between groups is random and uncorrelated with the predictor or 
explanatory variables). In addition, the robust standard error is a common model in the 
absence of homoscedasticity. 
Audit fees levels are used in the secondary data model as an appropriate proxy to capture 
audit quality. Previous literature and contextual factors support this proxy as the most 
appropriate one for the Jordanian context. In addition, views of the respondents rated audit 
fees as a superior proxy for audit quality within the Jordanian environment.  
The second part of the study attempts to provide a clearer understanding of the impact of 
boards of directors, audit committees and different ownership identities on audit quality, 
based on individuals’ perceptions. Those individuals are the important players in corporate 
governance, such as members of boards, members of audit committees and external auditors. 
The way that these groups think can assess the impact of the Jordanian governance code 
recommendations and may provide useful feedback for the regulatory bodies in particular to 
consider the current corporate governance practices. 
The motivation for employing a questionnaire survey model in this study is its ability to 
obtain unique information from external auditors, members of boards of directors and audit 
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committee members about the issue under investigation from perceptual viewpoints. In more 
detail, this model aims to achieve three main objectives. First, identify opinions of the 
respondents regarding the role of these corporate governance mechanisms in ensuring high 
audit quality (going beyond the available data in annual reports). This, in turn, supports 
inferences of the regression model (in the first part of this study) and further offers detailed 
and deep insights into the perceived corporate governance quality in Jordan and its impact on 
external audit quality. A robust understanding of this connection is difficult to obtain using 
secondary data method alone. This will contribute to a better understanding of directors’ and 
audit committees’ oversight by evaluating their perceptions of their assigned oversight 
responsibilities. 
 Second, examine whether the importance of these governance mechanisms varies across 
different groups. Interesting comparisons between these groups would highlight any gap in 
their viewpoints. For instance, a certain group may place more weight on particular 
mechanisms in comparison to other groups, which in turn informs the debate on the 
effectiveness of the extant corporate governance mechanisms and encourages further debate 
on where the balance of power/responsibility for corporate governance should lie.  
Third, given that Jordanian regulation, mainly the corporate governance code, is still in its 
infancy, and given that these targeted respondents have a consultative role in the formation of 
relevant regulations; the study seeks the views of these relevant respondents regarding 
possible improvements or changes to the current code, i.e. board of directors and audit 
committee-related suggestions that they feel are important in promoting audit quality, apart 
from what is already recommended in the current governance code (given that the regulated 
board and audit committee characteristics might provide an incomplete picture of directors’ 
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and audit committees’ effectiveness). The provided suggestions in turn could be a valuable 
input for any future governance reform. 
A combination of these different methodologies is recommended as a good methodology 
choice (Rudestam and Newton, (2007). Because each single methodology has its limitations, 
the secondary data approach suffers from the risk of omitted variables, and it is also difficult 
to find strong and reliable proxy variables (Beattie et al., 2012), which in turn fails to provide 
a deep insight into the phenomenon under study. In addition, in a survey-based approach the 
sample size is relatively small, and this may decrease the scope of the findings’ 
generalisability. Moreover, using different data collection methods within a piece of research 
ensures the accuracy of data interpretation; thereby enabling researchers to obtain a 
comprehensive overview of a particular issue, to interpret the research findings, to overcome 
the potential bias of a single method approach (Hussey and Hussey, 1997) and leads to 
greater validity and reliability.  
 
1.2. Study motivation and research questions 
 
Although there is plenty of research on corporate governance in countries within the Anglo-
American, and Continental European; countries in the Middle East and North Africa region 
(MENA thereafter) get minimal attention, and the corporate governance research in this 
region is still underdeveloped. In their survey of the corporate governance practices in the 
MENA region, Piesse et al., (2012) concluded that corporate governance research in this 
environment is recommended and it will provide a valuable contribution to the literature.  
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The majority of the corporate governance literature is conducted in the United States and the 
United Kingdom. Studies from these contexts (Carcello et al., 2002 and Zaman et al., 2011) 
leave uncertainties regarding the direction and magnitude of the empirical relationship in a 
developing market like Jordan. These uncertainties came from the difference in the 
institutional characteristics of Jordan in comparison to these developed markets; such as the 
relatively less restrictive auditor’s liability, lower disclosure requirements, lower public 
enforcement, and other institutional differences.  
Furthermore, MENA countries share a common culture, religion, language, tribal and family 
tradition and, to a large extent, colonial effect (Ali, 1990). In this environment, the financial 
markets are still underdeveloped, and the legal systems largely follow the civil-law tradition 
which is characterised by weak legal protection compared with the common-law (Omran, 
2008). However, important changes have happened across the MENA region in recent years, 
as the regulatory bodies enacted new or adjusted existing corporate governance regulations, 
and many firms started to introduce improvements in corporate governance to keep abreast of 
international markets (International Finance Corporation, 2008). Given this, the context that 
has been considered in this study is institutionally different from the Western context, and at 
the same time the results from the Jordanian environment can be generalized to other MENA 
countries that share the same contextual characteristics.  
To the best of my knowledge, in all MENA region countries, especially in Jordan, there is no 
previous literature examining the effect of internal corporate governance and different 
ownership identities on audit quality. Therefore, there is a strong incentive to study this 
matter in a virgin environment where the corporate governance research, in general, is 
underdeveloped. Additionally, an analysis of this issue from the developing countries allows 
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to explore the relationship between board and audit committee effectiveness and the quality 
of external audit in the absence of strong directors’ legal liability, given the context of 
relatively weak investor protection. In such context, the audit quality becomes imperative to 
enable the investors to accurately evaluate and monitor their investment, and to ensure that 
their interests are sufficiently protected. 
Jordan, since the 1990s, has successfully walked down the path towards a market economy. 
In particular, after launching the privatisation programme, the government has had a 
continuing interest in promoting effective corporate governance practices to regain investor 
confidence in the capital market, create a suitable investment environment to attract (and 
retain) external and local investors, and ultimately to strengthen the economy and financial 
market by long-term investment. Therefore, credible external auditing becomes essential to 
boost the investors’ confidence in the financial reporting. A lack of this confidence in firms’ 
financial systems and in the reported earnings can adversely affect the financial market; given 
that investors are the main capital providers who support the economic system. 
In this vein, Jordan has introduced a number of regulations aimed at improving corporate 
governance in order to enhance investors’ confidence, and ultimately to develop the financial 
market. The Jordanian Corporate Governance Code (2008) is one of the most important 
regulations enacted in recent years. The recommendations of this code emphasise and 
enhance the role of boards of directors, audit committees and external auditors as key 
practitioners in the audit process. Moreover, the litigation context in Jordan is weak 
compared to developed contexts; and this decreases auditor’ incentives to perform high audit 
quality (Francis, 2006; DeFond and Zhang, 2014). This, in turn, increases the importance of 
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effective boards of directors and audit committees to ensure that the auditors are delivering 
high audit quality. 
Consequently, given the above discussion, and given that the Jordan Securities Commission 
(JSC) spent much effort in the last years attempting to improve role of boards of directors and 
audit committees to ensure that investors obtain relevant and reliable information; this creates 
a motivation to examine the role of these corporate governance mechanisms in ensuring high 
audit quality in Jordan, and draw the first research question: 
RQ1: Do boards of directors and audit committees, as corporate governance 
mechanisms, have a significant impact on audit quality in a developing market 
like Jordan? 
 
In addition, ownership structure is considered as an important governance mechanism, 
especially in the absence of a strong legal environment. In Jordan, as many developing 
economies, the legal system does not offer sufficient protection for investors, which therefore 
makes controlling shareholders commonplace in the market.  
The different types of controlling shareholders have different investment policies and 
motivations, which consequently affect how they exercise their control rights over the 
investee firms. Thus, the ownership in Jordan is typically concentrated in hands of different 
identities, particularly family ownership and institutional ownership and non-financial 
institutions). Foreign ownership is common, and the government still owns a block of shares 
in a number of firms even after the privatisation process.   
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Therefore, given the importance of audit quality in increasing investors’ confidence and in 
developing the financial market; an interesting question is whether the various ownership 
identities in Jordan have an impact on audit quality, so the second research question is: 
RQ2: Is the level of audit quality in Jordan related to the prevalent different 
ownership identities?  
 
These two empirical questions are examined based on the secondary data in the first instance. 
However, the views of the important players in the corporate governance system about role of 
these mechanisms, which are important, are still missing, i.e. how the main practitioners in 
the governance system view/perceive the corporate governance mechanisms and how these 
mechanisms affect audit quality is not well investigated.  
 Consequently, the second model (questionnaire survey) of the thesis tackles these two 
questions from perceptual viewpoints of members of directors (who are not members in audit 
committees), audit committees members and external auditors. This, therefore, provides a 
clearer understanding of how these respondents perceive the impact of the role of these 
corporate governance mechanisms on audit quality.  The way different groups think about 
role of these mechanisms may provide useful feedback for the regulatory bodies in particular 
to consider the current corporate governance practises.  
These three groups are important in the corporate governance system. Boards of directors and 
audit committees are considered to be a cornerstone in corporate governance (Cohen et al., 
2008; Cadbury, 1992). The roles of these two governance pillars are highlighted by Jordanian 
regulation and in particular, they are a central part of the Corporate Governance Code (2008) 
as monitoring mechanisms to ensure high audit quality which helps in protecting shareholders’ 
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interests. The boards of directors are responsible for the integrity of overall financial 
reporting systems, and in particular they are responsible for presenting reliable financial 
statements. The audit committee is the main board sub-committee which has particular 
oversight responsibility in relation to the financial statements. It is responsible for ensuring 
auditor independence and reviewing internal control system, discussing matters related to the 
nomination of the auditor to ensure that he meets the requirements, engaging in the process of 
appointment of the external auditors, assessing the external auditor's plan of work, reviewing 
financial reports and discussing matters related to the audit.  
Moreover, as they provide a fair assurance about firms’ financial positions, the external 
auditors are considered to be an essential component in the corporate governance mosaic and 
they play an important role in mitigating agency conflict (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983; 
Cohen et al., 2002; Piot, 2001). The external auditors have to form and express their opinion 
on the fairness of firms’ financial statements, i.e. they have to produce credible audit quality. 
Given the potential interaction between external auditors and firms’ directors and audit 
committees, as stated in the Jordanian governance code, the views of the external auditors are 
important regarding the matter under investigation. 
Furthermore, as differences between the groups’ perceptions may arise in the questionnaire 
survey model, the comparisons between these groups would highlight any gap in their 
viewpoints. For instance, a certain group may place more weight particular characteristics in 
comparison to other groups. This, in turn, inform the debate on the effectiveness of the 
current corporate governance mechanisms and encourage further debate on this matter.  
Considering the potentially different opinions of the various involved groups also may have 
implications for the regulatory bodies. This may give them guidance to balance those 
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opinions against one another and provide a framework and practical guidance on how 
corporate governance mechanisms affect audit quality. For instance, the Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE), the Jordanian Securities Commission (JSA), and the Jordanian Association 
of Public Accountants (JACPA) take a proactive role in the training of directors, audit 
committee members and auditors in order to increase awareness of their duties and better 
enable them to discharge their fiduciary and oversight role.  
In addition, while meeting regulation requirements is important, it is not sufficient to ensure 
effectiveness (Martinov-Bennie, 2007; Contessotto and Moroney, 2013). A number of 
empirical studies identified numerous indicators of boards of directors’ and audit committees’ 
effectiveness not captured in regulation (Gendron and Bedard, 2006; Turley and Zaman, 2007; 
Cohen et al., 2013). Given this evidence, and given that Jordanian regulation, mainly the 
corporate governance code, is in its infancy and still evolving, and given that these targeted 
respondents have a consultative role in the formation of relevant regulations; this motivates 
the study to look beyond the current governance recommendations to gain a complete 
understanding of the characteristics that determine boards of directors’ and audit committees’ 
effectiveness
1
 . This is by asking these relevant respondents regarding possible improvements 
or changes to the current code, i.e. board of directors and audit committee-related suggestions 
that they feel are important in promoting audit quality, apart from what is already 
recommended in the current governance code. The provided suggestions, in turn, could be a 
valuable input for any future governance reform. So, the third research question will be: 
RQ3: What changes to the extant governance regulatory framework do respondents 
believe would most improve audit quality? 
                                                          
1
 Based on the result of their survey study, Contessotto and Moroney (2013) pointed out that adoption 
of regulated best practice does not necessarily ensure audit committee effectiveness; so it is important 
to look beyond the regulated requirements. 
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By answering these research questions - using primary data through a questionnaire survey 
alongside the secondary data model - the study (a) builds on strong ground to generalise the 
findings as the scope will be broader (b) furnishes further insights into comprehending the 
role of the board of directors and audit committee as well as different ownership identities in 
promoting high quality auditing; (c) may benefit policy makers in improving/developing 
appropriate governance practises in such emerging economy; and (d) makes a valuable 
contribution to the literature and empirically informs the debate about the effectiveness of 
boards of directors and audit committees in developing markets, as well as  the role of 
different ownership types in maintaining shareholders’ interests e.g. by promoting higher 
audit quality. 
Finally, it is worthwhile to mention here that given the overall purpose of this research is to 
obtain further insights into comprehending the role of the boards of directors and audit 
committees, as well as different ownership identities in promoting high audit quality; the 
questionnaire survey will complement the secondary data approach (first model) by exploring 
a broad set of attributes/activities of boards of directors and audit committees that are difficult 
to measure by the published secondary data. The survey approach can, therefore, support and 
complement the findings derived from the secondary data model (the support role is by re-
examining the variables that are included in the secondary data model but by different 
methodology, and the complement role is by examining other governance attributes that have 
not been examined in the secondary data model). 
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1.3. Findings overview 
 
The first part of the study (the secondary data approach) used 690 firm-year observations of 
public non-financial firms. The Jordanian Code of Corporate Governance was published in 
2008 by the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC), and the public shareholding firms were 
asked to adapt to this code starting from the beginning of 2009. Therefore, the study covers 
the period from 2009 to 2014 inclusive. The data was manually collected through annual 
reports. The Jordan Securities Commission’s website and firms’ websites are mainly used to 
download the annual reports.  
By employing different estimation methods; this part of the study highlights the importance 
of the boards of directors’ independence, audit committees’ independence, audit committees’ 
financial experience, family ownership, bank ownership and government ownership, in 
ensuring high audit quality. These results are consistent with the notion that more 
independent boards are seeking to maintain shareholder interests as well as to protect their 
reputation capital and by purchasing differentially higher-quality audits, and this is in line 
with agency theory propositions.   
Although boards of directors in such contexts are still dominated by male members, there are 
some females on a number of boards across listed companies. The regression result indicates 
that the existence of females on the boards adversely affects audit quality; likely to be due to 
more conflict as supported by findings of the second model. Furthermore, the result shows 
that board size is not an indication of greater board effectiveness; it is arguable that a large 
board might be related to more communication and decision-making problems, and lead to a 
negative impact on audit quality by reducing the board’s monitoring effectiveness (as 
highlighted in the questionnaire results).        
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Audit committees’ independence and financial experience also have an essential monitoring 
role to ensure the quality of financial reporting and serve as important governance attributes. 
However, the effectiveness of other audit committee characteristics with regards to improving 
audit quality is insignificant.  
It can be noted from the significance level of independence characteristic in the model that 
the independence of boards of directors and audit committees stands as the most valuable 
attribute for audit quality. Therefore, the regulatory bodies can recognise the essential role 
played by independent directors as one of the most important components of the corporate 
governance system in Jordan. Also, firms’ directors can benefit from this result by using it as 
a parameter to assess how board and audit committee characteristics may affect financial 
reporting and audit quality. 
From the second part of the study, the results of analysing 199 questionnaires reveal that 
respondents gave high importance to the role played by most boards of directors’ 
characteristics in promoting audit quality. These characteristics are mainly recommended by 
the Jordan Corporate Governance Code (2008) and are supported by the previous literature, 
as discussed earlier. Organising a company's financial affairs, setting risk management 
policies, ensuring that the executive managers have appropriate qualifications and experience, 
reviewing and evaluating the performance of a company’s executive management by the 
board, in addition to board independence, are the activities/attributes that obtained strong 
agreement from an overwhelming majority of the respondents as having made a significant 
contribution to audit quality.  
Regarding the perceived roles of audit committee activities in promoting high audit quality, 
respondents underscored most of these activities. As expected, the audit committees functions, 
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audit committee composition and audit committee resources have been rated as very 
important factors in the effectiveness of audit committee oversight, which in turn increases 
audit quality.  
Furthermore, it can be concluded that all ownership types in Jordan play a positive role in 
increasing audit quality, given the perceptions of audit committee members, other board 
members, and external auditors. These positive perceptions may have an impact on the 
behaviour of investors in the financial market. The Kruskal-Wallis test showed no significant 
differences between the three groups, indicating consistent perceptions regarding this 
question. The result is consistent with the argument that large capital providers have a 
significant role in monitoring and controlling managers’ decisions due to their ownership 
volume, and because they are better informed than individual investors. 
In conclusion, the findings of the study highlight the significance of the role played by the 
corporate governance mechanisms (boards of directors, audit committees and the dominant 
owners in the ownership structure) in ensuring high audit quality. These findings indicate that 
the governance regulations can contribute positively to audit quality even in developing 
countries where the weak legal system is weak and cultural environment is different 
compared to developed countries. This conclusion is consistent with the notion that high 
quality governance systems are equally, or even more, important in developing countries that 
are attempting to develop their capital markets and to gain credibility among investors. 
Hence, the overall findings indicate that the governance mechanisms set by JCGC (2008) to a 
large extent lead to effective monitoring over auditing (monitoring approach) and the role of 
these mechanisms not just symbolic i.e. play active rather than passive role, and this is, 
therefore, consistent with agency theory assumptions.  
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1.4. Structure of the thesis 
 
This section presents a brief overview of the contents of the thesis. Chapter Two provides an 
overview to the different economic and regulatory affairs  of Jordan, such as general 
information and the history of Jordan, the history of the economy since independence, 
regulation development, regulatory bodies, financial market and listing rules, the 
development and factors affecting the accounting and auditing profession,  ownership 
structures  and the corporate governance system. An understanding of the Jordanian 
environment provides an insight into the research background, motivation, and research 
questions. 
Chapter Three includes discussion of the theoretical framework used in corporate governance 
literature. There theories are stewardship theory, stakeholders’ theory, signalling theory, 
resource dependence theory, institutional theory, and information acquiring theory. This 
chapter also shows deeps discussion for agency theory and offers a justification for 
employing it as a more relevant theory. 
Chapter Four provides a discussion of audit quality and a critical literature review in relation 
to corporate governance practices and audit quality. This chapter contains two sections. The 
first one related the first empirical model while the second part covers the literature that 
considers corporate governance from perceptional viewpoints. Section 4.1.2 discusses boards 
of directors’ and audit committees’ characteristics. Section 4.1.3 discusses different 
ownership structures and their correlation with audit quality. Section 2.2.2 presents a 
summary of the literature about the perceived role of corporate governance mechanisms in 
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different corporate aspects, and particularly in financial reporting and audit quality. This 
section 2.2.2 focuses on the perceptions of directors, audit committee members, and external 
auditors. Hypotheses development for the second model is also presented in this chapter. 
Chapter Five contains four main sections. The first and second sections are about research 
philosophy and paradigms that are adopted in this research (5.1 and 5.2). Section 5.3 
discusses the methodology for the first empirical model (secondary data model). This section 
covers a description of the sample, the sources of data and justification of the time period 
during which the investigation was carried out, the definitions and measurements of the study 
variables (hypotheses and control variables), the different estimation methods and model 
specification. Section 5.4 discusses the research methodology that is employed to address the 
research questions of the second model (the questionnaire survey). This section contains an 
introduction in the subsection one; a summary of the research objectives and questions in the 
subsection two; a discussion of the research tool (questionnaire survey) and how it will be 
managed in terms of its design, content, piloting and validity assessment in subsections three 
and four; a presentation of the sample selection and questionnaire distribution procedures in 
subsection five; a test of the reliability of the questionnaire, which is essential before starting 
the statistical analysis, in subsection six; and finally a presentation of the section six 
investigates statistical methods used for the questionnaire analysis in subsection seven. 
Chapter Six covers the data analysis of the first empirical model and it contains the following 
sections. Section 6.1 presents introduction of the chapter. Section 6.2 discusses the 
descriptive statistics. Section 6.3 is about testing the correlations between the variables. 
Section 6.4 presents the results of data analysis and the discussion. Section 6.5 presents 
further analysis of the regression. The final section 6.6 contains the chapter’s conclusion. 
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Chapter Seven presents the analysis and discussion of the perceived roles played by the 
corporate governance mechanisms, e.g. boards of directors, audit committee activities and 
ownership structures, on audit quality in the Jordanian market. The chapter is organised as 
follows: The first section 7.1 is an introduction to the chapter. The second section 7.2 
provides a description of the respondents in terms of the demographic information obtained 
by the questionnaires. Section 7.3 presents the respondents’ views about audit quality 
attributes and potential proxies for audit quality in Jordan. Sections 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6 represent 
analyses of respondents’ views about the roles in audit quality of boards of directors, audit 
committees, and ownership structures respectively. Section 7.7 covers the suggested 
improvement made by the respondents. The final section 7.8 contains conclusion of the 
chapter. 
Chapter Eight offers a brief picture of the entire thesis. It presents a study overview including 
a summary of study motivation and aims. The chapter also shows the main findings, the 
contribution to knowledge, the implication for policymakers, the limitations and suggested 
avenues for future research. 
21 
 
CHAPTER TWO: JORDANIAN CONTEXT 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides An overview of different economic and regulatory affairs  of Jordan 
such as general information and history of Jordan, history of economy since independence, 
regulation development, regulatory bodies, financial market and listing rules, the 
development and factors affecting accounting and auditing profession,  ownership structure  
and corporate governance system. An understanding of Jordanian environment provides an 
insight into the research background, motivation and research questions. 
 
2.2. Jordan Economy: An overview 
 
Jordan is a small and recent state established after the First World War in 1921 and it 
remained as a British colony until 1946.  Jordan has limited natural resources and the 
economy is not fully independent. Jordan's economic resource heavily depends on foreign aid, 
overseas remittances, tourism, and export, and these are the main sources of hard currency 
earnings. Unlike its neighbouring countries, Jordan suffers from lack of oil, gas and coal 
reserves (Al-Akra et al., 2009). 
In addition to the scarcity of local resources, the Jordanian economy was affected to a large 
extent by the Arab-Israel conflict from independence in 1946 until the date of the Jordan-
Israel Peace Treaty in 1994. Jordan’s resources were exhausted by many wars against Israel; 
the 1948 war, the 1967 war and the 1968 war. In the 1948 war, and after establishment of the 
Israeli state on a large part of the West Bank, a huge number of Palestinians (335,000) were 
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transferred to Jordan. In 1967, when Israel had occupied the rest of the West Bank, hundreds 
of thousands more Palestinians fled to Jordan (Al-Akra et al., 2009 and Alshiab, 2003).  All 
these events affected the Jordanian economy and put more pressure on the limited local 
resources. 
During the 1950s and 1960s the Jordanian economy was in its early stage: a small economy, 
low gross saving, low local revenue and low investment, generally. The total imports were 
largely higher than exports that led to a deficit in the trade balance that was 37% as a 
percentage of GDP. Also, foreign aid grew from JD 68 million in 1956 to JD 385 million in 
1968 (Alshiab, 2003). However, in this period the GDP increased by 6.9%, real income per 
capita grew by 4.4% and income from industry and service increased by 14.2% and 9.1% 
respectively (Mustafa, 1977 cited in Alshiab, 2003). During this period also the government 
launched many infrastructure and construction projects which positively affected the growth 
rate (Alshiab, 2003). 
In the 1970s, and because of the civil war in Lebanon, many businesses and companies 
shifted from Lebanon to Jordan. Furthermore, due to the enactment of the Encouragement of 
Investment Law in 1972 and the liberalisation of foreign investment regulations, a large 
increase in economic activity was taking place (Al-Akra et al., 2009). Therefore, the 
movement of companies from Lebanon to Jordan and the economic prosperity during the 
1970s increased the financial importance of Jordan and this encouraged the Central Bank of 
Jordan, with assistance from the World Bank, to establish the first financial market in Jordan: 
the Amman Financial Market (AFM) in 1976 (Al-Akra et al., 2009 and Alshiab, 2003). 
In the beginning of the 1980s, the GNP increased due to the increase of external aid from 
Arab-oil countries as a result of the increase in oil revenues, as well as increasing the 
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remittance from Jordanian workers in Gulf countries, which increased from USD 10.2 million 
in 1972 to USD 565 million in 1985 (Alshiab, 2003). 
Moreover, in the 1980s, and especially in the last few years from that decade, the Jordanian 
economy faced serious problems which largely affected all people’s lives. In 1987, and due to 
the sharp decline in the oil price, the Jordanian economy arrived at the worst level because of 
the sharp decrease of foreign aid from Gulf countries (rich oil countries) and the decrease of 
expatriates’ remittances — which the Jordanian economy is heavily dependent on — and also, 
more than 35,000 of those expatriates were returned back to Jordan (Brynen, 1992; Al-Akra 
et al., 2009). 
 In 1988, and as a result of the continuation of the bad economic situation, the Jordanian 
Dinar lost about 45% of its value against the US dollar, the unemployment rate increased to 
35%, the inflation rate increased and the population percentage that was under the poverty 
line rose to 30% (Al-Akra et al., 2009). Also, in 1989 the external debt amount became 
double the GDP ($ 8.3 billion) and there was a shrinkage of foreign currency reserves 
(Brynen, 1992; Ramachandran, 2004). 
To overcome the obstacles which faced its economy, the Jordanian government launched an 
economic reform process with help of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1989. Jordan 
borrowed $ 275 million as a Stand-By Agreement (SBA) from the IMF to strengthen foreign 
currency reserves, control the inflation rate and correct the imbalances in the economy 
(Brynen, 1992; Alissa, 2009). 
In 1990 and 1991, and due to the Jordanian political position, which was supporting the Iraqi 
regime during the Gulf War, the Jordanian economy suffered again: cutting off external aid 
from Gulf and Western countries, expulsion of Jordanian workers from Gulf countries, 
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especially from Kuwait, a decrease in tourism income, in addition to the cost of receiving 
about 800,000 Iraqi refugees. Therefore, Jordan signed another Stand-By Agreement with the 
IMF in 1992 to mitigate the effect of these events on its economy (Alissa, 2009).  
After that, with the encouragement and assistance of the World Bank and the IMF, Jordan 
started with many economic and financial reform processes. It introduced the sales tax 
(value-added tax) in 1994, reduced the maximum custom tariff from 70% to 50% in 1996, 
trade liberalisation, and most importantly, launched the privatisation process (Al-Akra et al., 
2009; Alissa, 2009). The privatisation process in Jordan is one of the most, if not the most, 
successful privatisation programmes in the Middle East (Ramachandran, 2004). The 
programme started in 1996, and the main aims are enhancing the efficiency and productivity 
of the targeted enterprises, creating a suitable investment environment to attract external 
investment, and strengthening the economy and financial market by this long-term 
investment (ASE, 2014). 
 
2.3. Financial market regulations 
 
As a part of its efforts to success the privatisation process, to improve governance and the 
disclosure system, and to increase confidence in the overall economy and financial 
environment to attract more investment, the Jordanian government enacted the most 
important regulations for contemporary business and the financial environment, which are: 
the Companies Act (1997), the Temporary Securities Act (1997), and Securities Act (2002). 
These laws set the framework for the corporate governance system, improved corporate 
disclosure, and emphasised the adoption of International Accounting Standards (IAS/IFRS).  
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2.3.1. Companies Act 1997 
 
The government enacted this law to replace the previous one (Companies Act 1989) to keep 
pace with its new economic stage and because of the deficiencies of the previous act which 
was suffering from its limited scope and coverage; in particular it did contain sufficient 
disclosure requirements (Omar, 2007). 
Subject to the provisions of this law, companies registered under this law should be divided 
into the following forms: General Partnership, Limited Partnership, Limited Liability 
Company, Limited Partnership in Shares, Private Shareholding Company, and Public 
Shareholding Company (Article 6). With respect to the Public Shareholding Companies 
(PSCs), the act reports in details the PSC establishment procedures, its capital, subscription 
procedures, annual general assembly meetings (GAMs) process, PSC management, and 
liquidation procedures. Also, the new act emphasises the requirement to adopt IAS (IFRS) 
and ISA. 
The following are some of the most important of the act’s features regarding PSCs: 
The members of the board are elected for a period of four years by the shareholders in the 
GAM (Article 132/A).  
 The Board of Directors “shall prepare, within a maximum period of three months 
from the end of the fiscal year of the company, the annual balance sheet of the 
company, its profit and loss statement, and cash flows statements accompanied with 
their clarifications compared with those of the previous fiscal year, all duly certified 
by the company auditors, to be presented to the annual GAM” (Article 140). 
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 The PSC Board of Directors “shall prepare a semi-annual report that includes the 
financial position of the company, the results of its operations, profit and loss account, 
cash flow list and the clarifications related to the financial statements certified by the 
company auditors” (Article 142). 
 The Board of Directors of the PSCs “shall annually disclose to shareholders (a) all 
amounts received from the company during the fiscal year by the chairman and each 
of the members of the Board of Directors, in the form of wages, fees, salaries, 
bonuses, remuneration and others, (b) any benefits that the chairman and the members 
of the Board of Directors enjoy such as free accommodation, cars and others, (c) 
amounts that have been paid to the chairman and members of the Board of Directors 
during the fiscal year such as travel and transport allowances inside and outside the 
Kingdom, (d) a detailed account of the donations paid by the company during the 
fiscal year, and the entities that received the said donations, and (e) a list of the names 
of the Board of Directors” (Article 143). 
 Remuneration of the PSC directors’ members (including the chairman) “shall be 
determined at a rate of 10% of the net profit which can be distributed as dividends to 
shareholders, after deducting all taxes and reserves therefrom, provided that the 
remuneration for each of them do not exceed five thousand Jordanian Dinars annually. 
Remuneration shall be distributed amongst them in proportion to the number of 
meetings attended by each of them” (Article 162/A).  
 Public listed firms shall prepare its financial statements in accordance with the 
international accounting and auditing standards. 
The Companies Act shows some features relating to the process of board of directors’ 
selection. Within four months after the end of the financial year, an invitation is sent to each 
shareholder (at least fourteen days prior to the date set for the meeting) to attend the General 
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Assembly meeting. This invitation letter is accompanied by the agenda of the meeting and the 
report of the board of directors, its annual accounts, in addition to the auditors’ report (Article 
144). Other invitations also sent to the head of the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) and 
the Companies’ Controller Department (CCD) in order to attend the GAM (usually they send 
representatives on behalf of them). 
Company act mandates board of directors to announce the date set for the meeting of the 
Company General Assembly Meeting in two local daily newspapers, within two weeks prior 
the date of the general meeting (Article 145). Also they should announce the verbal invitation 
once through radio or television within a maximum period of three days prior to the date of 
meeting (Article 145). Based on this act, the shareholders have the right to give a proxy to 
another shareholder to attend the meeting on his/her behalf, and the proxy could be in writing, 
on a special template prepared for this purpose approved by the official companies’ controller 
(Article 179). 
2.3.2. Securities Act 1997  
 
The 1997’s act was targeted to organise and regulate the Jordanian capital market in line with 
international standards (Al-Shiab, 2006). Under this act, three controlling and regulating 
bodies came to the existence. Those new bodies are the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC), 
the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE), and the Securities Depositary Centre (SDC). 
The Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) was established to protect investors, and organising 
and promoting the capital market to ensure fairness, efficiency and transparency. To achieve 
these main targets, the JSC has a responsibility to regulate the issuance of securities and 
monitor the dealing process, to regulate and promote firms for accurate disclosure, and to 
regulate the licensing and registration of listed firms (Securities Act, article 8. Furthermore, 
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the JSC regulates and monitors the Amman Stock Exchange and Securities Depositary Centre 
(Securities Act, article 8).  
The Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) was established in March 1999 as a non-profit, private 
institution with an independent administrative and financial position. It replaced the Amman 
Financial Market (AFM) which was established in 1978. The ASE is authorised to operate as 
an exchange for the trading of securities. The ASE is committed to the principles of fairness, 
transparency, efficiency, and liquidity. ASE seeks to offer a strong and reliable environment 
for its listed securities while protecting the rights of its investors. To provide this transparent 
and efficient market, the ASE meets the latest international standards and it has implemented 
internationally recognised instructions regarding market divisions and listing criteria (ASE, 
2013). 
2.3.3. Securities Act 2002 
 
No material changes were made from the previous act. However, the 2002 Securities Act 
strengthened the role of the JSC, ASE and SDC and required all listed companies to adopt the 
IFRS. The 2002 Act also gives more power to the JSC with respect to imposing fines, 
suspending trading, or delisting companies in case of significant violations (ROSC, 2005).  
2.3.4. Listing Securities Directives 2012 
 
The ASE listing directives 2004 is mainly a document listing the requirements of suspending 
and delisting causes. Under these directives, to list its shares in the market, one year at least 
should have passed since it obtain permission to work, and the company should provide the 
ASE with the “company's memorandum of association, articles of association and prospectus, 
annual report for the last financial year (if any), the interim financial statements reviewed by 
an independent auditor, which covers the period from the end of the financial year preceding 
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the date of submission of the listing application till the end of the last quarter preceding the 
date of the listing application (Article 4). As required by the listing directives” (2012); the 
company's board of directors should issue a report contain the following (Article 4):  
a. A short profile of the firm's establishment, its major aims and its relationship with other 
related firms. 
b. A detailed specifications of the securities issued by the firm, and for potential issuance in 
the future. 
c. The board of directors' assessments supported with figures, of the firm’s performance, as 
well as achieved targets compared with the set plan. 
d. The important incidents the firms faced or affected the firms from the date of its 
establishment till the date of submission of the listing application. 
e. The future plan of the firm over the next three years. 
f. Names of the persons who hold 5% or more of the firm’s shares. 
 
The listing of the company's shares listed on ASE shall be suspended in cases of mergers, 
reduction of the company’s capital, any contingency event that may materially affect the 
sound dealing and Interruption of the normal activity of the company for a period exceeding 
three months without reasonable justification. Moreover, the ASE delists/cancels shares of 
the company when it changes its legal status, when suspension of trading exceeds two years 
and in cases of liquidation, either obligatory or voluntary. 
In addition, based on these listing directives, the listed companies should provide the ASE 
with annual, semi-annual and quarterly reports reviewed by the external auditor, the agenda 
and decisions of general assemblies and any other information which may affect the price of 
the share.   
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2.3.5. Corporate Governance regulation 
 
The results of the World Bank survey (ROSC, 2005) revealed that the Amman Stock 
Exchange became one of the largest equity markets in the region, as a percentage of market 
capitalisation to the GDP, legal investor protection in Jordan has been enhanced, companies 
become more interested in equity financing than before, and as a result of the enactment of 
new legislation, the quality of corporate disclosure has significantly improved. 
Furthermore, the World Bank in its survey (2005) has reported some aspects of corporate 
governance in Jordan such as: ownership appears to be less highly concentrated comparing to 
other emerging countries; average free float (as measured by the ASE) is about 40%; family 
ownership is typical; foreign ownership which is from Arab as well as non-Arab countries is 
around the half of the market capitalisation. 
In order to develop the capital market and its regulatory framework to attract more 
investments, the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) developed the Jordanian Code for 
Corporate Governance (JCCG) in 2008 for shareholding companies listed at the Amman 
Stock Exchange (ASE). The code is based on "compliance or explain" approach. All listed 
public firms in ASE should comply with the code, and in case of non-compliance, they 
required mentioning the reason for non-compliance in the firm’s annual report. This approach 
is intended to give firms more flexibility in implementing the code recommendations and 
enough time to adapt to them, in order to enhance awareness and to achieve full compliance 
gradually (JCCG, 2008).  
The Code focuses particularly on the role of boards of directors and audit committees as 
important mechanisms to monitor firms and ensure high reporting quality. For instance, with 
regards to board of directors’ characteristics, the code recommends board of directors’ 
31 
 
members should not be less than three and no more than 13, at least one third of them have to 
be independent members, the board of directors’ chairman should not hold any executive 
position in the company at the same time, and should run regular meetings, no less than six 
times per year. 
With regards to audit committees’ characteristics, the code recommends that the audit 
committees should be composed of no less than three members of the board of directors, at 
least two of them should be independent members, and at least one audit committee member 
should have worked previously in the accounting or finance fields, or that member should 
have an academic or professional certificate in accounting, finance or related fields. Also, 
audit committees should run regular audit committee meetings, no less than four times per 
year.  
It is worth to mention that the Jordanian corporate governance framework mirrors the models 
in developed countries especially the UK and the US, without consideration given to the 
socio-cultural peculiarities of the Jordanian business environment. For example, the JCGC 
recommendations regarding board independence, role duality, board size, frequency of 
meetings are similar to the recommendation of Cadbury Report (1992), the UK combined 
Code of Corporate Governance (1998), Higgs Report (2003) in the UK, and also quite similar 
to section 101 of SOX in the USA. Moreover, the JCGC recommendations regarding audit 
committees’ structure are similar to the recommendations of Cadbury Report (1992), the UK 
combined Code of Corporate Governance (2003), and section 301 of SOX.  
In this vein, Arcot et al. (2010) stated that the UK corporate governance code based on the 
“comply or explain” approach, which thereafter, adopted in many countries around the world, 
and became as a ‘trademark’ for good corporate governance system. Using a corporate 
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governance code that is introduced in a developed country does not necessarily hamper its 
effectiveness when applying it in a developing country. For example, Malaysia follows the 
UK corporate governance code, and the empirical studies revealed that the code 
recommendations have a positive impact on the effectiveness of the Malaysian financial 
market and on audit quality (Yatim et al., 2006). Thus, the study focuses on the impact of the 
Jordanian corporate governance code (2008) on audit quality. 
 
2.4. Sectorial analysis overview 
Jordanian economy is overwhelmingly service oriented. Around 67% of the GDP from the 
service sector, and this sector employs more than 75% of the total workforce. The service 
sector composed of many sub-sectors which are health service, educational service, tourism, 
transportation, IT and communication, media, energy and commercial service.  
Manufacturing sector accounts for 20% of Jordan’s GDP and absorbs around 10% from the 
workforce. It consists of pharmaceutical and medical industries, chemical industries, paper, 
printing and packaging, food & beverages, tobacco, mining & extraction industries, 
engineering & constructions, electrical, leathers & clothing, glass & ceramic industries. The 
mining is the most important sub-sector- within industrial sector- for Jordanian economy 
(World Bank, 2012). 
The major mining exports of Jordan are potash and phosphates. Jordan is one of the largest 
raw phosphates and Potash producer in the world. The Potash Inc., phosphates Inc., and 
cement Inc. are the biggest corporations that represent this sub-sector in Amman Stock 
Exchange, and their market capitalization in 2014 are $ 5 billion (19% as a percentage of the 
whole market), $ 1.3 billion (5% of the whole market), and $ 80 million respectively 
(Department of Statistics publications & ASE annual report 2015). 
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Although Jordanian banking system is one of the smallest in the Middle East, it is more 
developed system with total assets of JD 29.6 billion (US$41.4 billion) as of 2014. The 
system is composed of 23 banks, including three Islamic banks and eight foreign bank 
branches (Department of Statistics publications 2014, World Bank 2012, and JIB, 2014). 
Arab Bank is the largest Jordanian bank, it dominates the banking system, accounting for 
more than half of the total banking assets and its trade value was more than $ 280 million and 
its market capitalization was 5.85 billion in 2014 (21.8% of total market capitalization). The 
largest five banks are the Arab Bank, Housing Bank, Jordan Islamic Bank, Bank of Jordan 
and Ahli Bank. Those five banks together control more than two-thirds of the total assets and 
three-quarters of total deposits (Department of Statistics publications 2014, World Bank 2012, 
and JIB, 2014). 
The agricultural sector in Jordan is very limited and this due to scarcity in water resources 
and swathes which is valid for agriculture is small (about 11% from total land) (World Bank, 
2012).  
The following tables give information about importance of large ten companies from 
different aspects (source: ASE annual report 2014): 
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Top Ten Companies by Market Capitalization 
Name of the company Market Capitalization (USD 
million) 
As a percentage of the whole 
market 
ARAB BANK 5867 21.8 
THE ARAB POTASH 5105 19.1 
THE HOUSING BANK  2822 10.5 
JORDAN TELECOM 1934 7.2 
JORDAN PHOSPHATE MINES 1337 5 
JORDAN KUWAIT BANK 506 1.9 
BANK OF JORDAN 445 1.6 
CAIRO AMMAN BANK 387 1.4 
JORDAN ISLAMIC BANK 385 1.4 
JORDAN ELECTRIC POWER 364 1.4 
TOTAL 19198 71.2 
 
 
Top Ten Companies by Value Traded in 2014 
Company’s Name Value Traded 
(Million USD) 
% to Total 
Value 
ARAB BANK 281 7 
MIDDLE EAST COMPLEX FOR ENG., 
ELECTRONICS AND HEAVY INDUSTRIES 
277 6.9 
AL-TAJAMOUAT FOR CATERING AND 
HOUSING 
214 5.4 
UNION LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 152 3.8 
BANK AL-ETIHAD 144 3.6 
JORDAN PHOSPHATE MINES 140 3.5 
SPECIALIZED INVESTMENT COMPOUNDS 127 3.2 
JORDAN PETROLEUM REFINERY 122 3.1 
THE ROYAL JORDANIAN AIRLINES 121 3.1 
UNION INVESTMENT CORPORATION 112 2.8 
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Top Ten Companies by Shares Traded in 2014 
Company’s Name Shares Traded 
(Million Share) 
% to Total Share 
MIDDLE EAST COMPLEX FOR ENG., 
ELECTRONICS AND HEAVY IND 
570 14 
UNITED ARAB INVESTORS 237 5.8 
TAAMEER JORDAN HOLDINGS 202 5 
AL-TAJAMOUAT FOR CATERING AND 
HOUSING 
195 4.8 
ARAB REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT 188 4.6 
FIRST JORDAN INVESTMENT COMPANY 156 3.8 
SOUTH ELECTRONICS 143 3.5 
DARKOM INVESTMENT 116 2.9 
MODEL RESTAURANTS COMPANY 107 2.6 
SPECIALIZED INVESTMENT COMPOUNDS 104 2.6 
 
2.5. Ownership structure  
In Jordan as in other emerging economies, the legal system does not offer sufficient 
protection for investors, which therefore makes ownership concentration typical of most 
listed firms. The results of the World Bank survey (ROSC, 2005) revealed that ownership in 
Jordan appears to be less highly concentrated than in many emerging markets; average free 
float (as measured by the ASE) is about 40%. Family ownership is typical. In more recent 
studies,  Zeitun and Tian (2007), Omran et al. (2008) and Jafar and Elshawa (2009) 
documented that the ownership in Jordan is concentrated in hand of family and institutions in 
particular. Also, foreign ownership is common and the government still has ownership in 
some firms.  
Shareholders in Jordan typically are categorized into four main types: families, foreigners, 
government and institutions (banks and other institutions). The government ownership 
decreased after the privatization process, but is still available in a number of important 
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companies like Jordanian Airlines, Potash, Phosphate, and the Alrai newspaper. Unlike many 
developed countries (The US and the UK in particular), large institutional investors such as 
pension funds, trust funds, venture capitalists, and hedge funds) are not significant as 
controlling shareholders in Jordan (rather, the institutional investors are banks and other 
small institutions).  
 
2.6. Gender diversity 
Social and cultural structures in Jordan are different from those in Western societies in terms 
of barriers face female participation in the workforce. However, in recent years, opportunities 
for women in Jordan are increasing as globalization continues. Jordan is ranked the 77th out 
of 186 countries according to the Human Development Index (HDI) compared to the 86th 
level in 2003. Jordan has shown improvements in Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) 
over the years. The GEM rose from 0.22 in 1995 to 0.297 in 2002. In 2009, Jordan’s rank 
was 96 out of 109 nations. However, more improvements are needed.  
The 2007 ratio of female to male earnings was 0.19; quite a low figure, since a ratio of 1; 
would indicate absolute equality. The number of female in government roles increased from 
4.6% to 9.9% during the period between 1995 and 2002, showing that more improvement is 
being made in this area (Jordan Human Development Report, UNDP, 2011).  
Total female employment participation increased from 28 percent in 2003 to 45 percent in 
2013 (World Bank, 2013). Recently, MENA countries (Tunisia and Jordan in particular) are 
beginning to recognize the necessity of developing female talent up to the board level 
(Terjesen et al., 2009).  
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The difference between genders is widely documented in the literature, especially with 
regards to managerial style, decision making and communication process (Ittonen et al., 
2011). The literature has shown considerable evidence for the importance of gender diversity 
for many aspects in organizations. 
Due to the importance of gender diversity in the board, many countries take it into 
consideration. Some countries have determined a minimum number of directors’ seats that 
should be allocated for females. For example, Sweden has proposed a legal requirement that 
25% of board’s seats should be allocated to female directors, Norway requires 40% of the 
board to be female (Gul et al., 2011). Also, in its 2010 edition, the UK Corporate Governance 
Code recommends for giving due regard to diversity, including gender diversity, when 
searching for board candidates and making appointments to the board. However, the 
Jordanian regulations do not regulate gender diversity in the board so far, thus findings of this 
study may have some implications for policy makers.  
 
2.7. Foreign ownership structure 
 
Jordanian regulations offer open and equal opportunities for non-Jordanians to participate and 
invest in Jordan. Investment Promotion Law (1995) offers incentives for non- Jordanian 
investors in terms of freedom from customs duties, tax holidays, income tax exemptions and 
unrestricted transfer of capital and profits. Moreover, market stability and lack of taxes on 
capital gains and dividends attract foreign investors towards investment in ASE (Al-Qudsi et 
al., 2007). 
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The foreign ownership concentration in ASE has increased drastically in the last few decades. 
The privatisation process that started in the 1990s plays an important role in shaping and 
adjusting ownership structures because it aimed to attract more private Arab and foreign 
investments by opening up the markets and abolishing state monopolies (ASE, 2013 and 
Zeitun, 2009). 
Based on published figures from ASE and SDC, the ratio of foreign ownership (measured by 
market capitalisation) increased from 38% in 2003 to 51.3 % in 2013. The Saudi investments 
at the ASE ranked first among non-Jordanian investments; these Saudi investments reached 
about JD1.3 billion by the end of 2013. This figure constitutes 6.8% of the market 
capitalisation of the ASE, American investments ranked second with a percentage of 6.1%, 
followed by the Kuwaiti investments at 6.0%, the Qatari investments 4.5% and the Lebanese 
investments 4.0%.  
However, according to the Instructions of Foreign Investment, the foreign investors are not 
allowed to own or participate, wholly or partially in a number of projects and activities which 
are: “passenger and freight road transportation services including taxi, bus and truck services, 
quarries for natural sand, dimension stones, aggregates and construction stones used for 
construction purposes, security and investigation services, sports clubs including the 
organisation of sports events services, excluding health fitness clubs services and clearance 
services” (Article 6).  
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2.8. Regulating Framework for the Auditing Profession in Jordan 
 
The first Accounting Profession Law was enacted in 1961 followed by the first Company 
Law in 1964 and the first Commercial Law in 1966. Before these laws the commercial 
practises that were enacted by the Ottoman Empire in the 19
th
 century were in use (Al-Akra 
et al., 2009). The 1961 Accounting Profession Law determined all the requirements that 
should be satisfied in order to have the right to exercise in the auditing profession, such as 
auditors should not have any other job other than auditing and they should have relevant 
experience. However, this law does not require a university academic degree or professional 
examination as a compulsory requirement for auditors to be licenced.  
Globalisation, open markets, trade liberalisation, the privatisation process, and signing trade 
agreements with the US and EU put pressure on Jordan to change to the international 
accounting practices (Al-Omari, 2010). Many international institutions play an important role 
by helping and encouraging Jordan in that sense such as IASB, the World Bank, and the IMF 
(Al-Akra et al., 2009; Al-Omari, 2010). 
In 1985, the accounting profession in Jordan became more regulated: 1985 witnessed the 
enactment of the Certified Accounting Profession Law (before that date, the audit profession 
was not well regulated (Suwaidan, 1997)). As a result of this law, the Jordanian Association 
of Certified Public Accountants (JACPA) was established in 1987. JACPA aims to improve 
the audit profession by improving the competence of its members, emphasising on the 
independence of auditors and rules for the certification of public accountants, publishing 
accounting principles for the training and awareness of its members and developing 
accounting and auditing standards that could best meet the needs of the country. However, 
the JACPA did not have the power to impose IAS on companies or on its members until 1997 
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when the Companies Act No. 22 of 1997, and Securities Law No. 23 of 1997 have given 
consideration, authority and more power to JACPA (Al-Shiab, 2003). So, the adoption of 
IASs was not compulsory until 1998. 
In 2003, a new Certified Accounting Profession Law was enacted. The 2003 law is regarded 
as an important step to improve and regulate the accounting profession (Al-Omari, 2010; 
Shanikat and Abbadi, 2011). By issuing this law, the JACPA got more power and played a 
significant role in encouraging the adoption and explaining  the IAS/IFRS (Al-Akra et al., 
2009).  
The aims of the new law are “regulating and upgrading the practice of this profession, ensure 
complete compliance and adherence with the approved standards of accounting and auditing 
in order to protect the national economy, upgrading the educational and professional level of 
chartered accountants, ensure complete respect and observance to the acceptable ethics and 
behaviours of this profession, enhancement of the role of chartered accountants by 
emphasising their neutrality and independence” (Certified Accounting Profession Law, 
Article 3).  
According to the Certified Accounting Profession Law (2003), to be eligible to practice 
auditing, the person must have an academic degree, pass the professional exam (Jordan 
Certified Public Accountant JACPA), and must have seven years’ experience in auditing and 
accounting. Also, after being authorised, the auditor must attend 20 training course hours 
annually as a continuous learning in order to keep pace with latest updates
2
. 
                                                          
2
 As a comparison, to be authorised auditing companies, in many countries, including UK and USA, the auditor 
should pass a relevant exam(s), should have experience and should proof that he/she up to date with the relevant 
regulations. These generally the requirements in many countries, including UK and USA, but you will find 
differences in  structure of the exam, number of years as an acceptable experience or structure of the continuous 
improvement program. For example, in the UK, the auditor should be a member in ACCA, ICAEW, or AAPA 
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The international auditing and accounting firms – the Big-4 – are working in Jordan through 
affiliates except Deloitte. Allied accountant is a member of Earnest and Young, Qawasmi and 
Co. is a member of KPMG, and Bawab and Co. is a member of PwC. In addition to these 
offices, there are a number of large local audit offices like Abu-Ghazaleh, Professuonal 
auditors, Ghosheh, Arab professional, and Abbasi Co. Almost all the listed companies are 
audited by these audit firms (JACPA, 2015). 
 
2.9. Factors affecting the development of accounting practices in Jordan 
 A number of factors played a role in the development of accounting practises and in adoption 
of IAS/IFRS. The following are the most important factors. 
Political and economic factors: the political and economic situation in Jordan was unstable 
and at risk due to the Arab-Israel conflict since independence in 1946 until the date of the 
Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty in 1994. In addition to the Arab-Israel conflict and its 
consequences on the economic and financial development of Jordan, the Jordanian economy 
also witnessed many serious events such as the economic crisis of the late 1980s and the Gulf 
War’s severe effects in the beginning of the 1990s.   
To overcome the obstacles which faced its economy, the Jordanian government started with 
many economic and financial reform programmes. In order for the reform programmes to be 
successful, to improve the governance and disclosure system, and to increase confidence in 
the overall economy and financial environment to attract more investment, the Jordanian 
government enacted the most important regulations for the contemporary business and 
financial environment, which are: the Companies Act (1997), the Temporary Securities Act 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(this membership after achieving the required conditions and passing the required exams. Also, the auditor 
should have experience in audit and proof 30 hours continuous professional development (CPD) per year. 
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(1997), and the Securities Act (2002). These laws set the framework for the corporate 
governance system, improved corporate disclosure and emphasised the adoption of IAS/IFRS.  
Colonial influences: Given that Jordan used to be a British colony until 1946, this resulted in 
a strong economic and political relationship with the UK and all western countries in general. 
The colonisation effect and the post-colonisation relationship were facilitated and helped in 
transferring the British accounting culture to Jordan, and as a result, facilitated adoption of 
IAS/IFRS (Al-Akra et al., 2009). 
Tax regulations: Income tax and sales tax (value-added tax) are the most important types of 
tax in Jordan. The Income Tax Laws 1985 and 2010 and Sales Tax Laws 1994 and its 
amendments require that all companies should prepare their accounts based on IAS/IFRS and 
send a copy of them to the tax department attached to the external auditor report. 
Legal system: The countries’ legal systems largely affect the adopted accounting systems in 
those countries (Al-Akra et al., 2009). Regarding its legal systems, the countries are 
categorised as either common law or code law countries (Salter and Doupnik, 1992).  
Common law countries are characterised mainly by strong investor protection and their 
capital markets are the main financing source. (Porta et al., 1997). Jordan is classified as a 
code law country, so its sources of financing depend heavily on banks, and its investor 
protection system is weaker than common law countries. 
Corporate financing in Jordan has largely been through banks, and shareholder rights are 
relatively weak (Al-Akra et al., 2009). However, Jordan's recent economic reforms, which 
targeted the build-up of the local economy and the attraction of foreign and local investment, 
require the government to lay down legislations to protect shareholders’ rights and to increase 
confidence in the capital market (Al-Akra et al., 2009). 
43 
 
Nature of business ownership: Due to trade liberalisation and the privatisation process, 
government ownership has decreased and the number of shareholders increased including an 
increase in the number of foreign investors, and this has required more transparent disclosure 
from organisations.  
Education: The existence of professionals who studied in different educational backgrounds, 
especially from Anglo-Saxon countries, influence the improvement of accounting practises 
(Solas, 1994). In addition, the quality of accounting education in Jordan has become better in 
recent years, especially for the post-graduate level, but it needs to be improved more, for 
instance by establishing appropriate guidelines associated with IFAC educational standards 
(Al-Akra et al., 2009).  
International factors: Many international factors encouraged Jordan to adopt IAS as a global 
benchmark such as globalisation, changes in capital markets, increases competiveness and 
accelerated development in technologies (Solar, 1994 and Al-Omari, 2010).  
 
 
2.10. Conclusion 
This chapter surveys the Jordanian background and discusses the different economic and 
regulatory environment. The Jordanian environment has been presented in terms of the 
history of the country, history of the economy since independence, regulation development, 
regulatory bodies, financial market and listing rules, the development and factors affecting 
the accounting and auditing profession, ownership structures and the corporate governance 
system. An understanding of the Jordanian environment provides an insight into the research 
background, motivation, and research questions. 
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Consequently, it is important to mention that the financial market in Jordan is attractive for 
many reasons: (a) contrary to other Arab financial markets, the ASE is characterised by lack 
of any type of taxes or constraints; (b) the existence of many specialised bodies such as ASE, 
JSC and SDC which encourage increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the financial 
market and keep it away from probable financial crisis; (3) political stability in Jordan which 
makes Jordan  a centre for business in the Middle East, especially after the recent public 
revolutions in the neighbouring countries. On the other hand, it is clear that the policy makers 
and financial market regulations emphasize corporate transparency, good governance, and 
high quality financial statements to maintain the market reputation and motivate investment 
in the capital market. Thus, retaining current foreign investors and attracting more are of 
particular interest to regulatory bodies in Jordan. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
A number of theories are playing an important role in interpreting and analysing different 
corporate governance practices, e.g. agency theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, 
signalling theory, resource dependence theory, institutional theory, and information acquiring 
theory. Those theories vary from different aspects; each one is based on a different 
philosophy, discusses different items, and analyses and addresses the same case in different 
ways (Mallin, 2007; Solomon, 2011). Before going to these theories in detail, it is worth to 
mention about the theory of accounting in general. 
 
3.2. Accounting theory- overview 
As there are many theories of financial accounting, there is no universally agreed theory, or 
no even accepted views of how accounting theories should be developed (Deegan and 
Unerman, 2011). For instance, some researchers believe that the main role of accounting 
theory is to explain particular accounting phenomena, while other researchers believe that the 
role of the theory is to prescribe a particular approach to accounting (Deegan and Unerman, 
2011). 
Much of research in accounting is considered either positive research (the research which 
explains and predicts particular events) or normative research (the research which prescribes 
particular actions or activities). Positive (descriptive) theory is defined by Peirson and Brown, 
1992: 326) as a theory “begins with some assumption(s) and, through logical deduction, 
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enables some prediction(s) to be made about the way things will be. If the prediction is 
sufficiently accurate when tested against observations of reality, then the story is regarded as 
having provided an explanation of why things are as they are. For example, a positive theory 
of accounting may yield a prediction that, if certain conditions are met, then particular 
accounting practices will be observed”.  
Deegan and Unerman (2011) stated that while positive accounting theory typically based on 
observation, normative theory based on what the researcher believes should happen in a 
particular event. On other words, while positive theory seeks to analyse the observation and 
data at hand, and then derive a conclusion accordingly (deals and offer an explanation of the 
phenomena in question), normative theory seeks to describe what should be done in the 
future (provides a basis for predicting future actions). 
The normative theory has been criticized by many researchers as it is not based on 
observation (observation-based research is considered to be scientific, and then akin to good 
research), but rather it is based on personal judgments about what should happen (Deegan 
and Unerman, 2011). For this research, the study explains the effect of different governance 
mechanisms and further suggests recommendations for policy makers for instance. This, 
therefore, makes positive/descriptive accounting theory is the main base for this study. On the 
other hand, this study offers (prescribes) number of recommendations for policy makers in 
particulars regarding corporate governance mechanisms under investigations i.e. this study 
offers information about the expected implication of particular actions for interested parties 
(recommend what may be done in the future). This also indicates that the result of the study, 
to some extent, can be explained using the normative theory framework. 
Moreover, the positive accounting theory, which is mainly developed by Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986) explain why executive managers act particular behaviour or adopt 
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particular action. The main development of this theory is based on “rational economic person 
assumption”, which assumes that managers are motivated particularly by self-interest and 
will behave opportunistically to maximize their wealth (Deegan and Unerman, 2011). Thus, 
the self-interest assumption creates a need for organisations to establish alignment 
mechanisms to align principal and agent objectives e.g. corporate governance mechanisms 
and external auditing. 
This assumption, therefore, is the backbone of the agency theory (and the rationale behind 
corporate governance regulations across the world). This has been discussed in the agency 
theory section below.  
 
3.3. Agency theory 
The agency relationship is one of the “oldest and commonest” organised ways of social life 
(Ross, 1973). It is a contract that has arisen between one or more persons, when one is  
considered as an agent doing services on behalf of others (principal) (Ross, 1973; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Agency theory assumes that there is an inherent conflict between agent 
(manager) and principals (owners) of organizations, and its assumption is that the corporate 
governance problems stem particularly from the conflict of interests between these two 
parties (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). This 
consequently makes the alignment mechanisms of owners-managers’ interests the central 
focus of this theory. 
 
The root of agency conflict was documented a long time ago by Adam Smith in 1776. Since 
Adam Smith identified the potential problem that results from the separation of management 
and owners in his book The Wealth of Nations in 1776, many researchers “have argued that 
48 
 
the working of a free market with private property would keep businesses and individuals 
who control them from abusing their power and would promote the most efficient use of the 
productive resources they control” (Blair, 1995, p.18). Due to size of the businesses at that 
time, the owners take the responsibility of managing and controlling their companies. This 
situation changed later on, particularly at the beginning of the last century. Berle and Means 
(1932) shed light on the dramatic changes in the ownership of companies and documented the 
separation of ownership and control in the large modern corporation, which, in turn, results in 
an agency relationship (Bebchuk and Fried, 2006).  
Berle and Means (1932) pointed out that it is more beneficial for the owners to manage their 
businesses by themselves, but it is difficult in practice especially in the large modern 
corporations due to their complicated capital requirements (Clarke, 2004). Instead, owners 
just “invest their wealth in the corporation and design governance systems in ways that 
maximize their utility” (Davis et al., 1997: 22). Assuming that owners may not qualified 
enough, they seek qualified and experienced managers, while managers at the same time need 
shareholders’ funds ((Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Thence, owners make a contract with 
executives to manage their business on behalf of them. Based on this contract, shareholders 
accept uncertain and perhaps negative investment return (Fama, 1980), and agents accept the 
responsibility of managing principal’s investments and act rationally to maximize these 
investments’ value (Davis et al., 1997).  
Furthermore, based on the principals-agents’ contract, managers obtained a control right and 
discretion over the firms’ resources and, as Shleifer and Vishny (1997) reported, there may be 
constraints on this discretion in the contract in order to curb any harmful behaviour, and 
corporate governance is dealing with these constraints. This means that managers’ decisions 
are not always in the interest of shareholders and this consequently requires effective 
49 
 
governance mechanisms to keep managers’ behaviour in check. The actions taken to deal 
with these constraints are costly and create what are called agency costs. 
Agency cost comprises the "costs of structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set of contracts 
among agents with conflicting interests, plus the residual loss incurred because the cost of 
full enforcement of contracts exceeds the benefit" (Jensen, 1998: 153). When principals incur 
costs to monitor agents’ behaviour, these costs are called monitoring costs, for instance, 
external audit costs, costs related to creating effective governance structures. The bonding 
costs are the costs that are borne to align agents’ interests with principals (e.g. bonus 
incentives and/or reward structures) to curb or cure any costly actions taken by agents (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Hoque, 2006)
3
.The third type of agency costs is the residual loss, and 
this is all other costs that are incurred due to the divergence between principal and agent 
decisions despite monitoring and bonding processes. Given that managers-owners’ interests 
are not fully matched, any deviation of their interests is likely to create agency conflict 
problems and increases manager-shareholders’ agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Schulze et al., 2003). Therefore, any increase in agency problems increases the demand of 
higher audit quality (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
The demand of high audit quality is driven by two main factors; client incentives and client 
competencies to meet these incentives (DeFond and Zhang, 2014). Client demand for audit 
quality stems mainly from their incentives to reduce agency conflict in order to protect 
shareholders’ wealth (Jensen and Meckling; DeFond and Zhang, 2014). Clients’ 
competencies as a second main driver for audit quality are the abilities of clients to fulfil their 
incentives driven demand for audit quality (DeFond and Zhang, 2014). These abilities consist 
of mechanisms that facilitate meeting their demand for high- quality audit e.g. firms’ board of 
                                                          
3
 On the initiative of shareholders, the audit fees are considered as monitoring costs, whereas they are called 
bonding costs if they are engaged on the initiative of managers (Piot, 2001)                        
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directors and audit committees, which are typically integral components of the corporate 
governance system
4
 (Beasley and Petroni, 2001; DeFond and Zhang, 2014). These two 
mechanisms are addressed below. 
Information Asymmetry between principal and agent is the main source of agency conflict, 
and it is related to two main aspects of agency problems: moral hazard and adverse selection. 
Given that it is difficult for the principals to verify if the agent is acting in favour of or 
against their interests, and that most agents’ activities are unobservable, moral hazard 
problem occurs as the agents may not act as agreed/contracted with the principal, and any 
investment decision taken by managers may reflect their interests rather than owners’ 
interests (Eisenhardt, 1989; Shelfier and Vishny, 1997). Adverse selection arises mainly 
when a principal inadvertently contracts with an agent who is disqualified or less competent 
than principal’s expectations (Eisenhardt, 1989; Chrisman et al., 2004), or “when an 
employee has private information valuable to the agency in the sense that, if it were honestly 
revealed, would improve resource allocation” (Oldroyd, 2007: 182). 
So, given that managers are assumed to be untrustworthy based on agency theory lens, they 
need to be effectively monitored as they may take decisions that maximize their own benefits 
and, at the same time, are against shareholders’ interests. Therefore, shareholders work 
towards incurring control and monitoring costs in order to eliminate or decrease the 
principal–agent interests' divergence, and establishing a combination of fixed or 
performance-based incentives and punishments procedures for the agent (Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Eisenhardt, 1989; Clarke, 2004). Eisenhardt (1989) stated that as a solution for 
mitigating the principal-agent conflict,  agency theory proposes that corporate governance 
about create and monitor the mechanisms that are put in place by firms’ owners to control 
                                                          
4
 These mechanisms are triggered by Jordanian Corporate Governance Code (2008). 
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agents (management) in order to maximize shareholder value by reducing agency cost 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  
In order to mitigate the agency conflict, a corporate governance framework is developed to 
control management behaviour, and compel it to behave consistently with shareholders’ 
interests by preparing high quality financial statements and reducing earning manipulation. 
External audit is one of the monitoring tools used by the directors to compel management to 
consider owners’ needs. Therefore, based on agency theory proposition, effective board of 
directors and audit committees as important corporate governance mechanisms (Cohen et al., 
2002) play a dominant role in monitoring and controlling agents’ behaviours, and 
consequently decrease the agency cost by alignment the principal-agent’s interests (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976 and Fama and Jensen, 1983). Further, external audit complements/supports 
board of directors and audit committee monitoring role by control managers and increase the 
current/prospective investors' confidence in the financial statements. This confirms that the 
theoretical legitimacy of audit function is reducing the agency cost as it reduces information 
asymmetry and therefore bridges the gap between owners and managers (Piot, 2001). 
From another perspective, given that performance-based incentives for management is one of 
the common ways used to align principal-agent interests, managers (based on agency theory) 
tend to manipulate financial performance in order to obtain high rewards
5
. So, high quality 
auditors curb management’s opportunistic behaviour and they are less willing to approve 
                                                          
5
 Piot, 2001 summarized the managers’ motivations to manipulate accounting numbers, which are to increase 
their reputation, to increase their remuneration and bonuses, to avoid takeovers, and to limit the implication of 
shareholders in the firm and keep a sufficient discretionary margin. 
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doubtful financial statements
6
 (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Kane and Velury, 2004; Habbash, 
2010).  
Moreover, being the auditors provide a fair assurance about financial position, many 
researchers (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983; Cohen et al., 2002; Piot, 2001) documented that 
the external audit function is an essential component in the corporate governance mosaic and 
it plays an important role in mitigating agency conflict, and controls management’s 
opportunistic behaviour. The essential point in performing the audit function effectively, as 
discussed by Watt and Zimmermann (1983), is the ability of auditors to discover and report 
any material breach in the financial statements (so called audit quality). Becker et al., (1998)  
stated that auditors reduce information asymmetries and allow outsiders to verify the validity 
of financial statements. Thus, credible audit quality acts as an effective deterrent to financial 
statement fraud because management's reputation may be damaged and firm value adversely 
affected if misreporting is revealed. 
On the other hand, board of directors and audit committee play a significant role in 
demanding and monitoring the external auditing. Effective board of directors and audit 
committees (as indication of client competency) are interested to demand high audit quality 
in order to protect their reputation and to avoid legal accountability by decreasing the 
likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. Also, high-quality audit helps in controlling 
management misbehaviour and then maintain shareholders’ interests which is the ultimate 
target of corporate directors. Further, external auditors provide a high-quality audit in order to 
                                                          
6
 Given that the opportunistic managers may not disclose the correct performance/financial position of the 
company, which in turn leads to residual loss to the shareholders, auditors play an important role in control 
managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Suliman, 2011), and increase the current/prospective investors' 
confidence in the financial statements.  
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satisfy the effective boards’ expectations and to maintain a good relationship with their 
clients (Carcello et al., 2002 and Beasley, 1996).  
In summary, the agency theory is the underlying rationale of corporate governance code as 
the key purpose of corporate governance regulations is to monitor management’s behaviour.  
So agency theory provides explanations and solutions for owners-managers’ agency 
relationship which give it a priority over other theories (Dinga et al., 2009). In addition to this, 
agency theory is the most dominant theory in accounting and finance research. It is an easily 
understandable (Eisenhardt, 1989) and simple theory because it classifies the organization 
into two participants (agents and principals) with clear interests for each of them. Also, it is 
based on the philosophy of human nature with respect to the wealth maximization instinct 
(Daily et al., 2003). As a result, the agency theory is the main perspective within which this 
research is being carried out.  
After discussing agency theory, it is worthwhile to present other theories which are common 
in the corporate governance literature, and assess their relevance to the study. These theories 
are stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, resource dependence theory, institutional theory, 
and information acquiring theory.   
3.4. Stewardship theory   
While agency theory assumes a conflict between owners (principals) and executive managers 
(agents), stewardship theory assumes that there is no conflict of interests between these 
parties. Instead, it assumes a convergence due to their sharing joint collective interests 
(Donaldson, 2008; Van Slyke, 2007).  Stewardship theory proposes that managers act as 
stewards of the principals’ resources, exert their best efforts towards protecting and 
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maximizing the principals’ utilities, and they, therefore, give priority to the principal interests 
over their own interests (Davis et al., 1997; Mallin, 2007).  
Stewardship theory focuses on collaborative and empowering structures within the company, 
which is contrary to monitoring and control structures that are assumed by agency theory. So, 
stewardship theory suggests that the stewards (CEOs) work towards pro-organizational 
activities, achieve shareholders objectives and enhance the corporate performance when they 
have high authority e.g. when the chairman and CEO position is held by the same person 
(Davis and Donaldson, 1991). In addition to suggesting unifying of the role of CEO and the 
chairman, this theory assumes that boards of directors which are dominated by executive 
members are more beneficial for the company. This is  because they have more business 
operation knowledge about the company and have more loyalty than non-executive or 
independent members (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). 
The proponents of stewardship theory stress managers' tendencies to be collectively oriented 
and intrinsically motivated. As stewards, managers focus on cooperative decision making and 
goal alignment (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). Hence, they may be trusted to "behave in 
ways that are consistent with organizational objectives" (Davis et al., 1997: 25). However, 
given the advantages of this collaborative approach, what makes it applicable or not 
applicable to a corporate context depends on the risks that the principals are willing to 
assume (Davis et al., 1997). For instance, risk-averse principals perceive that executive 
managers are self-serving (this assumption is implied in the corporate governance code) and 
therefore they prefer monitoring prescriptions (Davis et al., 1997). 
To assess the relevance of this theory for the context of the study, it is worth mentioning that 
the key purpose of corporate governance regulations is to monitor management’s behaviour.  
These regulations have been enacted as a reaction to high-profile corporate scandals e.g. the 
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Maxwell and Enron scandals were the main motivation for the Cadbury Report (1992) and 
SOX (2002) respectively. In Jordan, the corporate governance code (2008) heavily focuses on 
the responsibilities of boards of directors and audit committees as “monitoring” rather than 
“empowering” mechanisms of the executive managers. This is consistent with the common 
notion that the effect of agency theory is contributory in the development of corporate 
governance code around the world (Habbash, 2010). 
Thus, given that this study is interested in examining the effectiveness of the corporate 
governance code, adopting the monitoring view of agency theory is more appropriate than the 
empowering view of stewardship theory. Also, it should be noted here that the results of the 
study challenge assumptions of stewardship theory e.g. the non-executive directors are more 
beneficial to the companies than the executive ones, and unifying of the role of CEO and the 
chairman has no significant contribution. 
 
3.5. Stakeholder theory 
Study of the stakeholder approach has grown since the first use of the term in 1963 at the 
Stanford Research Institute by Igor Ansoff and Robert Stewart, when they defined 
stakeholder as “those group without whose support, the organization would cease to exist” 
(cited in Freeman, 1984; Clarke, 1998). Also, stakeholder theory was originally detailed and 
developed by Freeman (1984) in his book “Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach”; 
he defines stakeholder as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organization’s objectives” . 
Stakeholder theory assumes that “all persons or groups with legitimate interests participating 
in an enterprise do so to obtain benefits and that there is no prima facie priority of one set of 
56 
 
interests and benefits over another” Donaldson and Preston (1995, p.68). Collier (2008, p.951) 
concluded that “Boards of directors in quasi-public organizations have both an economic 
concern with efficiency and a broader social concern”. So, based on stakeholder theory, the 
organization has obligations for all its stakeholders, and it should be run to benefit all of them, 
not for maximizing their shareholders’ utility only. The goals of the firm  should be achieved 
by creating a proper balance between the interests of all stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Heath 
and Norman, 2004). Shankman (1999) also report that such balancing is the “only way” for 
the company to achieve its objectives and to stay alive. The breakdown of corporate relations 
was one of the main reasons behind the failure of Enron and other corporations in the 2000s 
(Heath and Norman, 2004). 
Clarkson (1995) classified the stakeholder groups into primary and secondary groups based 
on its importance to an organization: primary stakeholders are the most important groups and 
they are essential for an organization to survive. The board of directors and management of 
the company must strive to create a proper satisfaction for each of these groups. If any of 
these groups disappeared from the organization system, continuity of the organization would 
be seriously affected. These groups include shareholders and investors, employees, customers, 
suppliers, and governments and communities which provide infrastructures for the corporate 
activities. Secondary stakeholders, Clarkson reported, are groups who can affect or be 
affected by the company’s activities, but they do not have any direct economic transactions 
with the company and their presence is not necessary in the corporate life cycle, e.g. media, 
general public and research centres.   
A stakeholder theory of the organization based on diverse economic doctrines, discussed and 
presented in many different ways (Clarke, 1998). Donaldson and Preston (1995) documented 
three approaches to discussing the stakeholder theory (descriptive, instrumental and 
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normative). The descriptive approach discusses the behaviour, actions and communication of 
the company’s management towards the stakeholders. The instrumental approach examines 
how the management achieves the corporate goals taking stakeholders’ interests into 
consideration. Finally, the normative approach focuses on how the company attains its goals 
considering moral and ethical norms.  
By taking the context of this study into consideration, it is important to point out that though 
the stakeholder theory explains the relationship between the business entities and their 
different groups of stakeholders, it is not appropriate when assessing the matter under 
investigation. The public companies have different stakeholders, but the study focuses on one 
of the important stakeholders - the shareholders.  
Furthermore, using stakeholder approach depends on a country’s laws, traditions, and 
corporate structure. In most of the governance systems around the world, the Jordanian one 
included, the priority is obviously shareholders and the maximisation of their interests. While 
other corporate governance systems, Germany as an example, view whole company-related 
parties as collective partners, and the employee and banks, who provide the finance, are 
represented in the board of directors (Mallin, 2007), this is not the case in Jordan. The 
stakeholder approach, therefore, is not appropriate for the context of the study. 
 
3.6. Theory of information acquisition costs 
A strong information environment provides independent directors with easy access to 
required information about the organisation (in turn, less cost of acquiring information) 
which is important to monitoring and control (Duchin et al., 2010; Zhang and Yu).  (Raheja, 
2005; Harris and Raviv, 2008; Duchin et al., 2010) indicate that independent directors obtain 
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rich information of firm’s business operations and, in turn, increase their effectiveness when 
the company works in a strong information environment and directors have easy access to the 
relevant information. Zhang and Yu, (2016) pointed out that better-informed independent 
directors, who are aware of firm risks and operations, are likely to ask more questions and 
request greater effort from the auditor to protect the firm’s value.  
 
However, Duchin et al. (2010) find that the effectiveness of the independent outside directors 
depends on the cost of acquiring information. That is, independent directors are expected to 
play an effective monitoring role only in a stronger information environment and where the 
cost of acquiring information is low (Zhang and Yu, 2016). Thus, in a weak information 
environment (e.g. Jordan), independent directors have difficulty in obtaining relevant 
information to effectively perform their responsibilities through higher audit quality for 
instance (Zhang and Yu, 2016).  
 
3.7. Resource dependence theory 
 
Another theory reviewed in the corporate governance literature is resource dependence 
theory. The essential assumption of resource dependence theory is the need for environmental 
connections between the organisation and outside resources (Yusoff and Alhaji, 2012). In this 
perspective, outside directors serve to link the organisation with external environment by co-
opting the resources needed to survive (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978). So this theory offers a 
theoretical framework for directors' resource role (Daily and Cannella, 2003).  
 
Proponents of this theory highlight the value of board members as “boundary spanners” of 
the organization and its environment (Dalton et al., 1999; Hillman et al., 2000; Daily et al., 
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2003). In this role, non-executive directors provide a vital set of resources needed by the 
organisation which are therefore important, to enhance organizational functioning, 
performance, and survival (Daily and Cannella, 2003). 
 
Hillman et al. (2000) consider the potential result of linking the organisation with the external 
environment and decreasing uncertainty which is also minimising the transaction cost 
associated with the external association. Resource dependence theory supports the 
appointment of directors to multiple boards as this creates the opportunities to gather 
information and build network (Yusoff and Alhaji, 2012). 
 
Cohen et al., (2008) posit that boards of directors help management in setting corporate 
strategy, and management also relies on the board to access scarce resources. So the primary 
role of the boards of directors under this framework is less that of a monitor than a partner to 
management (Cohen et al., 2008).  
 
It can be concluded that this theory stresses the importance of the “advisory role” (Daily and 
Cannella, 2003) and “linking role” (Hung, 1998) of the non-executive directors, rather than 
adopting the “controlling and monitoring role” as the agency theory assumes. Also, the 
rationale behind recruiting non-executive directors, as recommended in the JCGC, is to 
monitor and control management in order to behave in favour of shareholders’ interests by 
preparing high quality financial statements (i.e. the code implies that the non-executive 
directors are in the best position to control management behaviour given that they are 
outsiders and free from management pressure and intervention). 
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3.8. Institutional theory 
Institutional theory  originated in the social sciences (Scott, 2005), and has been further 
developed in the sociological literature of organisation and organisational behaviour. This 
theory helps to reveal the nature of the interaction between different governance players 
emphasising a  “substance over form” view (Cohen et al., 2008) Also, this theory considers 
organisations as cultural and social systems not just as a means to provide goods and services 
(Judge et al., 2008). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Cohen et al., (2008) pointed out that organisations become 
similar over time through the process of institutional isomorphism as organizations adapt and 
become similar to those around them: this homogeneity occurs as mimic other organizations 
to enhance their legitimacy. Institutional theory also proposes that there is a tendency to 
attract homogeneous individuals into organisations (Tuttle and Dillard 2007). The implication 
for corporate governance is that board members who come from similar backgrounds will be 
less inclined to challenge management or indeed, each other (Cohen et al., 2008).  
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identified three mechanisms through which institutional 
isomorphic change occurs: Coercive isomorphism, normative isomorphism, and mimetic 
isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism comes from political influence and the problem of 
legitimacy. It results from pressures exerted on organisations from government and other 
organisations. Mimetic isomorphism reflects environmental uncertainties (responses to 
uncertainty); if organisations face uncertain situations for example ambiguous aims, unclear 
solutions, or incomprehensible new technology, they mimic and follow other organisations 
which are viewed as successful and legitimate: this happens whether those organisations have 
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effective practises or not. The route is chosen simply because it is more convenient and less 
expensive.  
 
Normative isomorphism suggests isomorphism is associated with professionalization or 
effectiveness. DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 151) also, discussed two sources of 
professionalization that are important in isomorphism; “one is the resting of formal education 
and of legitimation in a cognitive base produced by university specialists: the second is the 
growth and elaboration of professional networks that span organizations and across which 
new models diffuse rapidly. Universities and professional training institutions are important 
centres for the development of organizational norms among professional managers and their 
staff”.  
 
Corporate governance considers all matters that contribute to shareholders’ wealth and 
organisations values, from management to the board of directors, from stationary 
requirements and financial markets structure, to more broad understandings of corporate 
culture in the modern context: this sociological perspective, as Davis (2005) argued, is more 
relevant and promising for corporate governance research than the more traditional 
perspective as it seeks to understand the institutional context in which it occurs. 
 
Institutional theory focuses on the deeper and more resilient aspects of social structure (Scott 
2005). It tackles the systems of social beliefs and practices that are associated with diverse 
functional areas of societal systems, such as religion, politics, norms, and regulations 
(Filatotchev and Nakajima, 2010); therefore, one of the keys to understanding organizations 
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is the study of the institutional environments that guide or constrain their legitimacy (Judge et 
al., 2008; Adegbite, 2010; Filatotchev and Nakajima, 2010).  
 
Cohen et al.,(2008: 187)  discussed the implication of institutional theory with respect to the 
internal workings of the board and suggested that “audit committees’ members will act to 
conform to other institutions and that they will tend over time to become similar to others 
within the same industry. Audit committees’ members are likely to come from similar 
backgrounds, often similar to the backgrounds of management as well. This theory has an 
indeterminate prediction on whether the audit committee will act as an ally to management or 
the auditor in disputes that the auditor may have with management. For example, the audit 
committee often fulfils an important symbolic role that in practice could lead its members to 
legitimize their role by asking questions of management. However, similar backgrounds and 
ties with management may lead the audit committee to accept management’s views”. 
 
This is contrary to agency theory which assumes boards of directors or audit committees’ 
members to be independent and to exert an effective monitoring role over management. 
Beasley (2009) and Cohen et al. (2008) argued that  institutional theory emphasizes the 
ceremonial role of corporate governance structures in creating legitimacy: it considers how 
governance structures attain ritualistic roles that help legitimize the interactions among the 
various players within the corporate governance structure and aids the communication of this  
to external parties. Under this theoretical view, board of directors and audit committee have 
no effective power over management and their role is passive and symbolic rather than active, 
i.e. board of directors and/or audit committee do not necessarily play effective monitory role.  
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DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Cohen et al. (2008) pointed out that a firm may comply 
with the corporate governance practices just to simulate other firms, or to meet the 
regulations without substantial impact on these governance practices. This study assumes that 
corporate governance practices in Jordan are effective and companies are not complying 
merely to mimic other companies. The findings of the study also highlight the effective role 
of the corporate governance mechanisms in ensuring high audit quality. However, some 
evidence could be explained by institutional theory. For example, frequency of boards of 
directors and audit committees’ meetings shows no effect on audit quality. This suggesting 
that more number of meetings might be unduly and, therefore, may not necessarily indicate 
board diligence. The number of conducted meetings may be just to simulate other firms or to 
meet the code recommendations. 
 
 
3.9. Conclusion 
A number of theories have been reviewed in the corporate governance literature. This chapter 
discussed the common and the most important theories in this field (Solomon, 2007; Mallin, 
2011) which are agency theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, resource dependence 
theory, institutional theory, and information acquiring theory. 
As the agency theory is the underlying rationale of corporate governance code, it can be 
concluded from the above discussion that the agency theory is the main perspective within 
which this research is being carried out. Though the agency theory is criticized as it presents 
a partial view of the world and ignores a complexity of organizations (Eisenhardt, 1989); it is 
still the dominant theoretical perspective adopted in the literature. It “has been the 
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predominant paradigm for understanding and explaining corporate governance issues” 
(Rubach and Sebora, 1998: 245). Furthermore, Adegbite et al., (2012: 397) concur stating 
agency theory “whilst its assumptions may be considered restrictive in cross-national 
application, they nevertheless remain absolutely valid and worthy precursors for conventional 
orientations towards corporate governance”. Thus, the agency theory continues to remain 
important as a starting point for any corporate governance discussions (Adegbite, 2010) and 
for building any corporate governance framework (Lubatkin et al., 2007). 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND AUDIT 
QUALITY- LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
Part one: Literature review and hypotheses development (first empirical 
model) 
 
4.1.1. Introduction 
 
This part covers a discussion of audit quality and its measurements, and a critical 
literature review in relation to corporate governance practices and audit quality, 
particularly boards of directors’ and audit committees’ characteristics. Discussion of 
the different ownership types in Jordan and their effect on audit quality has been 
presented. In addition, this chapter includes the hypotheses that are developed with 
respect to the first empirical model. 
 
4.1.2: corporate governance
7
 and audit quality 
 
4.1.2.1. Audit quality: its importance and measurements 
 
The agency problem that arises between owners and managers, due to information 
asymmetry between them, is the main motivation for external audit. External audit is 
an important requirement for any economic entity, and it is considered one of the 
corporate governance’s cornerstones (Cadbury, 1992). Audit purpose “…is to 
                                                          
7
 Boards of directors and audit committees as important corporate governance mechanisms  
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enhance the degree of confidence of intended users in the financial statements. This is 
achieved by the expression of an opinion by the auditor on whether the financial 
statements are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with an applicable 
financial reporting framework” (International Standard of Auditing (UK and Ireland) 
2004: 2).  
External audit function plays a significant role in corporate governance system as it 
bridges a gap between those who prepare financial information (management) and 
those who use it (shareholders). It is considered as a key monitoring device because it 
enhances the quality of financial statements, safeguards the shareholders’ interests, 
and helps the investors for their investment decisions and by giving them confidence 
about company’s status (Cohen et al., 2002; Habbash, 2010; Brown et al., 2011). 
Moreover, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that because of the agents act towards 
maximizing their own benefits even at the expense of principals and because of the 
information asymmetry between agents and principals, external auditors have a duty 
to convergence the principal- agent interests and to reduce the information asymmetry 
between them. Consequently, in case of large agency problem, it is expected that 
auditors will spend more effort in auditing activities (delivering higher audit quality).  
Francis et al. (1999); Becker et al. (1998) stated that as the accrual based accounting 
tempts managers to opportunistically manipulate financial statements, the main role of 
external auditors is to curb such opportunistic behaviour and to provide a credible 
auditing services for contracting and for outside shareholders. For this reason, agency 
theory is employed theoretically to legitimate the reason why external auditing is 
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essential in the modern economy (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Arnold and De Lange, 
2004; Sulaiman, 2011). 
External auditors also have a vital role in mitigating the principal- principal conflict 
not only the conventional principal- agent conflict. For instance, In developing 
countries where the companies are characterised by concentration ownership which in 
turn increases the agency problem, the external audit function would create 
confidence and assurance that the interests of minority shareholders are sufficiently 
protected from exploitation by controlling shareholders (Fan and Wong, 2005).  
The external audit function was imposed by regulations a long time ago (since 1900 in 
the UK and 1933 in the US) (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). In Jordan, the first 
Accounting Profession Law was enacted in 1961 (British code was used before). In 
1987, the Jordan Association for Certified of Public Accountant (JACPA) was 
established in order to improve the audit profession in Jordan. The law emphasized 
the independence and competency of auditors and rules for certified of public 
accountants. However, the JACPA did not have the power to impose IAS on 
companies or on its members until 1997 when Companies Law No. 22 of 1997, 
Securities Law No. 23 of 1997 have given consideration, authority and more power to 
JACPA. The audit environment became more regulated after enacting these 
regulations. These regulations require all listed companies to have their accounts 
audited by an independent auditor, and to disclose the annual audit fees in their annual 
financial reports. 
In Jordan, international accounting firms (Big 4 auditors) work through local affiliates, 
except Deloitte. Allied accountant is member of Earnest & Yung, Qawasmi & Co. is 
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member of KPMG, and Bawab & Co. is member of BwC. In addition to these firms, 
many local audit firms also play important role in Jordanian audit market. Obaidat 
(2007) documented that Jordanian auditors are complied with international standards 
of auditing (ISA). However the compliance level was different; the highest level of 
compliance was 90% regarding audit evidence and audit documentation standards, 
and lowest level of compliance was 70% which is regarding (the auditor’s 
responsibility to consider fraud in an audit of financial statements”. 
As previously noted, the audit function plays a vital role as an important part of the 
corporate governance mosaic. However, the effectiveness of the auditor role depends 
mainly on the audit quality provided. The audit quality concept has been defined in 
the literature from different perspectives. It can be defined as a process of detecting 
and reporting material misstatement (DeAngelo, 1981), the ability to detect and 
eliminate material misstatement (Davidson and Neu, 1993), and the ability of the 
auditor to provide precise information regarding corporate assets (Titman and 
Trueman, 1986). To assure financial reporting quality, DeFond and Zhang (2014) 
extended the definition of audit quality beyond the simple detection of accounting 
standards’ violations, to show how faithfully the financial statements reflect the firms’ 
underlying economics. Regardless of differences in the definitions of audit quality, 
there is no doubt about its importance in minimising agency costs and increasing 
investors’ confidence by enhancing the credibility of financial information.  
“A higher quality audit should improve the quality of financial reporting and reduce 
the risk of the auditor providing an incorrect audit opinion” (Goodwin‐Stewart and 
Kent, 2006: 387). High-quality accounting information has an important role in 
developing and increasing confidence in financial markets (Francis et al., 2003). 
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Therefore, it seems plausible to say that high-quality audit is an important component 
of well-functioning financial markets. 
Providing high-audit quality is function of two components; auditor incentives for 
independence and auditor competency (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). Auditor 
competency is related to auditor ability (auditor to be qualified) to supply high-quality 
audit. Auditor independence refers to auditor incentives that include reputation and 
litigation concerns (Dye, 1993; DeFond and Zhang, 2014). Jeong and Rho (2004) 
argued that when the institutional setting does not demand or is less interested in audit 
quality, auditors likely evade providing credible audit quality, so they exert less effort 
to curb management misbehaviour as well as possibly behaving opportunistically to 
retain/attract more clients. 
Audit regulations in Jordan play an important role in ensuring that auditors and 
competent and independent. According to the Certified Accounting Profession Law 
(2003), to be eligible to practice auditing, the person must have an academic degree, 
pass the professional exam
8
 (Jordan Certified Public Accountant JACPA exam), and 
must have seven years’ experience in auditing and accounting. Also, after being 
authorised, the auditor must attend training courses no less than 20 hours annually as 
continuous learning in order to keep pace with latest updates. Moreover, the 
regulations ban auditors to provide -at the same time- most of non-audit service for 
the same clients in order to maintain their independence.  
On the other hand, the litigation risk concern in Jordan is weak compared to 
developed contexts; and this decreases the auditor’s incentive to perform high audit 
                                                          
8
 Even those who have CPA or ACCA, they need to do the local exam in order to be certified auditor in 
Jordan. 
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quality. Investors in Jordan do not normally complain against auditors, and there are 
no common lawsuits cases against auditors (JACPA, 2015). This consequently 
increases importance of effective (competent) boards of directors and audit 
committees to ensure that the auditors are delivering credible audit quality. 
Furthermore, audit quality in Jordan obtained more attention at the end of the 1980s 
alongside starting the economic reform programme. At this period the government 
launched a privatisation programme, and the main aims are enhancing the efficiency 
and productivity of the targeted enterprises, creating a suitable environment for 
investment to attract the external investors, and strengthening the economy and 
financial market by this long-term investment (ASE, 2012). Later in 2008, the Jordan 
Securities Commission issued the Jordanian Code of Corporate governance (JCCG) 
with main targets also to increase confidence in the capital market by increased 
efficiency of their members (listed firms). Consequently, high audit quality is required 
to retain and attract investors, and to boost confidence in the financial market. This 
motivates this study to test whether the JCCG recommendations (regarding boards of 
directors and audit committees in particular) have any effect in improving audit 
quality (this has been translated to the first research question). 
In summary, it is difficult to assess audit quality ex ante because the amount of 
assurance provided by auditors is unobservable. The only observable outcome of the 
audit process is a common form of audit reports and most of  these reports are 
standard clean opinions (Francis, 2004). Therefore, an important development in audit 
quality research is based on the premise that ‘differences’ in audit quality exist and 
can be measured by comparing different classes of auditors, their industry 
specialisation, or level of audit fees (Francis, 2004). Therefore, as most commonly 
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found in the literature, DeFond and Zhang (2014) categorised audit quality models 
into: auditor-specific characteristics such as auditor size (captured by Big N audit 
firms) and industry specialisation, and auditor–client contracting features such as 
audit fees. These models are discussed below. 
 
4.1.2.1. Audit fees 
 
The amount of fees paid to the external auditors is largely used in a high-profile 
literature as an indication of audit quality (O'Sullivan, 2000; Felix Jr and Gramling, 
2001; Carcello et al., 2002; Abbott et al., 2003; Goodwin‐Stewart and Kent, 2006; 
Singh and Newby, 2010; Zaman et al., 2011).  
Theory predicts that higher audit effort increases the probability of detected errors 
(Shibano, 1990; Matsumura and Tucker, 1992; Dye, 1993), implying an adverse 
correlation between audit effort and financial reports’ restatements. Shibano (1990) 
developed a model which connects audit quality to the likelihood of misstatements. 
His model demonstrates that the auditor can increase the likelihood of detected 
misstatements through higher audit effort. Thus, the robust models that are developed 
by Dye (1993) and Hillegeist (1999) suggest that auditors who exert more auditing 
efforts are more likely to detect earnings management and generate high-quality 
financial statements.  
Testing the association between audit fees and audit effort is likely to aid the 
understanding of quality ((Johnson et al., 2002; Srinidhi and Gul, 2007). It is 
reasonable to argue that when an external auditor charges a premium fee to a client 
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this will be associated with a better quality of services provided (Palmrose, 1986). 
This is supported by Hribar et al. (2014) who tried to develop a measure of 
accounting quality based on audit fees, and concluded that audit fees can be used to 
provide a reliable measure of a firm’s accounting quality. 
High level of audit fee implies higher audit quality, ceteris paribus, which is either 
through more audit effort exerted (i.e. more audit hours) or through greater expertise 
of the auditor (higher billing rates) (Francis, 2004). As audit effort is the dominant 
factor priced in audit fees (Mande and Son, 2015), this makes audit fees a reliable 
indicator of audit quality because higher fees indicate that the auditor worked more 
hours, signalling greater effort (Eshleman and Guo, 2014; Zhang and Yu, 2016). 
Sampaio et al., (2015) investigates the relationship between audit fees and quality of 
the audit services rendered to the 300 Brazilian firms in the period between 2009 and 
2012. Their findings confirmed that audit fees is a reliable measure of audit quality, 
and in particular they stated that more aggressive earnings management is related to 
lower audit fees paid to auditors. 
Moreover, In his study, O’Sullivan (2000) used the amount of the audit fee as a proxy 
for audit quality as the quality of a company’s audit is not observable. He justified this 
proxy as it is reasonable to expect that more audit investigation will require more 
audit hours and/or the use of more specialised audit staff — resulting in higher fees. 
Further, the link between audit quality and fees has been raised both by Cadbury 
(1992) and the Chartered Accountants’ Joint Ethics Committee (1993) — both reports 
warning against the likelihood that audit quality may be compromised by low fees. 
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In support of the above views, Lynn Turner (2005)
9
, former Chief Accountant at the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), wrote: 
Certainly throughout the 1980s and 1990s, corporations, sometimes with the 
assistance of their audit committees, twisted the arms of independent auditors 
to reduce their audit fees. Our experience includes corporations who 
competitively bid their independent audit work solely to reduce their fees well 
below levels that could generate a reasonable return for the auditors. In turn, 
the audit firms reduced the level of work they needed to perform in their role 
as gatekeepers for investors. Inevitably inferior audits resulted. 
 
There is also empirical evidence supporting this argument in the literature. Prior 
research confirms that larger audit fees reflect high audit quality through greater audit 
effort (Caramanis and Lennox, 2008; Zaman et al., 2011; Carcello et al., 2002; Abbott 
et al., 2003; Bliss, 2011; O’Sullivan, 2000). Audit fees level is correlated positively 
with more audit effort which influences the ability of the auditors to discover material 
misstatements (Elitzur and Falk, 1996; Frankel et al., 2002; Lobo and Zhao, 2013), 
constrains earnings management (Caramanis and Lennox, 2008; Blankley et al., 
2012), increases earnings response coefficients (ERCs) (Higgs and Skantz, 2006) and 
increases accrual quality (Su et al., 2007; Mande and Son, 2015). 
A study by Caramanis and Lennox (2008) examined the role of effort exerted by 
auditors in improving earnings’ quality. By analysing a database of hours worked by 
auditors on 9,738 audits in Greece between 1994 and 2002, their findings revealed 
that lower audit hours are associated with positive and larger abnormal accruals. Also, 
with lower audit effort, managers are more aggressive in managing earnings in order 
to meet or beat the earnings benchmark. The researchers summarised that lower audit 
effort gives managers an opportunity to aggressively manage their reported earnings.  
                                                          
9
 Comment letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission in 12/4/2005, p.5. Available at: 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/soxcomp/soxcomp-turner.pdf 
 
74 
 
Moreover, Eshleman and Guo (2014) examined whether audit fees are related to audit 
quality. By using a sample of 1,670 firm-year observations spanning 2000-2011, and 
employing a OLS regression, they examined the association between audit fees and 
the likelihood of firms using income-increasing discretionary accruals to meet or beat 
the consensus EPS forecast. Their findings reported that clients paying higher audit 
fees are significantly less likely to use discretionary accruals to meet or beat the 
consensus analyst forecast. 
Blankley, Hurtt, and MacGregor (2012) reported an adverse relationship between 
audit fees and the probability of financial statements’ restatement in the post-SOX 
years. This is consistent with auditors who obtain more fees performing more 
thorough audits, and thus leading to a lower probability of misstatements. This result 
is consistent with a study achieved by Lobo and Zhao (2013). By using the 
misstatement detection model and considering a sample of US annually and quarterly 
financial statements from 2000 to 2009, Lobo and Zhao (2013) after correcting 
misstatement risk bias, reported a robust negative relationship between audit fees and 
annual report restatements.  
Frankel, Johnson and Nelson (2002) analysed a set of data collected from 3,074 proxy 
statements filed with the SEC between February 5, 2001, and June 15, 2001 to 
examine whether auditor fees are associated with earnings management in particular. 
They found that audit fees level is adversely correlated with earning management. 
The result is confirmed by (Larcker and Richardson, 2004) which reported that 
accrual is negatively related to total audit fees.  
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The most recent empirical evidence about the relationship between audit fees and 
accrual quality10 is a study by Mande and Son (2015). By estimating accruals quality 
using an industry-level pooled cross-sectional model for a large sample consisting of 
25,470 firm-year observations, Mande and Son (2015) confirmed the results reported 
by  Srinidhi and Gul (2007), showing that in the pre-SOX years, higher audit fees 
denoting higher effort imply higher accruals quality. This finding also stays 
significant in the post-SOX years but in less strength.  
Li and Ma (2015) tested the relationship between audit fees and accounting 
misstatements in China where auditors’ legal liability is essentially weak. Using the 
misstatements from annual reports of listed firms between 2001 and 2010, their result 
showed that current year audit fees are negatively and significantly associated with 
the probability of current year financial statements being misstated. This result is in 
line with prior research which is mainly from the US. This indicates that higher audit 
fees can also reflect audit effort in a context where no strong litigation risks exist.  
On the other side, large audit fees paid may make auditors more economically 
dependent on their clients and affect their independence (Magee and Tseng, 1990; 
Becker et al., 1998). Such financial dependency may create a relationship whereby 
the auditors become reluctant to make proper inquiries during the audit process due to 
their fear of losing highly profitable fees (Hoitash et al., 2007). Low audit fees might 
not reflect lower audit quality because the statutory audit service might be used as a 
“loss-leader” in order to gain a higher profit margin on non-audit fees (Hillison and 
Kennelley, 1988). Also, audit fees levels may reflect the negotiation power between 
                                                          
10 The authors used ‘accruals quality’ and ‘audit quality’ interchangeably throughout the paper. 
They relied on the direct link reported between high quality audits and high quality accruals by 
Caramanis and Lennox (2008), Dechow et al. (2011) and Gunny and Zhang (2013). 
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audit firms and their clients rather than audit quality (Asthana and Boone, 2012), or 
reflect litigation (and reputation) risk premium (DeFond and Zhang, 2014).  
However, Lin and Hwang (2010: 70) carried out a meta-analysis study about the 
relationship between audit quality and earnings management. They analysed 48 prior 
studies, published in high profile journals, and stated that there is strong evidence 
suggesting that as the audit fees increases, the benefit of the greater audit efforts 
outweighs the potential adverse outcomes i.e. economic bond or independence 
impairment. They further concluded that “the results seems to be consistent with the 
notion that when the auditor provides a better quality of audit, as reflected in a higher 
audit fee, earnings management is less likely”. 
In summary, there is a clear evidence that higher audit fees are indicative of greater 
auditor effort and thus a credible audit quality. Conversely, low audit fees level 
denotes less audit work and, hence, lower audit quality. Also, Increasing audit effort 
is a way auditors can respond to a heightened risk of financial reports misstatements 
and earnings management (Francis and Krishnan 1999; Eshleman and Guo, 2014; 
Blankley, Hurtt, and MacGregor, 2012). This view is echoed by the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), which targets firms with low audit fees 
relative to other firms in the same industry, when deciding which external audit firms 
to review (Bockwoldt, 2010 cited in Eshleman and Guo, 2014). The PCAOB assumes 
that companies that pay low audit fees receive low-quality audits. Finally, the audit 
fee model typically shows greater explanation power (well-specified with R-square 
exceeding 70%), which decreases concerns about correlated omitted variables (Ghosh 
and Tang, 2015). 
77 
 
 
4.1.2.2. Size of audit firms 
 
The relationship between the size of audit firm and audit quality has been widely 
investigated. A number of prior empirical evidence supported the view that the Big N 
audit firms provide higher quality audits (DeAngelo, 1981; Palmrose, 1988; Krishnan 
and Schauer, 2000; Fuerman, 2004; Al-Ajmi, 2009; Francis and Yu, 2009).  
Big N audit firms have ability and incentive to deliver a high audit quality because 
they have greater reputations to protect and high litigation risk in case of audit failure 
(Francis, 2004). When these audit firms have 'more to lose' from supplying a lower-
than-promised level of audit quality, clients properly use size as a quality surrogate 
(DeAngelo, 1981; Francis, 2004; Khurana and Raman, 2004). Sulaiman (2011) stated 
that big N audit firms tend to be more conservative in their work because they have 
more incentives to reduce litigation risk which also protects their reputation. 
Moreover, Big N audit firms have adequate human and technology resources which 
increase their ability of more intensive and powerful audit tests. Also, Big N audit 
firms are more independent of their client (DeAngelo, 1981) and have a high standard 
control system (Khurana and Raman, 2004; Francis, 2004). All these factors help in 
delivering high-quality audit. 
A number of prior studies results support the hypothesis that Big N auditors are 
associated with a lower incidence of earnings management (Becker et al., 1998; Kim 
et al., 2003), and more accurate earnings forecasts (Vinten et al., 2005; Lee et al., 
2006). In contrast, some studies did not find significant difference between audit firms’ 
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size and reported discretionary accruals (Jeong and Rho, 2004; Maijoor and 
Vanstraelen, 2006). 
However, studies conducted in the Belgian context (Vander Bauwhede et al., 2003; 
Bauwhede and Willekens, 2004) did not support quality differentiation between Big-4 
and non-Big-4 auditors. Also, Jeong and Rho (2004) used data from a sample of 2117 
firm-year observations from Korean listed firms from 1994 to 1998 to examine 
whether Big 6 audit firms provide better audit quality than non-Big 6 audit firms. The 
results show that there is no difference in audit quality between the Big and non-Big 
audit firms in such economic environments. Jeong and Rho (2004) concluded that Big 
6 audit firms do not have enough motivation to provide credible audit quality when 
litigation risk is low. Thus, It seems that the institutional setting e.g. risk of litigation 
(Sundgren and Svanström, 2013) influences whether audit quality differentiation 
exists between large and small audit firms. 
In addition, Lawrence et al. (2011) tried to tackle the issue by examining whether 
disparities between audit quality proxies among large and small firms are actually 
affected by the audited firms’ characteristics. They concluded “that Big-4 audit 
quality is not considerably higher than that of non-Big-4 auditors”. Also, Idris (2012) 
studied earning management in manufacturing firms listed on the Amman Stock 
Exchange over the period 2005–2008, and he reported that Big-4 audit offices do not 
have a significant effect in reducing abnormal accruals.  
On the other hand, Big N audit firms have been criticised as an indication of high-
audit quality for different reasons. First, as the litigation risk concern is an important 
motivation for Big N audit firms to deliver high-quality audit; it is not a strong 
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motivation in Jordan where the litigation risk is low, compared to the Common Law 
contexts where shareholders benefit from easier lawsuit opportunities. Investors in 
Jordan do not normally complain against auditors, and there are no common cases that 
went through court (JACPA, 2015). Consistent with this, Piot and Janin (2007) stated 
that low litigation risk increases the tolerance of Big N audit firms toward 
opportunistic accounting practice, and “they do not have to handle this litigation 
threat by adopting a more conservative attitude with respect to earnings management”.  
Second, as common in developing countries, Big-4 firms tend to operate through local 
partnership firms (Siddiqui et al., 2013). In Jordan, Big-4 auditors are local affiliates 
of Big-4 international firms, except Deloitte. These audit firms may not have the same 
quality control standards as the Big-4. At the same time, there are local audit firms 
comply with high audit quality standards, for instance Arab Professional Auditors, 
Abbasi Co, Abu Ghazaleh, and Ghosheh for auditing (JACPA, 2013).  
Third, Big-4 (affiliated) firms in Jordan do not have a substantial market share relative 
to developed countries
11
, as only 35% of the listed non-financial companies are 
audited by the Big-4 affiliates (37% of the sample used in this study is audited by Big-
4/affiliates). This indicates that Big-4 firms do not dominate the market or play a 
substantial role. Simunic (2003) mentioned that Big N may not be of higher quality in 
contexts that are characterised by low litigation risk, and in which the Big N are not 
major players. 
                                                          
11
 For instance, more than 97% of the UK FTSE 350 is audited by the Big-4 (Nehme, 2013). 
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Fourth, using the Big-4 and non-Big-4 dichotomy
12
 fails to capture quality variation 
for a large number of firms as the prior relevant studies suggest a similar level of audit 
quality exists in each category. In the case of Jordan, how can we differentiate the 
audit quality provided by non-Big-4 firms to 63% of non-financial firms from that 
that provided by the Big-4 to 37% of these firms? Consistent with this, Defond and 
Zhang (2014) pointed out that the major drawback of using Big N as a discrete 
measure is the inability to capture subtle differences in the demand for audit quality. 
Moreover, Arnett and Danos (1979) argued that as long as professional standards are 
maintained, it is unfair to arbitrarily differentiate between the large N auditors and 
other auditors. 
Fifth, Simunic (2003) revisited the issue of audit quality and its association with large 
audit firms and he raised many concerns. He mentioned that there is no direct 
evidence – based on studies of audit production – of quality differences between big 
firms vs. non-big firms. How do processes of big firm audit differ from those of non-
big firms? And at the same time the large corporate failures (e.g. Enron, Worldcom, 
Arthur Andersen, etc.) have largely involved the big audit firms. Simunic further 
added “the argument underlying a constant expected audit quality for an audit firm 
assumes limited information about an audit. Other credible information about a 
specific audit available to users makes auditor brand name less important e.g. audit 
fees (where disclosed) might also be a good proxy for audit quality. Also, both Big-4 
and non-Big-4 firms significantly reduce their total audit effort when subject to severe 
time and fee pressure from the client”.  
                                                          
12 
The vast majority of previous studies employed Big-4 and non-Big-4 are dichotomous. Few studies 
used the number of clients (Choi, Kim, Kim, Zang, 2010) and total fees received by each audit firm 
(John Daniel Eshleman and Peng Guo, 2014; Choi et al., 2010; Francis and Yu, 2009) as proxies of 
audit firms’ size. For this current study, the researcher tried to obtain this kind of information (number 
of clients or fees) but they were inaccessible in Jordan. 
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4.1.2.3. Auditors’ industry specialisation 
 
A specialist auditor is defined as a firm that has “differentiated itself from its 
competitors in terms of market share within a particular industry” (Neal and Riley Jr, 
2004: 170). The industry specific knowledge is addressed by the literature as an 
indication of audit quality based on the rationale that the specialist auditors possess a 
strong knowledge of a particular client industry which helps them in making 
appropriate judgments, and is in turn translated to higher audit quality. 
The results of prior literature suggest that the auditor’s industry specialisation 
increases audit quality, improving the accuracy of error detection (Solomon et al., 
1999; Owhoso et al., 2002), decrease the likelihood of earning management 
(Basiruddin, 2011), increase disclosure quality (Dunn and Mayhew, 2004) and 
enhance the quality of auditor’s risk assessment and improve audit-planning (Taylor, 
2000; Low, 2004). 
Furthermore, Balsam et al. (2003) and Krishnan (2003) linked auditor industry 
specialization with a reduction in earnings management. These studies concluded that 
lower discretionary accruals are found to be lower with clients audited by industry 
specialists than the clients of non-specialist auditors. This is indicating that industry 
specialist auditors play a role in reducing earnings management and curbing managers’ 
opportunistic behaviour. 
On the other hand, the industry specialisation model suffers from a number of 
limitations. First, this model is typically measured dichotomously, which implicitly 
assumes a homogeneous level of audit quality provided within each category. 
Consequently, though it differentiates quality between audit firms based on their 
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market share in each particular industry, industry specialisation fails to capture 
relatively subtle variations in audit quality (Clarkson and Simunic, 1994; DeFond and 
Zhang, 2014). Second, there is a lack of consensus on auditor industry specialisation’s 
measurement (Neal and Riley, 2004), suggesting that specialisation measures quality 
of audit service with a relatively large measurement error (Defond and Zhang, 2014). 
For instance, it is not clear whether the advantages of industry specialisation are 
coming from auditing a large number of clients or a few large clients (Balsam et al., 
2003). Third, an audit firm may have extensive industry experience even when its 
within-industry market share is small relative to other audit firms (Minutti-Meza, 
2013). 
Contextually, the Big-4 offices in Jordan are auditing 43 firms out of the study sample 
115 firms, with other local audit firms sharing in 72 firms. It was clear while 
collecting the data manually that no particular audit firm(s) is (are) dominant in a 
particular industrial (or sub-industrial) category, nor any of them have large market 
share at a level that helps to make this audit firm industry expertise. Thus, the industry 
specialisation model seems to be not relevant to a small market like Jordan as it will 
give unreliable outcomes.  
 
4.1.2.4. Accruals 
 
Accruals are used widely in the literature as a source of earning management. 
Accruals, or discretionary accruals, in particular, are used as an indication of earning 
manipulation conducted by managers (Jones, 1991). Total accrual which is the most 
common measure is calculated “as the change in non-cash working capital before 
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income tax payable less total depreciation expenses. The change in non-cash working 
capital before taxes is defined as the change in current assets other than cash and 
short-term investments less current liabilities other than current maturities of long-
term liabilities and income tax payable” (Jones, 1991: 207). 
Discretionary accruals are associated with Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Releases (Dechow et al., 1996), and thus capture the increased possibility of more 
severe misstatements (Defond and Zhang, 2014). Defond and Zhang (2014: 288) 
reported that the advantage of using accruals proxy “is that their continuous nature 
captures variations in audit quality even in studies that are restricted to relatively 
small samples, and within the subset of clients who do not have egregiously poor 
audit quality. This contrasts with other output measurements, whose infrequent 
occurrence requires large samples, and whose discrete nature masks any variation in 
audit quality among clients without restatements and going concern”. 
On the other hand, the common disadvantage of this reporting quality measures is that 
it tends to have high measurement error. For instance, absolute accrual can range from 
4% to10% of total assets, on average, relying on the estimation model and included 
sample (Gul et al., 2009), that looks too large to be plausibly justified by earnings 
management alone. Furthermore, there is little consensus on how these proxies should 
be measured. For example, accruals can be measured using an absolute value, 
assigned value, the Jones model, the modified Jones model, and/or performance 
matching (Defond and Zhang, 2014). 
In conclusion, input-based proxies (audit fees, audit firms and industry specialisation) 
are more appropriate when we consider demand-side of audit quality. On the other 
84 
 
words, effective directors for instance are expected to “demand” higher audit quality. 
Defond and Zhang (2014) further mentioned that the input based proxies (e.g. audit 
fees) are more appealing because clients must choose audit quality based on 
observable inputs. This is rationale behind why empirical research examining the 
effects of demand-side factors employs input based proxies. Output-based proxies, 
however, “are constrained by firms’ innate characteristics and confounded by the 
reporting system. Thus, to use these proxies, it is important to control for client innate 
characteristics and internal controls over financial reporting in isolating the effects of 
audit quality” (Defond and Zhang, 2014). 
Ultimately, Simunic (2003) concluded that the better way to know the effectiveness of 
audit firms in delivering high quality is to know what incentives are behind this. From 
their survey’s results obtained from relevant Jordanian participators, Al-Khaddash et 
al. (2013) concluded, in their survey, that Jordanian auditees should provide high fees 
as an incentive for auditors to enable them to do better work, and to be satisfied and 
comfortable. They further mentioned that if an auditor who receives high fees delivers 
poor audit quality; this makes him lose face and feel shame. In conclusion, measuring 
audit quality is still a controversial task because there are different views as to what 
constitutes higher-quality audit. Though the Big-4 firms’ model provides an 
indication about audit quality as reported by prior research, the audit fees model is 
preferable in a context like Jordan (given the above discussion). Therefore, based on 
the above discussion, the study follows prior high profile research, and considers the 
contextual situation by employing audit fees as a superior model to capture audit 
quality within the Jordanian environment.  
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Finally, the study’s questionnaire survey provided the opportunity to corroborate the 
use of audit fees as a proxy for audit quality in Jordan compared to the other measures 
discussed above (as presented in Table 7.4). Most of the respondents (71.3% of the 
board directors; 78.5% of audit committee members and 73% of auditors) agreed 
about this proxy in the Jordanian context.  
 
4.1.3. Board of Directors and audit quality 
 
The first research question addresses the impact of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms on audit quality measured by audit fees. Board of directors and audit 
committees are the most important corporate governance tools. The following section 
discusses board of directors and audit quality. Another internal corporate governance 
pillar; audit committee is discussed in section 4.1.2.3.2.   
The board of directors and its quality have received increasing attention by 
researchers in recent years. The board of directors is essential in the corporate 
governance process, it is described as a lynchpin (Gillan, 2006), and as a main central 
mechanism (Daily et al., 2003) for the organizations’ governance system. Boards of 
directors have the ultimate responsibility for the functioning of the firm (Jensen, 
1993), as their role includes a broad range of duties, powers, and responsibilities. 
As an essential component in corporate structure, boards of directors in Jordan are 
responsible for “(a) setting strategies, policies, plans and procedures that realize the 
objectives of the company, serve its interests, and maximize the rights of its 
shareholders, (b) setting necessary procedures to ensure that all shareholders, 
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including non-Jordanians, enjoy their full rights and that they are treated in justice and 
equality without any discrimination, (c) taking necessary measures to ensure 
compliance with the laws in force, (d) organizing the company's financial, accounting 
and administrative affairs by means of special internal regulations, … (g) Setting the 
company’s disclosure and transparency policy, and overseeing its implementation in 
accordance with the requirements of the regulatory authorities and the laws in 
force, … and (j) appointing the company's general manager and terminating his 
services” (Jordan Corporate Governance Code, 2008: 9). 
Therefore, a high quality board effectively achieves its monitoring, controlling, and 
advisory duties in order to maintain the company’s value and protect the shareholders’ 
interests. A number of prior studies presented its fruitful role in different corporate 
aspects. For instance, the effective board reduces probability of financial statements 
fraud (Beasley, 1996), reduces the likelihood of earning manipulation (Dechow et al., 
1996), strengthens the internal control system (Dechow et al., 1996, Tsui et al., 2001, 
and Messier, 2000), affects capital structure and  increases the financial return 
(Rechner and Dalton, 1991), reduces opportunistic managerial behaviour and 
expropriation of firm resources (Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Yatim et al., 2006), 
decreases cost of debt and increases the reporting integrity (Anderson et al., 2004).  
Moreover, given that the agency theory assumes the divergence/conflict in interests 
between owners (principals) and managers (agents) in the publicly traded companies, 
and this conflict, in turn, may affect companies’ value and owners’ wealth; boards of 
directors play a vital “controlling & monitoring role” in order to mitigate this conflict 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Also, (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2001) consider board of 
directors as an important part of the “market solution” to the agency problem by 
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alignment the interests of all related parties in organizations especially between 
managers and owners. 
One of the important roles of the board is “monitoring of what top management 
does,…, the monitoring of managerial actions can, in part, be seen as part of a board’s 
obligation to be vigilant against managerial malfeasance. Yet, being realistic, it is 
difficult to see a board actually being in a position to detect managerial malfeasance 
directly; at best, a board would seem dependent on the actions of outside auditors, 
regulators, and, in some instances, the news media. Indirectly, a board might guard 
against managerial malfeasance through its choice of auditor, its oversight over 
reporting requirements, and its control over accounting practices” (Adams et al., 2010: 
65). 
Therefore, boards of directors are expected to play a significant role in ensuring 
higher audit quality, as well as monitoring and facilitating the external auditors’ 
works. The relationship between boards of directors and external auditors is derived 
mainly from the following: first, given that the boards of directors have an oversight 
role over auditing and financial reporting processes, the external auditors provide a 
high quality audit in order to satisfy the boards’ expectations and to maintain a good 
relationship with their clients (Carcello et al., 2002 and Beasley, 1996). Second, the 
board of directors asks for high audit quality to maintain shareholders’ interests and to 
protect their reputations, i.e. approving untruthful financial statements can destroy 
directors’ reputation (Carcello et al., 2002). Finally, the board of directors (and audit 
committee) review the audit work and scope, and they have ultimate authority to 
select, evaluate, and where appropriate, replace the external auditor (Blue Ribbon 
Committee, 1999). 
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Boards of directors normally include a mix of executive and non-executive directors. 
Executive directors are those who work in the organisation as full-time employees, 
whereas non-executives refer to those who are not employed in the organisation and 
have no business relation with the organisation (Adams et al., Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992; 2010; He and Sommer, 2010).   
Each type of director is important for the survival of firms. Independent non-
executive directors are decision experts, they are very keen to protect shareholders’ 
interests, they have incentives to effectively monitor the management in order to 
protect their reputations, and they play an essential role in mitigating the agency 
problem between management and shareholders (Fama & Jensen,1983 and Vafeas & 
Theodorou, (1998). Moreover, “Non-executive directors should scrutinise the 
performance of management in meeting agreed goals and objectives, and monitor the 
reporting of performance. They should satisfy themselves on the integrity of financial 
information and that financial controls and systems of risk management are robust and 
defensible.” (The UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010: 10). 
On the other hand, because executive directors are full time employees and they are 
well-informed, they have more knowledge and technical expertise than outside 
directors (Beasley, 1996; Muth and Donaldson, 1998), and they act as an information 
link between external directors and management (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998). 
Raheja (2005) mentioned that although the executive directors are an important 
information source for board of directors, they may weaken the monitoring role and 
distort firms’ objectives due to their private interests and lack of independence. 
Ultimately, the mix of experts, valuable information, independence and objectivity in 
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the boards strengthen the corporate governance system and increase the value of the 
firms (Byrd and Hickman, 1992 and Beasley, 1996). 
The Jordan Corporate Governance Code (2008) highlights the importance of the 
mixture of these types of directors, and recommends that one-third of directors should 
be independent non-executives.  The Jordanian code defines independent director as 
“a member not tied to the company or any of its upper executive management, 
affiliate companies, or its external auditors by any financial interests or relationships 
other than his shareholding in the company that may be suspected to bring that 
member benefit, whether financial or incorporeal, or that may affect his/ her decisions 
or lead to exploitation of his/ her position with the company”.  
Based on the Code, the board member loses his independence in any of the following 
cases: “If he is, or has been, employed by the company or any of its affiliates during 
the last three years preceding his nomination for membership of the board of directors; 
If he or any of his relatives has direct or indirect interest in the contracts, projects and 
engagements signed with the company or any of its affiliates to the value of JD 
50,000 or more; If the member or any of his relatives is a partner of the company's 
auditor, or if he is or has been a partner or employee of the company's external auditor 
during the last three years preceding his nomination for membership of the board; or 
If the member has a control in the company of more than 10% of the company's 
capital”. 
 
4.1.2.2.1.1. Board of directors and audit quality: prior empirical evidence 
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Research done in this area revealed the important role played by the board of directors 
and examined different board characteristics (board of directors’ independence, CEO 
duality, board size, board ownership, board diligence and board diversity), as a 
measurable proxy for its effectiveness.  
Carcello et al. (2002: 381) examined the relationship between three board 
characteristics (independence, frequency of meetings, and the number of directorships) 
and audit fees for Fortune 1000 companies for one year ended in March 1993. By 
considering the Big 6 clients only, their regression revealed a positive relationship 
between all board characteristics and audit fees. They have indicated that “more 
independent, diligent, and expert boards seeking to protect their reputation capital, to 
avoid legal liability, and to promote shareholder interests by purchasing differentially 
higher-quality audit services. The auditor’s cost of providing such services are 
incorporated into the audit fee”.  
O'Sullivan (1999) examined post-Cadbury, whether corporate governance initiatives 
impact the statutory audit fee paid by large UK companies, and particularly they were 
interested whether board and audit committee compositions (board independence, role 
duality, and audit committee size) affect the audit fees. By examining the largest 146 
UK firms at the end of 1995; their results showed evidence of no significant 
relationship between board composition, audit committee composition, and audit fees.  
O’Sullivan (2000) examined the impact of board composition (independence and role 
duality) and ownership concentration on audit quality in the UK prior to the adoption 
of the recommendations of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance (Cadbury, 1992). Using data from a sample of 402 listed firms at the end 
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of 1992, they found that the proportion of non-executive directors are positively 
related to audit fee levels, and found no relationship between large blockholders or 
role duality on audit fees. This outcome suggests that a greater proportion of non-
executive representation leads to more extensive audit work which in turn is expected 
to result in more trustworthy financial statements. 
By exploring their role in assuring the quality of earnings, Klein (2002) examined the 
effect of audit committee and board characteristics on earnings management. Using a 
sample of 692 publicly traded US firm-years, Klein (2002) findings showed a 
negative relationship between audit committee independence, board independence 
and abnormal accruals. She stated that any reductions in board of directors or audit 
committee independence are accompanied by large increases in abnormal accruals, 
and overall greater board and audit committee independence are more effective in 
monitoring the quality of the financial accounting process. 
Tsui et al. (2001) tested the role of independent directors as an effective monitoring 
mechanism (measured by audit fees), and further examined whether the role of 
growth opportunities moderate the relationship between independent directors and 
audit fees. Using data from a sample of 1038 quoted firms in Hong Kong in the years 
1994 to 1996; they found that audit fees are negatively related to board independence. 
They argue that a situation where the directors are less independent makes them more 
dominated by executives, and this has an adverse impact on the reliability of the 
accounting system, which in turn results in higher control risk. A higher control risk, 
at the same time, will result in intensive audit work and consequently will be 
translated into higher audit fees. Moreover, they found that the firms’ growth 
opportunities decrease the monitoring effectiveness that is provided by independent 
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directors, and therefore weaken the adverse correlation between independent boards 
and audit fees. 
Bliss (2011) examined whether audit fees have a positive relationship with board 
independence and whether CEO duality affects this relationship. Utilising a sample of 
950 Australian non-financial firms in 2003, Bliss found a positive correlation between 
board independence and audit fees as more independent directors demand higher audit 
quality in order to fulfil their monitoring role. However, he did not find this 
correlation in firms with CEO duality, which implies that the dominant CEO 
compromises/decreases the board’s independence. This effect of role duality is 
previously highlighted by the Cadbury report (1992, article 4.6), which stated that a 
conflict of interest may arise when the CEO plays the chairman role at the same time, 
which consequently compromises the effectiveness of non-executive directors.  
From the Malaysian context, Yatim et al. (2006) employed a cross-sectional 
regression of 736 listed firms for the year ending in 2003. The purpose of their study 
was to examine the association between board of directors and audit committee 
characteristics and external audit fees. The study also examined whether Bumiputera-
controlled firms pay higher audit fees. The results showed a significant positive 
relationship between external audit fees and board independence, audit committee 
expertise, and the frequency of audit committee meetings. Further, the study found a 
strong negative association between audit fees and Bumiputera-owned firms. 
Moreover, the literature also showed empirical evidence regarding the role of boards 
in different aspects such as financial statement fraud (Beasley, 1996), financial 
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disclosure quality (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005), earning management (Salihi, 2015), 
and financial performance (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). 
Beasley (1996) examined the relationship between independent board members and 
financial statement fraud. He used a logit regression analysis of 75 fraud and 75 no-
fraud firms from the US and found firms which have boards with significantly higher 
percentages of independent members have less financial statement fraud than other 
firms; however, the presence of an audit committee does not have any significant 
impact on the likelihood of financial statement fraud. Further, the findings from 
Vafeas (2005), who used data on 252 US firms between 1994 and 2000, revealed that 
audit committee and board structure are related to financial reporting quality, but the 
relationship was not strong. 
Haniffa et al. (2006) examined 97 Malaysian listed firms over the period 2002 to 2003 
to investigate to what extent board of directors and audit committee effectiveness 
reduces earnings management. Using a cross‐sectional modified version of Jones 
model, where abnormal working capital accruals are used as a proxy for earnings 
management, the findings showed that earnings management is positively related to 
the number of board members, which indicates that larger boards appear to be 
ineffective in their monitoring duties relative to smaller boards. An insignificant 
relationship between independence of board and audit committee and earnings 
management was also reported, which also suggests that these mechanisms may not 
be effective in their monitoring role. The study further found that ethnicity has no 
effect in mitigating earnings management. 
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From the Nigerian market, Salihi (2015) studied the effect of board of directors and 
audit committee size on earnings management. Using multiple linear regressions, a 
sample of 29 companies in the consumer sector of the Nigerian stock exchange were 
analysed over the period 2010 to 2013. Inconsistent with Haniffa, Abdul Rahman, and 
Ali (2006), the findings showed that audit committee size has a significant negative 
effect on earnings management, and there is no impact of large board size indicating 
that a larger board of directors is not efficient to reduce the tendency of managing 
earnings in the Nigerian environment. 
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, none of the previous literature has tackled 
the impact of any corporate governance dimensions on audit quality in the Jordanian 
context. However, Abed et al. (2012) examined the effectiveness of boards of 
directors’ characteristics (including independence, size, and duality) on earning 
management. By utilizing 81 listed firms in the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) for 
the period from 2006 to 2009 and applying cross-sectional modified version of Jones’ 
model, their results generally showed no significant relationship between corporate 
governance factors. The researchers stated that the corporate governance practices 
have just started in Jordan, therefore, companies need more time to comply 
adequately with the new regulations, which in turn may affect the generalizability of 
the results. 
In summary, the evidence from literature generally highlights the role of boards of 
directors in many corporate aspects and in enhancing audit quality in particular. 
However, the existing literature revealed inconsistent results about its effectiveness in 
ensuring high-quality audit. Furthermore, the vast majority of the relevant literature is 
conducted in UK and US contexts which are institutionally different from other 
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contexts and from the context of this study in particular. The age of the employed data, 
sample size, and the single-equation approaches in most of the existing literature 
represent further limitations of their conclusions. See the table 4.1 at the end of this 
chapter and literature gap section which clearly differentiate this study from the 
existing literature. 
 
4.1.2.2.1.2.   Board of directors and audit quality: hypotheses development 
 
The Jordan Corporate Governance Code (2008) prescribes a number of characteristics 
for the structure of board of directors. Most important recommended attributes are 
addressed by this study. First, JCGC (2008) emphasizes the importance of board of 
directors and its independence. It recommends that one-third of directors at least 
should be independent in order to carry out effective monitoring away from 
management pressure. This is consistent with Cohen et al., (2002) who stated that 
primary characteristics for board members in the agency perspective are their 
independency from management.  
Second, JCGC (2008) recommends of chair-CEO separation. Having one person that 
holds both positions of chairman and CEO leads to a conflict of interests, as different 
tasks are assigned to each position. Jensen (1993) argues that it is crucial to separate 
the CEO and the chairperson positions for the board to ensure effective monitoring. 
Third, JCGC does not mandate a specific number of members that the board should 
include, instead, it offers a wide margin, and recommends that board size should be 
between three and thirteen. So given the ambiguous rule of board size, the study tends 
to find the consequences of large board size with regards to audit quality. Fourth, 
more frequent meetings may indicate a more active board, and may be used as a proxy 
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for the time directors have to monitor management (Vafeas, 1999). Finally, gender 
diversity in the board enhances board performance (Adams and Ferreira 2009). So the 
study expects that gender diversity in the board may contribute to audit quality.  
It is worth to mention that the following hypotheses (in addition to the hypotheses 
related to audit committee in section 4.2.3.2.2. are based on the Jordanian corporate 
governance code which is the only governance regulation in Jordan. As mentioned in 
the corporate governance section 2.3.5, this code (JCGC, 2008) mirrors the models in 
developed countries especially the UK and the US, without consideration given to the 
socio-cultural peculiarities of the Jordanian business environment. For example, the 
JCGC recommendations regarding board independence, role duality, board size, 
frequency of meetings are similar to the recommendation of Cadbury Report (1992), 
the UK combined Code of Corporate Governance (1998), Higgs Report (2003) in the 
UK, and also quite similar to section 101 of SOX in the USA. Moreover, the JCGC 
recommendations regarding audit committees’ structure are similar to the 
recommendations of Cadbury Report (1992), the UK combined Code of Corporate 
Governance (2003), and section 301 of SOX.  
After doing a review of the relevant literature, hypotheses will be proposed based on 
agency theory in particular, and causal relationships will be established between 
variables. The available literature makes it more natural to identify hypotheses based 
on the available literature and theories. Hence, after a careful analysis of the literature, 
hypotheses will be deduced and translated into operational terms (this applies for 
hypotheses development of audit committee and ownership structure as well). 
In the following sub-sections, this study presents hypotheses development of the 
aforementioned boards of directors’ features. 
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Board independence  
 
As the important objective of the board of directors is to ensure that management acts 
towards maximising shareholders wealth, the important characteristic for a board 
member in the agency perspective is independence from management (Cohen et al., 
2002). So independent directors are decision experts (Fama and Jensen, 1983), and do 
not have a financial interest in the company, nor they do have psychological ties to its 
management (Abbott et al., 2004; Boo and Sharma, 2008). Consequently, they are in 
a better position to objectively monitor and protect investors’ interests and firms’ 
value.   
 Fama and Jensen (1983) and Vefas and Theorden (1998) argued that independent 
directors play an essential role in mitigating the agency problem between 
management and shareholders. They also take their monitoring role seriously in order 
to protect shareholders’ interests, and to avoid potential litigation losses. Moreover, a 
number of empirical studies documented the role of independent directors in 
strengthening the internal control system, reducing financial statement fraud (Beasley 
1996), decreasing probability of earning management (Dechow et al., 1996), 
decreasing probability of financial reporting misstatement (Messier, 2000), and 
improving audit quality (O’Sullivan, 1999; Zaman et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, O’Sullivan (1999) and O Sullivan and Diacon (2002) explained that the 
external auditor can meet with independent directors away from management 
influence to discuss any issue regarding audit process. They further pointed out that 
independent directors focus, in their negotiation with the auditor, on audit scope rather 
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than on the audit fees in order to protect shareholders’ interest. Moreover, 
independent directors encourage more intensive audit work as a complement to their 
monitoring role, which thereby mitigates the agency problem. 
A number of studies have found a positive relationship between independent directors 
and the level of audit quality (O’Sullivan, 2000, Carcello et al., 2002, abbot et al., 
2003, and Bliss, 2011, Zaman et al., 2011). These studies consider the audit process 
as a complement function for their monitoring role, and they require higher audit 
quality to protect their reputation and to avoid legal responsibility.  
The Jordanian corporate governance code (JCGC) emphasized the necessity of 
independent NEDs, and it recommends that at least one-third of the board members 
should be independent members. Based on the JCGC, the board member loses his 
independence in any of the following cases: “If he is, or has been, employed by the 
company or any of its affiliates during the last three years preceding his nomination 
for membership of the board of directors; If he or any of his relatives has direct or 
indirect interest in the contracts, projects and engagements signed with the company 
or any of its affiliates to the value of JD 50,000 or more; If the member or any of his 
relatives is a partner of the company's auditor, or if he is or has been a partner or 
employee of the company's external auditor during the last three years preceding his 
nomination for membership of the board; or If the member has a control in the 
company of more than 10% of the company's capital”. 
Hence, based on the literature and agency theory proposition that raised the 
importance of board independence to control and monitor management and decrease 
the agency problem; this study proposes the following hypothesis: 
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H1: There is a significant positive relationship between the proportion of independent 
directors and audit quality. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Role duality 
 
Role duality means that the board chairman and CEO positions are occupied by the 
same person. As part of his/her responsibility, chairman hires, removes, and evaluates 
the CEO, and this creates the need for separating these two positions to ensure 
effective monitoring (Jensen, 1993). Therefore, it is difficult for the CEO/ chairman to 
do these functions objectively and away from his/her opportunistic behaviour, thus 
he/she needs to be controlled by an independent director.  
From the agency theory viewpoint, the CEO is responsible for implementing strategic 
decision (decision management role), whereas the board is responsible for monitoring 
and ratifying the CEO decisions (decision control role), so this may cause the CEO- 
without effective monitoring- to act towards maximising his/her own wealth and 
minimising his/her own risk even at the expense of shareholders (Boyd, 1995). 
Moreover, as the CEO controls the information given to the board, this prevents the 
board of directors from effectively monitoring and evaluating the CEO’s actions 
(Jensen, 1993).  
So the expected monitoring role of the directors is to curb managers’ misbehaviour 
and to compel them to produce high quality financial statements, as proposed by the 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Given this, existence of role duality may 
hamper ability of the boards of directors to exert effective monitoring, and this 
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therefore could negatively affect audit quality.  Moreover, the relationship between 
CEO domination and audit quality is based on the notion that CEO role duality is 
likely to result in a potential conflict situation, i.e. The CEO in such a case is 
monitoring his own decisions, and this consequently decrease the board's 
effectiveness to provide oversight over managerial decisions (Vance, 1983 and Tsui et 
al., 2001). This notion is highlighted by the JCGC (2008) and by the Cadbury report 
(1992, article 4.6), which stated that a conflict of interest may arise when the CEO 
plays the chairman role at the same time, which consequently compromises the 
effectiveness of non-executive directors. 
Previous studies (Carcello et al., 2002; Zaman et al., 2011; O’Sullivan, 2000) revealed 
inconsistent findings regarding the impact of duality on audit quality. Carcello et al., 
(2002) documented a positive relationship between the existence of role duality and 
audit fees as a proxy for audit quality. O’Sullivan (2000) reported that there is no 
relationship, whereas Zaman et al., (2011) showed a negative association.  
The JCGC (2008) highlights the importance of separating the CEO and chairman role 
to enhance board effectiveness, which consequently enhances audit quality. It 
recommends that it is not allowed for one person to hold the positions of chairman of 
the board of directors and any executive position simultaneously in the company.  
Thus, based on the agency theory’s propositions and given the dominant arguments in 
the literature; this study expects that the existence of role duality impedes board of 
directors from exerting effective monitoring. This is proposed in the following 
hypothesis:  
H2:  There is a significant negative relationship between role duality and audit quality. 
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Number of meetings 
 
Board meetings, as an indicator for board activity, are necessary for directors to carry 
out their duties effectively (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992), and to act towards maintaining 
shareholders’ interests (Vafeas, 1999). However, not all board meetings are beneficial. 
They may just repeat useless routine tasks, and may suffer from inefficient time 
management for directors’ dialogue (Vafeas, 1999). 
 
Since there is a meeting benefit (e.g. monitoring benefit) and there is a meeting-
related cost (e.g. meeting fees and preparing cost), Vafeas (1999) suggested that the 
firms should make a trade-off between costs and benefits of meetings frequency, and 
should determine the number of meetings efficiently, depending on their 
circumstances.  
 
The JCGC (2008) recommends that the board of directors should meet at least once 
every two months, provided that the number of meetings in the fiscal year should not 
be less than six. The recommendations of the governance code encourage board of 
directors to be more diligent and effective in monitoring management actions as well 
as the overall financial system. This is in line with the monitoring approach of the 
agency theory. More diligent boards hold high numbers of meetings, as they are very 
keen to obtain high audit quality in order to protect their reputation, to maintain firms’ 
value, (Abbott et al., 2003; Zaman et al., 2011; Rustam et al., 2013).  
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So, the results of the aforementioned studies and the recommendations of the JCGC 
suggest that board of directors that meet frequently are likely to be up to date of 
current auditing issues and more diligent in the discharge of their duties. This, 
therefore, implies that boards of directors can take proactive actions and positively 
influence audit quality. Therefore, based on the dominant arguments about the role of 
frequent board meetings, the hypothesis has been developed as follow: 
H3: There is a significant positive relationship between the frequency of board 
meeting and audit quality. 
 
 
 
Board size 
 
Many studies (Jensen, 1993; Linck et al., 2008; Jizi et al., 2013) discussed the 
importance of board size in organizations. Large board size has an unclear effect; in 
one view, large board size increases the board expertise and knowledge and leads to 
more monitoring effectiveness, and in turn it is advantageous as it improves financial 
performance (Adams and Mehran, 2011), and decreases cost of debt (Anderson et al., 
2004). 
The opposite view is that large boards tend to be ineffective and more likely to be 
controlled by management (Jensen, 1993). Moreover, large board size results in less 
meaningful dialogue between its members, which makes it difficult to express their 
opinions (Lipton and Lorcsh, 1992), less effective in monitoring management (Jizi et 
al., 2013), more time needed for decision making, and more communications 
problems (Bliss, 2011).  
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It is clear from the literature that there is no consensus view on the optimal board size. 
Raheja (2005) and Linck et al., (2008) noted that the optimal board size depends on 
contextual factors and on the company’s characteristics in particular. Generally, the 
board size should be sufficient associated to business requirements, it should be easily 
managed, and not be so large as to be unwieldy (UK Corporate Governance Code, 
2010). 
The Jordanian corporate governance code is flexible on this issue and it offers a wide 
range of options by recommending the board size should be between 3 and 13 
members. Moreover, there are no previous studies (to the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge) that examined the effect of board size on audit quality. However, the only 
study that considered this board characteristic (size) was carried out in Australia by 
Bliss (2011), and reported a positive correlation between board size and level of audit 
quality.  
Therefore, given the above discussion that the role played by large board size is still 
debatable, in addition to the limited empirical studies; the direction of the effect of the 
board size on audit quality is not clear. Therefore the study draws the following 
neutral hypothesis:  
H4: There is a significant relationship between board size and audit quality.  
  
 
 
 
Gender diversity 
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Arab social structures are different from those in Western societies. Miles (2002) 
reported that social and cultural barriers persist despite the increasing proportion of 
Jordanian women at work. Miles (2002) reported that family give more career support 
to males over females, and that females had to give up their jobs to help their family 
in home chores. Obtaining a job entailed a difficult negotiation process with the 
family, because of concerns about travel, accommodation, and harassment. 
However, opportunities for women in Jordan are increasing as globalization continues. 
Jordan is ranked the 77th out of 186 countries according to the Human Development 
Index (HDI) compared to the 86th level in 2003. Jordan has shown improvements in 
Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) over the years. The GEM rose from 0.22 in 
1995 to 0.297 in 2002. In 2009, Jordan’s rank was 96 out of 109 nations. However, 
more improvements is needed. The 2007 ratio of female to male earnings was 0.19; 
quite a low figure, since a ratio of 1; would indicate absolute equality. The number of 
female in government roles increased from 4.6% to 9.9% during the period between 
1995 and 2002, showing that more improvement is being made in this area (Jordan 
Human Development Report, UNDP, 2011). Total female employment participation 
increased from 28 percent in 2003 to 45 percent in 2013 (World Bank, 2013). 
Recently, MENA countries (Tunisia and Jordan in particular) are beginning to 
recognize the necessity of developing female talent up to the board level (Terjesen et 
al., 2009).  
The difference between genders is widely documented in the literature, especially 
with regards to managerial style, decision making and communication process 
(Ittonen et al., 2011). The literature has shown considerable evidences for the 
importance of gender diversity for many aspects in organizations. 
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The existence of women in boards of directors improves the monitoring process, and 
leads to a more  effective board (Gul et al., 2011, Adams and Ferreira 2009, Nielsen 
and Huse, 2010, and Terjesen et al.,  2009), strengthens corporate governance system 
and improves disclosure quality (Gul et al., 2011), improve earning quality (Srinidhi 
et al., 2011), and reduce conflict level (Nielsen and Huse, 2010). Moreover, women 
are generally considered more risk averse than men, and their decisions tend to be 
more conservative (Watson and McNaughton, 2007). Also, women more sensitive to 
losses and they be more risk management advantage over men (Schubert, 2006). 
On the other hand, although the gender diversity in board improves the performance, 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) argued that this is true for firms with weak governance 
system which need more monitoring process. For firms with strong governance 
system, gender diversity in the board could negatively affect the firm value; because 
over monitoring probably leads to counterproductive results. In addition, Nielsen and 
Huse (2010) indicated that gender diversity is not always beneficial for board 
effectiveness; it is contingent on the context and the nature of the board’s tasks. 
Due to the importance of gender diversity in the board, many countries take it into 
consideration. Some countries have determined a minimum number of directors’ seats 
that should be allocated for females. For example, Sweden has proposed a legal 
requirement that 25% of board’s seats should be allocated to female directors, 
Norway requires 40% of the board to be female (Gul et al., 2011). Also, in its 2010 
edition, the UK Corporate Governance Code recommends for giving due regard to 
diversity, including gender diversity, when searching for board candidates and making 
appointments to the board. However, the Jordanian regulations do not regulate gender 
diversity in the board. 
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Given that board of directors’ characteristics have an impact on audit quality (Abbott 
et al., 2003; Carcello et al., 2002, Zaman et al., 2011), and that gender diversity 
presumably affects the functioning of corporate board (Erhardt et al., 2003; Adams 
and Ferreira, 2009; Gul et al., 2011), it is of interest to test whether female 
representation on board of directors affects audit quality. Gul et al., (2008) examine 
this relationship and they concluded that existence of woman director is likely to 
strengthen the board and encourage it to demand additional audit effort from auditors 
to protect directors’ reputations and to avoid legal responsibility. Given that the 
Jordanian society is considered conservative, this study expects that the existence of 
women in the board might make it more conservative and more risk averse, and in 
turn, will motivate the board to demand more audit quality. This relationship will be 
tested by the following hypothesis: 
H5: There is a positive significant relationship between the proportion of woman in 
the board and audit quality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.2.2.2. Audit committee and audit quality 
 
 
The audit committee is one of the board’s committees that are formed to help boards 
and to carry out specific duties. The role of the audit committee, in particular, is 
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directly related to overseeing financial reporting and auditing activities (Dobija, 2015). 
Therefore, given this role of audit committee, it is expected to contribute to improving 
the quality of audit service and enhance the overall corporate governance system- as 
discussed below.  
Audit committees have assumed more importance since the 1990s, particularly after 
the enactment of relevant regulations such as Cadbury (1992), Higgs (2003) and 
Smith (2003) reports in the UK, SOX (2002) in the USA, and Best Practice Guide 
(1997) in Australia, which were a reaction to corporate failures and scandals. In 
Jordan, the corporate governance code also assigned many responsibilities to audit 
committees. All these regulations have emphasised the necessity of audit committee 
existence and its role in enhancing the financial reporting quality (Turley and Zaman, 
2004; Ghafran and O'Sullivan, 2012).  
Furthermore, audit committees are essential in strengthening the corporate governance 
system, and important for increasing financial reporting integrity and reducing audit 
risk (Turley and Zaman, 2004). To avoid a legal liability and to protect their 
reputation, audit committees should promote and maintain auditor independency, in 
addition to effectively monitoring the auditing process by demanding a broader audit 
scope (Zaman et al., 2011). Also, auditor independence is required in order to ensure 
audit quality, by mitigating  management’s pressure on auditors (Firth, 1997). 
As a part of their role in corporate governance, audit committees have a dominant role 
in monitoring and facilitating the external audit function, and thereby improving audit 
quality. Their role is clearly highlighted by the Jordanian corporate governance code 
(2008) in various aspects. First, audit committee in Jordan play a role in evaluating 
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and supervising the internal control procedures to ensure its effectiveness. Lee et al. 
(2004) Turley and Zaman (2004) pointed out that effective internal control helps in 
preventing reporting failure and management cheating, and in turn helps the external 
auditing process. 
Second, audit committees in Jordan ensure auditor independence and ensure that there 
is no conflict with management (JCGC, 2008). Prior studies confirmed that the 
existence of an effective audit committee increases the external auditors’ 
independence, because it frees them from management control, and it provides an 
effective channel of communication, and resolves any problem that may arise between 
management and auditors (Cadbury, 1992; Carcello and Neal, 2003; Lee et al., 2004; 
Turley and Zaman, 2004).  
Third, audit committees nominate competent auditors and make recommendations to 
the board of directors about their appointment (JCGC, 2008). Fourth, audit 
committees assess the external auditor's plan of work, carry periodic reviews and 
produce final reports, and therefore make relevant recommendations to the board of 
directors. 
 
 4.1.2.2.2.1. Audit committee and audit quality: prior empirical evidence 
 
The role of audit committees has recently come under considerable scrutiny due to 
increased concerns about the quality of the corporate financial reporting process 
caused by recent accounting scandals. Audit committees’ independence, financial 
expertise, size, and frequency of audit committees meetings are well examined in the 
literature as signals of audit committee effectiveness. The effect of these 
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characteristics on audit quality is documented in the literature; however, the nature of 
this effect is not sufficiently clear due to inconsistent empirical evidence. The 
following section presents relevant empirical studies regarding the effect of audit 
committee effectiveness on audit quality. Other relevant studies that address the role 
of audit committee in different corporate aspects are mentioned as well. 
Abbott et al., (2003) examined how the effectiveness of audit committees (measured 
by independence, financial expertise and frequency of meetings as dummy variables), 
influences audit fees. They utilised data for 492 US Big 5-audited firms between 
February 5, 2001 and June 30, 2001. Contrary to Carcello et al., (2002), the results of 
their cross-sectional regression showed a significant positive relationship between 
audit committee independence and financial expertise, and the log of audit fees. Also, 
no significant relationship has been reported between the number of audit 
committee’s meetings and audit. Given that they used data from the same context, 
Abbott et al., (2003) argue that the incongruence of their results and Carcello’s et al., 
(2002) results may be due to changes in the regulations in the late 1990s, and the 
differences in the degree of variation in audit committee characteristics in the samples 
used. 
Furthermore, Lee and Mande, (2005) tested to what extent effective audit committees 
affect fees paid to external auditors. Their sample included 792 US firms that were 
audited by Big 5 only for the year 2000. So, their result confirms the result obtained 
by Abbott et al., (2003). These findings are consistent with the notion that audit 
committee effectiveness impact the demand for greater audit coverage to assure 
higher audit quality.  
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Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) investigated a sample comprising the 2001 Fortune 500 
firms spanning 2001–2003. They reported that board’s independence, size, and 
meetings, in addition to audit committee’s independence, experience, and size, all are 
positively associated with audit fees. Notably, the results are not consistent across 
sample years, suggesting that the results coming from examining a single year of data 
may be misleading (Vafeas and Waegelein, 2007).  
Rustam et al. (2013) studied the impact of audit committee effectiveness and CEO 
compensation incentives on corporate audit fees. Using panel data regression for 50 
Pakistani firms, their findings indicate that audit committee activity and committee 
member's independence are positively associated with audit fee levels, consistent with 
the argument that external auditors work complements audit committees in 
monitoring management and assuring higher audit quality. This result is consistent 
with Vafeas & Waegelein (2007). In contrast, CEO’s pays incentives neither 
complement nor substitute for audit effort in disciplining company management. 
However, they confessed that their sample size is very small; it is only 50 out of more 
than 700 quoted firms in Pakistan. This raises a concern about precision and 
generalizability of their findings. 
Using a sample of 87 listed firms in New Zealand at the end of 2001, Rainsbury et al. 
(2009) examined the impact of audit committee quality (measured by audit committee 
independence and expertise) on financial reporting quality (measured by accounting 
quality scores derived from different accounting choices), and on audit quality 
(measured by audit fees). The result showed that there is no relationship between 
audit committee quality and the quality of financial reporting. Similarly, the impact of 
audit committee quality on audit quality was insignificant. These results are 
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inconsistence with previous literature which shows that audit committee 
independence increases audit quality (Abbott et al., 2003 and Lee and Mande, 2005) 
and decreases earnings management (Jenkins, 2003). Rainsbury et al., (2009) stated 
that the benefits of audit committees may be less than what have the NZD regulators 
anticipated, and they assumed that making the audit committee recommendations 
compulsory may create more effective audit committees. 
In order to test whether audit committees are effective in ensuring audit quality by 
protecting auditors from fee cuts (ensuring the audit hours are not reduced) which 
might affect audit quality, Collier and Gregory (1996) used a regression model for 
audit fees using a sample of FTSE 500 at the end of 1991. The findings show that the 
correlation between audit fees and the presence of an audit committee are positive and 
significant. The findings suggest that audit committees, to a large extent, protect audit 
quality from being compromised. However, Collier and Gregory (1996) addressed the 
merely existence of audit committee, not their effectiveness which might have 
produced invalids results and hence merits further investigation. 
Based on the notion that higher audit fees imply increased audit testing and higher 
audit quality, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) tested the relationship between audit 
committees existence, audit committees effectiveness and the use of internal audit on 
audit fees. By using a sample of 401 Australian firms for the year 2000, they found 
that higher audit fees are related to the existence of an audit committee, more frequent 
committee meetings and increased use of internal audits. Further, no relationship was 
found between audit committee expertise and audit fees. 
112 
 
Given the importance of financial experience in audit committees, Krishnan and 
Visvanthan (2009) tested a sample of S&P 500 for the years 2000 – 2002 in order to 
find out whether the level of audit fees reflects the effectiveness of the audit 
committees by focusing on financial accounting expertise as a key determinant of the 
audit committee’s effectiveness. Their results showed that audit pricing is negatively 
correlated with accounting financial expertise. However, this result is valid only 
where a strong corporate governance structure exists as they did not find a significant 
correlation between audit fees and accounting financial expertise for observations 
with weak governance structure.  
Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa (2011) focused on the impact of audit committee 
effectiveness on audit fees (they studied the joint effect of independence, financial 
expertise, frequency of meetings and size of the audit committee as indications of 
effectiveness). By exploring a sample of 135 UK listed companies (out of the total 
population which is 257 companies) over the years 2001-2004, and using pooled OLS 
regression, they found a significant positive association between audit committee 
effectiveness and audit fees. Their results imply that firms with high-quality audit 
committees are more likely to effectively monitor external auditors, consequently the 
scope of the audit will increase resulting in higher audit fees.  
The literature also shows inconsistent results about the role of the audit committee in 
constraining earnings management. Lin et al. (2006) studied the role of audit 
committees in ensuring the quality of corporate financial reporting quality by 
decreasing the probability of earnings restatement.  A multivariate logistic regression 
model was used to test 212 US public firms at the end of the year 2000. Their findings 
show a negative association between the size of audit committees and the occurrence 
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of earnings restatement. However, as they reported, other audit committee 
characteristics have not any significant impact on the reported earnings quality. This 
result is contrary to Abbott et al. (2004) study; that found a significant negative 
relationship between audit committee’s independence, expertise and frequency of 
meetings and occurrence of a restatement. Garven (2009), on the other hand, reported 
significant evidence that firms whose audit committee members are independent are 
more likely to engage in earnings management.  
Sun et al. (2014) measured real earnings management as abnormal cash flows from 
operations, abnormal discretionary expenses, or abnormal production costs, and 
examined the impact of audit committee characteristics on these earning management 
proxies. They reported insignificant relationships between all audit committee 
characteristics and earning management. 
Hamdan et al. (2012) studied the role of audit committee activity in constraining 
earnings management and improving accounting conservatism in Jordan. The study 
measures accounting conservatism using the book-to-market approach, and the ratio 
of total accruals to gross profit. By using a sample of 50 Jordanian industrial firms 
from Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) during the period of 2004-2009, and employing 
a pooled data regression, they found no relation between audit committee 
characteristics and accounting conservatism, with an exception of financial experience 
which was found to have a positive relationship with accounting conservatism.   
Similar to what the study concluded about the empirical literature of board of 
directors, the role of audit committees in audit quality has been well highlighted by 
the prior literature. However, the existing literature fails to provide clear and 
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consistent findings of the impact of audit committee effectiveness in delivering high-
quality audit. Therefore, the relevant literature has limitations in the employed 
sample, methodology, relevant variables, or proxies. The conclusion of this chapter 
and Table 4.1 show clearly how this study differs from the existing literature.  
 
4.1.2.2.2.2.   Audit committee and audit quality: hypotheses development 
 
The Jordanian Corporate Governance Code (2008) prescribes number of 
characteristics that effective audit committees should possess. First, the JCGC (2008) 
extends the notion of director independence to emphasise that audit committees 
should also be independent (at least two-third of committees’ members). The rationale 
behind this is that an independent member is likely to be free from management’s 
influence, and ensure that high-quality audit is employed and correct financial 
statements are presented to shareholders. 
 Second, audit committees members should possess relevant financial experience. 
Financial expertise helps committee members to understand and interpret financial 
information correctly, as well as help them to effectively monitor external auditors. 
The JCGC (2008) recommends that audit committees should be composed of three 
members; one of them at least should have financial expertise. Third, JCGC (2008) 
mentioned that larger committees are expected to offer stronger monitoring, and 
therefore it recommends that the size should not be less than three members.   
Fourth, consistent with the notion that the audit committees which meet more 
frequently allow directors more time to achieve their monitoring duties effectively 
(Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005); JCGC (2008) recommends that audit committees 
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should meet at least four times a year. In conclusion, this study expects (as stated in 
the following hypotheses) that more independent, expert, larger, and diligent audit 
committees provide better monitoring over management, and productive coordination 
with external auditors. 
 
Independence of audit committee members 
 
From the agency theory view, independent members in audit committees increase the 
committees’ ability to effectively carry out their oversight tasks over financial 
reporting and monitor management behaviour, which in turn reduce agency conflict 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). Abbott et al., (2000) and Farber (2005) concluded that audit 
committee with independent members reduce the probability of fraudulent financial 
reporting and increase the quality of financial statements.   
The literature shows inconsistent findings of the role of audit committees. Carcello et 
al., (2002), Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) and Rainsbury et al., (2009) found 
insignificant relationship between the independence of audit committees and audit 
quality. Abbott et al. (2003) in contrast, reported that high audit quality is positively 
related to audit committees independency. Abbott et al., (2003: 21) argued that “an 
independent audit committee may demand expanded audit scope in order to avoid 
being associated with a financial misstatement and preserve reputational capital. The 
committee may also demand additional audit procedures beyond the initial audit plan 
for areas that subsequently reveal greater amounts of contention, uncertainty, or risk”. 
This indicates that independent audit committee members are likely to positively 
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contribute to audit committee effectiveness, and demand more audit effort to assure 
financial statement integrity.   
Moreover, Lee and Mande (2005), Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) and Zaman et al., 
(2011) have supported the previous finding. They reported that the effective audit 
committees (member independent as one of audit committees’ effectiveness proxies), 
have more power over management and are regarded as a complement for the external 
audit task by carrying out its monitoring role effectively. 
Therefore, independent committee members are most likely to demand more audit 
effort, because they are more interested in reporting the true financial position to the 
shareholders. Also, independent members are more concerned about their reputational 
loss (Abbott et al., 2003) which may arise from issuing misleading financial 
statements. So, based on the dominant argument in the literature and agency theory 
suggestions, this study states the following hypothesis within the Jordanian context, 
where audit committee should contain three members, and at least two of them should 
be independent non-executives: 
H6: The proportion of independent audit committee members is positively related to 
audit quality. 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial expertise for audit committee members 
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The importance of the existence of a financial expert member within audit committees 
is highlighted by Jordan Corporate Governance Code (2008) which emphasises that 
“… at least one audit committees’ member should have worked previously in 
accounting or finance fields, or that member should have an academic or professional 
certificate in accounting, finance or related fields”. Audit committees with more 
financial experience are better in understanding and appreciating the external audit 
work, supporting external auditor and solving the disputes which may arise between 
auditor and management (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001). Under agency theory 
assumption, high-quality financial accounting process (which increased with financial 
expertise audit committees) reduces the agency problem by increasing the investors’ 
ability to take well-informed decisions (Xie et al., 2003). 
In addition, audit committee member with financial expertise increase financial 
statements’ integrity and reduce the probability of fraud, and then has a role in 
increasing audit quality. Farber (2005) found that less financial expertise is associated 
with higher fraud and less credible financial reporting system. 
Defond et al., (2005) explored the stock market reaction to the appointment of 
financial experts to the audit committees (this is measured by Three-Day [−1 to +1] 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) surrounding announcements of new director 
appointments to the audit committee). They studied 702 announcements about 
appointed directors to audit committees selected from the Corporate Library database 
from 1993 to 2002 in the US. The result showed that the market react positively to 
accounting financial expertise appointment (this result is conditioned by strong 
corporate governance existence before the appointment process), and no significant 
reaction for non-accounting financial expertise appointment in the audit committee. 
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This result supports the contention that accounting financial expertise improves and 
strengthens corporate governance, especially by making audit committees effective in 
carrying out their tasks with respect to the monitoring process and ensuring financial 
reporting quality.   
In similar manner, Abbott et al., (2003) found a positive relationship between 
financial expertise in audit committee and audit fees, as a member with financial 
expertise is more likely to be concerned about audit quality and then demand more 
audit effort to protect shareholders’ interests. Thus, based on the dominant argument 
and agency theory propositions, the study develops the following hypothesis:  
H7: There is a positive significant relationship between the audit committee expertise 
and audit quality. 
 
 
 
Audit committee meetings 
 
Frequency of audit committee meetings provides an indication of audit committee 
effectiveness (Zaman et al., 2011). This, in turn, implies that more diligent audit 
committee plays a better oversight role over whole audit process and, therefore, 
improves audit quality (Zaman et al., 2011), and decreases probability of fraud 
(Dezoort and Salterio, 2001). Thus, when the audit committee is interested in 
improving audit quality and decreasing fraud or misstatement, it would demand a 
broader audit scope and greater effort. I.E. a diligent audit committee, and then high 
audit quality, curb management misbehaviour (e.g. issuing fraudulent financial 
statements) and therefore decrease the agency problem. 
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Prior studies provide inconsistent results regarding the importance of frequency of 
meetings in audit quality. Lee and Mande (2005), Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) 
Zaman et al., (2011) revealed that regular meetings lead to effective and well-
informed committee which are more diligent in discharging their duties, and 
consequently results in a positive relationship between meetings and audit quality. 
Moreover, Inaam et al. (2012) examined the association between the number of 
committee meetings and earning quality in Tunis, and they found more frequent 
meetings are related to less earnings management. On the other hand, Carcello et al., 
(2002) and Abbott et al., (2003) stated that the relationship between the number of 
audit committee meetings and level of audit quality is not significant.  
To test this relationship in a Jordanian context where the corporate governance code 
recommends that the frequency of audit committee meetings should be four times at 
least, and based on effective monitoring views drawn from prior studies; the study 
draws the following hypothesis: 
H8: There is a positive significant relationship between the frequency of audit 
committee meeting and audit quality. 
 
 
 
 
Audit committee size 
 
Most of corporate governance regulations around the world emphasize audit 
committee size. In Jordan, the Corporate Governance Code (2008) anticipates that 
large audit committee’s size advantageous for monitoring purposes. It recommends 
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that audit committee should be comprised of at least three directors; two of them 
should be independent non executives. 
Relevant prior studies show mixed findings. Audit committee size is likely to “have 
an ambiguous effect on the committee’s monitoring performance. Larger audit 
committees have a wider knowledge base on which to draw but are likely to suffer 
from process losses and diffusion of responsibility” (Karamanou and Vafeas, 
2005:458 ). However, Zaman et al., (2011) found that audit quality measured by audit 
fees is positively related with audit committee size. They stated that large audit 
committees are favourable in firms as they more likely to improve the internal 
controls quality, as well as they make the audit committee more effective in fulfilling 
its monitoring role.  
Moreover, Yang and Krishnan (2005) examined the relationship between audit 
committee size and earnings-management in 896 US firms in the years of 1996 to 
2000. They concluded that large audit committee size leads to effective monitoring 
over financial reporting process, which is therefore related to less earnings-
management and more audit quality. 
Consequently, given above evidence from the prior studies and from the code 
recommendation, more audit committee members are expected to positively affect 
audit quality. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H9: There is a positive significant relationship between the audit committee size and 
audit quality. 
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4.1.4: ownership structure and audit quality 
 
The second research question targets the ownership concentration in Jordan and its 
impact on audit quality. In particular, the study focuses on the common ownership 
identities in Jordan which are; family ownership, institution ownership (financial and 
non-financial institutions), foreign ownership (Arab and non-Arab investors), and 
government ownership.  
4.1.4.1. Ownership structure and audit quality: overview and theoretical 
background  
 
Corporate ownership varies and takes different structures across countries (Shielfer, 
and Vishny, 1997). For instance, largely held shares is typical in US and UK; bank 
and financial institutions ownership are dominant in Japan and Germany; closely held 
shares or family ownership in particular are common in most EU countries, East-Asia 
and the Middle East and North Africa region. The difference in laws and legal 
families is one of the reasons that firms are owned differently across the countries (La 
Porta et al., 1999). Civil law compared with common law provides weaker legal 
protection for investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Porta et al., 1999). As civil law 
itself contains three legal families which are German, Scandinavian, and French civil 
law; the latter is the weakest one in terms of shareholders’ protection (La Porta et al., 
1999), and is the one which is applied in almost all developing countries in MENA 
region (including Jordan). 
Therefore, how do firms operate in countries characterized by weak law dealing with 
this problem? And are there any other substitute corporate governance mechanisms? 
122 
 
La Porta et al. (1999) examined this question. They have concluded that companies 
need to adapt to this context where there is neither enough legal protection nor 
appropriate law enforcement. So, ownership concentration is one of the efficient ways 
by which shareholders can protect their rights and effectively control management 
misbehaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, 1986; 
Dharwadkar et al., 2000). 
Given that legal protection (as an external corporate governance mechanism) for 
shareholders is relatively poor in developing countries (particularly where a French 
civil law is applied), the concentration of ownership is clearly dominant as an 
effective internal corporate governance mechanism in order to protect investors’ 
interests (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta 1999). Thus, Shleifer and Vishny, 
(1997), stated that a large ownership stake is an effective corporate governance 
mechanism applied to limit management expropriation in poor law contexts (investors 
prefer to hold more capital to exercise their control rights and consequently avoid the 
expropriation by management).  
However, even in well-developed countries like the US, UK, European countries or 
Japan, the legal protection and its enforcement alone are not enough to protect 
shareholders’ wealth as the managers there still have a large degree of discretion 
which consequently makes concentrated ownership an option in the developed 
countries as well (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). It is concluded from literature that the 
concentration of ownership is prevalent across the borders in different degrees
13
. This 
                                                          
13
 In their study about the corporate ownership structure of 27 wealthy countries, La Porta et al. (1999) 
revealed that 30% from their sample are owned by family, 18% are government ownership, while only 
36% are widely held. 
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also makes Berle and Means model of ownership (widely held ownership) exceptional 
rather than the norm as La Porta et al. (1999) concluded in their empirical study. 
The classical agency theory deals with shareholders-managers’ conflict assuming a 
divergence between the needs of these two parties. As a suggested solution for this 
conflict (according to agency theory propositions), concentrated ownership plays an 
important alignment role in mitigating this agency problem because large 
shareholders have sufficient incentive and power to control management (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). However, this structure of ownership creates a new agency perspective 
which is the principal-principal model of corporate governance and its conflicts are 
between two groups of principals, majority (controlling) and minority shareholders 
(Dharwadkar et al., 2000).  
The main problem that stems from principal-principal conflict is expropriation of 
minority shareholders’ value (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In this structure of 
ownership, major decision rights remain in the hands of a few individuals and there is 
usually not enough separation of duties and weak monitoring activities which in turn 
restrains the abuse of power by the controlling owners. Consequently, minority 
shareholders’ (and other stakeholders’) concerns about management and/or 
controlling shareholders expropriation increase; and therefore increase the need for 
high audit quality as a tool to mitigate these concerns (Fan and Wong, 2005).  
Agency theory suggests that high-quality financial reporting mitigates the information 
asymmetry level, improves investors’ confidence and improves stock price (Khurana 
and Raman, 2004; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In addition, Fan and Wong (2005) 
stated that in a concentration ownership context where there is a potential conflict 
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between controlling and minority shareholders; the firm is more likely to demand a 
high-quality audit as a bonding and monitoring mechanism to reduce agency 
problems. Thus, high audit quality in such environment is required to mitigate agency 
conflict by reducing information asymmetry and to align shareholders’ interests.  
Moreover, controlling owners may demand external audit to enable them to accurately 
evaluate and monitor their investment (Hay et al., 2008), to ensure that the interests of 
minority shareholders are sufficiently protected (Fan and Wong, 2005; Yang and 
Krishnan, 2005), to maintain their reputation and promote trust in other stakeholders 
(Niskanen et al., 2010).  
 
4.1.4.2. Empirical evidence and hypothesis development: identity of 
shareholders, and audit quality 
 
Ownership concentration is largely addressed in literature as a corporate governance 
mechanism (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 2000; Akbar, 2015). However, 
empirical results have not yet showed consistent findings regarding the monitoring 
effect of blockholders, and whether their presence leads to a credible audit function. 
Continuing to the above discussion about the role of concentration ownership, large 
capital providers have a significant role in monitoring and controlling managers’ 
decisions (if they are not already acting as managers) due to their ownership 
magnitude/voting power, and because they are better informed than the individual 
investors, and due to the analytical and information processing resources at their 
disposal (Jensen, 1993; Mitra and Cready, 2005; Khan et al., 2011). This leads to less 
information asymmetry, and then less agency conflict.  
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In addition to controlling management, large shareholders play an essential role in 
appointing external auditors due to their voting power. Therefore, large shareholders 
may demand high-quality audit for different reasons. Hay et al., (2008) stated that the 
existence of large shareholders leads to demand for additional audit quality to monitor 
their investments and to protect their reputation. Also, blockholders might require 
additional and reliable information regarding firms’ performance, and therefore they 
might expect the auditors to compensate for a lack of control over other internal 
activities (Hay et al., 2008), to ensure the quality of information they provide (Hadani 
et al., 2011), and to assure minority owners in particular and other stakeholders that 
their interests are sufficiently protected (Fan and Wong, 2005; Piot, 2001). This in 
turn highlights the role of high quality audit to protect firms’ assets and owners’ 
reputations, and to align majority-minority interests.  
From eight East Asian countries which are characterized by ownership concentration, 
Fan and Wong (2005) examined whether external auditing plays an effective role in 
such contexts as a corporate governance mechanism. They found that high ownership 
concentration is associated with demanding more credible audit. They explained that 
the reason behind this result is that the large shareholders are keen to employ high 
quality monitoring and bonding mechanisms to assure other shareholders that their 
interests are protected. Furthermore, Fan and Wong (2005) found that the firms that 
frequently issue equity capital are hiring high-quality auditors. This result is in line 
with the argument that says the controlling owners ask for high-quality audit in order 
to enhance the confidence of investors. 
In contrast, due to their power, large shareholders may act on their interests 
excessively and then adversely affect other shareholders’ interests and a firm’s value 
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(Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Gotti et al., 2012; Ali and Lesage, 2013). Given the 
demand for audit quality depends on the agency conflict level; higher audit quality is 
expected in this case to protect minority interests as suggested by agency theory. 
However, in practise, if those large shareholders behave deliberately to obtain private 
benefits at the expense of other shareholders, they will be less interested in high-
quality audit. Given that high-quality audit is an effective mechanism to reduce the 
agency problem by protecting minority owners from being expropriated by dominant 
shareholders, there is a serious concern about this role in the case when external 
auditors are appointed by shareholders.  
Piot (2001) stated that given the hiring of external auditors depends on votes of 
majority shareholders, minority interests are most likely neglected. This implies that 
the presence of dominant owners is not always associated with demanding high-
quality audit. Instead, dominant owners may appoint low-quality auditors to evade 
monitoring. This is particularly when those owners control the firms and the managers 
due to their influential shares and, at the same time, they tend to behave adversely to 
obtain private benefits, and wishes to surround their behaviour by opacity (Fan and 
Wong, 2005). 
Given that the different types of shareholders have different investment policies and 
then different degrees of incentives and abilities to exert effective monitoring (Lim et 
al., 2014), it is expected that these different ownership types will demand a different 
degree of audit quality to protect firms and minority owners’ wealth. Thus, it is worth 
studying the effect of ownership identity on audit quality in a context like Jordan 
where there are different ownership groups. Aguilera and Jackson (2003) and Lim, 
How and Verhoevene (2014) highly recommend taking different types of owners into 
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consideration when studying ownership structure as they have different targets and 
strategies. 
In the case of Jordan, as in other emerging economies, the legal system does not offer 
sufficient protection for investors, which therefore makes ownership concentration 
typical of most listed firms. The results of the World Bank survey (ROSC, 2005) 
revealed that ownership in Jordan appears to be less highly concentrated than in many 
emerging markets; average free float (as measured by the ASE) is about 40%. Family 
ownership is typical. In more recent studies,  Zeitun and Tian (2007), Omran et al. 
(2008) and Jafar and Elshawa (2009) documented that the ownership in Jordan is 
concentrated in hand of family and institutions in particular. Also, foreign ownership 
is common and the government still has ownership in some firms.  
Shareholders in Jordan typically are categorized into four main types: families, 
foreigners, government and institutions (banks and other institutions). The 
government ownership decreased after the privatization process, but is still available 
in a number of important companies like Jordanian Airlines, Potash, Phosphate, and 
the Alrai newspaper. Unlike many developed countries (The US and UK in particular), 
large institutional investors such as pension funds, trust funds, venture capitalists, and 
hedge funds) are not significant as controlling shareholders in Jordan (rather, the 
institutional investors are banks and other small institutions).  
Therefore, the focus on concentration ownership in general without considering each 
type of the owners separately may lead to an incorrect inferences regarding the role 
played by the different owners (Niemi, 2005). Thus, this motivates this study to go 
further and test whether the demand of audit quality varies across different ownership 
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identities (family, government, financial institutions, non-financial institutions, and 
foreign owners). 
 
 4.1.4.2.1. Family ownership 
 
This type of ownership is a salient feature of Jordanian companies (Zeitun and Tian, 
2007; Omran et al., 2008; Jaafar and El-Shawa, 2009). The corporate ownership in 
Jordan is concentrated in the hands of a few individuals particularly who are family 
shareholders (Zeitun and Tian, 2007), and prevalent in different business sectors 
(ROSC, 2005).  
There are different and inconsistent arguments associated with the role played by 
family members in the firms as controlling shareholders. The previous studies (Lim, 
How and Verhoeven, 2014; Azoury and Bouri, 2015; Niskanen et al., 2010; Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003) have failed to agree on the role of family owners in increasing or 
decreasing agency costs. From one side, high family ownership increases the 
likelihood of abusing their power and thus expropriates non-family minority 
shareholders. Moreover, in family ownership firms, executives’ positions are often 
occupied by families’ members, and they are more likely to pursue private benefit of 
control and expropriate other shareholders’ interests. This suggests that the type II 
agency cost (principal-principal model) is dominant in family firms (Azoury and 
Bouri, 2015). This requires high-quality audit to mitigate this agency cost by helping 
to limit managers’ mischief and protecting interests of other shareholders.  
Also, Niskanen et al., (2010) stated that in high family ownership firms there is a 
concern that the management acts for the controlling family and disregards other 
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owners. This has an entrenchment effect and implies that agency costs are higher in 
family firms. Agency theory further predicts that the demand for a credible audit 
services increases when agency problems are higher. 
On the other hand, the literature suggests that agency conflict is lower with family 
shareholders as they are more interested in maintaining long-term firms’ value as well 
as their reputation and consequently less likely to behave adversely (alignment role). 
The alignment argument of family ownership is based on the notion that there is no 
harmful conflict between controlling family owners and other owners, and that their 
interests are aligned, and then the expropriation concern is decreased.  
From 476 small and private Finnish firms, Niskanen et al., (2010: 230) presented 
empirical evidence of how family ownership affects the demand for audit quality. 
Their conclusion indicates that family ownership increases firms’ incentives to 
increase the credibility of their financial statements vis-à-vis outside stakeholders. 
Wang (2006) examined the relationship between family ownership and earnings 
quality using data from the Standard and Poor’s 500 companies. He presented 
empirical evidence to show that, on average, the magnitude of family ownership is 
associated with higher earnings quality. In particular, they found a consistent finding 
that family ownership is correlated with lower abnormal accruals, greater earnings 
informativeness, and less persistence of transitory loss components in earnings. 
In addition, given that the family firms have reputational concern (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003), the family members have greater incentives to protect their reputation by 
protecting firms’ wealth (Lim, How and Verhoeven, 2014). This might be particularly 
relevant for Jordan where a firms’ name in many cases is related to the family’s name, 
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which in turn creates an implicit commitment among family members toward 
maintaining the family name by stopping them from abusing their power and 
obtaining private benefits at the expense of other shareholders. Thus, the study 
expects that family ownership in Jordan is expected to be associated with higher audit 
quality either to maintain the reputation and/or to limit family owners from abusing 
the power and protecting interests of other shareholders as suggested by principal-
principal theory. Therefore the study develops the following hypothesis: 
H10: There is significant positive relationship between family ownership and audit 
quality. 
 
4.1.4.2.2. Foreign ownership 
 
Foreign investment is predominantly available in the Jordanian market; more than 
half of market capitalization is owned by foreign investors (ASE, 2015). Jordanian 
regulations offer investment promotion benefits for non-Jordanians to participate and 
invest in Jordan. Investment Promotion Law (1995) offer incentives for non- 
Jordanian investors in terms of freedom from customs duties, tax holidays, income tax 
exemptions and unrestricted transfer of capital and profits. Moreover, market stability, 
and lack of taxes on capital gains and dividends attract foreign investors towards 
investment in the Amman Stock Exchange ASE (Al-Qudsi et al., 2007). 
The foreign ownership concentration in ASE has increased drastically in last few 
decades. The privatization process that started in the 1990s played an important role 
in shaping and adjusting ownership structures because it aimed to attract more Arab 
and non-Arab foreign investments by opening up the markets and abolishing state 
monopoly (ASE, 2013 and Zeitun, 2009). Thus, opening the local market for foreign 
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investors should be associated with good corporate governance system and high level 
of transparency, which in turn creates the need for high-quality audit. 
In addition to the privatization process, other variables played an important role in 
increasing foreign investment in Jordan, for instance, investors’ confidence in the 
economy (Al-Halalmeh and Sayah, 2010), enacting Investment Promotion Law (Ali 
Khrawish and Zakaria Siam, 2010); regional events (Mansur, 2008), ASE’s stability 
and regional economic growth (Al-Qudsi et al., 2007). 
Based on published figure from ASE and SDC, the ratio of foreign ownership 
(measured by market capitalization) increased from 38% in 2003 to 51.3% in 2012. 
The foreign ownership in ASE is concentrated in banks (58%) and industry (57%), 
and less concentrated in the service sector (35%).The Saudi investments at the ASE 
ranked first among non-Jordanian investments; these Saudi investments reached about 
JD1.3 billion by the end of 2014.  
The relevant literature stated that foreign investors require more reliable and 
transparent information to avoid expropriation by insiders (Ben-Nasr et al., 2015). 
Being that foreign investors are geographically away from the firms they invest in, 
this increases information asymmetries and makes managerial monitoring more 
difficult (Lim, How, Verhoeven 2014). The literature documented that foreigners with 
substantial ownership exert more pressure on management to improve corporate 
governance and increase corporate transparency in particular, which therefore reduces 
information asymmetries (Jiang and Kim, 2004). However, if the foreign owners do 
not have influential shares (votes), the management may expropriate their interests 
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and may be less willing to demand high-quality audit in order to hide their 
unfavourable behaviour.  
Niemi (2005) examined the effect of foreign-owned subsidiaries and state ownership 
on audit quality. He used a sample of 200 non-financial companies in the Finnish 
context for 1996. The sample was limited to the firms that are audited by the Big Six 
only due to data accessibility. The findings showed that audit fees (as a proxy for 
audit quality) are higher in foreign-owned subsidiaries than locally-owned ones, 
suggesting that higher audit quality is related to foreign investors. Also, Niemi found 
no relationship between state ownership and audit fees.  
There is a scarcity of empirical evidences regarding the role of foreign owners in audit 
quality. Due to that, the study shows some evidences about their role in other relevant 
fields, which helps in drawing the relevant hypothesis. Ben Nasr et al., (2015) 
investigated the impact of state and foreign ownership on earnings quality in 350 
newly privatized firms from 45 countries. They documented a positive relationship 
between foreign shareholders and earnings quality (foreign ownership related to 
smaller abnormal accruals, higher earnings informativeness) and more persistent 
earnings. This result supports the argument that expects that foreign owners require 
higher earnings quality to curb management expropriation. 
Using a cross section of 3189 firms from 40 markets in 2002, He et al. (2013) showed 
evidence that companies with a higher foreign ownership tend to have more 
informative stock prices (measured by the probability of informed trading and price 
non-synchronicity). Their results indicate that foreign owners contribute to the 
informativeness of stock prices.  
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Furthermore, Jiang and Kim (2004) examined whether the level of foreign ownership 
decreases information asymmetry between firm managers and outside shareholders in 
Japan. They used a large sample over an 18-year period from 1976 to 1994 and 
employed different time-series and cross-sectional models to test the magnitude of 
intertemporal return-earnings associations as an indication for information 
asymmetry. The results reported that information asymmetry is inversely related to 
the foreign ownership level. 
Al-Najjar (2015) examined the effect of foreign owners on financial performance in 
Jordanian tourism firms (return on assets and return on equity used as proxies). By 
using a sample of 15 listed Jordanian firms and employing panel data model, his 
findings showed no relationship between foreign ownership and financial 
performance. He stated that the result suggests that foreign investors have no effective 
role in enhancing financial performance. 
In Jordan, Arab and non-Arab foreign investment are common, taking advantage of 
the aforementioned Jordanian market incentives. Although this investment 
environment treats all investors (Arab and non-Arab) equally, the study has the 
incentive to further examine the Arab and non-Arab investors separately. The reason 
behind this is that the agency problem facing non-Arab investors is expected to be 
greater than Arab investors for different reasons.  
The first reason is the physical distance between the foreigners and the Jordanian 
market. Investors who are geographically close to investee firms have an information 
advantage over other investors, possibly because the access to value-relevant 
information is relatively more convenient (Baik et al., 2010; Kang and Kim, 2010). 
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Kang and Kim (2010) find that the information asymmetry that arises from 
geographic proximity is an important determinant of investment decisions, as by these 
information advantage investors who are geographically proximate to investee targets 
enhances monitoring capabilities, and thus incentives to monitor their investment. 
Second, the language barrier is an important source of information asymmetry 
because this barrier negatively affects the communication process (Kang and Kim, 
2010). The third factor that increases information asymmetry is cultural differences 
(Kogut and Singh, 1988; Roth and O'Donnell, 1996; Krug and Nigh, 1998). Roth and 
O'Donnell (1996) argued that, as the cultural gap increases, it becomes more difficult 
and expensive for foreign investors to access information about investee firms.   
Therefore, the cultural and language similarity between Jordan and all other Arab 
countries helps Arab investors to use informal socio-cultural networks, and thus to be 
less sensitive to contextual considerations (e.g. local regulations) than non-Arab 
investors (Sekkat, 2014). On the other hand, foreign shareholders from countries with 
strong shareholder rights are more likely to be interested in strong governance 
mechanisms than those from countries with weak shareholder rights (Kang and Kim, 
2010).  
In summary, as reducing information asymmetry should be an essential target by 
management to attract more foreign capital (Jiang and Kim, 2004), demanding high-
quality audit is expected to pass on a positive signal about management integrity. 
Also, in order to protect their investment, foreign investors may ask for higher audit 
quality to decrease information asymmetry and to obtain reliable financial reporting. 
Furthermore, given that Arab investors are geographically close to Jordan, share the 
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same language and culture, and take advantage of social networks, the study predicts 
that non-Arab investors have more agency problem than Arab investors, and 
consequently high-quality audit is required either by those non-Arab investors to 
assure their investment or by firms’ management to attract this type of investors (due 
to their spillover efficiency or reputational benefits). Thus, the study predicts that all 
foreign investors have an impact on audit quality, but also expect the impact of non-
Arab investors is stronger. Thus, the study draws the following two hypotheses: 
H11 (a): There is a significant positive relationship between the level of Arab 
investment and audit quality. 
H11 (b): There is a significant positive relationship between the level of non-Arab 
investment and audit quality. 
 
4.1.4.2.3. Institutional ownership  
 
Previous literature documented that institutional investors have a favourable effect 
over many corporate aspects. For instance, institutional investors have an evident role 
in reducing earning management (Chung et al., 2002; Hadani et al., 2011), monitoring 
financial reporting and increasing earning quality (Velury and Jenkins, 2006), 
enhancing financial performance (Hutchinson et al., 2015), supporting firms’ 
innovation and competitiveness (Kochhar and David, 1996; Xu et al., 2015), and also 
increasing audit quality  (Kane and Velury, 2004).  
Further, concentrated ownership by institutions plays a crucial role in strengthening 
corporate governance systems (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Due to their fiduciary 
duties (Bushee, 2001), large voting blocks (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), well business 
experience (Pound, 1988) and their monitoring and analytical abilities (Mitra et al., 
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2007); institutional investors hold strong incentives and power for effective 
monitoring and forcing managers to behave towards maximizing shareholders wealth. 
Thus institutional investors are most likely to demand (or encourage management to 
demand) high-quality audit as an effective monitoring (bonding) mechanism.  
By examining all non-regulated US industries firms between 1992 and 1996, and 
employing a logistic regression model, Kane and Velury (2004) provided empirical 
evidence of a positive association between institutional ownership and audit quality 
measured by dichotomous auditor size. The theory expressed in their study is that 
institutional owners play a role in mitigating the information asymmetry through 
demanding higher quality, as they have greater ability to exert further influence over 
management. Consistent with Kane and Velury (2004), Lim et al. (2013) concluded 
that in the presence of institutional investors, managers most likely prepare high-
quality accounting reports. 
However, due to their power, institutional investors have a dominant role within the 
firms and they have ultimate access to private information that may be used by 
management to exploit shareholders, and therefore decrease their incentive to report 
high quality earning (Velury and Jenkins, 2006). Thus, from this contra-argument 
about the role of institutional investors, it seems plausible to expect that the presence 
of institutional investors may negatively correlate with demanding high-quality audit 
(given a positive relationship between audit quality and earning quality as 
documented in the literature (Teoh and Wong, 1993; Becker et al., 1998). 
Khanna and Palepu (1999) argued that institutional investors in many developing 
countries do not offer effective monitoring as their counterpart in developed countries, 
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due to underdeveloped capital markets and weak regulations. In such contexts, 
institutional investors may avoid challenging managers’ actions in order to maintain 
their business interests with the company even if this is to the detriment of other 
shareholders (Pound, 1998). 
Institutional investors around the world contain generally large institutions like 
mutual funds, pension funds and banks as defined by Bushee (1998) and Koh (2003). 
Given that large financial institutions like large mutual funds or large pension funds 
do not exist in Jordan (Haloush and Malkawi, 2008), the major financial institution in 
Jordan is banks. Banks in Jordan have different control system, different capital 
requirements, and having investment limitations, this study has a motivation to 
examine the effect of this type of ownership separately from other institutional 
ownership14. Non-financial institution owners for this study are manufacturing and 
services firms. 
Manufacturing and services firms are the main non-financial institutions in Jordan. 
These non-financial firms are involved in producing, purchasing and selling different 
types of goods, and they differ from financial institutions or banks as they are 
working under different regulations as well as they do not have constrains on their 
investments. These features motivate us to separate these non-financial institutions 
from financial institutions as another ownership identity.  
Investment of these non-financial firms in other firms’ shares is motivated by number 
of reasons. For instance, they have incentives to hold block shares in other firms as a 
way of vertical or horizontal business integration, or as a strategy to diversify their 
                                                          
14
 Also, consistent with O’Sullivan (2000) that separates the institutional owners in the UK into 
financial and non-financial firms. 
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businesses against market risk (Dinga, 2011). Furthermore, (Grossman and Hart, 
1986) argued that non-financial firms invest in other firms, particularly higher growth 
firms, to maximise their profit, expand their business network, control suppliers, 
support their competitiveness, or do business integration. 
However,  Alwshah (2009) raised a concern about the effectiveness of non-financial 
institution in Jordan regarding their ability to exert sufficient monitoring for a couple 
of reasons. First, many institutional investors in Jordan have significant business 
relationships with investee firms, which weakens their monitoring ability. Second, in 
many cases where the appointment is based on relationship rather than merit, the 
representative of institutional investors’ interest in the board of investee firms may be 
in a weak position in front of managers due to lack of experience. Third, even if such 
members are skilled and have expertise, they have low motivation to exercise 
monitoring over managers, as their tenure, career prospects, and rewards are not 
related to the performance of the firms in which they are served.  
Moreover, Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) used a Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) 
methodology to examine the correlation between institutions’ investment and earnings 
management (discretionary accruals) for a sample of Jordanian industrial companies 
listed on the Amman Stock Exchange during the period 2000 to 2005. They found an 
insignificant relationship between institutional investors and earnings management. 
Their findings indicate that institutions are generally not enough effective because 
they may either lack expertise, or engaged with management for their mutual benefits, 
ignoring other owners' interests.  
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In summary, the dominant arguments in literature are that institutional investors play 
a better monitoring role than individuals as they have more expertise and lead a 
professionally-managed block of shares (which is also consistent with agency theory 
as their role mitigates the information asymmetry and agency conflict).  However, 
these arguments are about institutional investors (e.g. pension funds, mutual fund, or 
other large financial institution), and there is a paucity of studies in developing 
countries about role of non-financial institutions as an effective monitor. Despite of 
this, the study tries to provide evidence on whether the increase of institutional 
investment is accompanied by audit quality improvement in Jordan as one of the 
developing countries. Thus, the study draws the following hypothesis: 
H12: There is a significant positive relationship between non-financial institutions 
and audit quality. 
 
As a financial institution, banks are a special type of institutional investor as they can 
be owners and lenders at the same time15 (Coffee, 1991; Boonyawat, 2013). “Monitors 
who hold both debt and equity need not be excessively risk-prone because their 
attitude will reflect their weighted average position as both creditors and 
shareholders” (Coffee, 1991: 1332). Bank shareholding creates a close relationship 
between banks and other firms (investee firms) making the banks active monitoring 
mechanisms with lower cost, and consequently minimize the information asymmetry 
problem (Diamond, 1984; Coffee, 1991). Also, banks have strong incentives to collect 
information about firms for monitoring purposes (Diamond, 1984), and their 
specialized knowledge helps to reduce information asymmetry. Moreover, Tian 
                                                          
15
 The owner-lenders situation provides an advantage as banks can offer loans to their clients (investee 
firms) with attractive rate of interest which decreases the cost of capital (Coffee, 1991). 
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(2004) indicated that banks are normally the main source of firms’ loans, and if 
managerial agency costs are assessed at high level, banks will not renew or provide an 
additional loan. This prohibits management from behaving opportunistically. 
On the other hand, a close relationship between banks and other companies may affect 
management incentives, induce companies to select unfavourable investment 
decisions and negatively affect companies’ value (Berlin et al., 1996; Mahrt-Smith, 
2006). By being lenders and owners at the same time, banks may face a conﬂict of 
interest and may give priority to their private benefits at the expense of general 
shareholders (Lin et al., 2009). For instance, banks may provide finance to corporate 
borrowers with higher costs, which in turn benefits bank owners and managers but 
other shareholders are not happy with these premiums (Coffee, 1991). Such problems 
may be more serious in emerging markets, where corporate governance system of 
both banks and companies are weak (Cull and Xu, 2000). 
Many empirical studies which are from developed countries agreed about the 
important role of banks ownership as facilitator of capital flow and providers of 
effective monitoring on related companies (Diamond, 1984; Barth et al., 2005). 
However, there is unclear evidence about the role of banks in developing countries 
where the corporate governance is poor and the banking system is still under-
developed. 
Lin et al. (2009) examined whether bank ownership affects firms’ performance in 
China. Using various proxies for operating performance, growth opportunities and 
valuation, they found that firms with bank ownership have a negative relationship 
with financial performance. They argue that easy access to bank loans motivate firms 
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to go through more investment when not all of this is feasible. Therefore, though the 
general positive correlation between investment and ﬁrm performance, the investment 
level at firms with leading bank shareholders relates negatively with performance 
measures (i.e. return-on-asset). This result is suggesting that banks most likely do not 
exert enough monitoring over their loans in investee firms. As a result, the better 
access to bank loans turns into a doubled-edged sword and affects ﬁrm performance, 
to a degree depending on monitoring context. 
From Japan, Morck et al. (2000) examined the effect of bank investments on firm 
value. Their result indicates that bank equity ownership increases the bank’s ability 
and willingness to charge higher interest rates from the investee firms. At the same 
time, the study showed that large bank ownership appears to positively affect firm 
value, by influencing firms’ investment policies, as higher level of bank ownership is 
associated with relaxed financial constraints, which allow companies to undertake 
more marginally acceptable investment opportunities. 
In Jordan, banks are the main source of external funds (Al-Fayoumi and Abuzayed, 
2009). All Jordanian banks are privately-owned, and there is no state ownership in 
these banks (a few were owned by the government but have been privatized since 
1996). Banks in Jordan hold equity investment in different companies in order to 
diversify their risk, and to maximise their wealth (Al-Fayoumi and Abuzayed, 2009). 
However, banks’ investment in Jordan is prohibited from holding substantial shares in 
other firms. Article 39 in Bank Law (2000) limits banks ownership to up to 10% in 
any firm’s capital.  
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Based on the literature discussion about the positive role of banks, it seems reasonable 
to expect that they have incentives and power to monitor financial reporting and 
penalize managers who report low earning quality, and therefore are more interested 
in higher audit quality. Given that the bank sector in Jordan is more developed, well-
managed and organized, and more committed with a corporate governance code 
compared to other sectors (Matar and Noor, 2007), the study therefore expects bank 
ownership will lead to higher audit quality. Thus, the study states the following 
hypothesis:  
H13: There is a significant positive relationship between financial institutions (banks) 
ownership and audit quality. 
 
4.1.4.2.4. Government ownership 
 
Government ownership is not like other types of ownership (Niemi, 2006). The 
government representatives are not the true owners (the actual owners are the people 
of the state), and therefore they have control without cash flow rights. However, they 
still have strong incentives to exercise effective control over the management in order 
to protect their reputation and to protect firm’s value (Niemi, 2006), and to increase 
the creditability to raise capital and to pass positive indications about their obligation 
to market oriented policies (Ben-Nasr et al., 2015). Thus, in the aforementioned 
scenarios, it is expected that the state representatives are more willing to demand 
intensive and high quality audit in order to protect firms’ assets, maintain their 
reputation or raise capital, and less care about monitoring (audit) cost.  
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Although some empirical studies reported potential benefits of government ownership 
like decreasing the probability of firms’ failure by providing bailout during financial 
distress (Faccio et al., 2006), state ownership increases agency cost (Ding et al., 2007) 
and it raises concerns of political expropriation (Faccio et al., 2006) and poor 
transparency (Bushman et al., 2004), which adversely affect other owners and firms’ 
value.  
On the other hand, government shareholders normally have less incentive for effective 
monitoring as their behaviour is mainly a function of political interests (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1994; Lim et al., 2014). Further, Johnson and Mitton (2003) stated that in the 
state representatives intentionally create an opaque information environment to hide 
their inefficiency and corruption. In this case it is expected that these representatives 
may resist appointing higher quality auditors. This argument is consistent with the 
empirical evidences that are presented by Ben Nasr et al. (2015) who documented a 
significant negative relationship between government ownership and earning quality 
based on a sample of newly privatized firms over a long period of time, 1990 to 2007. 
This result indicates that the state has greater incentives to report lower earnings 
quality in order to hide the potential “tunnelling” of corporate resources for political 
purposes, or to hide any actions that adversely affect other shareholders. 
Niemi (2005) addressed the effect of government ownership on audit quality in the 
Finnish market. By studying a sample of 200 non-financial companies and using data 
for year 1996, the study failed to find significant association between government 
ownership and audit quality.  
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Zeitun and Tian (2007) reported empirical evidence showing that government 
shareholding in Jordan has a negative impact on financial performance as measured 
by ROE. By using data for 59 public firms over the period 1989-2002; they concluded 
that government ownership is not as efficient as required, which leads to poor 
financial performance. However, since the mid-1990s, government ownership has 
largely decreased due to the privatization programme, and the foreign owners have 
increased as most of these investment were sold to them (ASX, 2014). The role of 
state ownership is expected to be better after completion of the privatization process 
(1996 to 2005) because the state ownership becomes more organized than before and 
focuses only on the most important and strategic investment. 
Attracting foreign investors is a priority for the Jordanian government due to the 
limited local resources (Zeitun and Tian, 2007). So, the subsequent governments 
worked hard during last two decades (mainly after the privatization process) to 
improve the governance and disclosure system, and to increase confidence in the 
overall economy and financial environment to attract more investment. Therefore, it is 
expected that the behaviour of government representatives in the listed Jordanian 
firms is consistent with the overall government strategy regarding attracting 
investments, and then they most likely demand high-quality audit to maintain firms’ 
value and provide positive signals for prospective investors. So, the relevant 
hypothesis for the effect of this type of ownership on audit quality is: 
H14: There is significant positive relationship between government ownership and 
audit quality. 
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4.1.5. Conclusion and literature gap 
 
While the corporate governance literature is concentrated in the developed markets, a 
little research has been conducted in countries where capital markets are less 
developed and where governance mechanisms are still evolving. However, high 
quality governance systems are equal, if not more, important in contexts that are 
attempting to develop their capital markets and to gain credibility among investors. 
MENA region16 markets and Jordan in particular attempt to boost investor confidence 
mainly after the economic reform plans and privatisation processes.  
The prior studies, that considered the impact of corporate governance effectiveness on 
audit, differ from this study in many ways. They used (1) different variables of 
corporate governance mechanisms and ownership structure, as well as different 
measures for these variables; (2) different approaches and methods; (3) different 
control variables and their measures; (4) different timescale of the examined data; (5) 
different thresholds of ownership concentration, and different ownership identities; 
(6) different data types which requires different analysis techniques i.e. regression for 
one year data (cross-sectional) or regression for many years (panel or pooled 
regression); (7) different estimation methods; and (8) different sample nature (some 
studies used samples of firms which are audited by Big 4 only; or used data of 
particular business sector only; or sample of small and non-listed firms). See tables 
4.1 and 4.2 at the end of this chapter which summarize the prior studies in details. 
                                                          
16
 Corporate governance is relatively new in this region, the legal system is far from being perfect, 
shareholder protection is under-developed, and independent monitoring mechanisms are still not as 
strong as in developed countries. 
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Extending the above brief points, further explanation about the study’s important 
contribution is summarized as follows. First, most of the relevant literature considered 
one or a few corporate governance mechanism(s) only and omitted other variables 
which (if the omitted variables related to the included variables) may make the 
estimated coefficient of the included variable both biased and inconsistent (Kmenta; 
Rediker and Seth, 1995). 
 Furthermore, failure to consider all relevant explanatory variables may lead to 
inconsistent and/or ambiguous findings, as well as lead to exclusion bias (Dinga, 
2011). Also, Niemi (2005: 305) stated “a significant omission in most fee models is 
controlling for ownership structure. If client ownership structure has an impact on 
audit production and fees, omitting it from the analyses of audit markets characterized 
by a wide range of client ownership structures increases the risk of incorrect 
conclusions”.  
Hence, given the shortage of included variables in the previous models employed, and 
given that the monitoring effectiveness emerges from mixed of corporate governance 
mechanisms rather than from just one (Rediker and Seth, 1995); this study targets a 
broad set of relevant variables which is expected to give more clear and robust results. 
To do so the study employs an augmented audit fees model which considers all 
measurable characteristics of boards of directors and audit committees, as well as all 
ownership types within the study environment as explanatory variables. 
Second, previous literature used different thresholds for ownership concentration. 
Mitra et al. (2007) used 5%, Hay et al. (2008) used 20%, O’Sullivan (2000) used 3%. 
Wiwattanakantang (2001: 326) stated “The reason of choice of the cut-off points is 
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not clear. It often looks like an ad hoc choice. The choice of cut-off points should be 
based on economic or legal frameworks of the given country”. Thus, this study is 
interested in examining the effect of all level of ownership. In this regard, because 
Jordanian companies are mandated to disclose ownership of 5% and above, the study 
will consider 5% as an ownership concentration threshold.  
Third, given that company size is a main determinant of audit fees (Simunic, 1984; 
Abbott et al., 2003), and has overwhelming influence over other firm characteristics; 
scaling audit fees according to firm size is essential to mitigate spurious correlations 
due to size and to reduce heteroscedasticity, and therefore to obtain better inferences 
at the end. Apart from Carcello et al. (2002); Abbott et al. (2003); Mitra et al. (2007), 
none of the previous literature considered this point, which makes the reported 
relationship with audit fees questionable as firm size is an important determinant of 
fees paid and dominates all other variables. 
Fourth, the study considers all salient ownership identities in the Jordanian market, 
which are family owners, foreign owners (Arab-foreign owners and non-Arab foreign 
owners), government, financial institution and non-financial institution owners. The 
previous studies about ownership structure and audit quality tend to be focused on one 
ownership type, e.g. family ownership (Niskanen et al., 2010); or institutional 
ownership (Kane and Velury, 2004; Mitra et al., 2007); or ownership concentration 
itself (Piot, 2001; Hay et al., 2008), notwithstanding that Niemi (2005) examined both 
foreign and state ownership.  
Fifth, apart from Niemi (2005) this study is the first study, to the best of my 
knowledge, which examines the effect of government ownership and foreign 
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ownership on audit quality. Niemi (2005) examined a sample of 200 non-financial 
companies in the Finnish context for 1996. The sample was limited to the firms that 
are audited by Big Six only due to data accessibility. He used dummy variables for 
foreign and state ownership (1 if the majority of shares are owned by the state, 0 
otherwise). Given that Foreign investment has become essential to global economic 
development, with flows exceeding US$1.5 trillion in 2011 (UNCTAD, 2012), and 
given that the openness of Jordanian capital market to foreign investors in recent 
years is associated with a greater demand for better corporate governance and high 
transparent financial numbers; it is worthwhile to study whether foreign ownership 
has association with high-quality audit. 
Sixth, the subject of board diversity has recently attracted more attention from 
regulators around the world. Further, a well-established management and psychology 
literature documents that female directors are more risk averse and more sensitive to 
loss (Watson and McNaughton, 2007). Also many corporate governance studies 
suggest that existence of female in the board of directors improves the monitoring 
process (Terjesen et al., 2009)  and financial performance (Adams and Ferreira, 
2009). Given these pieces of evidence, none of the previous studies (except a working 
paper was done in the US by Gul et al., (2012)) addressed the effect of gender 
diversity in the board on audit quality.  
Seventh, all relevant literature used data for one financial year, and consequently did 
the analysis through cross-sectional regression (except Zaman et al., 2011; Rustam et 
al., 2013; Hay et al., 2008; Niskanen et al., 2010; Vafeas and Weagelein, 2007; 
Basiruddin, 2011). Methodologically, Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) stated that the 
cross-sectional approach may give biased estimates of the relationship between 
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company characteristics and audit fees due to the endogenous determination of 
company characteristics and audit fees. To mitigate this problem, Vafeas and 
Waegelein (2007) suggest taking consideration of the parallel changes in the potential 
determinants of audit fees by employing additional years of audit fee data, i.e. 
comparing a firm to itself at a different time period. So, this study employs a data-set 
includes observations for different entities (115 Jordanian listed firms) over more than 
one year (six years from 2009 to 2014). Given this feature of the data-set, the panel 
approach in analysis is more appropriate. The panel data approach plays important 
role in controlling variables which are not observed or measured across entities or 
variables that may change over the time period but not in a consistent manner 
(Wooldridge, 2010). 
Eighth, the study contributes to the methodology literature by considering the analysis 
using different estimation methods including fixed-effect method, random-effect 
method and robust standard error estimation method, to ensure the validity of the data 
analysis. Finally, this model provides a detailed and timely review of corporate 
governance characteristics and ownership structure for a unique database which is 
hand-collected from a sample of 690 firm-year observations of all non-financial 
Jordanian listed companies between 2009 and 2014. This work significantly 
contributes to the existing body of knowledge, by providing more details about firm-
level corporate governance structures in Jordan as one of the Middle East and North 
African (MENA) countries. Furthermore, it has implications for regulatory 
authorities, professional bodies, corporate managers and boards, and academics. 
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Part two: Literature review and hypotheses development (second model) 
 
 
4.2.1. Introduction to the second empirical model (questionnaire survey) 
As discussed at the beginning of the thesis, the study seeks answers to the following research 
questions: 
RQ1: Do boards of directors and audit committees, as corporate governance 
mechanisms, have a significant impact on audit quality in a developing market like 
Jordan? 
RQ2:  Is the level of audit quality in Jordan related to the common ownership   
identities?  
RQ3: What changes to the extant governance regulatory framework do respondents 
believe would most improve audit quality? 
 
The first two empirical questions are examined based on the secondary data in the first model. 
However, the views of the important players in the corporate governance system about the 
role of these mechanisms, which are important, are still missing. So it would be useful to 
understand how the main practitioners in the governance system view corporate governance 
mechanisms and how these mechanisms affect audit quality; this area is under-researched. 
Consequently, the second model of the thesis, the questionnaire survey, tackles these two 
questions from the perceptual viewpoints of members, of directors, audit committees 
members and external auditors. This, therefore, provides a clearer understanding of how these 
respondents perceive the impact of these corporate governance mechanisms on audit quality.  
151 
 
The way different groups think about the role of these mechanisms may provide useful 
feedback for the regulatory bodies when considering current corporate governance practices.  
The overall purpose of this research is to obtain further insights into the impact that boards of 
directors and audit committees, as well as different ownership identities have in promoting 
high audit quality. Given this, the questionnaire survey will complement the first model by 
exploring an extended set of attributes/activities of boards of directors and audit committees 
that are difficult to measure using the methodology of the first model (i.e. not available in the 
published secondary data). In other words, the second model (survey approach) can, therefore, 
support and complement the findings derived from the secondary data model. In more detail, 
the second model examines the variables that are included in the secondary data model but by 
different methodology, and at the same time, it goes further and examines the other corporate 
governance attributes that have not been examined in the first model. By doing this, the study 
will complete the picture of the role of corporate governance mechanisms, as suggested by 
the local governance regulation, on audit quality. 
Also, the study is motivated to further understand the results of the secondary data model (the 
first model), which revealed a negative correlation between board size and audit quality, and 
also a negative correlation between gender diversity and audit quality. This will be carried 
out by the survey model (the second model), by asking the respondents about their views 
regarding the potential consequences of having a large board size and having women in the 
board of directors.   
In the first model of this thesis, audit fees have been used to capture audit quality in Jordan as 
the most appropriate audit quality indication in such a context. Thus, the survey model aims 
to test views of the respondents about the potential indicators of audit quality (Big 4 affiliates, 
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firm size, and industry specialisation as commonly reviewed proxies in the literature) in order 
to confirm the relevance of the audit fees proxy in Jordan, and also to see if the respondents 
provide different answer. 
On the other hand, taking into consideration the important role of the respondents in the 
corporate governance system, and given that the Jordanian corporate governance code is in its 
infancy; the third research question aims to look beyond the current governance 
recommendations to gain a complete understanding of the characteristics that determine 
boards of directors’ and audit committees’ effectiveness. This is by asking these relevant 
respondents regarding possible improvements to the current code (board of directors and 
audit committee-related suggestions) that they feel are important in promoting audit quality, 
apart from what is already recommended in the current governance code.  
 
 
4.2.2. Corporate governance and audit quality from perceptual viewpoints: hypotheses 
development 
 
4.2.2.1. Perceived role of boards of directors and audit quality 
 
A large and growing body of literature has investigated the role of the boards of directors and 
their quality in different corporate aspects. As an essential governance pillar, boards of 
directors have the ultimate responsibility for the functioning of the firm (Jensen, 1993) and 
their role includes a broad range of duties, powers, and responsibilities. 
Boards of directors have fiduciary duties to prepare credible financial statements, maintain 
firms’ financial records and protect shareholders interests. The directors’ role has grown in 
importance in light of recent governance regulations. The Jordanian Corporate Governance 
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Code (2008: 9) places more emphasis on directors’ responsibilities such as “(a) setting 
strategies, policies, plans and procedures that realise the objectives of the company, serve its 
interests, and maximise the rights of its shareholders, (b) setting necessary procedures to 
ensure that all shareholders, including non-Jordanians, enjoy their full rights and that they are 
treated in justice and equality without any discrimination, (c) taking necessary measures to 
ensure compliance with the laws in force, (d) organising the company's financial, accounting 
and administrative affairs by means of special internal regulations, … (g) Setting the 
company’s disclosure and transparency policy, and overseeing its implementation in 
accordance with the requirements of the regulatory authorities and the laws in force, … and 
(j) appointing the company's general manager and terminating his services”. 
Several attempts have been made to report the correlation between characteristics of boards 
of directors and audit quality. What we know about the role played by directors is largely 
based upon empirical studies that employ secondary data. The previous studies however 
failed to address many of directors’ characteristics/activities that have been highlighted by 
recent governance regulation and are difficult to be captured through those the secondary data 
studies  
Given the importance of survey studies to refine our understanding in this matter, there is a 
paucity of this type of research. Nevertheless, the survey carried out by Cohen et al., (2013) 
aimed to provide deep insights into the perceived effectiveness of governance regulations 
(e.g. board of directors-related regulations) in improving financial reporting and audit quality. 
The directors included in the study sample have expressed their opinions, which generally 
support the view that extant governance regulations strengths boards’ monitoring role. This 
confirms the findings of Cohen et al., (2004) and Bedard and Gendron (2010). 
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Moreover, Goodwin and Seow (2000) explored the perceptions of directors, investors and 
auditors in order to identify their opinions about corporate governance effectiveness (e.g. 
board structure). In this survey, the Singaporean respondents have been asked to indicate the 
optimal number of independent directors, the optimal board size to ensure effective corporate 
governance, and whether they support chairman-CEO separation. The results showed that 
36% of the respondents considered that the majority of board members should be 
independent and they also supported the separation of the position of CEO and chairman. 
This result highlights importance of board independence and separation of chairman position 
from CEO position, and this is therefore consistent with agency theory that assumes more 
independent board is favourable as it leads to more effective monitoring over executive 
management. 
By eliciting the opinions of 148 Australian directors, Nicholson and Newton (2010) 
highlighted how directors perceive their role in many activities (governance activities among 
those). The findings showed that the directors placed significant importance in their 
governance role e.g. defining their responsibilities within the governance system, engaging 
with management when defining the respective responsibilities of the board, and periodically 
reviewing and assessing management performance. The governance regulations across the 
world (JCGC among those) encourage boards of directors to take into account these 
responsibilities that therefore indicate for a diligent/effective board. 
Furthermore, Masood Foladi (2011) carried out a survey to explore the opinions of external 
auditors on the implications of corporate governance mechanisms for the audit process. 
Based on the respondents’ views, the most essential characteristics of corporate governance 
are board independence and audit committee independence. External auditors view boards of 
directors and audit committees as effective governance mechanism with respect to financial 
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reporting quality (boards of directors have been perceived as more powerful than audit 
committees). Further, the auditors have less confidence in the board when they are not 
independent. The auditors also believe that when the chairman holds the CEO position, the 
board’s ability to monitor and control management is diminished as a result of a lack of 
independence and a conflict of interest, which in turn leads to a less effective board. Audit 
committees with independent members are perceived to be more effective in protecting the 
external auditors from client pressure, as well as reducing the incidence of financial reporting 
problems and fraud. 
Goodwin and Seow (2002) examined the perceptions of external auditors and board members 
regarding the effect of different corporate governance mechanisms on financial reporting and 
audit quality. One of the main focuses was whether firms’ abilities to prevent and detect 
financial statement fraud and auditors’ abilities to perform effective audit work are influenced 
by directors’ effectiveness. The findings reported that effective directors have an impact in 
preventing financial statement fraud, detecting management misbehaviour and improving 
audit quality. 
Further to the above empirical discussion, boards of directors are expected to play a 
significant role in ensuring higher audit quality, as well as monitoring and facilitating the 
external auditors’ work. The relationship between boards of directors and external auditors is 
derived mainly from the oversight role of the board as follows. First, given that the board of 
directors has an oversight role over auditing and financial reporting processes, the external 
auditors provide a high quality audit in order to satisfy the boards’ expectations and to 
maintain a good relationship with their clients (Carcello et al., 2002 and Beasley, 1996). 
Second, the board of directors ask for high audit quality to maintain shareholders’ interests 
and to protect their reputations, i.e. approving untruthful financial statements can destroy 
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directors’ reputations (Carcello et al., 2002). Finally, the board of directors (and the audit 
committee) review the audit work and scope, and they have ultimate authority to select, 
evaluate, and, where appropriate, replace the external auditor (Blue Ribbon Committee, 
1999). 
Boards of directors play an important controlling and monitoring role over all corporate 
activities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and, in particular, they play an essential role in 
demanding and monitoring the external auditing. Consistent with agency theory assumptions, 
the effective boards of directors are expected to demand high audit quality to protect 
corporate assets and to bridge the gap between agents and principals by curbing managers’ 
misbehaviour and make sure that those managers are acting in the best interest of the 
company.  
The aforementioned discussion highlights the role of boards of directors in preventing 
financial statement error and ensuring credible audit quality as perceived by different 
respondents. The agency theory also hypothesizes that boards of directors act as an effective 
monitoring mechanism not just like a rubber stamp. Therefore, the study assumes that 
perceptions of the respondents will be in line with the monitoring approach which therefore 
contributes positively to audit quality. Thus, the study then draws the following hypothesis:  
H1: There is a presumption amongst boards of directors, audit committees and auditors that 
the role of boards of directors is positively associated with audit quality. 
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4.2.2.2. Perceived role of audit committees and audit quality 
 
Because of the significant expanded responsibilities attached recently to the role of the audit 
committee and because of the increased concerns about the quality of the corporate financial 
reporting process caused by recent accounting scandals, the role of audit committees has 
come under close scrutiny by both regulators and academics. In particular, this role has 
achieved greater importance since the 1990s after the enactment of a number of relevant 
regulations around the world. In Jordan, the Corporate Governance Code was enacted in 2008 
to boost investors’ confidence and develop the financial market. All these regulations have 
emphasised the necessity of audit committees’ existence and their role in improving financial 
reporting quality (Turley and Zaman, 2004; Ghafran and O'Sullivan, 2012).   
Previous literature and discussion have primarily been based upon annual reports’ disclosures 
to measure audit committee effectiveness (Zaman et al., 2011; Abbott et al., 2003, Carcello et 
al., 2002; Turley and Zaman, 2004; Collier and Gregory, 1996). However, little is known 
about what effective corporate governance practices regarding audit committees perceive as 
important in ensuring credible audit quality (i.e. role of audit committee in audit quality from 
perceptual viewpoints). Contessotto and Moroney (2013) reported that as it is difficult to 
observe actual audit committee effectiveness, thus survey method offers more reliable 
inferences.  
There have been relatively few opinion surveys regarding audit quality and what the 
important governance dimensions and determinants are. In an early study, Carcello et al. 
(1992) carried out a survey of the beliefs of financial statements’ preparers, external auditors 
and users within the US context. Responsiveness to client needs, compliance with the general 
standards (competence, independence and due care) and compliance with auditing standards 
were generally perceived to be more important in audit quality.  
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About 82% of the 253 US audit committee members believed that audit quality had improved 
after SOX, as per a survey carried out by the Centre for Audit Quality (2008). The perceived 
improvement in audit quality from audit committee members’ viewpoint was due to the level 
of communication with audit committees, the increased oversight role of audit committees, 
the increased emphasis on auditors’ quality; and more effective audit committee oversight 
over auditors.  
Furthermore, a survey of perceptions of US directors revealed that the impact of governance 
regulation on the relationship between external auditors and audit committees has improved 
audit quality. Cohen et al. (2009) reported that the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) strengthens the 
relationship between the audit committee and the external auditor. This positive association is 
mainly due to the enhanced expertise, experience, diligence, transparency and authority of the 
audit committee. The external auditor – audit committee alignment and communication, as 
well as the improved effectiveness of the audit committees were identified as important in 
improving the quality of financial reporting.  
DeZoort (1997) examined audit committee perceptions regarding their oversight role within 
firms. The findings show that many US audit committee members believe they do not have 
the required oversight expertise related to accounting and auditing, and they have agreed 
about the importance of holding sufficient expertise in these oversight areas. The results also 
indicate that audit committee members perform different roles beyond what is listed in the 
proxy statement and therefore agreed to expand their oversight responsibilities.  
Moreover, the survey of audit committees’ perceptions that was carried out by DeZoort 
(1997) shows that audit committees place more weight on internal control evaluation and 
perceive this as one of the most important areas of their oversight. This is in line with the 
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importance placed by different legislations on the role of the audit committee in evaluating 
and monitoring internal control systems. The survey also revealed other duties considered 
important, as perceived by audit committee members, includes evaluating the effectiveness of 
external auditors, and reviewing the financial statements. Evaluating special transactions and 
recommending and setting audit fees for the auditor were perceived as not important.  
Furthermore, by exploring the perceptions of 87 audit committee members, DeZoort (1998) 
evaluated whether audit committee members with experience in auditing and internal controls 
would make different internal control evaluations than members without this experience. His 
results indicate that the audit committee members with experience are more likely than those 
without such experience to make control evaluations more consistent with external auditors. 
The audit committee members with greater experience demonstrated a higher level of 
consensus and have a better understanding of the auditor’s role in disputes with management 
and are likely to assist the auditors in their dispute. 
Another study examining the perceptions of audit committee members with respect to the 
perceived importance of audit committee independence was carried out by DeZoort and 
Salterio (2001). The study tested the judgments of 68 audit committee members whose 
opinions were explored to determine the level of support they provided for the auditor vis-à-
vis management, in a situation including a disagreement over ambiguous accounting issues. 
The results supported the view that independent, well experienced audit committee members 
were more likely to support the auditor in a dispute with management.  
By eliciting opinions of among chief operating officers, internal auditors, external auditors 
and audit committee chairs, Haka and Chalos (1991) examined factors that form complete 
financial statement disclosure and factors that should influence accounting procedure choice. 
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They concluded that audit committee members tend to be interested in more disclosure than 
other groups. Moreover, the opinions of audit committee chairs and external auditors were 
not consistent regarding the impact of a number of factors (e.g. audit cost) that are important 
in the financial reporting process. External auditors and management have agreed on what 
should form financial statement disclosure and what should impact on accounting choice. 
Opinions of audit committee chairs, financial officers and audit partners were surveyed by 
Beattie et al. (2013) to explore what regulatory and economic variables contribute to audit 
quality. The three groups of respondents rated various audit committee interactions with 
auditors among the factors most enhancing audit quality. Overall, perceptions of all 
respondents stress the role of the audit committee in ensuring audit quality. Though the 
perceptions of the different groups are consistent to some extent, there are some different 
opinions attributable to their different roles and responsibilities. Audit committees are 
particularly enthusiastic about the regulatory recommendation about audit committees, e.g. 
their responsibility for recommending the appointment, reappointment and removal of 
auditors to the board as well as approving the remuneration of the external auditors. 
Evidence from developing markets comes from Kamel and Elkhatib (2013) who employed a 
questionnaire survey to examine the respondents’ perceptions (external auditors and financial 
managers or senior accountants) with respect to the role of audit committees in Egypt and 
their potential effect on financial reporting quality. The findings indicate that “reviewing 
significant changes in accounting policies” is the most important task for an effective audit 
committee, followed by internal control evaluation. The results also show that the vast 
majority of respondents have rated the independence of audit committee members and their 
financial experience as the most important attributes that should be considered when selecting 
the members of an audit committee. Finally, the study reported that the existence of a well-
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functioning audit committee is perceived as an effective corporate governance mechanism in 
restricting the incidence of financial statement fraud in Egypt. 
Beasley et al., (2009: 66) have designed a survey study to offer detailed insights into the 
effectiveness of the oversight role of audit committees. By exploring the responses of 42 
audit committee members, they concluded that “many audit committee members strive to 
provide effective monitoring of financial reporting and seek to avoid serving on ceremonial 
audit committees”. 
Cohen et al. (2002) suggested that auditors perceived audit committees to be lacking in 
effectiveness and power, and their role in communicating with the auditors was usually 
passive. Instead they perceived that boards of directors play a more active role. However, 
Stewart and Munro (2007) argued that these findings may not hold at the current time as audit 
committees get more attention and many related regulations are enacted, so further research is 
therefore needed. 
By surveying the perceptions of external auditors and boards of directors who are heavily 
involved in corporate governance in Singapore, Goodwin and Seow (2002) examined the 
perceived effect of the audit committee, internal control and the corporate code of conduct on 
financial reporting and the audit process. All of these mechanisms have some influence on 
financial reporting and audit quality. However, some differences were documented between 
two groups of respondents – auditors and directors; directors emphasised enforcing the 
corporate code of conduct while auditors have greater confidence in an effective internal 
control system. 
From the Australian context, (Stewart and Munro, 2007) examined auditors’ perceptions of 
the formation of an audit committee, the frequency of audit committee meetings and the 
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auditor’s attendance at those meetings on various aspects of the external audit. They pointed 
out that auditors believe that the existence of an audit committee significantly decreases the 
perceived audit risk and also the reduction in risk is influenced by meeting frequency and the 
audit partner’s attendance at meetings.  
Notwithstanding the range of opinions highlighted above about their effectiveness, audit 
committees are formed to assist boards and essentially oversee financial reporting and 
auditing activities (Dobija, 2015). Given this role, audit committees are expected by 
regulators to play a dominant role in monitoring and facilitating the external audit function, 
and therefore improving audit quality. Their role is clearly highlighted by the Jordanian 
corporate governance code (2008) and it takes different forms.  
First, reviewing and approving the appointment, reappointment, and removal of the external 
auditor, reviewing the independence and objectivity of the external auditor, and reviewing 
and approving the audit fee. Such activities might enhance auditors' independence and 
improve audit quality. Prior studies confirmed that the existence of an effective audit 
committee increases the external auditor’s independence because it make them free of 
management control, and it provides a channel of communication and resolves any problems 
that may arise between management and the auditor (Cadbury, 1992; Carcello and Neal, 
2003; Lee et al., 2004; Turley and Zaman, 2004). 
Second, the interactive communication between external auditors and the audit committee 
may increase audit quality (Truly and Zaman, 2004). JCGC (2008) grants the audit 
committee authority to communicate regularly with external auditors, to assess the external 
auditor's plan of work, to approve the external auditor’s evaluation of control procedures, to 
reviews its periodic and final reports and to discuss matters related to the audit, and therefore 
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make relevant recommendations to the board of directors. Regular communication between 
audit committee members and auditors could protect auditors from influence by management 
on accounting issues and thereby enhance audit quality.  
Third, the audit committee in Jordan plays a role in evaluating and supervising the internal 
control procedures to ensure its effectiveness. Lee et al. (2004) and Turley and Zaman (2004) 
pointed out that effective internal control helps in preventing reporting failure and 
management cheating, and in turn helps the external auditing process. Fourth, audit 
committees discuss matters related to the nomination of the auditors to ensure that they meet 
the requirements, and make a recommendation to the board of directors about their 
appointment (JCGC, 2008).  
From the agency theory perspective, audit committees are assumed to play active rather than 
passive monitoring roles; i.e. audit committees are assumed to be effective in carrying out  
their oversight tasks, monitoring management behaviour, and  monitoring the auditing 
process, and this, in turn, increase the confidence in the financial statements and reduce 
agency conflict (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
So, in addition to the above discussion of the empirical evidence and the agency theoretical 
framework, and given the highlighted role of the audit committee in the audit process 
throughout Jordanian regulation, as well as the reported findings of the first model; the study 
expects the role of audit committees in audit quality to be positive as perceived by the 
respondents, and draws the following hypothesis:  
 
H2:  Audit committees are perceived by boards of directors, audit committees and auditors to 
improve audit quality. 
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4.2.2.3. Perceived role of ownership structure and audit quality  
 
The second research question asks whether audit quality is contingent upon different types of 
ownership. Since the first empirical model has examined this using secondary data, the 
second model examines whether the various ownership identities have an impact on audit 
quality as viewed by directors, audit committee members and external auditors. Previous 
literature and discussions have been primarily based on annual reports’ disclosures to 
examine the effect of ownership structure on audit quality. However, there is a paucity of 
knowledge about the perceived role of different ownership identities in ensuring credible 
auditing.  
The concentration of ownership is considered as an internal corporate governance mechanism 
in order to protect investors’ interests, especially in developing countries where the legal 
system is weak and does not offer enough protection for investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
La Porta 1999). As large capital providers, blockholders have a significant role in monitoring 
and controlling managers’ decisions due to their ownership magnitude/voting power, and 
because they are better informed than individual investors, due to the analytical and 
information processing resources at their disposal (Jensen, 1993; Mitra and Cready, 2005; 
Khan et al., 2011). This leads to there being less information asymmetry and then less agency 
conflict.   
In addition to controlling management misbehaviour, large shareholders may demand a high 
audit quality for other reasons, e.g. large shareholders may ask for additional audit quality to 
monitor their investments and to protect their reputations, they might need additional and 
reliable information regarding the firm’s performance, and therefore they might expect the 
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auditors to compensate for a lack of control over other internal activities (Hay et al., (2008), 
and to assure minority shareholders that their interests are sufficiently protected (Fan and 
Wong, 2005; Piot, 2001). This, in turn, highlights the role of credible audit quality in 
protecting firms’ assets and owners’ reputations, and to align majority-minority interests.  
From eight East Asian countries which are characterised by ownership concentration, Fan 
and Wong (2005) examined whether external auditing plays an effective role as a corporate 
governance mechanism in such contexts. They found that high ownership concentration is 
associated with demanding more credible audit. They explained that the reason behind this 
result is that the large shareholders are interested to employ high-quality monitoring 
mechanisms to avoid the expropriation by management and assure other shareholders that 
their interests are protected. This result is in line with the agency theory propositions that says 
the controlling owners ask for high-quality audit in order to enhance the confidence of 
investors by decreasing information asymmetry. On the other word, given the 
demand for audit quality depends on the agency conflict level; higher audit quality is 
expected in this case to protect minority interests as suggested by agency theory. 
On the other hand, given that the different types of shareholders have different investment 
policies and then different degrees of incentives and abilities to exert effective monitoring 
(Lim et al., 2014), it is expected that these different ownership types will demand a different 
degree of audit quality to protect firms and minority owners’ wealth. Shareholders in Jordan 
typically are categorised into four main types: families, foreigners, government and 
institutions (banks and other institutions). Given that there is a paucity of relevant research 
from perceptual viewpoints, the study has a motivation to obtain more insights about the role 
of these ownership types in ensuring audit quality. 
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Consequently, in the light of the above discussion, the study develops the following 
hypothesis:  
H3: There is a presumption amongst boards of directors, audit committees and auditors that 
the different ownership types in Jordan are positively contributed to audit quality. 
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4.2.3. Conclusion and literature gap 
 
As essential governance mechanisms, boards of directors and audit committees have the 
ultimate responsibility for the functioning of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and Jensen, 
1993). Several attempts have been made to a report clear correlation between characteristics 
of boards of directors and audit quality. What we know about the role played by boards of 
directors and audit committees is largely based upon empirical studies that employ secondary 
data. The previous studies however failed to address many of directors’ 
characteristics/activities that have been highlighted by recent governance regulation and are 
difficult to be captured through the secondary data studies.  
The role of boards of directors includes a broad range of duties, powers, and responsibilities 
e.g. monitoring firm’s financial system, monitoring management, setting the risk 
management and disclosure policies, ensuring that the executive managers have the 
appropriate qualifications and experience needed to carry out their duties effectively, taking 
necessary procedures to ensure compliance with the relevant regulations in force. Boards of 
directors also should have an appropriate composition, diligence, and have appropriate 
knowledge resources. The importance of these attributes of boards of directors is underscored 
by Jordan Corporate Governance Code (2008) as an indication of board effectiveness in 
carrying out their duties effectively and, in particular, ensuring the integrity of financial 
statements. 
The reported literature in the second part of this chapter focuses on how effective boards of 
directors are perceived to be. However, these studies that consider perceptions of respondents 
suffer from a narrow focus on limited board attributes, e.g. board independence (Goodwin 
and Seow, 2000; Masood and Foladi, 2001), board monitoring over financial reporting 
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(Cohen et al., 2013), assessing management performance (Nicholson and Newton, 2010). 
Other attributes of the boards of directors that have been rated, by JCGC (2008), as important 
for ensuring financial statement quality have not yet been examined.  
In terms of audit committees, as the second corporate governance pillar, the reported 
literature focuses on the perceived importance of having a strong relationship between audit 
committees and external auditors, audit committee experience, and diligence (Cohen at al., 
2009 and Beattie et al., 2013), audit committee independence (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001; 
Kamil and Elkhatib, 2013), monitoring the auditing process, reviewing financial statements, 
reviewing internal control system, and reviewing audit fees (DeZoort, 1997, DeZoort, 1998; 
Kamil and Elkhatib, 2013), audit committee’s formation and frequency of meetings (Stewart 
and Munro, 2007).  
However, similarly to what has been mentioned regarding boards of directors above, these 
studies focus on narrow attributes of audit committees. Other audit committee attributes, as 
recommended by JCGC (2008), which are expected to play positive role in ensuring high 
audit quality have not yet been examined, e.g. the role of audit committees in reviewing and 
approving significant accounting policies, monitoring and reviewing financial risk 
management systems, reviewing the independence of the external auditor, reviewing and 
approving types and fees of non-audit service, reviewing and approving the appointment, 
reappointment and removal of the external auditor, and acquiring relevant information and 
monetary resources from management to achieve their duties effectively.  
Since this study aims to examine the extent to which the corporate governance practices in 
Jordan contribute positively to audit quality; the study will take into account an extended set 
of attributes/characteristics of boards of directors and audit committees which are highlighted 
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by JCGC (2008) (as mentioned briefly in the above paragraphs and discussed extensively 
later in the methodology and discussion chapters). The opinions of members of boards of 
directors, audit committees, and external auditors, as important players in the corporate 
governance system, about the effect of these governance mechanisms on audit quality offer 
deep insights into the role of current governance practices in ensuring high audit quality in 
Jordan and may provide useful feedback for the regulatory bodies in particular to consider 
current corporate governance practices. 
Moreover, the Jordanian market is characterised by different identities of shareholders, e.g. 
family owners, foreigners, government and institutions (banks and other institutions). 
Provided that the different types of shareholders have different investment policies and then 
different degrees of incentives and abilities to exert effective monitoring (Lim, How, & 
Verhoeven, 2014), it is expected that these different ownership types will demand a different 
degree of audit quality to protect firms and minority owners’ wealth. The results of 
examining the effects of these types of ownership may have a potential impact on the 
behaviour of investors and may affect their concerns that these types of shareholders may 
have an adverse effect on corporate assets and shareholders’ interests.  
Given the importance of refining our understanding in this matter, it is worth saying this is 
the first study that examines the perceived effect of ownership type on audit quality. The 
findings will also augment the first part’s inferences and will offer more insights about the 
role of these ownership types in ensuring audit quality. 
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Table 4.1: Summary of the literature which considered impact of corporate governance (board of directors and audit committees) on audit 
quality 
Authors  Country Independent variable(s) 
 
Sample & Methodology Main Findings 
O’Sullivan (1999) UK Board independence, role duality, 
and audit committee size. 
146 largest companies 
(measured by market 
capitalization) listed on the 
London Stock Exchange at 
the end of December 1995. 
OLS for Log of audit fees 
was employed. 
No significant relationship 
between all of the study 
variables and audit fees. 
O’Sullivan (2000) 
 
UK Board of directors’ independence, 
role duality, and ownership 
concentration directly after adoption 
of Cadbury report. 
 
402 listed firms in the UK for 
year 1992.  OLS for Log of 
audit fees was employed.  
Proportion of non-executive 
directors are positively related 
to audit fees level, and no 
relationship between large 
blockholders or role duality on 
audit quality measured by audit 
fees. 
Tsui et al., (2001) 
 
Hong Kong Board independence. 1038 quoted firms in Hong 
Kong in years 1994-1996. 
OLS regression was used. 
Negative relationship between 
board independence and audit 
fees. 
Carcello et al., (2002) 
 
USA Board of directors’ independence, 
role duality, board meetings, audit 
committee independence, audit 
committee expertise, and audit 
Used a regression for one 
year ended in March 1993, 
for Fortune 1000 companies. 
They considered the Big 6 
Positive relationship between 
all board characteristics and 
audit fees. When they added 
audit committee variables to 
the model they did not find any 
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committee meetings. clients only. relationship between audit 
committee characteristics and 
audit fees 
 
Abbott et al. (2003) 
 
USA 
Board of directors’ independence, 
board meetings, audit committee 
independence, audit committee 
expertise, and audit committee 
meetings. 
Used cross-sectional 
regression for 492 US Big 5-
audited firms between 
February 5, 2001 and June 
30, 2001.  
Positive relationship between 
audit committee independence 
and financial expertise, and of 
audit fees. No significant 
relationship between and 
number of audit committee 
meetings and audit fees. 
Lee & Mande (2005) 
 
USA Audit committee independence, and 
frequency of audit committee 
meetings. Also, whether 
Bumiputera-controlled firms pay 
higher audit fees.  
792 US firms that audited by 
Big 5 only for year 2000. 
Single equation models 
estimated using OLS and the 
simultaneous equation 
models estimated using two-
stage least squares (2SLS). 
Positive relationship between 
Audit committee independence, 
and frequency of audit 
committee meetings and audit 
fees. 
Yatim et al., (2006) 
 
Malaysia Board of directors’ independence 
and frequency of audit committee 
meetings. 
Cross-sectional regression of 
736 listed firms for the year 
ending in 2003. 
Positive relationship between 
external audit fees and board 
independence, audit committee 
expertise, and the frequency of 
audit committee meetings. 
Further, the study found a 
strong negative association 
between audit fees and 
Bumiputera-owned firms. 
Vafeas & weagelein 
(2007) 
USA Audit committee independence, 
audit committee expertise, and audit 
Fortune 500 firms and spans 
the 2001–2003. OLS 
regression for each year 
 Board independence, size, and 
meetings, and audit committee 
independence, experience, and 
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 committee size. separately and then for all 
years together (pooled). 
size, are all positively 
associated with audit fees. 
 
Gul et al., (2012) 
(Working paper) 
USA Gender diversity in the board. A sample of US firms from 
2001 to 2003. A pooled cross-
sectional regression was used. 
 
 
 
 
Existence of female, as well as 
proportion of female in the 
board related audit effort 
proxied by audit fees.  
Also, non-executive female 
demands more audit effort. 
Bliss (2011) 
 
Australia Board of directors’ independence 
and board size. 
950 Australian non-financial 
firms in 2003. OLS 
regression. 
Positive correlation between 
board independence and audit 
fees. However, the relationship 
turns to be insignificant in the 
presence of CEO duality. 
Board size positively correlated 
with audit fees. 
Zaman et al., (2011) 
 
UK Audit committee independence, 
audit committee expertise, and audit 
committee meetings, and audit 
committee size. 
 135 UK listed companies. 
Utilised pooled OLS 
regression. 
Significant positive association 
between audit committee 
effectiveness and audit fees.  
Rustam et al., (2013) Pakistan Committee effectiveness and CEO 
Compensation Incentives. 
Used panel data regression 
for 50 Pakistani firms. 
Audit committee activity and 
committee member's 
independence are positively 
associated with audit fee levels. 
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In contrast, CEO pays 
incentives neither complements 
nor substitutes for audit effort 
in disciplining company 
management. 
Rainsbury et al., 2009 NZD Audit committee independence and 
expertise 
87 listed firms in New 
Zealand. 
OLS regression for year 
2001. 
The relationship between audit 
committee quality and audit 
quality was insignificant. No 
relationship between audit 
committee quality and the 
quality of financial reporting.  
Basiruddin (2011) UK Board & audit committee 
characteristics, audit fees and 
earning management  
FTSE 350 firms over years 
2005-2008. OLS pooled 
regression is used in 
particular 
Board independence correlated 
positively with audit fees. Also, 
higher quality auditors are 
likely to reduce earnings 
management. 
Collier and Gregory 
(1996) 
UK Audit committee existence A regression model for audit 
fees of a sample of FTSE 500 
at the end of 1991. 
A positive relationship between 
audit fees and the presence of 
an audit committee. 
Goodwin-Stewart and 
Kent (2006) 
Australia Audit committee existence, audit 
committee characteristics and 
internal audit. 
OLS regression for a sample 
of 401 Australian firms for 
one year 2000 (a 
questionnaire  survey sent to  
Australian listed companies 
seeking information 
on their internal audit 
activities) 
Higher audit fees are related to 
the existence of an audit 
committee, more frequent 
committee meetings and 
increased use of internal audits. 
However, no significant 
relationship between audit 
committee expertise and audit 
fees. 
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Krishnan & Vesvanthan, 
2009 
US Audit committee financial expertise sample of S&P 500 for the 
years 2000 – 2002 
Negative relationship between 
accounting financial expertise 
in audit committees and audit 
pricing. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2a): summary of studies about role of concentration ownership and ownership identities in audit quality 
Author(s) Context Variable studied/study aim(s) Methodology Main results 
 
Mitra, Hossain & Deis 
(2007). 
Institutional investors 
 
US Ownership characteristics and 
audit fees; 
Comparing the effect of small 
institutional shareholders (less 
than 5%) and large institutional 
shareholders (5% and more) on 
audit fees. 
Cross-sectional least square 
regression model,  
Only for US industrial firms 
that are engaged in 
manufacturing & 
merchandising operation and 
that only audited by Big 5 
firms- for year 2000. 
R2 is 66.9% 
Revealed evidence of a 
significantly positive 
relationship between diffused 
institutional stock ownership 
(i.e., having less than 5% 
individual shareholding) and 
audit fees, and a significantly 
negative relationship between 
institutional 
blockholder ownership (i.e., 
having 5% or more individual 
shareholding) and audit fees. 
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Lasse Miemi 2005;  
 
 
Finland Foreign ownership (foreign-
owned subsidiaries), state 
ownership and audit fees in 
Finland. 
Examined sample of 200 
non-financial companies in 
Finnish context for year 
1996. The sample limited to 
the firms that are audited by 
Big Six only due to data 
accessibility.  
He used dummy variables 
for foreign and state 
ownership (1 if majority of 
shares owned by state, 0 
otherwise). R2 is 48% 
 Audit fees as proxy for audit 
quality are higher in foreign-
owned subsidiaries.  Also, no 
difference between 
companies owned by the state 
or and companies with a more 
diverse ownership structure 
can be found. 
Niskanen et al., 2010 Finland Family ownership & audit quality 
(Limited to private family firms). 
Finnish private firms for 
fiscal years 2000 to 2006. 
Using The logit regression 
model. big4 Dummy variable  
R2 16% 
Big 4 model used to capture 
audit quality. 
Their conclusion indicates 
Family owners increase 
firms’ incentives to employ 
Big 4 audit firms to increase 
their financial statements’ 
credibility. 
Kane & Velury (2004) 
 
US Institutional investors and audit 
quality 
Sample of all non-regulated 
US industries firms between 
1992 and 1996, and 
employing logistic 
regression model for auditor 
size. 
Positive association between 
institutional ownership and 
audit quality measured by 
dichotomous auditor size.  
Hay, Knechel  & Ling 
(2008) 
New Zealand Ownership concentration, 
Internal audit, existence of audit 
A sample consists of 130 
Companies. OLS regression 
Positive relationship between 
all studied variables and audit 
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committee. for 1995 and 2005. fees in both years. 
Piot (2001) 
 
France Whether ownership concentration 
related to higher audit quality 
(proxied with a triple distinction 
of auditor reputation: Big Six, 
national Majors and Local audit 
firms) 
Multivariate logistic, and 
univariate analysis used for a 
sample 285 observation in 
year 1998. 
Positive correlation between 
insider ownership and audit 
quality. 
 
Table 4.2b: Summary of studies about role of different ownership types in other corporate aspects (for further highlight on role of these 
ownership types) 
Dechun Wang, 2005 US Family ownership and earning 
quality (proxies for earnings 
quality: abnormal accruals, 
earnings informativeness, and 
persistence of transitory loss 
components in earnings). 
4,195 firm-year observations 
that have proxy statements 
available in Lexis-Nexis 
from 1994 through 2002 for 
the 542 unique firms. 
The empirical results show 
that, on average, founding 
family ownership is 
associated with higher 
earnings quality. In particular, 
I find consistent evidence that 
founding family ownership is 
associated with lower 
abnormal accruals, greater 
earnings informativeness. 
Ben Nasr et al., 2015 Different 
countries 
The impact of state and foreign 
ownership on earnings quality. 
The sample is 350 newly 
privatized firms from 45 
countries. 
350 newly privatized firms 
from 45 countries. 
They documented a positive 
relationship between foreign 
shareholders and earnings 
quality (foreign ownership 
related to smaller abnormal 
accruals, higher earnings 
informativeness) and more 
persistent earnings. This 
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result supports the argument 
that expects foreign owners 
require higher earnings 
quality to curb management 
expropriation. 
Zeitun & Tian (2007) Jordan Impact of government ownership 
and financial performance 
(measured by return on assets 
(ROE) 
59 publicly listed companies 
on the Amman Stock 
Exchange over the period 
1989-2002. 
Negatively correlation 
between government 
ownership and firm 
performance 
Alnajjar (2015) Jordan Foreign ownership on financial 
performance (measured by ROA 
& ROE) in tourism firms. 
A sample of 15 listed 
tourism firms and employing 
panel data model. 
The finding showed no 
relationship between foreign 
ownership and financial 
performance.  
Ding, Zhang and Zhang 
(2007) 
China Concentration ownership earning 
management. 
273 Chinese companies 
listed in 2002. Cross-
sectional multivariate 
regression. Both 
discretionary accruals and 
non-operating income/sales 
used as proxies for earning 
management.  
Relationship between 
earnings management 
measures and ownership 
concentration exhibits an 
inverted U-shape pattern 
(earning management related 
to controlling owners till 55% 
ownership level).  
Lim,  How & 
Verhoeven (2014) 
Malaysia Concentration and identity of the 
largest shareholder matter to the 
timeliness of corporate earnings, 
measured by a stock price-based 
timeliness metric and the 
reporting lag 
Panel data of 1276 
Malaysian firms from 1996 
to 2009 
Main finding showed find a 
non-linear relationship 
between concentrated 
ownership, measured by the 
largest shareholding in a firm, 
and the reporting lag but not 
the timeliness of price 
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discovery.  
Jiang and Kim (2004) Japan Foreign ownership and 
information asymmetry 
A sample over 18-year 
period from 1976 to 1994. 
Time serious and cross-
sectional models are 
employed to test timing and 
magnitude of intertemporal 
return-earnings associations 
as indication for information 
asymmetry. 
Negative relationship 
between foreign ownership 
level and information 
asymmetry. 
He, Donghui Li, Shenb, 
Zhang (2013) 
Different 
countries 
Foreign ownership and stock 
prices informativeness (measured 
by the probability of informed 
trading and price non-
synchronicity). 
The sample covers 3189 
firms with foreign block 
ownership data in 40 markets 
in 2002. cross-sectional 
regression is used  
The finding indicates that 
foreign owners contribute to 
the informativeness of stock 
prices.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This chapter starts by discussing the research philosophy and paradigms that commonly used 
in the business research and clarify where this research fits in these paradigms. The following 
part presents the methodology used to test the hypotheses for the first empirical model 
(secondary data model). The last part in the chapter covers the methodology used for the 
second model (questionnaire survey model).  
 
5.1. Research philosophy 
 
Following an appropriate scientific approach is important for researchers to obtain the truth 
about the subject under investigation (Sekaran and Bougie, 2013). There are two fundamental 
ways of thinking about research philosophy which are ontology and epistemology, and the 
difference between them affects the way in which researchers think about the research 
process (Saunders et al., 2007). 
Ontology is concerned with the nature of reality (Saunders et al., 2007), so all scientific 
research is based on perceptions about what is around us, how does the world operate, and 
what can be possibly discovered by research (Sekaran and Bougie, 2013). Objectivism and 
subjectivism are two common perspectives of ontology, and both could result in valid 
knowledge.  
Epistemology, on the other hand, is called the theory of knowledge as it is concerned with 
what constitutes valid knowledge. The essential question of epistemology is “can the 
approach to the study of the social world, including that of management and business, be the 
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same as the approach to studying the natural sciences? And the answer to that question points 
the way to the acceptability of the knowledge developed from the research process” 
(Saunders et al., 2007: 108). Positivism and interpretivism are the two common aspects of 
epistemology. Following is a brief discussion about these aspects alongside ontology’s 
aspects as the most important perspectives for business research.  
Positivism is a philosophical position of research in dealing with the observation of social 
reality so the final research product can be law-like generalisations similar to those produced 
by natural scientists (Saunders et al., 2007). From a positivist perspective, the world is 
governed by cause and effect laws that can be understood by employing a scientific approach 
of research (Sekaran and Bougie, 2013). The scientific approach given this perspective is 
seen as the means to obtain the truth (Sekaran and Bougie, 2013). Thus, the philosophy here 
is based on developing and testing research hypothesis based on propositions of a certain 
theory. Also, the researcher is assumed as entirely independent, value-free, and unbiased 
(Hussey and Hussey, 1997). 
Contrary to Positivism view, Interpretivism is an epistemology that holds a view that the 
world around us is mentally constructed and it is, therefore, interested in understanding what 
is happening in people’s mind and/or how people create knowledge rather than searching for 
the objective truth (Sekaran and Bougie, 2013). The relevant research method for 
Interpretivism research is often qualitative, that enables the researcher to obtain a rich and 
more context-relevant data, for example via focus groups or interviews (Sekaran and Bougie, 
2013). Generalizability is not deemed a priority from interpretivists point of view. Given the 
nature of the business environment which is continuously changing, interpretivists would 
argue that evidence from today’s research may not hold valid for next year which therefore 
makes generalizability less important.  
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Objectivism is an ontological stance proposes that social phenomena and their meanings exist 
independently/ external to social actors (Bryman and Bell, 2015, Saunders et al., 2007). 
Based on this view, entities are seen as social groups that have physical existence (objective 
reality). Subjectivism, on the another hand, assumes social phenomena and their meanings 
are not independent from social actors (Bryman and Bell, 2015). Saunders et al., (2007: 108) 
stated that subjectivist view “is that social phenomena are created from the perceptions and 
consequent actions of social actors. What is more, this is a continual process in that through 
the process of social interaction these social phenomena are in a constant state of revision”. 
Moving forward, the extent to which researchers are clear about the theory when they start 
their research raises an important question concerning the design of the research (Saunders et 
al., 2007). This question is whether the research is deductive or inductive. The deductive 
approach means that the researcher develops hypotheses based on a specific theory and 
employs an appropriate methodology to examine the hypotheses (Saunders et al., 2007). 
Saunders et al., (2007: 109) summarised a number of important characteristics for the 
deductive approach. First, this approach is concerned with causal relationships between 
variables e.g. whether a change of dependent variable is contingent to a change in 
independent variable(s). Second, the deductive approach controls to allow hypotheses testing 
which ensures that any change in the dependent variable is a function of the research 
independent variable by controlling effect of other potential variables. 
Third, the deductive approach dictates that the researcher should be independent of what is 
being observed, i.e. have no direct intervention. For example a researcher only collects 
secondary data, or when the role of a researcher merely involves collecting primary data from 
self-administrated questionnaires, without having any direct intervention that may affect 
respondents’ answers. Fourth, concepts involved in a study have to be employed in a way that 
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enables facts to be measured quantitatively. The final characteristic is generalisation, which 
requires selecting a sufficient sample size in order to generalise research outcome. 
 Inductive analysis is the second research approach. In this approach, the researcher collects 
data (usually through observations or interviews) and develops a theory as a result of data 
analysis i.e. a researcher observe phenomena and based on data analysis induces a theory (e.g. 
grounded theory) (Saunders et al., 2007, Sekaran and Bougie, 2013). Studies using this 
approach are likely to be more interested in the environment in which such events are taking 
place (Saunders et al., 2007). Therefore, contrary to the deductive approach, in inductive 
approach the study of a small sample is more appropriate than a large one (Saunders et al., 
2007). This also indicates that inductive research is less interested in generalisation. Table 5.1 
presents the major differences between deductive and inductive approaches.  
In summary, given the above discussion, this study employs a deductive approach. In the 
field of corporate governance and audit quality there is a wealth of literature that makes it 
more natural to draw hypotheses based on the available literature and theories (Creswell, 
2013). Quantitative method is considered to be more relevant to this research as the objective 
is to empirically investigate the causal relationship among the research constructs. Hence, 
after a careful analysis of the literature, theory and contextual factors, hypotheses were 
deduced and translated into operational terms as presented in chapter four. 
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Table 5.1: Major differences between inductive and deductive research approaches 
Deduction emphasises Induction emphasises 
 moving from theory to data 
 the need to explain causal 
relationships  between variables 
 the collection of quantitative data 
 the application of controls to ensure 
validity of data 
 the operationalisation of concepts to 
ensure clarity of definition 
 a highly structured approach 
 researcher independence of what is 
being researched 
 the necessity to select samples of  
sufficient size in order to generalise 
conclusions 
 gaining an understanding of the 
meanings humans attach to events 
 a close understanding of the research 
context 
 the collection of qualitative data 
 a more flexible structure to permit 
changes of research emphasis as the 
research progresses 
 a realisation that the researcher is 
part of the research process 
 less concern with the need to 
generalise 
Source: Saunders et al., (2007: 120): Research Methods for Business Students, 4th edition. 
 
 
5.2. Research paradigms 
 
A paradigm is a term used in the social sciences which indicates the “way of examining 
social phenomena from which particular understandings of these phenomena can be gained 
and explanations attempted” (Saunders et al., 2007: 112). Bryman and Bell (2004) also 
defines paradigm as a way by which a research should be conducted and the results should be 
interpreted. 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) indicates that the research paradigms aim at assisting researchers 
in “clarifying their assumptions about their view of the nature of science, offering a useful 
way of understanding the way in which other researchers approach their work; helping 
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researchers plot their own route through their research to understand where it is possible to go 
and where they are going” (cited in Saunders et al., 2007: 113). 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) presented four research paradigms which are; radical humanist, 
radical structuralist, interpretive and functionalist. At the same time, there are also four 
conceptual dimensions which are arranged to be related to the four paradigms which are 
radical change, regulation, subjectivist and objectivist as presented in figure 5.1. Subjectivist 
and objectivist are the most common aspects of ontology as presented above. Radical change 
dimension relates to “a judgement about the way organisational affairs should be conducted 
and suggests ways in which these affairs may be conducted in order to make fundamental 
changes to the normal order of things” (Saunders et al., 2007: 112). Regulation dimension, on 
the other hand, is less judgemental than radical change. It is interested in how organisational 
affairs are managed and provides an improvement to the current situation (works within the 
existing framework) without doing a substantial change in the organisational affairs 
(Saunders et al., 2007). 
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Figure 5.1: Four paradigms for the analysis of social science 
Radical change 
 
 
 
Subjectivist 
 
Radical Humanist 
 
Radical Structuralist 
 
 
 
Objectivist  
Interpretive 
 
 
Functionalist 
Regulation 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979:22). Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis. 
 
The functionalist paradigm is located on the objectivist and regulatory dimensions, and it is 
the most common paradigm that operates in business research (Saunders et al., 2007). Under 
this paradigm, researchers are more interested in a rational explanation of why a particular 
organisational event is happening and developing a set of recommendations to be adopted in 
the current situation (Saunders et al., 2007). Saunders et al., (2007) stated that the important 
proposition here is that organisations are assumed to be rational, in which rational 
explanations provide solutions to rational problems.  
The interpretive paradigm is the epistemology philosophical position that holds a view that 
the world around us is mentally constructed and it is therefore interested in understanding 
what is happening in people’s mind rather than searching for the objective truth (Sekaran and 
Bougie, 2013). Unlike emphasizing rationality as functionalist paradigm assumes, 
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interpretive paradigm is more likely to be interested in discovering irrationalities (Saunders et 
al., 2007). 
The radical humanist paradigm is stated within the subjectivist and radical change dimensions 
(Figure 5.1). As mentioned before, the radical change dimension adopts a substantial change 
on organisational structure. Thus, this paradigm concerned with radical change to the current 
organisational situation not just recommendations for improvement. Subjectivist perspective 
in research would be used for this paradigm (as well as for interpretive paradigm) as an 
ontological philosophy. 
The final paradigm is radical structuralist which is attached with radical change and 
objectivist dimensions. Its view is to achieve radical change based on analysing 
organisational phenomena and at the same time “adopts an objectivist perspective because it 
is concerned with objective entities, unlike the radical humanist paradigm which attempts to 
understand the meanings of social phenomena from the subjective perspective of 
participating social actors” (Saunders et al., 2007: 113).   
This study shows the research paradigms that are commonly used in business and 
management literature. After considering the previous research methods philosophies and 
taking into consideration the dominant paradigm followed in business studies, this research 
employs the positivism philosophy standpoint as the best relevant one to the researcher’s 
philosophical orientation. Hypotheses of the study were proposed based on agency theory in 
particular, and a causal relationships were introduced between variables. The researcher 
maintained independence particularly in the data collection process which help in producing 
objective quantitative data. Following this philosophy allows the results to be generalised 
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from the sample to the population (figure 5.2 below shows how this study fits within research 
philosophies and approaches).  
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Figure 5.2: Research philosophy and study models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from Iskander (2008): the relationship between auditing expectations gap and voluntary 
corporate disclosure: Egyptian evidence 
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5.3. Research methodology: first empirical model  
 
The first section in this part provides description of the sample, the sources of data and 
justification of the time period during which the investigation was carried out. The chapter 
then outlines the definitions and measurements of the study variables (hypotheses and control 
variables). Third section is about descriptive statistics. Fourth section is about testing the 
correlations between the variables. Estimation methods, model specifications are discussed in 
section five. 
 
5.3.1. Sample description 
 
The population of the study is the listed non-financial companies in Amman Stock Exchange. 
The total listed non-financial firms in ASE at the end of 2014 are 177 firms (table 5.2). The 
financial companies are excluded because they are normally considered separately due to 
differences in their businesses and regulatory environment (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). 
Furthermore, annual reports for 62 firms have missing data regarding audit committee 
characteristics in particular. These firms stated in their annual reports that they have audit 
committees (the hierarchy diagrams show the presence of audit committee as well), but they 
do not offer details of audit committee members which make it difficult to obtain the required 
information e.g. member independence or financial expertise). 
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 Thus, as presented in table 5.2A, the final sample is 115 public non-financial firms (out of 
177 or 65%)
17
. The size of final sample appropriately represents the population (table 5.2B) 
and therefore helps to generalize the findings of the study (it is consistent with the guidelines 
for sample size provided by Sekaran and Bougie (1992). The further detailed classification of 
the firms also shows that all industries’ sub-sections are represented (table 5.2C). 
Jordanian Code of Corporate Governance is published in 2008 by Jordan securities 
commission (JSC), and the public shareholding firms have been asked to adapt with this code 
starting from the beginning of 2009. Also, because of the data availability and because of the 
time frame for the research, the study is unable to include 2015 in the sample.  Therefore, the 
study covers period from 2009 to 2014 inclusive. The data is manually collected through 
annual reports. Jordan Securities Commission’s website and firms’ websites are mainly used 
to download the annual reports
18
.  
Table 5.2: Sample description 
Panel A: Sample determination  Numbers 
Listed non-financial companies in ASE as 31/12/2014  177 
Missing data   (62) 
Final sample  115 
Panel B: Sectors in Jordan as classified by ASE Total population Sample included 
- Financial sector excluded excluded 
- Manufacturing sector 64   43 
- Services sector 113   72 
Total 177   115 
                                                          
17
 The proportion of sample to total population was 60% in Zaman et al., (2011); 34% in Carcello et al., (2002); 
29% in Goodwin and Stewart (2006). 
18
 The researcher contacted some firms via email and phone to obtain some missing data. 
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Panel C: Detailed classification of sectors 
 
Total population 
 
Sample included 
Services sector   
- Health care 4 3 
- Education 6 4 
- Hotel and tourism 11 8 
- Transport 11 5 
- Communication 1 1 
- Media 2 1 
- Utilities 3 2 
- Commercial services 75 48 
                    Total for service firms 113 72 
Industrial sector   
- Pharmaceutical 6 6 
- Chemical 10 7 
- Paper and printing 4 2 
- Food and beverage 10 7 
- Tobacco 2 2 
- Mining 14 10 
- Engineering and construction 7 4 
- Electric industries 5 3 
- Textile and leather 6 2 
Total for Industrial firms 64 43 
 
 
192 
 
 
5.3.2. Definition of variables 
 
5.3.2.1 Dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable for the study is audit quality which is measured using audit fees as a 
proxy. As discussed in the previous chapter, the audit fees level implies the quality of audit 
provided, ceteris paribus, either through greater audit effort (more hours) or through greater 
expertise of the auditor (higher billing rates) (Francis, 2004).  
O’Sullivan (2000) used the amount of the audit fee as a proxy for audit quality. He argued 
that it is reasonable to assume that more audit investigation will require more audit hours 
and/or the use of more specialized audit staff, resulting in higher fees.  
Prior studies acknowledge the link between audit quality and fees, and  confirms that larger 
audit fees reflect high audit quality through greater audit effort (O'Sullivan, 2000; Carcello et 
al., 2002; Abbott et al., 2003; Caramanis and Lennox, 2008; Bliss, 2011; Zaman et al., 2011). 
Audit fees level is correlated positively with more audit effort which influences the ability of 
the auditors to discover material misstatements (Lobo and Zhao, 2013), constrain earnings 
management (Blankley et al., 2012), and increase accrual quality (Mande and Son, 2015). 
The audit fees variable is transformed to natural log ln_FEES to help in achieving normality 
of data, in order to prevent the largest firms from influencing the findings (Basiruddin, 2011). 
Data for this variable is obtained from annual reports as Jordanian public firms are mandated 
to disclose audit fees in their annual reports. 
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5.3.2.2. Explanatory variables 
 
Board of directors’ variables 
 
The Jordan Corporate Governance Code (2008) prescribes a number of characteristics for the 
structure of boards of directors. Most important recommended attributes are addressed by this 
study as indicators of board effectiveness. First, JCGC (2008) emphasizes the importance 
board of directors’ independence. The code recommends that one-third of directors at least 
should be independent in order to carry out effective monitoring away from management 
pressure. To do so, independent directors are expected to demand high quality audit to 
maintain shareholders’ interests and to protect their reputation. Cohen et al., (2002) stated 
that the primary characteristic for board members in the agency perspective is their 
independence from management. This study measures the board independence variable as a 
percentage of independent members to board’s total members. Due to varying board’s size in 
different firms, considering an absolute number leads to biased results (Abbott et al., 2003). 
For example, the effect or power of five independent directors in a board containing ten 
members is not equivalent to the effect of five independent directors in a board containing 
only six members. This is also applicable for gender diversity, audit committee independence, 
and audit committee expertise. This is also applicable to gender diversity, audit committee 
independence and audit committee expertise proxies. 
Second, JCGC (2008) recommends chair-CEO separation. Holding positions of chairman and 
CEO by the same person leads to conflict of interests as different tasks are assigned to each 
position. Jensen (1993) argues that it is necessary to separate the CEO and the chairperson 
positions for the board to ensure effective monitoring.  
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Third, Large board size has unclear effect; in one view, the large board size increases the 
board expertise and knowledge and leads to more monitoring effectiveness, (Adams and 
Mehran, 2011). In the opposite view, large board size results in less meaningful dialogue 
between its members, and more difficult to express their opinions (Lipton and Lorcsh, 1992), 
more communications problems (Bliss, 2011) and less effective in monitoring management 
(Jizi et al., 2013). Therefore, due to these arguments, the study finds it better to keep the 
expected association with audit quality as neutral. 
Fourth, more frequent meeting may indicate a more active board, and may be used as a proxy 
for the time directors have to monitor management (Vafeas, 1999). The number of board 
meetings may be used as an indication of the efforts exerted by directors, as well as an 
indication of their closer monitoring over management. Thus, the study expects that audit 
quality is positively associated with more diligent directors. 
Finally, the existence of females in boards of directors improves the monitoring process, and 
leads to more effective board (Gul et al., 2011, Adams and Ferreira 2009, Nielsen and Huse, 
2010, and Terjesen et al.,  2009), improves earning quality (Srinidhi et al., 2011), and reduces 
conflict levels (Nielsen and Huse, 2010). Moreover, women are generally considered more 
risk averse than men, and their decisions tends to be more conservative (Watson and 
McNaughton, 2007). Also, women are more sensitive to losses and they can give more of a 
risk management advantage over men (Schubert, 2006).  
On the other hand, the existence of female in the board may have adverse effect. Adams & 
Ferreira (2009) argued that women as a directors in the board could negatively affect the firm 
value because the over monitoring probably leads to is counterproductive results. Thus, 
gender diversity not always beneficial for board effectiveness (Nielsen and Huse, 2010).  
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Given that the Jordanian is considered as a conservative community, the study expects that 
the existence of women in the board might make it more conservative and more risk averse, 
and in turn additional monitoring and will demand more audit quality 
The representation of female directors in the sample is still small compared to other countries 
(4% of the total directors)
19
. Also, those women are not independent and they do not hold any 
executive positions in their firms. So, the variable of gender diversity (GEND) in represents 
non- executive and non-independent females. This study measures this variables using 
proportion of female members to total members. 
Therefore, based on the above discussion and consistent with agency theory propositions, this 
study expects that more independent directors in the board (B_IND), the separation of Chair 
and CEO positions (RD), frequency of meetings (B_MEET), and gender diversity (GEND) 
lead to better monitoring and better audit quality. These variables are summarised in table 5.3, 
panel A. 
 
Audit committee’s variables 
 
The Jordan Corporate Governance Code (2008) recommends a number of characteristics that 
effective audit committees should possess. First, the JCGC (2008) extends the notion of 
director independence to emphasise that audit committees should also be independent (at 
least two-third of committees’ members). The rationale behind this is that an independent 
member is likely to be free from management’s influence in ensuring that high-quality audit 
is employed and correct financial statements are presented to shareholders. This study 
                                                          
19
 This ratio is consistent with representation of female directors in the whole population. 
196 
 
measures audit committees’ independence as a percentage of independent members to total 
audit committee’s members. 
 Second, audit committees’ members should possess relevant financial experience. Financial 
expertise helps the committee members to understand and interpret the financial information 
correctly, as well as help them to effectively monitor external auditors. The JCGC (2008) 
recommends that audit committees should be composed of three members; one of them at 
least should have financial expertise. This study measures this variables using proportion of 
members who have financial experience to total members. 
Third, JCGC (2008) mentioned that an audit committee is expected to offer strong monitoring, 
and therefore it recommends that the size should not be less than three members. Frequent 
audit committee meetings keep the committee abreast of any raised auditing issues, and 
therefore decrease the likelihood of reporting misstatement (Raghunandan, Rama and 
Scarbrough, 1998).   
Fourth, it is consistent with the notion that the audit committees which meet more frequently 
allow directors more time to achieve their monitoring duties effectively (Karamanou and 
Vafeas, 2005). Moreover, large audit committee size is associated with less discretionary 
accruals (Ghosh et al., 2010), and less earning management (Yang and Krishnan, 2005). The 
JCGC (2008) recommends that audit committees should meet four times yearly at least. 
In conclusion, the study expects, as stated in the following hypotheses, that more independent, 
expert, larger, and diligent audit committees provide better monitoring over management, and 
productive coordination with external auditors. So, the audit committee variables, as shown 
in table 5.3, panel B, are: audit committee independence (AC_IND), audit committee 
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financial expertise (AC_EXP), audit committee meetings (AC_MEET), and audit committee 
size (AC_SIZE). 
 
Ownership identities’ variables 
 
Shareholders in Jordan can be categorised into four main types: families, foreigners (Arab 
and non-Arab foreigner investors), government and institutions (financial and non-financial 
institutions). The government ownership decreased after the privatization process, but is still 
available in a number of firms. Banks and other small institutions will be considered as 
institutional investors, because large institutional investors such as trust funds, venture 
capitalists, and hedge funds are not common in Jordan. 
Lim, How and Verhoeven (2014) argued that the different types of shareholders have 
different investment policies and different degrees of incentives, and therefore their abilities 
to exert effective oversight might be different. So, it is expected that these different 
ownership types will demand different degrees of audit quality to protect firms and minority 
owners’ wealth. Therefore, the ownership identities’ variables are: family ownership 
(FAMILY_OWN), financial institution (INST_FIN), non-financial institutions 
(INST_NON_FIN) Arab-foreign ownership (FOR_ARB), Non-Arab investors 
(FOR_NON_ARB) and government ownership (GOV_OWN) — see table 5.3, panel C. 
The study is interested to examine the effect of all levels of ownership. So, because Jordanian 
companies are mandated to disclose 5% and above ownership; the study will consider 5% as 
an ownership concentration threshold.  
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5.3.2.3 Control variables 
 
The study takes into consideration different control variables which may have a potential 
effect on the dependent variable which are: company size (LNSIZE), business complexity 
(COX), leverage level (LEV), profitability (ROA), risk level (CURRTASSET), loss (LOSS), 
big4 audit firms (BIG4), non-audit service (NAS) and industry type (INDUSTRY). These 
control variables are well identified by prior research. The employed control variables model 
has been robust across different samples, different time periods, and different countries 
(Francis and Simon, 1987; Chan et al., 1993; Yatim et al., 2006; Zaman et al., 2011). 
Company size: Prior studies define corporate size as a main determinant of audit fees, and 
they suggest a number of theoretical explanations about the relationship between company 
size and audit quality measured by audit fees. First, large firms require more audit 
transactions and efforts due to their business volume (Simunic, 1980; Collier and Gregory, 
1996; Naser and Nuseibeh, 2008). Second, large firm size makes the monitoring process by 
management/or owners more difficult, which consequently leads to a demand for more audit 
effort to compensate for the control loss (Abdel-Khalik, 1993). Third, large firm size 
increases the likelihood of wealth transfers, and thus, the need for undertaking monitoring 
increases (Chow, 1982).  
The study measures size as the natural log of total assets. Considering assets as a proxy of 
firm size is consistent with Simunic (1980: 172) who pointed out that “assets seem more 
closely related to possible loss exposure than would an accounting flow measure, such as 
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revenue, because defective financial statements which result in a lawsuit frequently involve 
some deficiency in asset valuation”. 
Complexity: firms that have more subsidiaries have more complex business transactions, and 
face more risks relative to other firms, and consequently experience higher audit fees (Hay et 
al., 2008). Most Jordanian firms do not have subsidiaries. Anyway, for the firms which have 
subsidiaries, the study measures complexity as the number of subsidiaries, consistent with 
previous literature (O’Sullivan, 1999; Zaman et al., 2011).  
Leverage: the theoretical discussion in literature supports a positive association between level 
of debt and demand for external auditing (Chow, 1982). Chow (1982) and (Carey et al., 2000) 
have argued that high debt levels in firms’ capital structures increases owners’ incentives to 
transfer wealth from the bondholder, and this in turn increases the demand for external 
auditing. Moreover, Abdel-khalik (1993) stated that more audit effort is required to meet the 
requirements placed on a firm by creditors. Therefore, positive association between leverage 
and audit fees is expected. Consistent with previous research, the study uses debt as a 
proportion of total assets as a measure of leverage.  
Profitability: the study uses return on assets (ROA) as a proxy of firms’ profitability. It is 
measured by dividing company earnings at the end of financial year by its total assets. More 
audit effort is required for clients with bad financial outcomes, and conversely profitable 
firms are perceived as less risky (Pratt and Stice, 1994). So, the auditors assessment of risk is 
expected to be low, and therefore audit work will be less than higher risk client (a negative 
relationship is expected).  
Risk: inventory and account receivables and inventory are more difficult to audit than other 
tangible assets (Simunic, 1980). Moreover, current assets are perceived as being more risky 
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to audit, resulting in higher audit effort and fees (Hay et al., 2008). The study uses the 
proportion of current assets to total assets as a measure of inherent risk.  
Loss: A poorly performing firm is often perceived as being riskier and has weak internal 
control systems (Whisenant et al., 2003; Hay et al., 2008). Therefore auditors have to exert a 
greater audit effort due to increased risk (Rustnam et al., 2013). Thus, positive correlation is 
expected. The variable is coded as 1 if the firm reported a loss in any of the last two years, 
and 0 otherwise.  
Big 4: Zaman et al., (2011) argued that firms with poor internal control are less likely to hire 
a big 4 auditor because they might be financially constrained and consider big 4 firms to be 
expensive. This suggests that big 4 firms (and big 4 affiliates) charge higher audit fees. The 
study uses a dummy variable to indicate a big 4 firm audit.  
Non-audit fees: The term non-audit services (NAS) “means any professional services 
provided to an issuer by a registered public accounting firm, other than those provided to an 
issuer in connection with an audit or a review of the financial statements of an issuer” 
(Sarbanes, 2002: 747). The non-audit services include: bookkeeping services, design and 
implementation of the financial information systems, valuation services, actuarial services, 
internal audit outsourcing services, management and investment services, and legal services. 
Under the SEC, it is unlawful for the public accounting firms to do any of those services 
contemporaneously with the audit service. However, the public accounting firms are allowed 
to engage in one or more NASs, excluding above services, in conjunction with the audit 
service in cases pre-approved by the audit committee of the auditee company and/or if the 
SEC see that this will be appropriate for the public interest and to protect the investors. The 
201 
 
audit committees are exempt from the preapproval process if the NAS fees are no more than 
5% of total fees paid to the incumbent auditor in a financial year (SOX, 2002, section 201). 
The provision of NAS has received considerable attention from regulators, auditors, investors, 
and academic researchers, especially after the corporate scandals that happened in recent 
years and the enactment of governance regulations as well. For example, audit fees and non-
audit fees have been compulsory disclosed in UK annual reports since 1992 and since 2000 in 
the US (imposed by the Cadbury Report and the SEC, respectively). The extant research 
investigated mainly the consequences of providing NAS by the incumbent auditor, 
contemporaneously with the audit service, on the auditor’s independence and the whole 
provided service quality.  
Moreover, many researchers pointed out that providing NAS by the incumbent auditor 
increases the economic bond between auditors and their clients, and in turn negatively affect 
the auditor independence (Frankel et al., 2002, Gul et al., 2006,  Chahine and Filatotchev, 
2011, and Quick et al., 2013; Causholli et al., 2013). Moreover, the joint provision of NAS 
also increases the probability of earning management and discretionary accruals level 
(Frankel et al., 2002), decreases the value relevance of earnings (Gul et al., 2006), and in 
general decreases financial reporting quality (Habib, 2012). 
From another side, the joint provision of NAS and the audit service has an advantage for 
organisations. Providing such services results in cost saving through “knowledge spillover” 
(Simunic, 1984; Antle et al., 2006), and contractual nature effects (Arruñada, 1999). They 
argued that the knowledge spillover happened because the same set of information is used in 
achieving those type of services, and results in one service having a favourable effect on the 
other; for instance, an auditor who evaluates the internal control system, as part of his usual 
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duty, has a better knowledge to advise on or improve the internal control system than another 
service provider, and vice versa.  
The contractual nature advantage “is connected with the fact that the exchange of 
professional services involves high transaction costs due to the informational asymmetry 
existing between supplier of and client for such services. Therefore, it becomes worthwhile to 
make use of the safeguards (brand-name, reputation, conduct rules, control systems among 
professionals, and client confidence) already developed when contracting and ensuring 
quality in auditing, thereby reducing the total cost of providing such services (Arruñada, 1999: 
514).  
Regarding the potential relation between audit fees and non-audit service fees, the academic 
literature ((Palmrose, 1986); (Simunic, 1984); (Ezzamel et al., 1996); Firth, 1997 and (Antle 
et al., 2006)) that empirically investigates this relationship showed mixed findings  reported a 
positive association between audit fees and non-audit fees. Simunic (1984) argued that the 
audit fees of clients who also purchase NASs from incumbent auditors are significantly 
higher than the audit fees of clients who purchase those NASs from another provider. 
Moreover, Becker et al. (1998) indicated that non-audit services strengthen the economic 
bond between firms and auditors and therefore increases the audit fee taken from a client. 
Palmrose (1986) also documented a positive relationship between audit and non-audit fees.  
On the other hand, the normal audit services may be used as a “loss-leader” in order to gain a 
higher profit margin on non-audit fees (Audousset-Coulier, 2015). So, auditors may discount 
auditing services in order to hold on to the profitable fees of non-audit services (Basiruddin, 
2011), which therefore suggests a negative association between audit and non-audit fees. 
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Also, other studies found no evidence of an association between audit fees and non-audit fees 
especially after controlling for several factors expected to be associated with the demand for 
non-audit services (Firth, 2002; Whisenant et al., 2003). They explained that the positive 
correlation between audit fees and non-audit fees (NAF) is due to specific events (e.g. 
mergers activated and issuing new shares) that create a demand for non-audit service and, at 
the same time, require more auditing. If these factors are controlled, together with client size, 
there is no association between audit fees and non-audit fees, and the results provide no 
relationship. 
Based on the regulatory framework in Jordan, most common non-audit services are 
prohibited to be done by the same auditors who run the statutory audit work in order to 
maintain auditors’ independence. According to the organising external audit profession 
(2006), it is not allowed for an external audit provider to offer contemporaneously any other 
services such as a bookkeeping service, liquidation consultations’ service or design internal 
control system. However, some services are allowed, such as an IT service, or feasibility 
study service.  
During the data collection process, it has been realised that only a few of the firms included 
in the sample received non-audit service from their incumbent auditors. These firms state in 
their annual reports that the external auditor also provides a consultation services for the firm, 
without any indication of the money paid for this services (Jordanian regulations do not 
mandate firms to disclose fees paid for non-audit services). Therefore, as the dominant 
literature supports “loss leader” view and documents negative relationship between audit fees 
and non-audit fees (Firth, 1997; Knechel et al., 2012), this study expect the association to be 
negative. This variable is coded as 1 if the firm received non-audit service from the same 
auditor, and 0 otherwise. 
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Industry types: the complexity and business conditions are different between industries, and 
this might lead to different demand of audit effort. Controlling for industry type may help in 
identifying unobserved heterogeneity at the industry level (Klapper and Love, 2004). In 
Jordan, the market is relatively small and the main industries are financial, manufacturing and 
services (ASE, 2014). As financial industry is excluded from our sample, other two industries 
are considered as control/dummy variable.  
The study use only main industry categories because many sub-categories (see table 5.2c) 
contain very few firms which make the estimates effect of these small sub-categories 
imprecise and the standard errors will be quite large. Further, the studies from Jordanian 
market (Matar and Noor, 2007; Al-Najjar, 2010; Hamdan et al., 2013) used also the main 
industry categories. 
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         Table 5.3: definition of the variables   
Symbol    Variable name Descriptions and measures Expected 
sign 
I: Dependent variables  
ln_FEES      Audit fees                                                                 Total amount paid to auditors as fees of 
statutory audit (converted to natural log). 
 
 
II: Independent variables 
 
Panel A: Board of directors variables  
B_IND Board independence Proportion of independent members to total 
members 
+ 
RD CEO-Duality Dummy variable equal 1 if the chairman 
holds the CEO position, 0 otherwise 
- 
B_MEET Board meetings Frequency of board meetings during a year + 
B_SIZE Board size Number of board’s members +/- 
GEND Gender diversity Proportion of female members to total 
members 
+ 
 
Panel B: Audit committee variables  
 
AC_IND Audit committee 
independence 
Proportion of independent members to total 
members 
+ 
AC_EXP Audit committee expertise Proportion of members who have financial 
expertise to total members.  
+ 
AC_MEET Audit committee meetings Frequency of audit committee meetings 
during a year 
+ 
AC_SIZE Audit committee size Number of audit committee’s members + 
 
Panel C: Ownership identities variables 
 
FAMILY_OWN Family ownership Proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% 
of the firm’s outstanding shares held by 
family. 
+ 
    
INST_FIN Financial Institutional 
ownership 
Proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% 
of the firm’s outstanding shares held by 
financial institutions (banks). 
+ 
INST_NON FIN Non-Financial Institutional 
ownership 
Proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% 
of the firm’s outstanding shares held by non-
financial institutions. 
+ 
FOR_ARB Arab foreign ownership  Proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% 
of the firm’s outstanding shares held by Arab-
foreign investors 
+ 
FOR_NONARB Non-Arab Foreign 
ownership  
Proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% 
of the firm’s outstanding shares held by non-
Arab foreign investors 
+ 
GOV_OWN Government ownership Proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% 
of the firm’s outstanding shares held by 
government. 
+ 
III: Control variables  
LEV Leverage Debt as a percentage of total assets. + 
COX Complexity Number of subsidiaries + 
LOSS Loss Dummy variable equal 1 if a company 
reported loss in last two years, 0 otherwise.  
+ 
RISK Inherent risk Percentage of current assets to total assets. + 
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ROA Profitability  Net profit as a percentage of total assets 
(indication of profitability). 
- 
BIG4 Big4 audit firms Dummy variable equal 1 if the company 
audited by one of Big4 (Big 4 affiliates) audit 
firms, 0 otherwise. 
+ 
LASIZE Company size Natural log for total assets  + 
NAS Non-audit service Dummy variable equal 1 if the audit firm 
provides non-audit service jointly with the 
obligatory audit work, 0 otherwise. 
- 
INDUSTRY Industry type Dummy variable equal 1 if manufacturing 
firm and 0 if service firm. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3.3. Estimation methods employed for data analysis 
 
The data-set for this study is observations for different entities (115 Jordanian listed firms) 
over more than one year (six years from 2009 to 2014). Also, all firms have the same number 
of observations for each year (balanced) and have no missing values. Given this feature of the 
data-set, the panel approach in analysis is more appropriate
20
. The panel data approach has a 
number of favourable characteristics. First, using panel data analysis plays important role in 
controlling variables which are not observed or measured across entities or variables that may 
change over the time period but not in a consistent manner (Wooldridge, 2010). It therefore 
enables time-invariant inter-firm heterogeneity (within firm) to be controlled. Studenmund 
(2000) stated that using panel data increases the sample size and helps in avoiding the 
omitted variables problem that may cause bias in a cross-sectional approach.  
Second, by using the same cross-sectional units at different points in time, the panel approach 
provides a solution (control) of endogenity problem (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2001; 
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 The panel approach assumes a difference between groups as well as over time (panel effect), whereas OLS 
assumes no significant differences across groups within the measurement data-set e.g. firms (i.e. no unique 
features of these groups).  
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Wooldridge, 2010). Panel data allows us “to obtain consistent estimators in a presence of 
omitted variables” under certain assumptions (Wooldridge, 2010: 281).  
Third, panel data improves the efficiency of econometrics estimates (more accurate inference 
of model parameters), as it offers a large number of data points, increases the degrees of 
freedom and reduces the collinearity between explanatory variables (Hsiao, 2014). 
Fourth, panel data can deal with different types of variables; for instance, variables which 
change between individuals but are the same over time such as gender or industry code; 
variables that change over time but are the same for all individuals in a given time period 
such as inflation rate or unemployment rate; variables that change between individuals as 
well as over time, such as audit fees, frequency of audit committee meetings or firms’ 
profitability; and variables which vary in predictable ways such as particular individual’s age 
(Studenmund, ,2000). 
So, when a data-set is characterized as panel data, the most common estimated models are 
fixed effects and random effects models, particularly when the number of cross-sectional 
units is large, and the number of time periods is small (Kennedy, 2003). Therefore, these 
estimation methods are taken into consideration in this study, in addition to robust standard 
error as a common model in the absence of homoscedasticity. 
 
 
5.3.3.1. Fixed effect model 
 
The fixed effect model tests the relationship between explanatory and outcome variables 
within an entity (e.g. firm). Each entity has its own characteristics that may or may not affect 
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the explanatory variables (Torres-Reyna, 2011), so the fixed effects model embodies the 
panel effect by allowing the intercept to vary across entities (Al-Najjar, 2010).  
The rationale of the fixed effect model is mainly based on two things as summarised by 
Torres-Reyna (2011). First, the fixed effect model assumes that something within the entity 
may influence the explanatory or dependent variables and the model will control them. The 
fixed effect model deletes the impact of the time-invariant characteristics from the 
explanatory variables, and then tests the predictors’ net effect. Kohler and Kreuter (2005) and 
Torres-Reyna (2011) stated that the estimated coefficients produced by the fixed-effect model 
cannot be biased due to omitted time-invariant characteristics, because this model controls for 
all time-invariant differences between the individuals.  
Second, the time-invariant characteristics are unique to the entity and should not be correlated 
with other entity’s characteristics (Torres-Reyna, 2011). Each entity’s error term and the 
constant should not be correlated with the others because each entity is different (Torres-
Reyna, 2011). In case error terms are correlated then this model (fixed effect) will be no 
longer be suitable as its inferences may not be true, then alternative model(s) become more 
appropriate e.g. the random effect model.  
However, the fixed effect method suffers from some problems. As the fixed-effect model is 
designed to study the variations within a group or entity; time-invariant variables stay stable, 
because they do not vary over time for each entity (Kohler and Kreuter, 2005; Torres-Reyna, 
2011). Thus, the fixed effect model does not estimate coefficients of these independent 
variables that are constant across time (in this study for instance, Stata software under the 
fixed effect model drops (omits) industry and government ownership variables because they 
are constant over the study period). Also, under the fixed effect model, degrees of freedom 
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are a little low because for each cross-sectional observation, one degree of freedom is lost due 
to of the time demanding (Studenmund, 2000). In this study, with those two predictors 
omitted from the estimation of the fixed effect model, the predictors are decreased by two and 
therefore the model will report fewer degrees of freedom. 
 
5.3.3.2. Random effect model 
 
The rationale behind the random effects model is that the difference between groups is 
assumed to be random and uncorrelated with the predictor or explanatory variables that are 
included in the model (Torres-Reyna, 2011). (Greene, 2008: 183) stated that “…the crucial 
distinction between fixed and random effects is whether the unobserved individual effect 
embodies elements that are correlated with the regressors in the model, not whether these 
effects are stochastic or not”. Thus the random-effects model is a weighted combination of 
the between and within estimators, and takes the following form: 
Yit = βXit + α + uit + εit  
 
 
Comparing to the fixed effect model, the random effect model estimates coefficients of 
independent variables that are time-invariant (i.e. constant over time, such as race or industry). 
In the fixed effects model these variables are absorbed by the intercept (Torres-Reyna, 2011). 
The random effect model also has more degrees of freedom as rather than estimating an 
intercept for each cross-sectional group in the measurement data-set, it estimates the 
parameters that describe the intercepts’ distribution (Studenmund, 2000).  
However, the random-effect model requires us to assume that the time-invariant omitted 
variable is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in order to avoid omitted variable bias 
Between-entity error Within-entity error 
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(Studenmund, 2000). In addition, while the random-effect is fully efficient if it is more 
appropriate, its estimations become inconsistent if the fixed-effect model is appropriate, 
because then correlation between Xit and αi21 implies correlation between the explanatory 
variables and the error (Colin and Trivedi, 2009). 
A Hausman test is normally used to guide for more appropriate regression should be used- 
random-effects regression (GLS) or the fixed-effects regression test. It indicates that the 
random-effects regression is more appropriate as the result shows a rejection of the null 
hypothesis (H0), because the chi-square value is insignificant (more than 5%), and the fixed 
effect model if chi-square value is significant. The outcome of the Hausman test (as presented 
later table 6.5) indicates that the coefficients of both models are not significantly different, 
which indicates that the random effect model is preferable. Accordingly, the random-effects 
regression is used as a main test and the fixed effect as a robustness (sensitivity) test.  
In addition, when the Hausman test suggests the random effect model as a superior option, a 
Lagrange Multiplier test is used to check whether heterogeneity of entities is significant. If 
the outcome of this test is significant, this confirms the appropriateness of using panel model. 
However, if not, this means that no significant differences across entities (or firms), a simple 
OLS regression becomes applicable. Table 5.4 shows the outcome of a Lagrange Multiplier 
test which indicates that the random-effect model is very appropriate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21
 αi is the unknown intercept for each entity (random individual-specific effects).  
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Table 5.4: Lagrange multiplier test for random effects 
ln_FEES (code,t) = Xb + u(code) + e(code,t) 
 Var sd = sqrt(Var) 
ln_FEES .4959604 .7042446 
e .0272538 .1650874 
u .1347377 .3670663 
Test:  Var(u) = 0 
chibar2(01) = 1032.00 
Prob > chibar2 =  0.0000 
 
 
 
 
5.3.3.3. Robust standard error model (Huber-White’s sandwich estimator) 
 
The results of a Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity shows an 
insignificant p-value of chi-square, thus indicating that heteroscedasticity (non-constant 
variance) is present. The visual check of the residuals plotted against fitted values also 
confirms the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
As one of the common robust estimators, Huber-White’s sandwich estimator is suggested to 
control and correct for the problem of heteroscedasticity and to give more reliable inferences 
when heteroscedasticity is present. As residuals variance (or variance of error term) is 
assumed to show homoscedasticity; heteroscedasticity is the absence of homoscedasticity of 
these residuals, and in turn the violation of this assumption causes standard errors to be 
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biased. Therefore, employing an appropriate estimation method e.g. Huber-White’s sandwich 
estimator provides appropriate estimation (more reliable) even when the homoscedasticity 
assumption is violated. 
 
5.3.4. Model specification 
 
 
Assessing the level of audit quality is difficult ex ante because the amount of assurance 
provided by auditors is unobservable. The only observable outcome of the audit process is a 
generic template of the audit report which is in most cases standard clean opinions (Francis, 
2004). Therefore, an important development in audit quality research is based on the premise 
that ‘differences’ in audit quality exist and can be inferred by the outcome of an adopted 
appropriate model (Francis, 2004).  
The essential objective in selecting an audit quality model is its appropriateness for the 
research setting. Assessing model appropriateness should take into consideration whether the 
study examines the demand or supply of audit quality (DeFond and Zhang, 2014). They argue 
that when the study is interested in examining the demand of audit quality, the input-based 
models
22
 (e.g. audit fees, audit firm size) of audit quality are more appropriate, while if the 
objective is to study the supply side of audit quality, the output-based measures (e.g. 
conservatism, market reaction, restatement, and going concern opinions) become more 
appropriate. 
Given that this study is interested to examine the role played by boards of directors, audit 
committees and ownership types in ensuring higher audit quality, this implies the demand 
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 In which client choose audit quality based on the observable inputs (DeFond and Zhang, 2014). 
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side of audit quality. DeFond and Zhang (2014) categorised input-based models of audit 
quality into: auditor-specific characteristics such as auditor size (captured by Big N audit 
firms) and industry specialisation, and auditor–client contracting features such as audit fees. 
These models are presented below (NB: these audit quality measures are discussed more 
broadly in chapter four, section audit quality measurements). 
 
Audit fees model: This model is based on the notion that higher audit fees are associated 
with higher audit quality. The theory predicts that higher audit effort increases the probability 
of detected errors (Shibano, 1990) and thereby higher audit quality. Therefore, a higher audit 
fee implies higher audit quality, ceteris paribus, either through more audit effort (more hours) 
or through greater expertise of the auditor (higher billing rates) (Francis, 2004). As audit 
effort is the dominant factor priced in audit fees (Mande and Son, 2015), this makes audit 
fees a reliable indicator of audit quality because higher fees indicate that the auditor worked 
more hours, signalling greater effort (Eshleman and Guo, 2014).  
Examining the relationship between audit fees and audit effort is likely to aid the 
understanding of quality ((Johnson et al., 2002; Srinidhi and Gul, 2007). It is reasonable to 
argue that when an auditor charges a premium fee to a client this will be associated with a 
better quality of assurance services provided (Palmrose, 1986). This is supported by Hribar, 
Kravet and Wilson (2014) who tried to develop a measure of accounting quality based on 
audit fees, and concluded that audit fees can be used to provide a reliable measure of a firm’s 
accounting quality. Also, Increasing audit effort is a way auditors can respond to a heightened 
risk of financial reports misstatements and earnings management (Francis and Krishnan 1999; 
Eshleman and Guo, 2014; Blankley, Hurtt, and MacGregor, 2012). 
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The audit fees model is characterised by high consensus on its measurement, with low 
measurement error and capture quality variation for a large number of companies (Gul and 
Goodwin, 2010; DeFond and Zhang, 2014). Moreover, the audit fees model typically shows 
greater explanation power (well-specified model with R-square exceeding 70%), which 
decreases concerns about correlated omitted variables (Ghosh and Tang, 2015). On the other 
hand, results from the audit fees model are subject to alternative explanation(s). In some 
cases low audit fees might not reflect lower audit quality because the statutory audit service 
might be used as a “loss-leader” in order to gain a higher profit margin from non-audit 
services (Hillson and Kennelley, 1988). Also, audit fee levels may reflect the negotiation 
power between audit firms and their clients rather than audit quality (Asthana and Boone, 
2012), or reflect litigation (and reputation) risk premium (DeFond and Zhang, 2014).  
 
Size of audit firm: large auditors are expected to be more competent (large in-house 
expertise) and have strong incentives to provide high audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981). The 
advantage of this model is that it has been tested and supported by many prior studies and 
there is a strong assumption that it captures incentives and competences (DeFond and Zhang, 
2014).  
The greatest weaknesses for the audit firms is that they are typically measured dichotomously, 
which in turn fails to capture quality variation for a large number of firms, as the prior 
relevant studies suggest a similar level of audit quality exists in each category. In the case of 
Jordan, how can we differentiate the audit quality provided by non-Big-4 firms to 63% of 
non-financial firms from that provided by the Big-4 to 37% of these firms? Moreover, Arnett 
and Danos (1979), argued that as long as professional standards are maintained, it is unfair to 
arbitrarily differentiate between the large N auditors and other auditors.  
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In addition, in Jordan, Big-4 auditors are local affiliates of Big-4 international firms, except 
Deloitte. These audit firms may not have the same quality control standards as the Big-4. At 
the same time, there are local audit firms that comply with high audit quality standards, for 
instance Arab Professional Auditors, Abu Ghazaleh, Abbasi Co, and Ghosheh for auditing 
(JACPA, 2013). Also, given that Jordan is characterised by low litigation risk, this decreases 
the motivation of audit firms (Big-4 auditors in particular) to deliver high audit quality.  
 
Auditors’ industry specialisation: A specialist auditor is defined as a firm that has 
“differentiated itself from its competitors in terms of market share within a particular 
industry” (Neal and Riley 2004, p. 170). The industry specific knowledge is addressed by the 
literature as an indication of audit quality based on the rationale that the specialist auditors 
are more competent and have strong reputational incentives to deliver a credible audit. Also, 
the strong knowledge they have about the clients helps specialised auditors in making 
appropriate judgments, and is in turn translated to higher audit quality. 
The advantage of this model is that it provides a measure of quality variation within Big-4 
auditors. This is a benefit because this “finer partitioning” helps to address questions that are 
related to quality differences within audit firms (DeFond and Zhang, 2014). However, the 
major drawback is that this model suffers from lack of consensus on its measurement (auditor 
specialisation being normally measured by sales volume, market share, total fees received 
and number of clients) and therefore measure audit quality with a large measurement error 
(Neal and Riley, 2004; DeFond and Zhang, 2014). In addition to this general drawback, this 
model is less appropriate in a context like Jordan where the market is small and in which no 
particular auditor(s) dominates any specific industry (or industries) and nor do any of them 
have a large market share at a level that helps to make this audit firm industry experts. Thus, 
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the industry specialisation model seems to be not relevant to a small market like Jordan as it 
will give unreliable outcomes.  
Ultimately, measuring audit quality is still a controversial task because there are different 
views as to what constitutes higher-quality audit. Though the Big-4 firms’ model provides an 
indication about audit quality as reported by prior research, the audit fees model is preferable 
in a context like Jordan. The study follows prior high profile research, and considers the 
contextual situation by employing audit fees as a superior model to capture audit quality 
within the Jordanian environment (a broad discussion about audit quality measures is 
presented in chapter four, section audit quality and its measurement).  
Moreover, all prior studies that examined the effects of corporate governance mechanisms; 
board of directors and audit committee in particular (O’Sullivan, 1999; Carcello et al., 2002; 
Abbott et al., 2003; Tsui et al., 2001; O’Sullivan, 2000; O’Sullivan and Diacon, 2002; Lee 
and Mande, 2005; Goodwin-Stewart and Kent, 2006; Yatim et al., 2006; Vafeas and 
Weagelein, 2007; Krishnan and Vivanathan, 2009; Bliss, 2011; Zaman et al., 2011; Rustam et 
al., 2013; Rainsbury et al., 2009; Collier and Gregory, 1996; Hay, Knechel and Ling, 2008) 
used the audit fees model to measure audit quality. 
The audit fees model employed in this study also differs from the audit fees model that was 
employed by prior empirical studies. The common limitation of prior studies is that their 
models include few explanatory variables. Failure to consider all relevant explanatory 
variables may lead to inconsistent and/or ambiguous findings, as well as leading to exclusion 
bias (Dinga, 2011). Further, Niemi (2005: 305) stated “a significant omission in most fee 
models is controlling for ownership structure. If client ownership structure has an impact on 
audit production and fees, omitting it from the analyses of audit markets characterised by a 
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wide range of client ownership structures increases the risk of incorrect conclusions”. So, this 
study employs an augmented audit fees model which considers all measurable characteristics 
of boards of directors and audit committees, as well as all ownership types within the study 
context as explanatory variables.  
In addition, some variables are included into our model for the first time, for instance Arab 
investors. Foreign investors and government investment are addressed only once as a dummy 
variable in a cross-sectional model by Niemi (2005) in the Finnish context. Gender diversity 
is also addressed once by Gul et al. (2012) in the US context. The majority of prior studies 
employed the cross-sectional audit fees model which may provide biased estimates of the 
relation between firm characteristics and audit fees because of the endogenous determination 
of firm characteristics and audit fees (Vafeas and Waegelein, 2007).  
Therefore, because the subject-related literature (corporate governance in particular) has 
grown substantially since Simunic (1980) developed the first audit fees model (e.g. Ghosh 
and Tang, 2015; Abbott et al., 2003, Yatim et al., 2006, Zaman et al., 2011), this study 
accordingly adds other explanatory variables and therefore estimates the following 
augmented time series- cross sectional audit fee regression to reduce any omitted correlated 
variables concern. Thus, the model considers many proxies for corporate governance quality 
(i.e. a large set of the board of directors and audit committee characteristics, as well as 
different ownership identities).  
Also, to avoid model misspecification, the model considers a set of variables to control for 
the cross-sectional variations in audit fees that were identified by prior research. The 
employed control variables model have been robust across different samples, different time 
periods and different countries (Francis and Simon, 1987; Yatim et al., 2006; Abbott et al., 
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2003; Zaman et al., 2011).These control variables include client size, complexity, Big-4, 
leverage, profitability, risk, loss, non-audit service and industry types.  
In summary, the study uses the following cross-sectional time series model as a basis of the 
analysis. 
 
ln_FEESit = β0 + β1 B_INDit+ β2 RD it+ β3 B_MEET it + β4 B_SIZE it + β5 GENDit + β6 
AC_INDit + β7 AC_EXP it+ β8 AC_MEETit+ β9 AC_SIZE it +β10 FAMILY_OWNit+ β11 
NON_FIN_INS it + β12 FIN_INST it + β13 FOR_ARAB it + β14 FOR_NON_ARABit+ GOVit+ 
β15 BIG4it + β16LN_ SIZEit +β17 COXit + β18 LEVit + β19 ROAit + β20 RISK + β21 LOSS+ + 
β22 NASit +β23 INDUSTRY +e 
 
Where 
lnFEES      Total amount paid to auditors as fees of statutory audit (converted to natural log). 
B_IND Proportion of independent members to total members 
RD Dummy variable equal 1 if the chairman holds the CEO position, 0 otherwise 
B_MEET Frequency of board meetings during a year 
B_SIZE Number of board’s members 
GEND Proportion of female members to total members 
AC_IND Proportion of independent members to total members 
AC_EXP Proportion of members who have financial expertise to total members.  
AC_MEET Frequency of audit committee meetings during a year 
AC_SIZE Number of audit committee’s members 
FAMILY_OWN Proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares held 
by family. 
INST_FIN Proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares held 
by financial institutions (banks). 
INST_NON FIN Proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares held 
by non-financial institutions. 
FOR_ARB Proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares held 
by Arab-foreign investors 
FOR_NONARB Proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares held 
by non-Arab foreign investors 
GOV_OWN Proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares held 
by government. 
LEV Debt as a percentage of total assets. 
COX Number of subsidiaries 
LOSS Dummy variable equal 1 if a company reported loss in last two years, 0 otherwise.  
RISK Percentage of current assets to total assets. 
ROA Net profit as a percentage of total assets (indication of profitability). 
BIG4 Dummy variable equal 1 if the company audited by one of Big4 (Big 4 affiliates) 
audit firms, 0 otherwise. 
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LASIZE Natural log for total assets  
NAS Dummy variable equal 1 if the audit firm provides non-audit service jointly with 
the obligatory audit work, 0 otherwise. 
INDUSTRY Dummy variable equal 1 if manufacturing firm and 0 if services firm 
NB: The study did not use year dummy because of the analysis of differences shows no significant 
differences between the six years included. Also, the visual check of the descriptive figures confirms 
this. Furthermore, because of the model already includes dummy variables (e.g. Duality, Big4, Loss), 
adding more dummy variables may affect results of these included variables. 
 
 
 
 
5.4. Research methodology: second model (questionnaire survey) 
 
5.4.1. Introduction 
 
This section presents the research methodology that is employed to address the research 
questions from perceptual viewpoints. Section two summarises the research objectives and 
questions. Section three discusses the research tool (questionnaire survey) and how it will be 
managed in terms of its design, content, piloting and validity assessment. Section four 
describes the sample selection and questionnaire distribution procedures. Section five is about 
a reliability test for the questionnaire which is essential before starting statistical analysis, and 
section six investigates statistical methods for the questionnaire analysis. 
 
5.4.2. Study objectives  
 
This section re-emphasises the objectives of this survey study. The main objectives of this 
study are, from perceptual viewpoints; first, elicit the opinions of relevant respondents in 
order to find out the perceived role of corporate governance mechanisms in ensuring credible 
audit quality. This, in conjunction with the secondary data model, offers further inferences 
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about the extent to which current corporate governance recommendations in Jordan affect 
audit quality. Secondly, to provides useful inputs for future governance reform by examining 
whether the importance of these governance mechanisms varies across the different groups. 
Thirdly, seek the views of relevant respondents regarding possible improvements in the 
current governance regulations.  
 
 
 
5.4.3. Research tool and its specifications 
 
 
 
 5.4.3.1. Questionnaire survey  
 
The questionnaire survey is effective as a research tool in measuring people's feelings or 
thoughts and it is associated with both positivistic and phenomenological methodology 
(Hussey and Hussey, 1997). Beattie and Fearnley (1998) concluded that the questionnaire as 
a survey instrument is able to examine both economic and behavioural factors, whereas 
secondary data analysis focuses only on economic factors. This type of research is scarce in 
Jordan and in similar contexts as well, so the opinions obtained from relevant respondents 
will pave the way and provide a building block for future research in this area. 
Designing a questionnaire varies based on how it is administered and, in particular, the 
number of targeted respondents (see Figure 5.3). There are two types of questionnaire; self-
administrated and interview-administrated questionnaire. Although the interview-
administrated questionnaires provides better quality and more deep answers, there is a serious 
concern surrounding the generalisability of the findings, based on the use of a small and 
unrepresentative number of samples (Saunders et al., 2007). Moreover, in a context like 
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Jordan, it is difficult to access to the boards of directors and audit committees because they 
are not always available in their companies, and also people there pay less attention to 
research and they may consider the interview as an investigation. 
Self-administered questionnaires characterised by the ability to send it to different and 
dispersed places at the same time, suitable for large size of sample and therefore the ability to 
generalise the findings, and easy to code and analyse the collected responses. In this type the 
likelihood of contamination or distortion of consultation or respondent’s answer is very low 
(Saunders et al., 2007).  
Therefore, self-administered questionnaires is utilised in this study. This type of 
questionnaire is normally completed by the respondents, and it is carried out through three 
ways. It can be administered electronically using the Internet (Internet-mediated 
questionnaires) or an intranet (intranet-mediated questionnaires), personally distributed and 
collected (delivery and collection questionnaires) or posted to respondents who return them 
by post after completion (postal or mail questionnaires). So, given that there is no efficient 
post service in Jordan and post addresses are not available for all respondents, the study will 
use delivery and collection and Internet-mediated questionnaires (Qualtrics software is used 
for the internet-mediated questionnaires). 
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Figure 5.3: Types of questionnaire 
 
Source: Saunders et al., (2007: 357), Research Methods for Business Students, 4
th
 edition. 
 
 
Oppenheim (1992, p. 102) highlights that questionnaires have a considerable advantages over 
other survey methods. Using questionnaires is a relatively inexpensive data collection and 
processing method; it is possible to send them to respondents who live in dispersed 
geographical locations and all respondents can receive them simultaneously, thereby reducing 
potential influence from the timing of events, and finally questionnaires may avoid 
interviewer bias (Fink et al., 2003). However, the questionnaire method can suffer from some 
drawbacks such as a low response rate, unsuitability for respondents with poor literacy or 
who have language difficulties, there is no opportunity to give explanations, and no 
opportunity to check on questionnaire completion (Oppenheim, 1992). The design and 
Questionnaire 
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administrated 
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Delivery and 
collect  
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Postal 
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Structured 
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administration of the questionnaire took these matters into consideration and carefully 
considered them. Poor literacy and language problems are viewed as insignificant since 
respondents are members of boards of directors, audit committees of listed companies and 
auditors who are well educated and well-informed on the subject under investigation.  
 
 
 
5.4.3.2. Questionnaire design  
 
Two types of questions, open and close-ended questions, have been used and the majority of 
them are close-ended questions. Close-ended questions offer a choice of answers in the form 
of a rating scale as this allows a numerical value to be given to an opinion, and be easy for 
respondents to answer and easy for the researcher to analyse (Hussey and Hussey, 1997).  
Further, close-ended questions allow effective group comparison, which is useful to test 
specific hypotheses, and to save time for both researcher and respondents (Oppenheim, 1992, 
p. 115). Though closed-ended questions may suffer from loss of expressiveness and an 
absence of available places to reason the answer (Oppenheim, 1992), this study overcomes 
this issue by including open questions to give the respondents free space to answer 
spontaneously in each section. Also, a blank page is added at the end of the questionnaire for 
further comments.  
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Therefore, a five-point Likert Scale
23
 is used in the questionnaire (Saunders et al., 2000), 
utilising a scale of 1 signifying `strongly disagree or least important', 2 for `disagree or less 
important', 3 for `no view or important', 4 for `agree or more important', and 5 for `strongly 
agree or most important'. The Likert Scale is useful in measuring opinions, beliefs, and 
attitudes as it shows varying degrees of agreement with, or endorsement of, a statement 
(Deville, 2003).  
Moreover, the questionnaire survey is conducted in the Arabic language, so every respondent 
would understand the questions in the same fashion (the questionnaire has been translated 
back-to-back, i.e. translated into Arabic language and then back into English language to 
ensure that all questions convey the same meaning to all respondents).  
A covering letter is added to the questionnaire explaining the nature and purpose of the study. 
In order to make respondents feel more comfortable, to encourage cooperation with the 
researcher and provide truthful information, a clear statement is added to the covering letter 
indicating the confidentiality of responses and the anonymity of respondents. Clear 
instructions are added at the end of the questionnaire explaining what the respondent should 
do with the completed questionnaire (for the delivery and collect questionnaire).  
 
 
                                                          
23
 All the relevant survey studies in this field used Five-point Likert Scale, so for the consistency purpose, the 
study employs the Likert scale containing five points. In addition, researchers advised that surveys should be 
developed in a manner that avoid complication and maintain simplicity to attract respondents, hence, the 5-point 
Likert scale was used because of its simplicity (Krosnick and Presser, 2010; Dillman, 1991).  
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5.4.3.3. Questionnaire content 
 
This section shows the questionnaire content which is designed to elicit respondents' 
perceptions on corporate governance mechanisms and their effectiveness in improving audit 
quality.  
The design of the measurement questions should be determined by the data you need to 
collect (Saunders et al., 2009). Bourque and Clark (1992) pointed out that in designing a 
questionnaire, the included questions come from one of three resources (1) adopted questions 
used in other questionnaires; (2) adapted questions used in other questionnaires; or (3) self-
developed questions. Adopting or adapting questions is also “more efficient than developing 
your own questions, provided that you can still collect the data you need to answer your 
research question(s) and to meet your objectives” (Saunders et al., 2009: 368). 
Given the study aims to examine the effectiveness of corporate governance practices in 
ensuring high audit quality in Jordan, the study adapted constructs (questions) from the 
Jordanian Corporate Governance Code (2008) particularly with respect to board of directors 
and audit committee. Furthermore, the study considered questions from previous relevant 
studies (Beasley et al., 2009; Beattie et al., 2012; Alghamdi, 2012; Stewart and Munro, 2007, 
Goodwin and Seow, 2002) and “adapted” these questions to be consistent with the study 
context and with the Jordanian governance code recommendations in particular. Further, the 
pilot study enhances the relevance/validity of the questions.  
The questionnaire consists of five parts (appendix 1). Part one contains demographical 
information of the respondents (e.g. position, experience, gender and educational level). This 
type of information helps in explaining various perceptions among respondents.  
226 
 
Part two is about audit quality attributes (section one) and potential relevant proxies for audit 
quality in Jordan (section two). First, audit quality is commonly defined as the probability 
that an auditor will both detect and truthfully report material errors, misrepresentations, or 
any material breach in a client’s accounting system (DeAngelo 1981; Catanach and Walker 
1999). The probability of detecting such material breaches or misrepresentations depends on 
an auditor’s ability (Deis and Giroux, 1992), while the probability of reporting these 
discovered breaches is a function of auditor independence (DeAngelo, 1981; Raghunandan 
and McHugh, 1994; Knechel et al., 2012).  
So in order to make sure of the extent that the respondents correctly understand audit quality 
concept, a question has been added presenting the two broad constructs for audit quality; 
these are ability (competence) and independence. The question in this part is asking about 
technical competence, audit work experience and technological proficiency as indications of 
an auditor’s ability to detect material breaches. Auditor’s technical competence and work 
experience are documented in literature as they enhance auditors’ abilities, enhance their 
knowledge of financial statement errors, enhance their quality of judgement, and affect their 
cognitive representations (Libby and Frederick, 1990; Catanach and Walker, 1999; Francis, 
2004; Knechel et al., 2012; DeFond and Zhang, 2014). Auditor’s technical competency 
reduces auditors’ start up and learning costs, and may offer more structured audit techniques 
that enhance audit quality (Lys and Watts, 1994; Craswell et al., 1995). 
On the other hand, independence and objectivity are indications of the auditors' ability to 
report any material misstatement. They are unbiased attitude that enable auditors to achieve 
audit work and express an opinion not influenced by personal bias (Brenda and Jon, 2003) or 
management intervention. If auditors possess these attributes they are expected to deliver 
high audit quality. 
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The second section in this part aims to elicit the views of respondents about relevant proxies 
for audit quality in the Jordanian context. An important development in audit quality research  
is based on the premise that ‘differences’ in audit quality exist and can be measured by 
comparing different classes of auditors, their industry specialisation  or level of audit fees 
(Francis, 2004). Therefore, as most commonly in the literature, DeFond and Zhang (2014) 
categorised audit quality models into auditor-specific characteristics such as auditor size and 
industry specialisation, and auditor–client contracting features such as audit fees. In the first 
model of this thesis audit fees have been used to capture audit quality in Jordan as the most 
appropriate audit quality indication in such a context. Thus, this question is to test 
respondents’ views about potential indicators of audit quality (Big 4 affiliates, firm size, and 
industry specialisation) in order to confirm the relevance of the audit fees proxy in Jordan, 
and also to see if the respondents come up with different answers. 
Part Three represents the monitoring activities of the boards of directors and the extent to 
which these activities/attributes affect audit quality. In order to support results of the first 
model, a number of questions have been asked here about board independence, role duality, 
frequency of meetings, board size and gender diversity. Moreover, the questionnaire covers 
the importance of other important features of directors’ effectiveness in audit quality from 
perceptual viewpoints which cannot be measured through the available secondary data (not 
covered in the first model of this study).  
The other boards of directors’ attributes includes roles of boards of directors in organising 
firms’ financial and accounting affairs, set disclosure policy and risk management policy to 
address the risks that the firm may face, obtaining relevant and timely information about the 
firm, monitoring and evaluating the executive management, and information and knowledge 
resources of the boards of directors.  
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Given the result of the secondary data model reveals a negative correlation between board 
size and audit quality and also between gender diversity and audit quality, the study has a 
motivation to obtain more understanding of this adverse correlation. This is by asking the 
respondents about their views regarding the potential consequences of having a large board 
size and having women in the board of directors.  So the consequences of having a large 
board size may result in higher coordination cost (Jizi et al. 2013 and Jensen et al., 1993), 
more time for decision making, more communication problems (Bliss, 2011) and may less 
effective in monitoring management (Judge and Zeithmal, 1999). Moreover, the literature 
pointed out some behavioural aspects of women that may affect the board monitoring 
effectiveness, e.g.  women are committed to the attendance of board meetings more than men 
(Gul et al., 2012), they are more conservative in their decisions than men (Watson and 
McNaughton, 2007), they ask for more audit work compared to men (Gul et al., 2012), and 
women on the board results in a higher level of conflict (Hambrick et al., 1996; Rose, 2007, 
Brunzell Eva Liljeblom, 2014). 
Part four is about audit committees’ monitoring activities and their perceived role on audit 
quality. In order to obtain more insight about the matter under study and support the first 
model inferences, a number of question have been asked here (questions about independence, 
size, meetings and experience). Other important dimensions for audit committee effectiveness 
cannot be measured through secondary data, so other questions go beyond these quantifiable 
characteristics and they will provide more insight and enrich our understanding about audit 
committee effectiveness and its role in audit quality.  
The questions in this part includes the audit committee's activities in reviewing and approving 
significant accounting policies of the firm, internal control, risk management system and 
financial reporting, duties of the audit committee namely reviewing and approving the 
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appointment, reappointment and removal of the external auditor, reviewing the independence 
and objectivity of the external auditor, and reviewing and approving the audit fee and types 
and fees for non-audit services provided by external auditors. These statements are suggested 
by the Jordanian Corporate Governance Code (2008). Also their relationship with audit 
quality is supported by prior literature (Cadbury, 1992; DeZoort, 1997).  
Moreover, it is important for audit committees to obtain credible timely information from 
management as well as appropriate monetary resources. The ability of audit committee 
members to carry out effective monitoring relies to a large extent on the quality of the 
information they receive (Bedard and Gendron, 2010), so this information should be of high 
quality, and on time (Sabia and Goodfellow, 2005). Another important type of resource is the 
monetary resource necessary, which is important for audit committees to pay any outside 
advisers, and to pay for their ordinary administrative expenses that are necessary or 
appropriate in carrying out their duties. Bedard and Gendron (2010) stated that audit 
committee effectiveness might be compromised when the committee is dependent on 
management’s discretion to pay external advisors appointed by the committee, especially in 
the case where a potential conflict of interest with management is in place.  
According to Sabia and Goodfellow (2005), while audit committee independence is an 
important attribute for an audit committee’s effectiveness, this effectiveness will not be fully 
achieved without opening informal channels to share information and matters of concern to 
be discussed candidly. Recent qualitative research documented that great interaction takes 
place outside of formal meetings through informal communications with external auditors 
(Gendron and Bédard, 2006; Turley and Zaman, 2007; Beasley et al., 2009). Also, Turley & 
Zaman (2004) pointed out that the interactive communication between external auditors and 
an audit committee may increase audit quality. Given this evidence and given that the Jordan 
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CGC (2008) emphasises the importance of such types of interaction; the study is interested to 
know the extent to which this interaction affects audit quality in the Jordanian context. 
Therefore,  
Furthermore, Prior studies suggest that audit committee members who hold accounting and 
finance experience are likely to be more effective, and thus positively affect audit quality 
(Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009). However, little is known about other 
knowledge/experience that might be important for audit committee effectiveness that could 
contribute to the integrity of financial reports. DeZoort and Salterio (2001) documented that 
different experience/knowledge bases of audit committee members leads to differences in 
their judgements and their relations with auditors. Therefore, other types of experience 
(experience in accounting, finance, external audit, internal audit, legal experience and 
business operation knowledge) have been added to the questionnaire to explore the potential 
effects of these different audit committee experiences in enhancing audit quality.  
Part Five explores the respondents’ opinions regarding the impact of the common ownership 
types in Jordan on audit quality. The respondents have been asked to mention their opinion 
for each ownership type (family ownership, financial institutions, non-financial institutions, 
government and foreign ownership). Given the paucity of relevant studies, the inferences 
obtained by the perceptions will confirm the findings of the first empirical model and 
consequently will help to obtain a deep understanding and a better explanation of the role 
played by different ownership identities in audit quality.  
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5.4.4. Pilot study and validity assessment 
 
The rationale of the pilot study is to refine the questionnaire before sending it to the intended 
respondents so that respondents will have no problems in understanding or answering the 
questions (Saunders et al., 2009; Fink, 2003). A pilot test also helps in obtaining some 
assessment of the questions’ validity and the likely reliability of the data that will be collected 
(Saunders et al., 2009). An initial run of the data collected by the pilot study provides an 
indication that the data collected will enable your research questions to be answered 
(Saunders et al., 2009). 
Bryman & Bell (2015) suggested that using the pilot study is important in finding out the 
time needed to complete the questionnaire; the clarity of instructions; which, if any, questions 
are unclear or vague; which, if any, questions the respondents feel are difficult to answer; 
whether in their opinion there are any major subject omissions; and whether there are any 
other comments.  
For this study and in order to carry out the pilot test, copies of the questionnaire were 
circulated to a number of academic staff, a small sample of directors and a small sample of 
external auditors. The suggestions introduced by those respondents have been taken into 
consideration. The minimum number for a pilot test is ten questionnaires (Fink, 2003). An 
appropriate sample for the pilot study has been taken into consideration, so 16 questionnaires 
have been employed. 
In this stage the internal validity of the questionnaire has been checked to ensure its ability to 
measure what is intended to be measured. The important point here is to check the validity of 
the “questionnaire’s content” which means to what extent the questions in the questionnaire 
provide adequate coverage of the investigative questions (Saunders et al., 2009). ‘Adequate 
232 
 
coverage’ can be assessed through careful definition of the research through the literature 
review, or alternatively to use a number of individuals to assess whether each question in the 
questionnaire is ‘essential’, ‘useful but not essential’, or ‘not necessary’ (Saunders et al., 
2009). In this study, the measurement questions have been carefully adapted from the 
literature and the Jordanian governance code, and also have been assessed by the individuals 
who will participate in the pilot study. 
 
 
5.4.5. Administration of the questionnaire: Sample selection and distribution process 
 
Given the difficulties in considering the whole population due to limited time and resources 
and accessibility, an important step in administering a questionnaire is to identify the 
sampling frame for the targeted participants. Therefore, the sample frame should be a 
complete list of all the cases in the population from which your sample will be drawn, as the 
sample frame also has implications regarding the extent to which you can generalise from 
your sample (Saunders et al., 2009).  
There are two types of samples; probability and non-probability samples. In probability 
samples “the chance, or probability, of each case being selected from the population is known 
and is usually equal for all cases. This means that it is possible to answer research questions 
and to achieve objectives that require you to estimate statistically the characteristics of the 
population from the sample. Consequently, probability sampling is often associated with 
survey and experimental research strategies” (Saunders et al., 2009: 207). For non-probability 
samples, the probability of selected cases is unknown and therefore it is difficult to address 
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the research objectives effectively. It is possible to generalise the inferences from non-
probability samples, but not on statistical grounds (Saunders et al., 2009). 
Probability sampling (or representative sampling) is the most common sampling approach 
correlated with survey-based research, where the target is to make inferences from a sample 
about a population to find answers to the research question(s) or to meet the study objectives 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Saunders et al., (2009: 208) summarised the following main steps to 
make sure that a well-representative sample has been obtained:  
1. Identify a proper sampling frame based on the study objectives. 
2. Choose a suitable sample size. 
3. Select the most suitable sampling method and select the sample. 
4. Check that the sample is representative of the population. 
 
The study has taken these steps/requirements into consideration (as discussed below) in order 
to produce a valid questionnaire and in order to be able to generalise produced inferences. 
As mentioned earlier, the participants are divided into three groups: members of boards of 
directors, members of audit committees and external auditors. Since these groups are a 
cornerstone of monitoring mechanisms, their perceptions could have remarkable implications 
for the purpose of the current research. The questionnaire survey has been developed to get 
an insight into the perceptions of these parties with respect to the effectiveness of internal 
corporate governance mechanisms and audit quality in Jordan.  
The survey includes members of board of directors and audit committee members for 175 
listed non-financial firms. Given the descriptive results of the first empirical study in the 
thesis, the average board size is eight members resulting in 1400 members as the directors’ 
population. The audit committee members at the same time are directors and the average 
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audit committee size is three members. Therefore, the 1400 members have been split into 
directors who are members of audit committees and directors who are not. As a result, the 
population of audit committee members is 525 (175*3), and the population of directors who 
are not members of audit committees is 875 (1400-525) as presented in Table 5.5. 
Nearly all the listed non-financial firms in Jordan (96%) are audited by ten audit firms. Based 
on the information obtained from the Jordan Association of Certified Public Accountants 
(JACPA), the average number certified auditors in these firms is five. So, the targeted 
population for external auditors is 50. The study considered all of the population because it is 
recommended to take all the population if its size is below 50 cases (Henry, 1990). 
Regarding choosing a suitable sample size, the following formula (Yamane, 1967) has been 
used to determine the appropriate sample size.  
𝑛 =
N
1 + N ∗ (𝑒)2
 
 Where: 
 n is the sample size 
 N is the population size 
 e is the acceptable sampling error 
 95% confidence level and p=.05 is assumed 
 
So, as presented in Table 5.5 below, the minimum sample size for directors is 267 
(875/1+875*(.0025)); for audit committee members is 222 (525/1+525*(.0025)); and 44 for 
external auditors (50/1+50*(.0025)). 
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Table 5.5: structure of population and study sample 
Groups Population (N) Sample size (n) 
Directors in boards (not members of audit committee) 875 267 
Audit committee members 525 222 
External auditors 50 50
24
 
 
The study employed a random sampling method (which is one of the probability sample 
types) in order to choose the target sample size. So, a list of all directors has been prepared 
and 268 directors and 223 audit committee members have been randomly selected. After that, 
a directory is prepared, comprising a list of their details (for those who have been selected in 
the sample) e.g. firms they work in and contact details. The contact details, such as phone 
numbers (private or business numbers), faxes and email addresses, are sought from various 
sources e.g. the Amman Stock Exchange, the Securities Depository Centre, websites and 
personal relations. 
The survey began by contacting the targeted respondents by email and telephone to obtain 
their consent to participate in the survey. For this contact, a number of points have been 
highlighted, for instance the identity of the researcher, the institution he belongs to, the study 
objectives and potential implications and benefits, confirming anonymity and encourage them 
to take part. Also, respondents were asked about the preferable method to send the 
                                                          
24
 Based on the sample size equation, the minimum sample size of auditors should be 44. However, the study 
will consider all of the population because it is recommended to consider all the population if its size is below 
50 cases (Henry, 1990). 
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questionnaire through e.g. by hand, email, fax, or online survey (postal questionnaire is not 
an option because the post service in Jordan is inefficient enough/unreliable).  
 
5.4.6. Reliability 
 
A reliability test of the questionnaire is a statistical way to measure how reproducible the 
survey instrument’s data are (Litwin, 1995). In other words, it represents to what extent the 
measurement data (items) included in the questionnaire are consistent. So this makes the 
reliability test important as a measuring instrument which verifies errors that lead to 
inconsistencies between observations, either through any one-measurement procedure or each 
time a given variable is measured by the same instrument (Deville, 2003). 
One of the most common tests for measuring reliability is Cronbach’s Alpha test. Cronbach’s 
Alpha offers the best indication of the instruments’ internal consistency as it has no right-
wrong (binary) marking schemes, and then can be used for questions adopting scales such as 
the Likert Scale (Oppenheim, 1992). The results of Cronbach’s Alpha test range between 0 
and 1. A coefficient closer to 1 indicates better internal consistency of responses and 
therefore indicates that the research tool, e.g. the questionnaire, is a more reliable tool. 
Therefore, the study used Cronbach’s Alpha as a reliability (internal consistency) test because 
it is less biased and is a more reliable method. A coefficient level of 0.70 or more for 
Cronbach’s Alpha test is an acceptable level of reliability (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). 
So, in this study, the coefficient is over 0.82 for all tests, indicating that the instrument is 
reliable and the data is suitable for the intended analysis. 
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5.4.7. Statistical methods for questionnaire analysis 
 
Parametric and non-parametric tests are the common methods of data analysis for any 
scientific research. Though the parametric type of testing is more powerful; employing it is 
conditional on a number of assumptions (such as normality of distribution and linearity 
between variables) that should be met before conducting the analysis (Siegel, 1957; Gujarati, 
2009; Hair, 2010).  
Non-parametric tests remains an alternative statistical test as an appropriate statistical method 
used in analysing nominal or ordinal data (e.g. Likert Scale) regardless of the parametric-
related assumptions (Siegel, 1957; Gujarati, 2003). Newbold et al., (2003) suggest that a non-
parametric test is more relevant for the questionnaire survey because the data involved in the 
questionnaire is particularly nominal and ordinal data without the normality assumption. 
Moreover, Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests have been used to analyse the 
normality and they showed that the data is not normally distributed (P value is less than 5%). 
As a result, non-parametric tests were used in this study.  
Descriptive Statistics are used as a quantitative description of the main data characteristics. 
This comprises calculating frequencies, percentages, means for group responses and show 
level of agreement for each group. Kruskal-Wallis as the appropriate non-parametric test is 
used to examine the differences between respondents’ perceptions (board of directors, audit 
committee members and external auditors). Kruskal-Wallis test provides an indication that 
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there is a significant differences between groups, but it doesn’t show where the difference lies 
or between which groups. The study has employed Post hoc test after running Kruskal-Wallis 
to identify between which groups difference lies. 
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CHAPTER SIX: DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS DISCUSSION-
FIRST EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents hypothesis testing for the first empirical model which is based on the 
secondary data. The data analysis and discussion are presented in the following order. Second 
section covers the descriptive statistics for the collected data. Third section shows both 
Pearson and Spearman rank correlations which are normally used to measures the strength of 
relationship between two variables i.e. correlation test. Fourth and fifth sections contains the 
result interpretation are discussion based on the different statistical estimation methods and 
finally the conclusion is section six. 
 
6.2. Descriptive results 
 
Tables 6.1.a and 6.1.b provide descriptive statistics for the variables employed in the study. 
Panel A reports those for continuous variables and panel B presents those for dichotomous 
variables. Of particular interest to the study are the corporate governance variables. The 
Jordanian corporate governance code 2008 require all public listed firms to have board of 
directors comprising three to thirteen members one-third of them should be independent, 
meet regularly at least six time a year, and chair and CEO position should be separated. 
Listed companies also should have audit committees comprising at least three members, two 
of whom should be independent, and one at least should have financial expertise. 
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Table 6.1 present some important descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum 
and maximum, skewness, and kurtosis) of dependent variable (audit fees ln_AFEE), the 
hypothesis variables (board independence B_IND, role duality RD, board meetings B_MEET, 
board size B_SIZE, gender diversity in the board GEND, audit committee independence 
AC_IND, audit committee financial expertise AC_EXP, audit committee meetings during a 
year AC_MEET, audit committee size AC_SIZE, proportion of o shares held by family 
FAMILY_OWN; proportion of o shares held by non-financial institutions NON_FIN_INS; 
proportion of o shares held by financial institutions (banks) FIN_INS; proportion of o shares 
held by government GOV; proportion of o shares held by foreign Arab investors FOR-ARB: 
FOR-ARB; proportion of o shares held by non-Arab foreigners FOR_NON_ARB. 
Descriptive statistics for control variables also presented. The following is a show of 
important descriptive statistic results. 
For board of director characteristics, the average board size is just above eight members. So, 
Firms in Jordan have relatively modest board sizes, given that board of directors in Jordan is 
comprised of an odd number of members, minimum three, and maximum thirteen. Given that 
the optimal board size is depends on firms’ characteristics, different argument are mentioned. 
The average of board size in Jordan is similar to what was reported in Malaysia which is 8 
members (Hannifa and Hudaib, 2006), and less that the size in US which is 11.3 members in 
averages (Laksmana, 2007). Also, more than half of directors are independent; the average 
proportion of independent directors on boards is 51 per cent. This ration is higher than some 
developing countries like Malaysia where ratio of independent is 44% (Bin-Muhamed, 2013). 
Therefore, the board in study sample adheres with code recommendation regarding 
independent existence of independent directors.  
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The average frequency of board meetings is 7.3 times a year which is close to the minimum 
limit determined by the regulations which is 6 times a year. So, there is an obvious gap 
between the minimum numbers of meetings, which are 4 times a year and the maximum 
number of meeting, which is 23 times a year. this indicates that board in Jordan meets less 
frequently than their counterparts in the UK where the average board meetings is 8.78 times a 
year (Zaman et al., 2011), as well as quite similar to Malaysia where average board meetings 
reported by Bin-muhamed (2013) is 7.73 times per year. 
Role duality is still common in Jordanian companies but the ratio was decreased from 25 per 
cent in 2009 to 20 per cent in 2014, which this likely due to the encouragement by regulations 
towards separation between board chair and CEO position. Though the position of chairman 
& CEO is separated in the majority of Jordanian companies, this ratio of role duality is still 
high comparing to other contexts, for instance it is 12% in Australia (Bliss, 2011); 7% in the 
UK (Zaman et al., 2011); 13% in Malaysia (Bin-Muhamed, 2013).  
With regard to audit committee’s variables, the average of audit committee size AC_SIZE is 
three members, which complied with the JCGC (2008) that requires audit committee to 
contain at least three members. The maximum number of committee members is five, and 
also the result indicates that most of committees have only three members. 
The average frequency of audit committee meetings during a year is 3.8 times. About two 
third (64 per cent) of audit committee members are independent with an average of 59 per 
cent of them having financial expertise.  Accordingly, these descriptive results indicate that 
the Jordanian companies on average comply with the governance code and its 
recommendations with respect of formation and characteristics of board of directors and audit 
committee. However, the role duality is still common in Jordan with (in about 23% of the 
listed companies).  
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The result of ownership identities show that family ownership, financial institutions, non-
financial institution, foreign Arab-ownership, foreign-non-Arab ownership are common in 
Jordan by percentages 12%, 9%, 17%, 8% and 4% respectively. These figures are in line with 
previous results (Jafar and Alshawa, 2009, Omran et al., 2008 and Zeitoun & Tian, 2007). 
Foreign investment (which was 11% in total; Arab is 8% and non-Arab 3.5%) are stable 
(slightly changed) over 2009 and 2014 as ASE obtained more advantage as a stable market in 
a stable state. The government ownership is also stable as its investments are in some 
important firms (e.g. Phosphate, Potash, Alrai Press) for strategic reasons. 
As shown, skewness and kurtosis indicated some problem with the normality assumption for 
some variables and the data has been transformed accordingly using natural logarithm to get 
the best fit. Number of variables have been transformed (e.g. LN_AFEE, LN_ASSET) using 
the natural log. Rahman and Ali (2006) reported that data is considered to be normal if the 
standard skewness is within ±1.96 and standard kurtosis is ± 2. Other researchers consider 
data to be normal if the standard Kurtosis within ±3 (Gujarati, 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006).  
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 Table 6.1.a: descriptive statistics for continuous variables (n= 690) 
 
YEAR Desc. Stat. Ln_FE
ES 
B_IND     B_MEE
T 
B_SIZE GEN
D      
AC_IN
D 
AC_EX
P 
AC_
MEE
T 
AC_ 
SIZE 
NON-
FIN. 
INS 
FIN_IN
S 
FAMIL
Y  
GOV FOR
_ 
ARB 
FOR_NO
N_ARB 
SIZE 
(000) 
Lev COX risk ROA 
2009 Mean 13660 0.50 7.06 8.38 0.03 .646 .592 3.66 3.09 .189 .08 .107 .007 .074 .034 68147 .06
8 
1.26 .45 .019 
Min 1865 0.00 5.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 3.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 2448 0 0 .004 -.42 
Max 110900 .91 13.0 13.0 0.29 1.00 1.00 7.0 4.00 .736 .95 .9 .27 .86 .89 885699 .77 16 .99 .803 
SD 16461 0.21 1.71 2.05 0.07 .293 .24 .79 0.29 .21 .16 .178 .04 .148 .12 127925 .13 2.7 .27 .12 
Skewness 3.5 -0.51 1.74 .364 2.20 -0.53 .-14 .99 2.74 .85 2.6 1.8 5.7 2.6 4 4 3 3 .14 1.6 
Kurtosis 17 2.80 5.33 2.90 7.40 2.57 2.74 5.95 8.56 2.6 10 6.5 34 10 24 20 15 14 1.8 16 
 
2010 
 
 
Mean 13944 0.52 7.02 8.38 .034 0.64 0.59 3.8 3.10 .18 .08 .11 .007 .07 .035 69368 .07
8 
1.3 .44 .007 
Min 2000 0.00 6.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2 3.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 2142 0 0 .004 -.507 
Max 116904 0.90 14.0 13.0 0.42 1.00 1.00 7 4.00 .75 .95 .9 .27 .86 .89 1008039   72 16 .99 .38 
SD 17303 0.20 1.63 2.04 0.07 0.29 0.24 .76 0.30 .2 .16 .18 .04 .14 .12 145718 .13 2.7 .27 .12 
Skewness 3.6 -0.57 1.94 .32 2.64 -0.56 -.19 .83 2.58 .9 2.5 1.8 5.7 2.7 4 4 2.7 3 .13 -1.2 
Kurtosis 17 2.92 6.73 2.8 11 2.62 2.83 6 7.70 2.7 10 6 34 11.4 24 24 12 14 1.9 8 
 
2011 
Mean 14262 .50 7.2 8.2 .033 .63 .59 3.88 3 .17 .09 .12 .007 .08 .033 77944 .07
6 
1.39 .42 .002 
Min 2000 0 6 5 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1917 0 0 .003 -.3 
Max 131818 .91 19 13 .40 1 1 17 4 .93 95 .9 .27 .86 .89 1302160 .61 21   .97   .31 
SD 18211 .20 2.35 2 .07 .29 .24 1.46 .31 .2 .16 .19 .04 .15 .13 193043 .12 3 .27 .09 
Skewness 3.9 -.42 2.92 .38 2.5 -.43 -.17 6.25 2.5 1.3 2.6 1.7 5.7 2.5 4.7 5 2 3.6 .21 .18 
Kurtosis 20 2.75 12.4 2.65 9.9 2.4 2.83 58 7.6 4.2 11 5 34 10 27 29 9 19 1.9 4.7 
 
2012 
Mean 14620 .51 7.49 8.26 .033 .63 .58 3.9 3 .17 .09 .12 .007 .08 .035 80007 .08 1.3 .43 .005 
Min 2000 0 4 5 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1920 0 0 .003 -.46 
Max 119818 .91 23 13 .4 1 1 8 5 .94 .95 .9 .27 .86 .89 1534884 .61 21 .96 .29 
SD 17013 .19 2.62 2.10 .07 .29 .24 .91 .38 .21 .16 .19 .04 .16 .13 200483 .12 3 .27 .10 
Skewness 3.8 -.34 2.81 .38 2.5 -.35 -.12 1.2 3 1.3 2.5 1.6 5.7 2 4.7 5 2.3 3.7 .17 -1.2 
Kurtosis 19 2.78 13.7 2.63 9.9 2.3 2.8 9.9 12 4.4 10 5 34 9 26 33 8 20 1.9 8.4 
 
2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 15178. .51 7.5 8.1 .029 .64 .59 3..82 3.11 .15 .09 .12 .007 .087 .035 85788 .08 1.36 .41 .015 
Min 1392 0 6 5 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1887 0 0 -.19 -.27 
Max 128818 1 20 13 .4 1 1 9 5 .96 .95 .9 .27 .86 .89 1798635 .67 20 .96   .28 
SD 17874 .21 2.6 2 .07 .29 .24 1.09 .34 .21 .16 .2 .04 .16 .13 225092 .13 2 .28 .07 
Skewness 3.7 -.47 2.5 .47 2.8 -.4 -.14 2 3 1.6 2.5 1.6 5.7 2 4.7 6 2 3.6 .175 .066 
Kurtosis 19 2.9 10 2.7 11 2.3 2.8 12.9 12.2 5 10 5 34 9 26 37 9 19 1.9 6.5 
 
2014 
Mean 15351 .52 7.7 8 .027 .65 .59 3.8 3 .16 .09 .12 .007 .084 .035 84961 .07
5 
1.3 .43 .01 
Min 1392 0 4 5 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1692 0 0 -.29 -.35 
Max 142297 1 18 13 .4 1 1 10 5 .96 .95 .9 .27 .86 .89 1765784 .95 20 .97   .31 
SD 18519 .21 2.8 2 .06 .29 .24 1 .34 .21 .16 .2 .04 .15 .13 223219 .14 2.9 .293 .08 
Skewness 4 -.43 1.9 .50 2.9 -.42 -.11 2 3 1.4 2.5 1.6 5.7 2.5 4.7 5 3.4 3.6 .15 -.2 
Kurtosis 23 2.9 6.2 2.7 12 2.3 2.7 14 12 4.7 10.6 4.9 34 9.8 26 35 18 19 2 6.9 
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Total 
Mean 
Mean 
14413 .51 7.3 8.2 .03 .64 .59 3.8 3.11 .17 .09 .12 .007 .08 .035 77702 .07
6 
1.3 .43 .01 
Min 1392 0 4 3 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1692   0 0 -.29 -.50 
Max 142297 1 23 13 .42 1 1 17 5 .96 .95 .9 .27 .86 .89 1798635 .95 21 .99 .80 
SD 17525 .2 2.3 2 .07 .29 .24 1 .33 .21 .16 .19 .04 .156 .13 188976 .13 2.9 .27 .10 
Skewness 3.8 -.45 2.6 .4 2.6 -.45 -.14 3.9 2.9 1.2 2.5 1.7 5.7 2.5 4.6 5 2.8 3.5 .16 -.06 
Kurtosis 20 2.8 11 2.7 10.4 2.4 2.7 44 11 4 10.7 5 34 9.8 26 38 12.
6 
18 1.94 12 
Ln_FEES: audit fees; B_IND: percentage of board members who are independent based on JCCG definition; B_MEET: frequency of board meetings during a year; B_SIZE: 
board size; GEND: percentage of female in the board; AC_IND: percentage of independent member in audit committee; AC_EXP: percentage of AC members who have 
financial expertise; AC_MEET: frequency of AC meetings; AC_SIZE: audit committee size; FAMILY_OWN: proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% of the firm’s 
outstanding shares held by family; NON_FIN_INS: Proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares held by non-financial institutions; FIN_INS: 
proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares held by financial institutions (banks); GOV: proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% of the 
firm’s outstanding shares held by government; FOR-ARB: proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares held by foreign Arab investors; 
FOR_NON_ARB: proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares held by non-Arab foreigners; LEV: leverage; COX: number of subsidiaries; 
risk: percentage of current asset from total asset; ROA: return on asset; SIZE: firm total asset.
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Table 6.1.b: descriptive statistics for dichotomous variables (n= 690) 
  RD Loss Big-4 Industry(manufacturing) NAS 
2009 Yes 29 43 40 42 12 
Percent .25 .37 .347 .365 .104 
No 86 72 75 73 103 
Percent .75 .63 .653 .635 .896 
2010 Yes 29 53 42 42 12 
Percent .25 .46 .365 .365 .104 
No 86 62 73 73 103 
Percent .75 .54 .635 .635 .896 
2011 
 
Yes 28 51 44 42 11 
Percent .24 .44 .38 .365 .095 
No 87 64 71 73 104 
Percent .76 .56 .62 .635 .905 
2012 Yes 24 64 44 42 12 
Percent .21 .56 .38 .365 .104 
No 91 51 71 73 103 
Percent .79 .44 .62 .635 .896 
2013 Yes 25 60 43 42 12 
Percent .22 .52 .37 .365 .104 
No 90 55 72 73 103 
Percent .78 .48 .63 .635 .896 
2014 
 
 
 
Yes 23 47 45 42 12 
Percent .20 .41 .39 .365 .104 
No 92 68 70 73 103 
Percent .80 .59 .61 .635 .896 
All Yes 26 53 43 42 12 
Percent .23 .46 .37 .365 .102 
No 89 62 72 73 103 
Percent .77 .54 .63 .635 .898 
RD: 1 if there was role duality, 0 otherwise; LOSS: loss in last two years 1, 0 otherwise; BIG4: 1 if audited by 
big4 (affiliates), 0 otherwise; INDUSTRY: 1 if manufacturing, 0 if services; NAS: 1 if the audit firm also 
provide non-audit service, 0 otherwise.
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6.3. Correlation analysis 
 
This section presents both Pearson and Spearman rank correlations which are normally used 
to measures the strength of relationship between two variables and ranges from +1 to -1, 
where a correlation of ±1 indicates a perfect linear relationship between the variables. The 
threshold of harmful multicollinearity is ± 0.80, and at this level the regression analysis
25
 may 
be adversely affected (Gujarati, 2003). As a result of the non-parametric nature of our data, a 
spearman collinearity test is used (Table 6.2) to test for multi-collinearity among the study 
variables. Also, Pearson collinearity test (Table 6.3), which is usually used to check 
parametric data, is used to confirm Spearman test results.  
Outcomes form two correlation matrix are quite similar. As a result, the presented correlation 
tables do not show collinearity threat to the interpretation of regression coefficients of the 
study variables. However, from the Pearson correlation, the highest coefficient is reported 
between company’s size and audit fee (0.66) which is expected because the size is the 
dominant determinant of audit fees (Simunic, 1980, Zaman et al., 2011). To overcome any 
potential problem in the regression, the study deals with this matter, later in the regression 
section, by scaling audit fees according firm size in order to linearize the relation between 
fees and firms’ size, and to reduce heterogeneity of variance due to size.  
Furthermore, the correlation between board independence ratio B_IND and audit committee 
independence ratio AC_IND is high (0.72), this correlation is also expected because audit 
committee members - at the same time – are part of board members. Other high correlations 
are between firm size (ln_SIZE) and board size (BSIZE) 0.43, and relatively higher between 
                                                          
25
 Hair et al., (2009) are considered ±0.90 as a multicollinarity threshold.  
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firm size (ln_SIZE) and (BIG4) 0.33. This correlation is justified as large companies 
normally have large boards (Coles et al., 2008), as well as audited by big audit firms BIG4.  
Finally, in order to make a robust check for multicollinearity in the model, an evaluation of 
variance inflation factor (VIF) was carried out (table 6.4) to check for the degree of 
multicollinearity. The VIF and tolerance levels (1/VIF) show that all values are within 
acceptable level suggesting  no multicollinearity problem (Gujarati, 2003; Hair et al.). 
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Table 6.2: Spearman correlation matrix  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
(1) ln_FEES 
 
1.0                         
(2) B_IND 
 
0.085 1.00                        
(3) RD 
 
-0.197 0.048 1.00                       
(4) B_MEET 
 
0.176 0.129 -0.140 1.00                      
(5) B_SIZE 0.344 0.143 -0.035 0.107 1.00                     
(6) GEND 
 
-0.182 -0.117 0.059 0.006 -0.035 1.00                    
(7) AC_IND 0.193 0.729 -0.019 0.166 0.308 -0.150 1.00                   
(8) AC_EXP 
 
0.242 0.059 -0.033 0.032 0.152 -0.122 0.175 1.00                  
(9) AC_MEET 
 
0.141 0.065 -0.114 0.174 0.218 0.033 0.144 -0.042 1.00                 
(10) AC_SIZE 
 
0.246 -0.015 0.023 0.057 0.319 0.049 -0.113 -0.134 0.106 1.00                
(11) FAMILY 
 
-0.173 -0.087 0.108 -0.114 -0.030 -0.022 -.0009 -0.079 -0.034 -0.096 1.00               
(12) INST_FIN 
 
0.060 -0.086 -0.068 0.113 0.063 0.059 -0.050 0.096 0.080 0.062 -0.193 1.00              
(13) 
NON_FIN_INS 
 
-0.003 -0.130 -0.044 0.027 -0.033 0.100 0.012 0.146 0.003 -0.055 -0.185 -0.192  1.00             
(14) GOV 
 
0.472 -0.108 -0.098 0.130 0.217 -0.051 -0.061 -0.002 0.068 0.351 -0.108 -0.002 -0.100 1.00            
(15) ARB_FOR  0.215 -0.062 0.045 -0.007 0.167 -0.067 -0.014 0.108 0.146 0.108 -0.168 -0.106 -0.200 0.113 1.00           
(16) NON_ARB 0.283 -0.301 -0.131 0.051 -0.120 -0.064 -0.308 -0.063 -0.010 0.069 -0.097 -0.063 -0.197 0.221 -0.011 1.00          
(17) ln_SIZE 0.663 -0.082 -0.150 0.173 0.436 -0.052 0.040 0.140 0.240 0.295 -0.235 0.007  0.056 0.407 0.182 0.216 1.00         
(18) LEV 0.222 .0002 -0.137 0.169 0.079 -0.145 0.052 0.003 0.144 0.061 -0.179 -0.069  0.182 0.099 0.164 -0.011 0.323 1.00        
(19) COX 0.461 0.110 -0.083 -0.039 0.130 -0.052 0.162 0.228 0.133 0.007 -0.061 -0.062 0.096 0.029 0.110 -0.013 0.313 0.124 1.00       
(20) LOSS 0.026 0.182 -0.033 0.018 -0.133 -0.090 0.140 0.115 -0.096 -0.143 -0.076 -0.161 -0.004 -0.077 0.084 -0.056 -0.165 0.117 0.165 1.00      
(21) RISK -0.053 0.003 -0.065 0.001 -0.079 -0.226 -0.005 -0.065 -0.013 0.005 0.065 0.153 -0.199 -0.019 -0.020 0.026 -0.096 -0.229 -0.222 -0.199 1.00     
(22) ROA 0.012 -0.180 0.089 -0.009 0.117 0.162 -0.109 -0.032 0.103 0.176 0.055 0.240  -0.04 0.131 -0.055 0.068 0.240 -0.105 -0.079 -0.431 0.122 1.00    
(23) BIG4 0.484 -0.029 -0.199 0.249 0.173 0.083 0.097 0.163 0.108 0.177 -0.092 0.142  0.06 0.219 0.155 0.275 0.331 0.109 0.090 -0.024 -0.031 0.022 1.00   
(24) NAS 
 
-0.034 0.093 -0.062 -0.025 0.108 -0.063 0.083 -0.096 0.006 0.060 0.027 -0.143  -0.04 0.121 -0.095 -0.029 -0.004 -0.065 -0.032 0.038 -0.009 -0.010 -0.054 1.00  
(25) INDUSTRY -0.063 -0.293 -0.048 -0.191 -0.006 -0.101 -0.269 -0.061 -0.001 0.084 0.161 -0.088 -0.106 0.090 -0.028 0.190 -0.106 -0.090 -0.204 -0.116 0.193 0.025 -0.076 0.149 1.00 
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Table 6.3: Pearson correlation matrix (* indicate the correlation is significant at level 5%) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
(1) ln_FEES 
 
1                         
(2) B_IND 
 
0.0857* 
0.0244 
1                        
(3) RD 
 
-0.1977* 
0.000 
0.0488 
0.20 
1                       
(4) B_MEET 
 
0.1764* 
0.000 
0.1294* 
.0007 
-0.1403* 
0.0002 
1                      
(5) B_SIZE 0.3446* 
0.000 
0.1432* 
0.0002 
-0.035 
0.347 
0.1072* 
0.004 
1                     
(6) GEND 
 
-0.1829* 
0.000 
-0.1177* 
0.002 
0.059 
0.12 
0.006 
0.87 
-0.03 
0.35 
1                    
(7) AC_IND 0.193* 
0.000 
0.7293* 
0.000 
-0.019 
0.603 
0.1668* 
0.000 
0.3089* 
0.000 
-0.15* 
0.000 
1                   
(8) AC_EXP 
 
-0.1508* 
0.000 
0.0597 
0.117 
-0.0338 
0.375 
0.0329 
0.388 
0.1524* 
0.0001 
-0.12* 
0.0013 
0.1754* 
0.000 
1                  
(9) AC_MEET 
 
0.1413* 
0.0002 
0.0657 
0.0845 
-0.1141* 
0.0027 
0.1747* 
0.000 
0.2183* 
0.000 
0.0335 
0.3794 
0.1446* 
0.0001 
-0.0420 
0.2700 
1                 
(10) AC_SIZE 
 
0.2468* 
0.000 
-0.0154 
0.6866 
0.0235 
0.5384 
0.0578 
0.1290 
0.3197* 
0.000 
0.0494 
0.1947 
-.1138* 
0.0028 
-0.1342* 
0.0004 
.1065* 
0.0051 
1                
(11) FAMILY 
 
-0.1739* 
0.000 
-0.0873* 
0.0219 
0.1084* 
0.0044 
-0.1146* 
0.0026 
-0.0303 
0.4264 
-.0226 
0.5542 
-0.0009 
0.9809 
-0.0793* 
0.0372 
-.0347 
0.3628 
-.0962* 
0.0115 
1               
(12) INST_FIN 
 
0.0601 
0.1146 
-0.0867* 
0.0227 
-0.0680 
0.0744 
0.1130* 
0.0029 
0.0632 
0.0969 
0.0595 
0.1187 
-0.0509 
0.1821 
0.0963* 
0.0114 
.0801* 
0.0355 
0.0629 
0.0987 
-.193* 
0.000 
1              
(13) NON_FIN_INS 
 
-0.0037 
0.9223 
-0.1309* 
0.0006 
-0.0444 
0.2438 
0.0273 
0.4734 
-0.0338 
0.3747 
.1009* 
0.0080 
0.0124 
0.7450 
0.1466* 
0.1466* 
0.0038 
0.9202 
-0.0555 
0.1451 
-.185* 
0.000 
-.192* 
0.000 
1             
(14) GOV 
 
0.4721* 
0.0000 
-0.1080* 
0.0045 
-0.0982* 
0.0099 
0.1309* 
0.0006 
0.2172* 
0.0000 
-.0516 
0.1756 
-0.0618 
0.1047 
-0.0026 
0.9458 
0.0689 
0.0706 
0.3516* 
0.0000 
-.108* 
0.004 
-.192* 
0.949 
-0.10* 
0.008 
1            
(15) ARB_FOR  0.2153* 
0.000 
-0.0623 
0.1022 
0.0453 
0.2345 
-0.0077 
0.8400 
0.1676* 
0.000 
-.0678 
0.0753 
-0.0140 
0.7138 
0.1089* 
0.0042 
.1466* 
0.0001 
0.1083* 
0.0044 
-.168* 
0.000 
-.107* 
0.005 
-.200* 
0.000 
.113* 
0.002 
1           
(16) NON_ARB 0.2830* 
0.000 
-0.3014* 
0.000 
-0.1315* 
0.0005 
0.0512 
0.1790 
-0.1203* 
0.0015 
-.0647 
0.0893 
-.3086* 
0.000 
-0.0637 
0.0944 
-.0100 
0.7937 
0.0696 
0.0678 
-.097* 
.0101 
-0.063 
0.097 
-.197* 
0.000 
.221* 
0.000 
-0.011 
0.770 
1          
(17) ln_SIZE 0.6631* 
0.000 
-0.0825* 
0.0303 
-0.1500* 
0.0001 
0.1735* 
0.0000 
0.4367* 
0.0000 
-.0526 
0.1672 
0.0402 
0.2912 
0.1407* 
0.0002 
.2403* 
0.000 
0.2951* 
0.0000 
-.235* 
0.000 
0.007 
0.838 
.0562 
0.140 
.407* 
0.000 
.182* 
0.000 
.216* 
0.000 
1         
(18) LEV 0.2228* 
0.000 
0.0002 
0.9965 
-0.1374* 
0.0003 
0.1699* 
0.000 
0.0797* 
0.0364 
-.145* 
0.0001 
0.0522 
0.1710 
0.0032 
0.9334 
.1445* 
0.0001 
0.0613 
0.1075 
-.179* 
0.000 
-0.069 
0.068 
.182* 
0.000 
.099* 
0.009 
.164* 
0.000 
-0.011 
.7549 
.323* 
0.000 
1        
(19) COX 0.4611* 
0.0000 
0.1109* 
0.0035 
-0.0831* 
0.0291 
-0.0394 
0.3019 
0.1302* 
0.0006 
-0.052 
0.1725 
0.1626* 
0.000 
0.2286* 
0.0000 
.1334* 
0.0004 
0.0072 
0.8503 
-.0614 
0.107 
-0.062 
0.101 
.096* 
0.010 
0.029 
0.438 
.110* 
.0038 
-0.013 
0.723 
.313* 
0.000 
.124* 
.0011 
1       
(20) LOSS 0.0260 
0.4959 
0.1824* 
0.000 
-0.0337 
0.3773 
0.0188 
0.6214 
-0.1336* 
0.0004 
-.090* 
0.0171 
0.1403* 
0.0002 
0.1157* 
0.0023 
-.096* 
0.0113 
-.1436* 
0.0002 
-.076* 
0.045 
-.161* 
0.000 
-0.004 
0.906 
-.077* 
0.042 
.084* 
.0267 
-0.056 
0.138 
-.165* 
0.000 
.117* 
.0021 
.165* 
0.000 
1      
(21) RISK -0.0535 
0.1608 
0.0034 
0.9293 
-0.0653 
0.0864 
0.0019 
0.9602 
-0.0792* 
0.0376 
-.226* 
0.000 
-0.0056 
0.8843 
-0.0654 
0.0861 
-.0135 
0.7227 
0.0051 
0.8939 
0.065 
0.087 
.153* 
0.000 
-.199* 
0.000 
-0.019 
0.617 
-.0204 
.5925 
0.026 
0.488 
-.096* 
.0109 
-.229* 
0.000 
-.222* 
0.000 
-.199* 
0.000 
1     
(22) ROA 0.0120 
0.7531 
-0.1802* 
0.000 
0.0896* 
0.0186 
-0.0093 
0.8071 
0.1176* 
0.0020 
.1625* 
0.000 
-.1097* 
0.0039 
-0.0329 
0.3885 
.1038* 
0.0063 
0.1766* 
0.0000 
0.055 
0.142 
.240* 
0.000 
-0.043 
0.257 
.131* 
.0005 
-0.055 
0.143 
0.068 
0.070 
.240* 
0.000 
-.105* 
.0058 
-.079* 
0.037 
-.436* 
0.000 
0.12* 
0.001 
1    
(23) BIG4 0.4842* 
0.000 
-0.0295 
0.4386 
-0.1997* 
0.000 
0.2499* 
0.000 
0.1739* 
0.000 
.0839* 
0.0276 
0.0972* 
0.0106 
0.1634* 
0.000 
.1082* 
0.0044 
0.1772* 
0.000 
-.092* 
0.015 
.142* 
.0002 
0.067 
0.076 
.219* 
0.000 
.155* 
0.000 
.275* 
0.000 
.331* 
0.000 
.109* 
.0039 
.090* 
.0173 
-0.024 
0.526 
-.031 
.410 
0.022 
0.55 
1   
(24) NAS -0.0341 
0.3714 
0.0934* 
0.0141 
-0.0628 
0.0994 
-0.0250 
0.5126 
0.1088* 
0.0042 
-.0633 
0.0965 
0.0838* 
0.0278 
-0.0967* 
0.0111 
0.0063 
0.8686 
0.0602 
0.1140 
0.027 
0.477 
-.143* 
.0002 
-0.044 
0.246 
.121* 
.0014 
-.095* 
.0121 
-0.029 
0.434 
-0.004 
0.911 
-0.065 
0.083 
-0.032 
0.402 
.038 
.31 
-.009 
.80 
-0.01 
.79 
-.05 
.15 
1  
(25) INDUSTRY -0.0637 
0.0947 
-0.2936* 
0.000 
-0.0484 
0.2042 
-0.1914* 
0.000 
-0.0066 
0.8621 
-.101* 
0.0077 
-.2698* 
0.000 
-0.0612 
0.1084 
-.0015 
0.9684 
0.0840* 
0.0273 
.161* 
0.000 
-.08* 
0.019 
-.10* 
0.005 
.090* 
0.017 
-.028 
.4558 
.190* 
0.000 
-.10* 
.0049 
-.09* 
.0179 
-.20* 
0.000 
-.11* 
.002 
.19* 
0.00 
0.025 
.50 
-.07* 
.04 
.1* 
0.0 
1 
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Table 6.4: variance inflation factor (VIF) 
Variable VIF Tolerance level (1/VIF) 
B-IND 2.97 0.336794 
AC_IND 2.88 0.346631 
ln_SIZE 2.31 0.433192 
NON_FIN_INS 1.83 0.545418 
NON_ARB_FOR 1.73 0.579010 
B_SIZE 1.71 0.583111 
FIN_INS 1.68 0.593618 
BIG4 1.55 0.643873 
FAMILY 1.54 0.649276 
FOR_ARB 1.53 0.654650 
ROA 1.48 0.675501 
AC_SIZE 1.45 0.690721 
LOSS 1.41 0.710077 
GOV 1.40 0.713457 
INDUSTRY  1.4 0.714155 
LEV  1.4 0.715717 
RISK 1.35 0.739222 
COX 1.35 0.739521 
AC_EXP 1.30 0.771012 
GEND 1.29 0.774558 
B_MEET 1.23 0.815750 
RD 1.16 0.860747 
NAS 1.14 0.874433 
Mean 1.60  
lnFEES: audit fees; B_IND: percentage of board members who are independent based on JCCG 
definition; RD: 1 if there was role duality, 0 otherwise; B_MEET: frequency of board meetings 
during a year; B_SIZE: board size; GEND: percentage of female in the board; AC_IND: percentage 
of independent member in audit committee; AC_EXP: percentage of AC members who have 
financial expertise; AC_MEET: frequency of AC meetings; AC_SIZE: audit committee size; 
FAMILY_OWN: proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares held 
by family; NON_FIN_INS: Proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% of the firm’s outstanding 
shares held by non-financial institutions; FIN_INS: proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% of 
the firm’s outstanding shares held by financial institutions (banks); GOV: proportion of aggregate 
blocks of at least 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares held by government; FOR-ARB: proportion of 
aggregate blocks of at least 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares held by foreign Arab investors; 
FOR_NON_ARB: proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares 
held by non-Arab foreigners; LEV: LOSS: loss in last two years 1, 0 otherwise; BIG4: 1 if audited 
by big4 (affiliates), 0 otherwise; leverage; COX: number of subsidiaries; risk: percentage of current 
asset from total asset; ROA: return on asset; lnSIZE: natural log of firm total asset; NAS: 1 if the 
audit firm also provide non-audit service, 0 otherwise; INDUSTRY: 1 if manufacturing, 0 if 
services. 
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6.4. Regression results’ discussion  
 
Table 6.6 presents regression results of the study variables and their effect on audit quality 
measured by a natural log of audit fees. Given that the random effect estimation method is 
more appropriate (than the fixed effect one) based on Hausman test outcome (table 6.5), it is 
considered as the main estimation method (column 1). Even it is less favourable, the outcome 
of the fixed effect estimation method is very close to the random effect one, and it still gives 
an indication about within firm variations (column 2). Column 3 shows the outcome of 
Huber-White’s sandwich estimator as a most common robust regression in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity.  
 
6.4.1. Board of directors and audit committee mechanisms and audit quality: 
Hypotheses testing.  
 
The result shows a strong evidence for the positive relationship between board independence 
and audit fees across all estimation methods
26
.  This suggests the Jordanian firms that have a 
higher proportion of independent directors on board likely demand broader audit scope (more 
audit fees in turn) to maintain shareholders’ wealth to protect their reputation by ensuring 
more honest reporting produced by executives. This is consistent with the notion that 
independent directors utilize more extensive audits to complement their own monitoring of 
managerial behaviour.  
The result is also consistent with agency theory as well as with prior studies. Agency theory 
proposes that that independent directors play an effective monitoring role over all firms 
                                                          
26
 The economic magnitude of the increase in board independence, on average, is about JOD 980 ($1,370), 
which is due to 8% (after unclogging) of the sample mean audit fees which is about JOD 14,000 ($19,000). 
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activities (including management behaviour) as their ultimate goal is to protect shareholders’ 
interest in addition to avoid potential legal liabilities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983a). Therefore, demanding high audit quality by independent directors is expected 
as a monitoring tool (which resulting in more monitoring cost). Prior studies also confirmed 
that independent directors seek differentially higher-quality audit by demanding intensive 
work from external auditors, suggesting that audit function is complement the board 
monitoring role (Carcello et al. 2002; Abbott et al, 2003, O’Sullivian, 2000;  Zaman et al. 
2011; Bliss et al., 2009; Yatim et al., 2006).   
Moreover, The Jordanian corporate governance code (2008) emphasises on board 
independence. It recommends that one third of board members should be independent as 
independent members provide effective monitoring, for instance, with respect to setting 
procedures that ensure that all shareholders, enjoy their full rights and that their rights are 
protected, and setting procedures that curb managers from using private information to 
achieve personal material or moral gains. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, the findings of all employed estimation methods report a 
significant negative correlation between proportional of female in the board and audit fees. 
This result is also inconsistent with viewpoints of prior studies that the existence of women in 
the board improves the corporate governance and leads to more effective board, as well  
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Table 6.5: Hausman test outcome for the regression that examining the explanatory and 
control variable on the outcome variable ln_FEES.   
Variables 
Coefficients Differences 
(b-B) Fixed (b) Random (B) 
B_IND .2441196 .302186 -.0580664 
RD -.0060516 -.0199833 .0139316 
B_MEET -.0012673 -.001416 .0001487 
B_SIZE -.007041 -.0067043 -.0003367 
GEND -.8503811 -.8902825 .0399014 
AC_IND .4484453 .3814208 .0670245 
ACE_EXP .2518815 .2410257 .0108558   
AC_MEET -.004019 -.0069895 .0029705 
AC_SIZE .0223809 .033932 -.011551 
FAMILY_OWN .5291918 .359431 .1697608 
INST_FIN .3893729 .4740966 -.0847237 
INST_NON_FIN .1385919 .1351616 .0034303 
FOR_ARB .2077524 .3369156 -.1291632 
FOR_NON_ARB -.1806559 .6085307 -.7891865 
Ln_SIZE .1223611 .1637895 -.0414284 
LEV .062224 .083703 -.0214791 
COX .0586556 .0662836 -.0076279 
LOSS .0351273 -.0296293 -.005498 
RISK -.0713014 -.0510675 -.0202339 
ROA -.1898521 -.2085926 .0187405 
BIG4 .2434706 .2519239 -.0084533 
NAS -.0259267 -.0864392 .0605125 
Test:  H0:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
chi2(22) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
=       28.78 
Prob > chi2 =      0.1511 
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Table 6.6: Regression of the effect of board of directors characteristics, audit committees characteristics, different ownership 
identities and different control variables on audit quality (measured by ln audit fees) –using different estimation methods.  
Variables 
Column1: Random-Effect 
Regression for all study variables 
Column2:Fixed-effects 
regression  
Column3: Robust standard error 
regression (Huber-White’s S. estimator) 
Coefficient z value Coefficient t value Coefficient z value 
B_IND .302 2.80*** .24 2.08** .302 2.39** 
RD -.019 -0.49 -.006 -0.13 -.019 -0.41 
B_MEET -.001 -0.30 -.001 -0.26 -.001 -0.20 
B_SIZE -.006 -0.59 -.007 -0.51 -.006 -0.52 
GEND -.80 -3.43*** -.85 -2.84*** -.80 -2.70*** 
AC_IND .38 4.27*** .44 4.34*** .38 2.65*** 
ACE_EXP .24 2.78*** .25 2.38** .24 1.75* 
AC_MEET -.006 -0.72 -.004 -0.40 -.006 -0.60 
AC_SIZE .03 0.56 .022 0.32 .03 0.54 
FAMILY_OWN .35 2.74*** .52 3.11*** .35 1.87** 
INST_FIN .47 2.51** .38 1.26 .47 1.72* 
INST_NON_FIN .13 1.39 .13 1.24 .13 0.87 
GOV 4.8 5.45*** - - 4.8 6.65*** 
FOR_ARB .33 2.36** .20 1.20 .33 2.14** 
FOR_NON_ARB .60 2.58*** -.18 -.50 .60 1.40 
LnSIZE .16 7.17*** .12 4.10*** .16 3.89*** 
3.89*** LEV .08 0.77 .06 0.53 .08 0.54 
COX .06 6.55*** .05 3.54*** .06 3.22*** 
LOSS -.02 -1.56 -.03 -1.82** -.02 -1.15 
RISK -.05 -0.77 -.07 -0.93 -.05 -0.55 
ROA -.20 -2.21** -.18 -1.98** -.20 -1.58 
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BIG4 .25 7.04*** .24 6.26*** .25 2.85*** 
INDUSTRY .09 1.15 - - .09 1.16 
NAS -.08 -0.86 -.02 -0.14 -.08 -0.96 
Intercept 5.5 13.16*** 6.3 11.39*** 5.5 7.9*** 
R-square 0.73 0.48 0.73 
F statistics (p-value) 448.61*** 8.34*** 633.37*** 
*sig. at level 10%, ** sig. at level 5%, ***sig. at level 1% 
lnFEES: audit fees; B_IND: percentage of board members who are independent based on JCCG definition; RD: 1 if there was role duality, 0 
otherwise; B_MEET: frequency of board meetings during a year; B_SIZE: board size; GEND: percentage of female in the board; AC_IND: 
percentage of independent member in audit committee; AC_EXP: percentage of AC members who have financial expertise; AC_MEET: 
frequency of AC meetings; AC_SIZE: audit committee size; FAMILY_OWN: proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% of the firm’s 
outstanding shares held by family; NON_FIN_INS: Proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares held by 
non-financial institutions; FIN_INS: proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares held by financial 
institutions (banks); GOV: proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares held by government; FOR-ARB: 
proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares held by foreign Arab investors; FOR_NON_ARB: proportion of 
aggregate blocks of at least 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares held by non-Arab foreigners; LEV: LOSS: loss in last two years 1, 0 
otherwise; BIG4: 1 if audited by big4 (affiliates), 0 otherwise; leverage; COX: number of subsidiaries; risk: percentage of current asset from 
total asset; ROA: return on asset; lnSIZE: natural log of firm total asset; NAS: 1 if the audit firm also provide non-audit service, 0 otherwise; 
INDUSTRY: 1 if manufacturing, 0 if services. 
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as enhance earning quality (Gul et al., 2011, Adams and Ferreira 2009, Nielsen and Huse, 
2010, and Terjesen et al.,  2009).   
However, the reported negative relationship can be explained by evidences from several 
behavioural and management literature. Earley and Mosakowski (2000) suggested that 
members from different gender tend to communicate less frequently as they are less likely to 
share the same opinions. Similarly, Tajfel and Turner (1986) and Williams and O'Reilly 
(1998) suggested that the groups which contain gender diversity are less cooperative and 
experience higher emotional conflicts. Furthermore, Milliken and Martins (1996); Williams 
& O’Reilly (1998) from team diversity literature found that gender diversity is often 
associated with higher levels of conflict and then reduce team productivity.  
Therefore, when more gender diversity among board members create more conflict, the 
decision making process consumes more time, and likely result in a less effective board. This 
conclusion is also confirmed by Lau and Murnighan (1998) and Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 
(2008) that found gender diversity in the board adversely affect its effectiveness. Further 
explanation, as being more risk averse than men (Watson and McNaughton, 2007), the over 
monitoring exerted by women probably leads to counterproductive results (Adams & Ferreira, 
2009). In the case of Jordan, while the women are more conservative and more risk averse 
(Terjesen et al., 2009), our result indicates that the adverse effect of conflict and/or over 
monitoring consequences might outweigh the mentioned advantages of gender diversity.  
Other board characteristics which are role duality RD, frequency of board meetings B_MEET, 
and board size B_SIZE do not show significant relationship with audit quality. The result 
regarding role duality RD is inconsistent with our hypothesis. Also is inconsistent with 
Zaman et al., (2011) that presented a negative relationship between role duality and audit 
257 
 
quality. However, same result is obtained by O’Sullivain (2000) that did not find significant 
relationship between role duality and audit quality. 
Agency theory suggests that separation of CEO and chairman position is necessary to ensure 
effective monitoring. Conversely, role duality increases the need for higher audit quality due 
the increase of agency problem (Bliss, 2011). On the other hand, the negative association 
reported between role duality and audit fees (audit quality demanding) might be because 
CEOs (who hold chairman position as well) are less inclined to demand additional audit 
testing (O’sullivan, 2000) possibly because they on average have better knowledge about the 
firms and also have access to insider information which in turn decrease their motivation for 
additional audit quality, and at the same time those CEOs do not behave opportunistically (i.e. 
show moderated level of effectiveness on average). 
The number of board meetings incurred indicates board diligence (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; 
Abbott et al., 2003), which implies effective board in carrying out their monitoring duties and 
ensure high audit quality (monitoring benefit). However, the reported result fails to find 
significant association between frequency of board meetings B_MEET and audit quality. This 
result indicates that not all board meetings are beneficial; they may just repeat useless routine 
tasks (Vafeas, 1999). Furthermore, more number of meetings not necessary an indication for 
good oversight; some companies run many meetings than normal if they are in trouble or 
suffering from any other problems. 
Also, given that there is an ambiguity about the effective monitoring advantages 
(disadvantages) came from board size; the developed hypothesis aims to test this relationship 
in Jordanian context. Thus, the presented results show that there is no significant correlation 
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between board size B_SIZE and audit quality, which is suggesting that there is no effect of 
board size on audit quality in Jordan. 
Regarding audit committee characteristics, the findings from all estimation methods are 
consistent with our expectation that higher proportional of independent members AC_IND as 
well as proportion of members who have financial expertise AC_EXP lead to higher audit 
quality
27
. These findings are consistent with agency theory propositions and in line with most 
of previous empirical studies. Agency theory suggests independent non-executive members 
in audit committees increase the committees’ ability to effectively carry out  their monitoring 
tasks over financial reporting and monitor management behaviour, which in turn reduce 
agency conflict (Fama and Jensen, 1983). (Abbott et al., 2000; Farber, 2005) concluded that 
audit committee with independent members reduce probability of fraudulent financial 
reporting and increasing quality of financial statements.  
In summary, this result confirms that independent committee’s members most likely demand 
more audit effort, because they are more interested to pass credible financial statements to 
shareholders, as well as they are more concerned about their reputational loss which may 
arise from issuing misleading financial statements. 
The result about the existence of financial expertise in audit committees AC_EXP supports 
our hypothesis by showing a positive relationship with audit fees. This result is supported by 
agency theory which assumes that financial expertise within audit committees increases 
quality of financial accounting process, and consequently reduces the agency problem by 
increasing the investors’ ability to take well-informed decisions (Xie et al., 2003).  Also, this 
is constant with number of prior studies that addressed role of audit committee financial 
                                                          
27
 The economic magnitude of the increase in audit committee independency, on average, is about 1050 
($ 1,470) and JOD 900 ($1,260), which is due to 8%  and 6.6% respectively (after unclogging) of the 
sample mean audit fees which is about JOD 14,000 ($19,000). 
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expertise in ensuring higher audit quality (Abbott et al., 2003). However, Rainsbury et al., 
(2009) have not found a relationship between audit committee independence and expertise 
and audit quality. The researchers mentioned that these findings likely because the formation 
of audit committees in New Zealand was voluntary. They further suggested that companies 
should mandated to form audit committees which therefore will put pressure on the directors 
to take their monitoring role seriously. 
Therefore, the study can conclude that audit committees with more members holding 
financial experience are related to higher audit quality in Jordan, as those members –as the 
Jordanian CG code expects- provide support for external auditors, solve potential 
management-auditors conflict, and they are better (than those who do not have this 
experience) in appreciating the importance of credible audit and its consequences. 
Audit committee size AC_SIZE does not show significant correlation with audit fees, which 
is contrary to the developed hypothesis. This result is also inconsistent with number of prior 
studies like Vafeas & Waeglein (2007) for US and Zaman et al., (2011) from UK context that 
documented that large audit committee is more effective and more likely than a small one to 
improve its monitoring role, and then in ensuring high audit quality. However, the possible 
explanation of this result is that the recommendations of Jordanian CG code have been fully 
adopted regarding the audit committees size with very small variation between firms (vast 
majority of the firms included in the sample have three members in their audit committees- 
see descriptive analysis table), this is therefore likely weakening the power of the empirical 
tests.   
Also, the regressions’ results do not present significant relationship between audit committee 
meetings AC_MEET and audit fees. This result is against our hypothesis, and against the 
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monitoring view of meetings’ frequencies which suggest that more meetings lead to effective, 
well-informed and more diligent committee in discharging its duties particularly its oversight 
over auditing process (Scarbrough et al., 1998; Goodwin‐Stewart and Kent, 2006), and 
most likely demand more audit scope and requires high audit quality (Lee & Mande, 2005). 
However, this result is consistent with Carcello et al., (2002) and Abbott et al., (2003) that 
reported insignificant correlation between audit committee meetings and audit quality. Too 
frequent meetings not necessary indication of diligence, they might be just to mimic other 
firms or to meet the code recommendations as proposed by institutional theory (Cohen et al., 
2007), and therefore they might be futile and unduly. 
 
6.4.2. Ownership types and audit quality: Hypotheses testing  
 
Furthermore, regarding the second research question which is covered by ownership 
identities hypotheses, the findings show positive relationship between family ownership 
FAMILY, financial institution ownership INS_FIN, government ownership GOV, foreign 
Arab investors FOR_ARB and non-Arab investors FOR_NON_ARB, and audit quality. 
However, Non-Financial institution ownership does not show significant correlation with the 
outcome variable.  
As expected, family ownership shows significant association with audit quality under all 
employed estimation methods. This result supported by entrenchment effect view which 
assumes that higher proportion of family ownership increase agency conflict, and therefore 
creates the need for higher audit quality in order to mitigate agency cost by protecting 
interests of other shareholders (Azoury and Bouri, 2014). In case of family members control a 
firm, shareholders have incentives to take action for instance appointing high quality auditor 
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in order to curb them from “harming themselves as well as those around them” (Jensen, 1994: 
43). 
This reported result confirms Niskanen (2010) which documented a positive correlation 
between family ownership and audit quality, and it argued that in high family ownership 
firms there is a concern that the management acts for the controlling family and disregards 
other owners. Also, the result is in line with Wang (2006) that found that family ownership is 
correlated with lower abnormal accruals, higher earnings quality. 
The result might be also supported by argument of Anderson and Reeb (2003) which 
mentioned that family firms have reputational concern and they are interested to protect their 
reputation, and therefore less inclined to publish misstated financial statement. Given, Jordan 
is a small community, this scenario is relevant for Jordan where name of many firms are 
related to (easily traced to) the families’ name. Consequently, this might increase incentives 
of family members to ensure high audit quality in order to avoid the adverse consequences 
(e.g. reputation damage) of presenting fraud financial statements. 
Moreover, the regression result regarding financial institution ownership INS_FIN supports 
our hypothesis. This is consistent with number of empirical studies which agreed about the 
important role of banks ownership as providers of effective monitoring and decrease the 
agency problem (Barth, Caprio, Levine 2006; Coffee, 1991). The bank sector in Jordan is 
more developed, well-managed and organized, and more committed with a corporate 
governance code compared to other sectors (Matar and Noor, 2007). Also, given banks are 
main source of external funds in Jordan, particularly for the firms they invest in (AlFayoumi 
and Abuzayed, 2009), banks have incentives to monitor financial reporting and penalize 
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managers
28
 who report low earning quality, and therefore they are more interested in credible 
audit quality. 
On the other hand, non-financial institution INS_NON_FIN does not show significant 
relationship with audit quality. This result from Jordanian market can be justified by the 
concerns that raised by Alwshah (2009) about the effectiveness of equity firms (non-financial 
firms) in Jordan regarding their ability to exert sufficient monitoring in other firms they 
invest in. He stated that many of those investors have significant business relationships with 
the investee firms, which might weaken their monitoring ability. Furthermore, Al-Fayoumi et 
al., (2010) and Al-Fayoumi et al. (2009) concluded that non-banks institutions in Jordan are 
less effective in constraining managerial behaviour of earnings management than banks. 
Furthermore, consistent with our hypothesis, audit quality is significantly and positively 
associated with government ownership GOV. This result is not consistent with the study that 
addressed the relationship between government ownership and audit quality (Niemi, 2005), 
which found that there is no relationship reported. Niemi (2005) study is different 
contextually and methodologically from this study. Niemi’s study was conducted in Finland 
which is contextually different from Jordan (e.g. financial market and audit regulation, and 
motivations of government ownership). Also, Niemi considered only one year in his study 
and also he employed a dummy variable for state ownership (1 if majority of shares owned 
by state, 0 otherwise).   
In addition, though Zeitun and Tian (2007) found that government shareholding in Jordan 
does not play effective role and has a negative impact on financial performance; their used 
data is old (1989-2002), and the government ownership becomes more organized after the 
                                                          
28
 e.g. do not renew or do not provide an additional loan 
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privatization and focuses only on the most important and strategic investment. Therefore, the 
result is expected because the behaviour of government representatives should be consistent 
with the overall government strategy regarding attracting investments. 
It can be noted that the government variable GOV is omitted under fixed-effect estimation 
method. Given that fixed-effect estimation method considers variations within firms only; 
any time-invariant variable will not be presented under this estimation method. The 
government ownership in Jordanian firms is stable over the study period and does not change 
“within” firms.  
Both foreign ownership identities; foreign-Arab FOR_ARB and foreign-non-Arab 
FOR_NON_ARB investors are positively and significantly correlated with audit quality, 
which is consistent with the hypotheses. This indicates that the foreign owners with 
substantial ownership exert more pressure on management to improve corporate governance, 
and also they ask for high audit quality to make sure that their interests are sufficiently 
protected. This result support prior studies arguments that foreign investors require more 
reliable and transparent information to avoid expropriation by managers (Ben-Nasr et al., 
2015), and therefore reduce information asymmetries (Jiang and Kim, 2004). 
Given that both types of foreign investors show significant correlation under random-effect 
method, the coefficient of non-Arab ownership is higher than Arab ownership coefficient 
which means the effect of changes of non-Arab investment ratio on the mean of audit fees is 
higher than the effect of Arab investment ratio. This seems plausible (as discussed before) 
because non-Arab investors face higher agency problem than Arab investors due to cultural, 
language and geographical differences.  
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However, apart from the coefficient, the robust standard error method has weakened the 
relationship between foreign non-Arab FOR_NON_ARB and audit fees and became 
insignificant
29
. Insignificant relationship might be explained partially by that non-Arab 
foreigners invest in Jordan as an evolving market on the long term (Tayem, 2015) and the 
level of monitoring they exert might be less than expected
30
.  
Moreover, financial institution ownership INS_FIN, foreign-Arab FRO_ARB and foreign-
non-Arab FOR_NON_ARB ownership turned to be insignificant under fixed-effect 
estimation method. The most likely interpretation is that the variation of these types of 
investment within firms is very small
31
, and then their within-firm relationship to outcome 
variable will be insignificant. Cameron and Trivedi, (2010: 238) stated that “in the fixed-
effect model the coefficient of a regressor with little within variation will be imprecisely 
estimated and will be not identified if there is no within variation at all”. 
 
 
6.4.3. Results of employed control variables 
 
The result regarding firm size ln_SIZE, complexity COX, and big audit firm BIG4 are 
consistent with expectations and in line with Zaman et al., (2011), Abbott et al. (2003) and 
Carcello et al. (2002) that confirmed the positive relationship between these variables and 
audit fees. The negative significant relationship of profitability ROA is also consistent with 
                                                          
29
 This likely because FOR_NON_ARB variable suffers from inconstant variance (heteroscedasticity) which 
affects the coefficient to be inefficient. 
30
 Some foreign investors appoint local representatives to follow their investment in ASE (ASE, 2015), so in this 
case they do not exert direct monitoring. 
31
 This was clear for the researcher during the collecting data process. 
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our expectation. More audit effort is required for clients with bad financial outcomes, and 
conversely profitable firms are perceived as a less risky (Pratt and Stice, 1994).  
Moreover, the result presents that providing non-audit service NAS by same external auditor 
does not have significant relationship with audit fees. Jordan has regulated non-audit services 
to preserve auditor independence, and most of non-audit services are not allowed to be done 
by same auditors who do the statutory audit. However, some firms still buy some consultation 
services from their incumbent auditors. The result indicates that there is no concern about 
auditor independence particularly regarding the economic bond between auditors and their 
clients. Further, regarding industry variable, the results show that there is no significant 
difference between manufacturing sector and service sector. This is consistent with Matar and 
Noor (2007) that concluded that these two sectors is quite similar to each other in terms of 
corporate governance practises and their management structure, and largely different  from 
financial sector in Jordan. 
Poorly performing firms are often perceived as being riskier (Whisenant et al., 2003; Hay et 
al., 2008) and therefore auditors have to exert a greater audit effort due to increased risk. 
However, the regression result indicates a negative relationship between LOSS and audit fees 
(not strong relationship as the coefficient is 0.02). The possible reason for this is that even 
these firms report a loss, auditors may not pay much attention because they do not expect 
litigation consequences as the litigation risk in Jordan is very low. Also, given that the study 
considers the demand side effect of audit quality, directors may not ask auditors for more 
audit effort albeit their firms is reporting loss e.g. they may do this to decrease the level of 
transparency and in case they want to hide some unfavourable events. 
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Also, the regression shows no significant relationship with leverage LEV. As the concern of 
the litigation risk usually encourages auditors to pay more attention and produce high audit 
quality in a high leverage firms, this is not the case in Jordan where the litigation risk is very 
low. So, this may justify the insignificant relationship. 
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6.5. Further analysis: scaling audit fees according to firm size 
 
Firm size is an agreed determinant of audit fees across literature, as well as it has a strong 
effect on different firms’ characteristics (overwhelming influence of large firms). Thus, by 
taking consideration of the effect of firms’ size (by scaling audit fees according to firm size), 
the study can obtain a better indication of the effect of study variables on audit fees.  
Similar to Simunic, 1980; Carcello et al., 2002, Abbott et al., 2003 and Mitra et al., 2007, this 
study scales audit fees according to firm size in order to linearise the relation between fees 
and size, and to reduce spurious correlations and heterogeneity of variance due to size 
(Kinney et al., 2004; Simunic, 1980). Simunic (1980: 179) stated that “by using size-deflated 
audit fees as the dependent variable, an implicit interaction is assumed between [deflated fees] 
and each of the independent variables and the error term in the determination of the observed 
undeflated value of fees. That is, the effect of each of the independent variables in the 
regression function was assumed to be conditional on auditee size”. 
The results in column 1 (table 6.7) are outcome of fixed-effect estimation method
32
, given 
Hausman test gives indication about appropriateness of this estimation method
33
 . Also, given 
that the outcome of Breusch-Pagan/Cook- Weisberg test still indicates some evidence of 
heteroscedasticity; robust standard error method (Huber-White’s sandwich estimator) is 
employed as a more reliable method to diagnose this issue (column 2).  
                                                          
32
 As discussed before, fixed-effect method omits the time-invariant variables (e.g. GOV and Industry), and also 
financial institution ownership INS_FIN is insignificant under this method which is likely due to insignificant 
variance within firms. 
33
 When fixed-effect model is appropriate, it is considered as a fully efficient estimation method, and the 
estimations of random-effect method become inconsistent (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). Given this, results of 
random-effect method have not been shown. 
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Table (6.8) shows the regressions results of the effect of board of directors’ variables, audit 
committees’ variables, ownership types’ variables and control variables on the new outcome 
variable (scaled fees). The results are close to the results presented before by using natural 
log of fees as an outcome variable. These variables retain their significant correlation with 
audit fees even after considering the effect of firms’ size. 
However, when taking firm size into account while testing the model, Arab-foreign 
ownership (FOR_ARB) and non-Arab foreign ownership (FOR_ARB) do not have a 
significant relationship with the new outcome variable (fees scaled to firm size). This result 
weakens the outcome presented before, which reported a significant association between 
these ownership identities and audit fees (i.e. make it less significant). Moreover, this likely 
suggests that foreign investors mainly target large size firms to invest in. This is also 
supported by (Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001)who found a strong correlation between 
foreign ownership and firms’ size (i.e. foreign investors are more inclined to invest in large 
firms than small ones). 
In addition, board size (B_SIZE) shows a significant negative relationship with the outcome 
variable. This finding in table 6.8 differs from the one presented before while considering 
ln_FEES as an outcome variable (table 6.6). Given that a significant relationship is 
documented between firm size and board size (Coles et al., 2008)
34
, the previous reported 
result is likely to be less reliable (than the later one) due to the confounding effect with firm 
size.  
Therefore, the significant negative association between board size and audit fees (scaled audit 
fees) is supported by number of arguments from prior studies. Large board size might results 
                                                          
34
 Also, it is clear from the collected data-set that large firms in Jordan have large board sizes. 
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in higher coordination cost and free riding problem (Jensen, 1993), less effective in 
monitoring management (Jizi et al., 2013), more time for decision making, and more 
communications problems (Bliss, 2011). Consequently, large board might lead to negative 
impact on audit quality by reducing the board’s monitoring effectiveness. 
Another important change from employing the new outcome variable is that Big 4 firms 
turned out to have insignificant relationship with audit fees which indicates that firm size 
affect inferences of this variable — given a high association between firm size and appointing 
Big-4 auditors. This result weakens the result presented in table 5.6, and the study can 
conclude that, after taking account of firm size, there is no strong association between Big-4 
offices and audit quality. This also confirms the discussion raised before that the Big-4 firms 
are working in Jordan through local firms (affiliates) and they not necessary supply better 
audit quality than other local audit firms.   
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Table 6.7: Hausman test outcome for the regression that examining the explanatory and 
control variable on the outcome variable ln_FEES.   
Variables 
Coefficients Differences 
(b-B) Fixed (b) Random (B) 
B_IND 1.191379 1.097463 .0939157 
RD -.0102367 .0178732 -.0281099 
B_MEET   -.0043906 .0004117 -.0048022 
B_SIZE -.0897596 -.1294415 .0396819 
GEND -2.548116 -1.914062 -.6340537 
AC_IND   1.998416 1.428404 .57001 
ACE_EXP .6632173 .635779 .027437 
AC_MEET -.0276372 -.0350365 .0073993 
AC_SIZE .2967851 .2714036 .0253816 
FAMILY_OWN 2.369578 1.694031 .6755468 
INST_FIN -.1607503 1.00873 -1.16948 
INST_NON_FIN -.4088678 -.103906 -.3049616 
FOR_ARB -.1164673 .3905348 -.5070022 
FOR_NON_ARB .6552449 1.14026 -.4850187 
LEV .4698638 .0588704 .4109934 
COX   -.0362707   .066539 -.1028098 
LOSS -.0589982 -.0399142 -.019084 
RISK -.6529328 -.5681273 -.0848055 
ROA -1.06790 -1.117266 .0493643 
BIG4 .2111375 .3083471 -.0972097 
NAS -.028414 -.0432338 .0148198 
Test:  H0:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
chi2(22) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
=     66.73   
Prob > chi2 =  0.0000     
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Table 6.8: Regression of the effect of board of directors characteristics, audit committees 
characteristics, different ownership identities and different control variables on audit quality 
(measured by scaled audit fees) –using different estimation methods.  
Variables 
Column1:  Fixed-effects regression Column3: Robust standard error 
regression (Huber-White’s sandwich 
estimator) 
Coefficient t value Coefficient z value 
B_IND 1.19 2.80*** 1.09 1.77* 
RD -.01 -0.06 .017 0.13 
B_MEET -.004 -0.25 .0004 0.02 
B_SIZE -.089 -1.82* -.129 -2.58*** 
GEND -2.5 -2.34** -1.91 -2.30** 
AC_IND 1.9 5.32*** 1.42 1.68* 
ACE_EXP .66 1.72** .635 1.61* 
AC_MEET -.027 -0.76 -.03 -1.12 
AC_SIZE .29 1.16 .271 1.20 
FAMILY_OWN 2.36 3.84*** 1.69 2.11** 
INST_FIN -.16 -0.14 1.0 1.68* 
INST_NON_FIN -.40 -1.00 -.10 -0.19 
GOV - - 4.4 3.28*** 
FOR_ARB -.116 -0.19 .39 0.82 
FOR_NON_ARB .65 0.51 1.1 1.33 
LEV .46 1.11 .05 0.12 
COX -.036 -0.60 .06 0.95 
LOSS -.058 -0.84 -.03 -0.45 
RISK -.65 -2.38** -.56 -1.67* 
ROA -1.06 -3.10*** -1.1 -1.79* 
BIG4 .21 1.51 .30 1.38 
INDUSTRY - - .38 1.40 
NAS -.028 -0.04 -.04 -0.13 
Intercept .177 0.18 .48 0.43 
R-square 0.18 0.17 
F statistics (p-value) 5.92*** 136.01*** 
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6.6. Test for potential endogeneity  
All empirical models suffer from omitted variables to different extents (Hay et al., 2006). The 
general assumption is that the relationship between dependent variables and explanatory 
variables does not have a systematic effect on the omitted variables, i.e. the error term is 
unrelated to the explanatory variables (Gujarati, 2003). If this assumption fails, the least-
squares estimator can no longer be given a causal interpretation (Cameron and Trividi, 2009). 
Endogeneity is defined by Roberts and Whited (2013: 493) as “a correlation between the 
explanatory variables and the error term in a regression”. So, endogeneity may occur because 
of the independent variable’s omission in the regression, which would result in the error term 
being correlated with the explanatory variables, and therefore violating a basic assumption 
behind ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis (Roberts and Whited, 2013; Abdallah 
et al., 2015). Also, it may arise in a case of the dependent variable being influenced by one or 
more independent variables, which in turn are influenced by the dependent variable 
(simultaneous effect).  
*sig. at level 10%, ** sig. at level 5%, ***sig. at level 1% 
lnFEES: audit fees; B_IND: percentage of board members who are independent based on JCCG definition; 
RD: 1 if there was role duality, 0 otherwise; B_MEET: frequency of board meetings during a year; B_SIZE: 
board size; GEND: percentage of female in the board; AC_IND: percentage of independent member in audit 
committee; AC_EXP: percentage of AC members who have financial expertise; AC_MEET: frequency of 
AC meetings; AC_SIZE: audit committee size; FAMILY_OWN: proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 
5% of the firm’s outstanding shares held by family; NON_FIN_INS: Proportion of aggregate blocks of at 
least 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares held by non-financial institutions; FIN_INS: proportion of 
aggregate blocks of at least 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares held by financial institutions (banks); FOR-
ARB: proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares held by foreign Arab 
investors; FOR_NON_ARB: proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares 
held by non-Arab foreigners; LEV: LOSS: loss in last two years 1, 0 otherwise; BIG4: 1 if audited by big4 
(affiliates), 0 otherwise; leverage; COX: number of subsidiaries; risk: percentage of current asset from total 
asset; ROA: return on asset; NAS: 1 if the audit firm also provide non-audit service, 0 otherwise; 
INDUSTRY: 1 if manufacturing, 0 if services. 
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The panel data approach allows us to get consistent estimators in the presence of omitted 
variables that are caused by unobservable heterogeneity among companies in a cross-
sectional sample (Wooldridge, 2010). Therefore, by using the same cross-sectional units at 
different points of time, the panel approach mitigates the (control) endogeneity problem 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Wooldridge, 2010). Moreover, Yermack (1996), Wooldridge 
(2010), and Li (2011) stated that employing a regression method (e.g. the fixed effect method) 
and controlling variables like industry dummies in the panel data approach helps to control 
endogeneity caused by omitted variables.  
In a study of this type, we have a concern of simultaneity (causality) as one of endogeneity
35
. 
Evidence from previous empirical studies suggests that there is a significant association 
between the fees paid for statuary audit services and the fees paid for non-audit services when 
both are jointly provided by the same auditor (Simunic, 1984; Palmrose, 1986). However, the 
findings about the nature of this association are mixed. On one hand, knowledge spillovers 
from providing non-audit service contemporaneously with the audit service reduce the fixed 
or marginal costs of audits or non-audit services, which in turn affect the level of audit fees or 
non-audit fees, depending on the price elasticity of the audit demand function (Simunic, 
1984). Thus, the “knowledge spillovers” view suggests a positive relationship between audit 
and non-audit fees.  
On the other hand, external auditors may discount the fees of a statutory audit in order to gain 
a higher profit margin on non-audit services (Hillison and Kennelley, 1988; Felix et al., 
2005). Therefore, the view of using audit services as a “loss-leader” suggests a negative 
relationship between audit and non-audit fees. 
                                                          
35
 When the endogeneity problem (in the form of the simultaneity effect) is present, two options are 
common in the literature to deal with this problem: the use of instrumental variables (IV) regression (Li, 
2011) and the use of 2SLS estimation (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). To use instrumental variables, there 
are strict requirements that need to be fulfilled. Given this strict requirement, most of studies go through 
the 2SLS (Bin-Muhamed, 2013). 
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Therefore, Given that the presence of endogeneity may cause regression to be biased and 
inconsistent, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test has been used to check for the presence of 
endogeneity. Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests the null hypothesis that the residual values of the 
endogenous variables are jointly equal to zero. If this test shows a significance level of F-
statistic, the null hypothesis is rejected and this means that an endogeneity problem is present. 
Accordingly, the result of Durbin-Wu-Hausman test indicates that the causality effect is not a 
problem. 
However, given the above discussion and given the use of panel data which, to some extent, 
alleviate the effect of endogeneity (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2001; Wooldridge, 2010), this 
does not provide a definitive solution to the issue regarding the relation between most of the 
explanatory variables (corporate governance variables) and audit fees and unobservable 
heterogeneity can still not be ruled out. 
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6.7. Conclusion  
This empirical model examines whether the characteristics of boards of directors, audit 
committees and different ownership identities affects audit quality using secondary data. I.E., 
Is the audit function a complement to boards of directors’ and audit committees’ roles with 
regards to monitoring duties, particularly in the environment which is characterised by a 
weak legal system and where governance regulations are still underdeveloped? This is 
motivated by the recent effort exerted by the government in Jordan to enact different 
regulations (corporate governance code in particular) in order to strengthen the financial 
market. 
The results are consistent with the notion that more independent boards are seeking to protect 
their reputation capital
36
 and to promote shareholder interests by purchasing differentially 
higher-quality audit, and this is in line with agency theory propositions. Although boards in 
such contexts are still dominated by male members, there are some females on a number of 
boards across listed companies and the regression result indicates that the existence of 
females on the boards adversely affects audit quality (likely due to more conflict or to over-
monitoring consequences). Furthermore, the result shows that board size is not an indication 
of more board effectiveness; instead a large board might be related to more communications 
and decision-making problems, and lead to a negative impact on audit quality by reducing the 
board’s monitoring effectiveness as documented previously by Bliss (2011). 
Audit committees’ independence and financial experience also have an essential monitoring 
role to assure the quality of financial reporting and serve as an important governance 
mechanism, which is consistent with most prior studies (Turley and Zaman, 2004; Zaman et 
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 Director independence has been used in literature (O’Sullivan, 2000; Abbott et al., 2003; Boo and Sharma, 
2008) as a measure of directors’ desire to protect their reputation capital 
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al., 2011). However, the effectiveness of other audit committee characteristics with regards to 
improving audit quality is either marginal or insignificant.  
Obviously from the reported results, the board of directors’ and audit committees’ 
independence stands as the most valuable audit quality mechanism. Therefore, the regulatory 
bodies can recognise the essential role played by independent directors as one of the 
important component of the corporate governance system in Jordan. Also, firms’ directors 
can benefit from this result by using it as a parameter to assess how board and audit 
committee characteristics may affect financial reporting quality. 
Furthermore, the most important result from the ownership identities is that family, 
government and bank ownership particularly are found to play a significant role in ensuring 
credible audit quality. This result has implications for regulatory bodies e.g. the Jordan 
Securities Commission (JSC) to encourage the participation of these types of investor in the 
capital markets. However, analysis shows the insignificant role of non-financial institutions 
in audit quality. This result also has important implications for policy makers, for instance to 
encourage and motivate these institutions to provide effective (productive) monitoring over 
the firms they invest in as this may enhance the reliability and transparency of reported 
earnings. These results assist financial market participants in Jordan to make better informed 
investment decisions. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DISUSSION OF FINDINGS – 
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY MODEL 
 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
Boards of directors, audit committees and external auditors are essential players in the 
recent corporate contexts around the world. In Jordan, the relevant regulations 
emphasise the importance of these players as important parts of the corporate 
governance system. Therefore, their perceptions would have significant implications 
for the objectives of this study. This chapter presents an analysis and discussion of the 
perceived roles played by the corporate governance mechanisms, e.g. boards of 
directors, audit committee activities and ownership structure, on audit quality in the 
Jordanian market.  
The chapter is organised as follows: The second section provides a description of the 
respondents in terms of the demographic information obtained by the questionnaires. 
The third section presents the respondents’ views about audit quality attributes and 
potential proxies for audit quality in Jordan. The fourth, fifth and sixth sections 
represent analyses of respondents’ views about the roles in audit quality of boards of 
directors, audit committees and ownership structure respectively. The seventh section 
shows the recommendations to the current governance code. The final section 
contains the chapter’s conclusions. 
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7.2. Descriptive statistics of respondents’ information 
 
This section presents descriptive statistics for the three groups of respondents based 
on their positions i.e. directors (who are not member of audit committees), audit 
committee members and external auditors. Table 7.1 shows the number of 
questionnaires sent and the response rate for each group. It is important to mention 
here that this overall response rate (37%) is an acceptable response rate for a 
questionnaire survey and is also higher than the average response rate of studies in 
similar contexts. Neuman (2000) reports that response rates for questionnaire surveys, 
generally, range between 10% and 50%, and this takes into account the survey 
environment. Furthermore, Saunders et al. (2007: 215) stated that an examination of 
recent business surveys reveals response rates as low as 10% - 20%. 
 
Table 7.1: structure of population and study sample 
 
Groups Population 
(N) 
Sample size 
(n) 
Returned 
questionnaires 
Response 
rate 
Overall 
response rate 
Directors in boards (not 
members of audit committee) 
 
875 267 87 32.6%  
37% 
Audit committee members 
 
525 222 79 35.5% 
External auditors 
 
50 50
37
 33 66% 
 
Table 7.2 shows respondents’ gender, work experience and educational level for the 
three groups, and directors’ independence, their financial experience and whether they 
                                                          
37
 Based on the sample size equation, the minimum sample size of auditors should be 44. However, the 
study will consider all of the population because it is recommended to consider all the population if its 
size is below 50 cases (Henry, 1990). 
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have role duality (the last three characteristics are not applicable to the third group, 
which is the external auditors). As you can see in Table 7.2 (panels A-F), the analysis 
shows the number of respondents in each group and their percentage.  
It can be clearly noted that the response rate for the auditors group is the highest, at 
66%, whereas the response rates for board and audit committee members are 32.5% 
and 35.5% respectively. This result is due to the small size of auditor population 
compared to the directors’ population, and also it was much easier to get access to 
auditors and follow up the circulated questionnaire, while it was more difficult to get 
access to directors due to the nature of their work, as most of them are not available at 
the company site all of the time. Alghamdi (2012) reported a response rate for 
directors and audit committee members 20% lower than the auditors’ response rate.  
In terms of length of work experience, the figures in Table 7.2 (panel A) show that 
about half of respondents (47.2%) have more than 8 years and up to 12 years work 
experience in their position, and 20.1% of them have more than 12 years of 
experience; 25% of respondents have between 4 years and 8 years of experience and, 
finally, respondents who have held their positions for 4 years or less represent 8.5%. 
Therefore, more than two thirds of the respondents have long work experience (more 
than 8 years). These results are consistent with expectations, as these groups usually 
retain their positions for a long period of time in Jordan38. 
The educational level for the respondents has been examined. As indicated in Table 
7.2 (panel B), about one third of the respondents hold postgraduate qualifications, a 
majority of them hold a first degree (64.8%), and only 6% have lower than degree 
                                                          
38
 This was also clear for the researcher when he was collecting the data about directors from annual 
reports over 2009-2014. 
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qualifications. This result indicates that the respondents are well educated, which in 
turn enhances their awareness about corporate issues e.g. audit and corporate 
governance. Panel C shows the composition of respondents in terms of their gender. It 
can be noted that women’s participation in such positions is still limited (5.5%) 
compared with other developed countries and this is expected as women in Jordan are 
still underrepresented in workforce and in the business community in particular. 
The remaining three characteristics apply to two groups, which are the directors who 
are not members of audit committees and audit committee members. With regard to 
directors’ independence, as shown in panel D, half of the respondents from these two 
groups are independent (51%), and this proportion increases for directors who are 
members of audit committees (57%), compared to other members of the boards of 
directors (41.4%). It is noticeable that there is a similar composition in terms of 
directors who have financial expertise (panel E); 35.4% of audit committee members 
have financial experience compared to 19.5% for other board directors. These figures 
make sense and they represent the actual situation in Jordan because the Corporate 
Governance Code (2008) added more emphasis on the importance of independence 
and financial experience in audit committee members than other directors, i.e. it 
recommends that audit committees should comprise three members, two of them 
should be independent and one should have financial expertise. 
Also, only 4% of the sample occupied the chairman and CEO positions at the same 
time (role duality): 9% are the chairman but do not hold the CEO position, and the 
vast majority of the directors (87%) are not chairmen. In conclusion, a majority of the 
respondents are well educated as they have higher academic qualifications; they have 
good work experience in their field as well as a high proportion of them having 
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financial experience. This consequently suggests that they are aware of the issues 
raised in the questionnaire, and this also leads us to expect that their perceptions 
should be rational and there should be credibility in the findings. 
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Table 7.2: descriptive statistics for the three groups of respondents 
Panel A: Experience 
Length of experience (years) Board of directors Audit committee External auditors Total 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
4 or less 9 10.3 6 7.6 2 6.1 17 8.5 
More than 4, up to 8 16 18.4 29 36.7 3 9.1 48 24.1 
More than 8, up to 12 41 47.1 38 48.1 15 45.5 94 47.2 
More than 12 21 24.2 6 7.6 13 39.4 40 20.1 
Total 87 100 79 100 33 100 199 100 
Panel B: Qualification 
 
Qualification 
Board of directors Audit committee External auditors Total 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Postgraduate 37 42.5 15 19 6 18.2 58 29.1 
Bachelor  45 51.8 57 72.2 27 81.8 129 64.8 
Others 5 5.7 7 8.9 0 0 12 6 
Total 87 100 79 100 33 100 199 100 
Panel C: Gender 
Gender Board of directors Audit committee External auditors Total 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Male 82 94.3 78 98.7 28 84.8 188 94.5 
Female 5 5.7 1 1.3 5 15.2 11 5.5 
Total 87 100 79 100 33 100 199 100 
Panel D: independence (does not apply to auditors) 
Independence Board of directors Audit committee External auditors Total 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Yes 36 41.4 45 57 n/a n/a 81 49 
No 51 58.6 34 43 n/a n/a 85 51 
Total 87 100 79 100 n/a n/a 166 100 
Panel E: Financial experience (does not apply to auditors) 
Financial 
experience 
Board of directors Audit committee External auditors Total 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Yes 17 19.5 28 35.4 n/a n/a 45 27 
No 70 80.5 51 64.6 n/a n/a 121 73 
Total 87 100 79 100 n/a n/a 166 100 
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Panel F: Duality (does not apply to auditors) 
Duality Board of directors Audit committee External auditors Total 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Chairman and 
CEO  
6 6.9 0 0 n/a n/a 6 4 
Chairman not 
CEO 
14 16.1 1 1.3 n/a n/a 15 9 
Director not 
Chairman 
67 77 78 98.7 n/a n/a 145 87 
Total 87 100 79 100 n/a n/a 166 100 
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7.3. Audit quality attributes and proxies as perceived by the respondents  
 
As presented before in section 5.4.3.3, audit quality is a combination of competence 
and independence (DeAngelo, 1981; Catanach and Walker (1999) and Porter and 
Simon (2003), because they jointly contribute to high audit quality. Though the 
respondents who are members of boards of directors (including audit committee 
members) and external auditors are expected to be aware of the audit quality concept 
and what it means, this section is added just to discover to what extent they correctly 
understand audit quality before going on to the next questions in the questionnaire 
(also to make sure that their perceptions are consistent with the definition of audit 
quality across the literature).   
As presented in Table 7.3, for the competence part of audit quality, the overwhelming 
majority of respondents from the three groups emphasise its importance as an audit 
quality attribute, i.e. more than 92% agreed that technical competence and audit work 
experience are important attributes, with an overall response mean of 4.61 out of 5. 
This result supports the importance of the competency requirement in the audit quality 
definition (DeAngelo, 1981).The importance given to the auditor competency is 
consistent with the notion that auditor competency increases auditors’ abilities to 
deliver high audit quality by enhancing their knowledge of financial statement errors, 
and influencing their cognitive representations (Libby and Frederick, 1990; Catanach 
and Walker, 1999; Francis, 2004; Knechel et al., 2012; DeFond and Zhang, 2014).  
Auditors’ knowledge of the local business environment is fed into auditor competency 
and is also rated as an important audit quality attribute. Moreover, the response was 
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similar for the independence and objectivity attributes; 94% from overall responses 
appreciate the importance of independence and the objectivity of auditing work as 
important attributes to feed into audit quality. The perceptions of the respondents to 
these attributes are not significantly different. 
It is worth mentioning here that audit regulations in Jordan play an important role in 
ensuring that auditors are competent and independent. According to the Certified 
Accounting Profession Law (2003), to be eligible to practice auditing, the person must 
have an academic degree, pass a professional exam and must have seven years’ 
experience in auditing and accounting. Also, after being authorised, the auditor must 
attend training courses no less than 20 hours annually as continuous learning in order 
to keep pace with the latest updates. Moreover, the regulations ban auditors from 
providing – at the same time – most of the non-audit services for the same clients, in 
order to maintain their independence.  
The above findings are in line with previous studies that emphasised importance of 
auditor’s technical competence and work experience as ways to enhance auditors’ 
abilities, enhance their awareness of financial statement misrepresentation (Libby and 
Frederick, 1990; Catanach and Walker, 1999; Francis, 2004; Knechel et al., 2012; 
DeFond and Zhang, 2014). In addition, the agency theory highlights the importance of 
auditing as an important governance mechanism through which owners can seek to 
monitor management. However, the effectiveness of the auditor role depends mainly 
on the audit quality provided. Therefore, the auditor’s competence and experience are 
important attributes that contribute to audit quality and subsequently play a vital role 
in decreasing agency problem. 
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Auditor’s technical competency as reported by Craswell, Francis, & Taylor (1995) 
reduces auditors’ start up and learning costs, and may offer more structured audit 
techniques that enhance audit quality. Independence and objectivity on the other hand 
are essential in helping auditors to achieve audit work and express an opinion not 
influenced by personal bias (Brenda and Jon, 2003) or management pressure. If 
auditors possess these attributes they are expected to deliver high audit quality. 
Overall, it can be concluded that the respondents attached more importance to the 
competence and independence attributes in forming audit quality, as defined across 
audit regulation and literature. This therefore indicates that the respondents are aware 
of the audit quality concept, as expected.  
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Table 7.3: Responses about audit quality attributes analysed by respondent groups 
 
Audit quality 
attributes 
Boards of directors (n=87) 
Response percentage and response mean 
Audit committee members (n=79) 
Response percentage and response mean 
External auditors (n=33) 
Response percentage and response mean 
 
Overall 
Mean 1 2 3 4 5 Mean 1 2 3 4 5 Mean 1 2 3 4 5 Mean 
Technical 
competence 
2.3 2.3 2.3 14.9 78.2 4.64 1.3 2.5 3.8 25.3 67.1 4.54 0 6.1 3 6.1 84.8 4.70 4.61 
Audit 
experience 
2.3 3.4 2.3 17.2 74.7 4.59 1.3 2.5 5.1 21.5 69.5 4.56 0 5.5 4.4 6.3 83.8 4.70 4.59 
IT proficiency 
in audit 
4.6 3.4 8 24.1 59.8 4.31 8.9 2.5 20.3 24.1 44.3 3.92 3 0 21.2 30.3 45.5 4.15 4.13 
Local 
knowledge 
(Jordanian 
business 
environment) 
3.4 2.3 4.6 19.5 70.1 4.51 2.5 5.1 5.1 17.7 69.9 4.47 0 3 15.2 9.1 72.7 4.52 4.49 
Independence 2.3 2.3 2.3 12.6 80.5 4.67 1.3 2.5 5.1 13.9 77.2 4.63 0 3 0 6.1 90.9 4.85 4.68 
Objectivity 3.4 2.3 1.1 14.9 78.2 4.62 1.3 2.5 5.1 14 77.1 4.63 0 3 6.1 9.1 81.8 4.70 4.64 
 
1-5 are Likert scale intervals: 1= Strongly disagree; 2= Disagree; 3= No view; 4= Agree; 5= Strongly agree 
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Furthermore, Table 7.4 presents the perceptions of respondents about the extent to 
which audit fees, Big 4 affiliates, audit firm size and industry specialisation are 
perceived as an indication of audit quality in the Jordanian context. As discussed 
before (in section 5.4.3.3), the rationale behind this question is to support the 
discussion of the first model of this thesis and also to contribute to the current debate 
in literature by shedding light on the most appropriate proxy for audit quality in such 
context(s). The results in Table 7.4 show that audit fees level is the item that obtained 
the most agreement, while other potential indicators obtained lower agreement. 
It can be noted from Table 7.4 that the audit fee level is the most important indication 
for audit quality in Jordan. Most of the respondents (71.3% of the board directors; 
78.5% of audit committee members and 73% of auditors) agreed about this proxy in 
this context. This result is not surprising; it is consistent with the conclusion of the 
first part of this thesis, and also consistent with the outcomes of prior studies 
(O'Sullivan, 2000; Felix Jr and Gramling, 2001; Carcello et al., 2002; Abbott et al., 
2003; Goodwin‐Stewart and Kent, 2006; Singh and Newby, 2010; Zaman et al., 
2011). Catanach and Walker (1999) commented that higher audit fees contribute to 
audit quality directly by encouraging auditors to do more audit work, and indirectly as 
a finance source to invest in qualified people and to train them. 
Importantly, this result is consistent with the regression result presented before in the 
first model (see table 6.6). This regression shows that Big4 affiliates in Jordan have 
insignificant relationship with audit quality, and also confirms the discussion raised 
before that the Big-4 firms are working in Jordan through local firms (affiliates) and 
they not necessary supply better audit quality than other local audit firms.   
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In this vein, previous studies from Jordan (Al-Khaddash et al., 2013; Almomani, 2015) 
also reported the appropriateness of audit fees as a proxy of audit quality in Jordan. 
Al-Khaddash et al. (2013) concluded in their survey that Jordanian auditees (clients) 
should provide high fees as an incentive for auditors to enable them to do better work, 
and to be satisfied and comfortable about that work. They further reported that an 
auditor loses face if he delivers poor audit quality while he receives high audit fees.  
A number of respondents added comments on this question, as unrestricted space in 
the questionnaire has been offered to them. There are some relevant comments that 
support the above discussion about audit fees levels, as follows: 
One of the auditors wrote:  
I believe that audit fees level is connected with the performed audit 
work. 
 
One of the audit committee members wrote: 
When we give the auditor high remuneration we can ask him with 
more confidence and without reluctance to spend more time and do 
further audit tests when necessary. 
 
Also, there is an interesting comment added by another director in which he stated: 
Any well qualified auditor, either specialist or belonging to a large 
audit firm at the end of the day this will be reflected in the audit fees 
i.e. an auditor who is a specialist or working in a big audit firm will 
not accept low audit fees, so these indications will be reflected in 
the audit fees at the end of the day, so I believe that fees is a more 
reliable way of capturing audit quality in Jordan. 
 
Moreover, one of the audit committee members mentioned that: 
We normally pay fees to an audit office not to the auditor in person, 
and the office accordingly assigns an auditor to take the audit’s 
responsibility. So, when we pay high audit fees to the audit office; 
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we can ask for a competent and well-qualified auditor to be 
assigned to audit our company. In addition, more pressure will be 
put on this assigned auditor to achieved good audit work for our 
company. 
 
An additional comment made by an audit committee member: 
 
I do not care whether the auditor belongs to Big 4 affiliate or to a 
big local audit firm. Instead I look to the auditor himself and his 
ability to offer us good audit quality. From my experience there are 
auditors in small audit firms who provide audit quality better than 
those who are working in big audit offices. 
 
 
The mentioned comments acknowledge the link between audit quality and audit fees. 
So, as a support to the main proposition of the first model of this thesis, It is 
reasonable to argue that when an external auditor charges a premium fee to a client 
this will be associated with the provision of a better quality of service (Palmrose, 
1986). This is further supported by Hribar et al. (2014) who tried to develop a 
measure of accounting quality based on audit fees, and concluded that audit fees can 
be used to provide a reliable measure of a firm’s accounting quality. In addition, 
(Shibano, 1990; Matsumura and Tucker, 1992; Dye, 1993) argued that higher audit 
effort increases the probability of detected errors implying an adverse correlation 
between audit effort and financial reports’ restatements.  
In conclusion, as supported by prior studies from the Jordanian context in particular 
(Al-Khaddash et al., 2013 and Almomani, 2015) and by perceptions of the majority of 
respondents as well, the audit fees stay as the main motivation to obtain high audit 
quality in such an environment. In other words, the amount of audit fees is a better 
way for audit quality to be differentiated in Jordan, holding all other variables 
constant
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Table 7.4: Responses about the potential indicators of audit quality analysed by respondent groups 
Potential 
indicators of 
audit quality 
Boards of directors (n=87) 
Response percentage and response mean 
Audit committee members (n=79) 
Response percentage and response mean 
External auditors (n=33) 
Response percentage and response mean 
Overall 
mean 
1 2 3 4 5 Mean 1 2 3 4 5 Mean 1 2 3 4 5 Mean 
Audit fees 5.7 11.5 11.5 20.7 50.6 4 5.1 10.1 6.3 41.8 36.7 3.95 6.1 12.1 9.1 33.3 39.4 3.88 3.95 
Big 4 affiliates 23 33.3 21.8 13.8 8 2.51 21.5 27.8 27.8 16.5 6.3 2.58 18.2 45.5 21.2 9.1 6.1 2.39 2.52 
Firm size 16.1 24.1 28.7 14.9 16.1 2.91 5.1 30.4 34.2 21.5 8.9 2.99 12.1 24.2 33.3 24.2 6.1 2.88 2.93 
Industry 
specialisation 
24.1 26.4 26.4 12.6 13.3 2.59 12.7 32.9 31.6 16.5 6.3 2.71 9.1 39.4 27.3 15.2 9.1 2.79 2.66 
 
1-5 are Likert scale intervals: 1= Strongly disagree; 2= Disagree; 3= No view; 4= Agree; 5= Strongly agree 
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7.4. Boards of directors and audit quality; perceptions of Jordanian boards of 
directors, audit committees and external auditors  
 
The roles of boards of directors and audit committees are highlighted by the Jordanian 
regulations and in particular by the Corporate Governance Code as monitoring 
mechanisms to ensure high audit quality which therefore helps to protect shareholders’ 
interests. The Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) spent time and energy in recent 
years attempting to improve the role of boards of directors and audit committees to 
ensure that investors obtain relevant and reliable information (because enhancing 
investors’ confidence in the financial statements and financial market is a significant 
target for the regulators). The effort of JSC in this vein is culminated in launching a 
Corporate Governance Code in 2008. This code put many responsibilities on the 
shoulders of boards of directors and audit committees as corporate governance players. 
In terms of boards of directors, the governance code recommends that the board 
should be effective in carrying out its duties, e.g. authority over management and 
financial reporting, appropriate composition, diligence, and appropriate knowledge 
resources. Given the regulators’ targets and hopes about the effect of these 
characteristics/ attributes in strengthening financial reporting and ensuring audit 
quality; this section examines whether (and to what extent) these characteristics have 
an impact on audit quality as perceived by board members, audit committee members 
and external auditors.. 
This section presents an analysis of the respondents’ views with respect to the 
effectiveness of boards of directors in fulfilling their fiduciary responsibilities relating 
to the financial reporting process, particularly in audit quality, i.e. showing views of 
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board members, audit committee members and external auditors about the extent to 
which boards of directors’ effectiveness (boards of directors’ functions (authority), 
composition, diligence and resources) play a role in audit quality (Table 7.5).  
The discussion about boards of directors’ responsibility will be presented in two parts: 
their responsibility for a firm’s financial system and their responsibility for executive 
management. First, given that boards of directors have the ultimate responsibility for 
the functioning of the firm (Jensen, 1993; JCGC, 2008; Achek and Gallali, 2015), 
organising a firm’s financial system, setting effective risk management policies and 
disclosure policies are expected to protect the firm’s value and to ensure that the 
shareholders receive credible financial statements. This potential connection is also 
supported by the literature which documented strong evidence of the relationship 
between sound financial reporting systems organised by the board of directors and 
audit quality (Knechel et al., 2012). Moreover, the disclosure levels encourage all 
parties within the companies to take their role seriously, to decrease information 
asymmetry, to work towards maximising shareholders’ interests, and therefore to 
ensure there is less likelihood of financial statement misrepresentation and more 
likelihood of high audit quality (Copley, 1992; Lennox, 1999; Goodwin and Seow, 
2000; Allini et al., 2016). 
Generally and as noted in Table 7.5, all groups of respondents agreed with these 
relevant statements, i.e. they agree that organising a firm’s financial system and the 
setting of effective risk management policies by boards of directors contribute 
positively to audit quality in Jordan (the agreement level is above 70% for the three 
groups with an overall mean of 4.02 out of 5). These findings are consistent with the 
Jordanian governance code’s expectations about the role of these functions on audit 
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quality, and are also supported by previous survey studies (Nicholson and Newton, 
2010; Cohen et al., 2012). 
Agency theory points to a high level of disclosure being important and being required 
from the board as a way to reduce information asymmetry (Allini et al., 2016). 
However, the perceptions of this disclosure level differ significantly between the 
directors and external auditors (at 5% level); 67% of auditors agreed about the 
importance of this statement compared to 53% of directors (there was no significant 
difference between the perceptions of audit committee members and other board 
directors).  
It can be noted that external auditors value the importance of disclosure more than 
other groups. This might be because auditors perceive a weak disclosure policy to be 
an indication of the existence of misbehaviour/breaches and that the management is 
keen to keep them hidden. Goodwin and Seow (2000) pointed out in their survey that 
the lack of transparency may lead to or mask management fraud, and also increase 
their exposure to litigation risk. On the other hand, directors might feel that focusing 
on a high level of transparency may distract their attention from other important 
monitoring duties. This view is supported by a survey carried out by Goodwin and 
Seow (2000) in Singapore. Their survey reported that the directors are reluctant to 
agree with a high level of disclosure, and they also concluded that over-emphasis on 
disclosure may curb directors’ ability to perform effectively. 
Second, as they are at the top of firms, boards of directors are responsible for ensuring 
that the appointed executive managers have the appropriate competence to carry out 
their duties, and they should also effectively review and evaluate the performance of 
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those managers (JCGC, 2008). The respondents in all groups agree with the role of 
these mechanisms in contributing to better audit quality (63%). In particular, more 
agreement is reported when boards of directors effectively evaluate executive 
management’s performance (72%). These findings are consistent with the corporate 
governance and agency theory propositions, which suggest that boards of directors 
should create closer/more effective monitoring over management to ensure it acts in 
the best interests of shareholders (Cohen et al., 2004). Adams, Hermalin, and 
Weisbach (2009) pointed out that effective monitoring of management, by ensuring 
its efficiency and evaluating its performance, is considered as an indication that a 
board of directors is vigilant against managerial malfeasance. So, in such cases, 
management is less likely to behave opportunistically, i.e. curb earning management 
activities and misrepresentation of financial statements. 
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Table 7.5: Board of directors activities/attributes and audit quality, perceptions analysed by respondents groups 
In your view, to what extent 
do you believe that the 
following board of directors’ 
features might contribute to 
increased audit quality: 
Boards of directors (n=87) 
Agreement level (%) and response mean 
Audit committee members (n=79) 
Agreement level (%) and response mean 
External auditors (n=33) 
Agreement level (%) and response mean 
 
Overall 
mean  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
Mean 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
Mean 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Mean 
1. Boards of directors 
efficiently organise the 
company's financial affairs. 
8 6.9 12.6 23 49.4 3.99 3.8 10.1 10 30.5 45.6 4.04 6.1 6.1 15.2 21.2 51.4 4.06 4.02 
 
2. Boards of directors set the 
risk management policies to 
address any types of risk that 
the company may face. 
9.2 5.7 13.8 21.8 49.4 3.97 5.1 8.9 8.9 26.6 50.6 4.09 9.1 6.1 18.2 18.2 48.2 3.91 4.01 
3. Boards of directors set a 
disclosure policy that ensures 
a high level of transparency. 
13.8 12.6 27.6 28.7 17.2 3.23* 7.6 13.9 22.8 29.1 
 
26.6 3.53* 9.1 3 12.1 9.1 66.7 4.21 3.51 
4. Boards of directors ensure 
that the executive managers 
have the appropriate 
qualifications and experience 
needed to carry out their 
duties effectively. 
9.2 8 24.1 40.2 18.4 3.51 5.1 11.4 10.1 46.8 26.4 3.78 6.1 6.1 15.2 27.3 45.5 4 3.70 
5. Boards of directors review 
and evaluate the performance 
of the company’s executive 
management. 
9.2 5.7 12.6 23 49.4 3.98 6.3 7.6 8.9 13.9 63.3 4.20 9.1 3 18.2 9.1 60.6 4.09 4.09 
6. Boards of directors acquire 
credible relevant and timely 
information from the 
management. 
11.5 9.2 12.6 26.4 40.2 3.75 10.1 10.1 11.4 20.3 48.1 3.86 6.1 9.1 30.3 9.1 45.5 3.79 3.80 
7. Boards of directors have 
adequate knowledge of 
relevant legislation (e.g. 
Corporate Governance Code, 
company law, financial market 
14.9 13.8 14.9 21.8 34.5 3.47 20.3 15.2 26.6 8.9 29.1 3.11 9.1 3 45.5 12.1 30.3 3.52 3.34 
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regulations). 
8. Boards of directors take 
necessary procedures to 
ensure compliance with the 
relevant regulations in force. 
13.8 18.4 20.7 23 24.1 3.25 19 16.5 25.3 16.5 22.8 3.08 6.1 6.1 36.4 18.2 33.3 3.67 3.25 
9. Boards of directors 
comprise 3-13 members. 
12.6 36.8 32.2 13.8 4.6 2.61 20.3 29.1 31.6 7.6 11.4 2.61 9.1 30.3 39.4 15.2 6.1 2.79 2.64 
10. Boards of directors meet 6 
or more times a year. 
19.5 29.9 32.2 12.6 5.7 2.55 17.7 27.8 30.4 13.9 10.1 2.71 6.1 29.9 39.7 14.9 6.4 2.91 2.67 
11. Boards of directors 
comprise independent 
directors. 
8 6.9 20.7 23 41.4 3.83 6.3 8.9 13.9 22.8 48.1 3.97 5.9 6.3 21.2 21.2 45.5 3.94 3.80 
12. Members of the board do 
not represent any other 
companies that run similar 
businesses. 
6.9 10.3 18.4 27.6 36.8 3.59 5.1 10.1 13.9 22.8 48.1 3.99 6.1 3 27.3 21.2 42.4 3.91 3.80 
13. The chairman’s position is 
separate from the CEO 
position. 
12.6 17.2 33.3 17.2 19.5 3.14 8.9 22.8 24.1 12.7 31.6 3.35 9.1 12.1 39.4 9.1 30.3 3.39 3.27 
14. Directors have not been 
employed by the company or 
any of its affiliates during the 
last three years. 
6.9 9.2 21.8 26.4 35.6 3.75 6.3 11.4 12.7 16.5 53.2 3.99 6.1 9.1 18.2 24.2 42.4 3.88 3.81 
15. Directors have no relatives 
who have been employed in 
an executive position by the 
company or any of its 
affiliates during the last three 
years. 
8 8 19.5 28.7 25.6 3.76 6.3 10.1 6.3 26.6 50.6 4.05 6.1 6.1 21.2 24.2 42.4 3.91 3.86 
16. Directors have no 
relationship with the firm’s 
auditors during the last three 
years. 
8 8 21.8 27.6 34.5 3.72 8.9 5.1 10.1 24.1 51.9 4.05 6.1 6.1 24.2 15.2 48.5 3.94 3.86 
17. Directors have no business 
relationship with the firm 
6.9 10.3 23 29.9 30 3.66 7.6 7.6 10.1 27.8 46.8 3.99 6.1 6.1 18.2 24.2 45.5 3.97 3.81 
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(worth more than JOD 50K). 
18. Directors do not control 
more than 10% of the 
company's capital. 
8 9.2 23 32.2 27.6 3.62 7.6 7.6 11.4 29.1 44.3 3.95 6.1 6.1 18.2 30.3 39.4 3.91 3.77 
19. Board of directors includes 
female(s). 
12.6 41.4 34.5 3.4 8 2.53 13.9 45.6 24.1 6.3 10.1 2.42 12.1 24.2 48.5 12.1 3 2.70 2.56 
1-5 are Likert scale interval; 1= Strongly disagree; 2= Disagree; 3= No view; 4= Agree; 5= Strongly agree 
* indicates a significant difference from the auditors’ group 
# indicates a significant difference from the audit committees’ group 
The significant difference between the three groups of respondents has been analysed using the Kruskal-Wallis test (to find if there is a difference between groups but without 
indicating between which groups) and a post hoc test to find where the significant difference lies, i.e. between which groups. 
Same outcome has been confirmed by ANOVA One Way test. 
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Furthermore, the Corporate Governance Code (2008) emphasises the importance of 
the human, knowledge and information resources of the board. So it recommends that 
in order to perform its oversight duties effectively; boards of directors (i) should 
contain three to thirteen members, (ii) should have adequate knowledge of relevant 
local legislation (e.g. financial market regulations), as well as making sure that the 
firm is in compliance with this legislation, and (iii) should acquires credible timely 
information from management. So statements 6-9 in Table 7.5 present perceptions of 
the respondents about whether these resources help in ensuring high audit quality. 
Most of the respondents (66% of directors, 68.4% of audit committee members and 
55% of auditors) have agreed about the importance of information resources in audit 
quality. While most of the auditors agreed about this statement, their agreement is 
relatively lower than directors. This could be because auditors are less aware of the 
importance of this resource than directors who are in charge. This result is expected as 
the relevant information is a key source for board effectiveness: without it directors 
do not know what is going on in their companies. JCGC (Section 2 para. 9) states that 
“the company shall provide members of the board of directors with all information 
and data related to the company, to enable them to perform their duties and to be 
aware of all aspects related to the company's work”. Thus, this raises the importance 
of having a good information system in place to make sure that the board obtains the 
required information.  
Effective directors are interested in being in compliance with the law, e.g. governance, 
financial markets, and are expected to be keen on ensuring high audit quality. 
However, given the views of the respondents, directors’ knowledge of relevant local 
legislation (e.g. financial market regulations), as well as their actions to make sure 
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that the firm is in compliance with this legislation, do not obtain strong attention 
(40%-50% agreement level), suggesting their perceived role in audit quality is less 
important. This might be because of the weak legal environment in Jordan and the 
absence of strong litigation risk against directors who do not adhere to the relevant 
regulations.  
With respect to board human resources, i.e. the number of directors on the board, the 
perceptions of the respondents do not show a significant role for the number of board 
members (as recommended by Corporate Governance Code, 2008) in achieving high 
audit quality. It can be noted that around 20% of the respondents agreed about the role 
of board size and about one third provided a neutral view. Therefore, to obtain more 
in-depth information, the respondents have been asked about the potential adverse 
effect of large board size as documented by corporate governance and behavioural 
literature (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Bliss, 2011). As presented in Table 7.7, the 
directors and audit committee groups significantly agree that a large board size results 
in higher coordination costs, more time for decision making, and more 
communication problems. This result also gives more clarification for the inferences 
obtained in the first model (regression result in table 6.8 showed negative correlation 
between board size and audit quality). 
Therefore, though there is an ambiguity about the effective monitoring advantages 
derived from board size, this outcome is supported by a number of arguments from 
prior studies, which reported that a large board size might result in higher 
coordination costs and a ‘free riding’ problem (Jensen, 1993), more time for decision 
making, and more communication problems (Bliss, 2011). Furthermore, Judge and 
Zeithaml (1999) interviewed 114 board members from four US industry sectors, and 
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they concluded that board size is negatively related to boards’ effectiveness in 
monitoring.  
JCGC (2008) recommends that boards of directors should meet no less than six times 
per year. Though this recommendation is made by the Jordanian governance code, the 
frequency of board meetings does not have a clear effect on board monitoring 
effectiveness. On the one hand, a higher frequency of meetings is considered as a 
signal of diligence, and fewer meetings indicate a lack of commitment towards 
shareholders’ interests, or indicate insufficient time for effective monitoring of the 
financial reporting system (Gendron and Bédard, 2010). On the other hand, some 
studies failed to support this argument (Vafeas, 1999; Abbott et al., 2003). So, the 
survey’s result concerning this attribute (Table 8.5) shows no significant effect, 
indicating that the respondents think that the number of board meetings does not 
necessarily translate to effective monitoring over financial reporting and audit quality, 
i.e. given the views of the sample; it is not a strong indicator of board diligence in 
Jordan. 
This effect of the frequency of board meetings over audit quality, as perceived by the 
respondents, is not surprising as a number of previous studies have reported consistent 
findings. Vafeas (1999) indicates that the frequency of board meetings is not 
necessarily an indication of diligence, it might merely be a routine behaviour, i.e. 
“form over substance” as suggested by institutional theory. Not all board meetings are 
beneficial; they may just repeat useless routine tasks (Vafeas, 1999). Furthermore, 
more meetings may be held if a company is in trouble or has serious problems. In this 
vein, one of the respondents mentioned (see section 7.7) that the duration of the 
meetings should be taken into account, not just the number of meetings run per a year. 
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 Statements 11-19 present views of the respondents about board composition that 
might affect audit quality, for instance the existence of independent directors, role 
duality and the existence of females on the board. The role of board independence in 
audit quality is highlighted by JCGC (2008) and is also supported by evidence from 
previous literature. Statements (10-19) represent independence criteria, as reported in 
JCGC (2008), which covers independence in term of (i) employment relationships, (ii) 
family and personal relationships, and (iii) business relationships. As shown in Table 
7.5, more than 66% of respondents viewed the independence of directors as a key 
characteristic of boards in maintaining high audit quality (compared to only about 15% 
who don’t).  
Agency theory supports this result as the presence of independent directors enhances 
boards' ability to monitor management (Young et al., 2008; Allini et al., 2016; Wu et 
al., 2016) and thus improve audit quality (Cohen et al., 2013). In addition, JCGC 
(2008) stresses the importance of independent directors in maintaining shareholders’ 
interests and protecting firms’ resources. The separation of the chairman and CEO 
roles did not receive strong agreement as a potential factor in high audit quality 
(around 40% agreed compared to 30% who did not agree, and about one third gave a 
neutral view). Finally, it is worthwhile noting that there is no significant difference 
between the groups regarding these characteristics.  
On the other hand, the directors (and audit committee members) are not fully agreed 
that gender diversity has a positive effect on audit quality (statement 19 in Table 7.5). 
The more likely reason for this can be captured by the directors’ views presented in 
the next table (Table 7.6). In Table 7.6, “Gender diversity increases conflict in the 
boardroom especially at times of decision making” is the statement that obtained more 
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agreement by the respondents (overall mean of 3.68 out of 5). Auditors, on the other 
hand, do not have a significant level of agreement with all of these statements (about 
half of auditors gave a neutral view). The difference between the views of directors 
(and audit committees) and auditors is significant (at level 5%), and this may be 
explained by auditors having less (or no) actual experience of what is happening 
inside board meetings than board members. 
In more detail, while question 19 in Table 7.5 reflects the respondent’s perspectives 
towards the gender diversity role in audit quality, questions 1-5 in Table 7.6 provide 
the potential behaviour of women in the boardroom, which in turn generates more 
insight on how women are perceived to operate. So by merging the views of the 
respondents about these questions, it can be concluded that more gender diversity 
among board members creates more conflict, the decision making process consumes 
more time, and is likely to result in a less effective board. Other potential behaviours 
for women on the board (statements 1-4) are rated insignificant in the Jordanian 
environment. This conclusion supports the result of the first model (that showed 
negative relationship between gender diversity and audit quality) (see results in table 
6.6), and also confirmed by Lau and Murnighan (1998) and Campbell and Mínguez-
Vera (2008) who found that gender diversity on the board adversely affects its 
effectiveness.  
Given that the literature failed to provide consistent insights about the role of gender 
diversity in board effectiveness (Nielsen and Huse, 2010, Hambrick et al., 1996; Rose, 
2007), a number of studies reported that the existence of women negatively affects 
board performance, and supported the idea that gender diversity may slow down the 
decision making process and make reaching a consensus harder (Hambrick et al., 
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1996; Rose, 2007), the coordination more difficult and costly (Ancona and Caldwell, 
1992), and hamper board efficiency (Brunzell Eva Liljeblom, 2014). Furthermore, this 
result is in line with the finding of the recent survey carried out by Brunzell Eva 
Liljeblom (2014). By eliciting perceptions of the chairmen of 780 Nordic companies, 
they found that the chairmen are significantly less satisfied with female board 
members as compared to male ones. 
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Table 7.6: Potential gender diversity effect on boards of directors; perceptions analysed by respondents’ groups 
Regarding gender 
diversity in the board, to 
what extent do you agree 
about the following 
statements: 
Boards of directors (n=87) 
Agreement level (%) and response mean 
Audit committee members (n=79) 
Agreement level (%) and response mean 
External auditors (n=33) 
Agreement level (%) and response mean 
 
Overall 
mean  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
Mean 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
Mean 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Mean 
1. Women are committed 
to the attendance of board 
meetings more than men. 
8 43.7 34.5 10.3 3.4 2.57 12.7 49.4 17.7 12.7 7.6 2.53 6.1 39.4 36.4 12.1 6.1 2.73 2.58 
2. Women are more 
conservative in their 
decisions than men. 
7.5 47.1 31 11.5 2.9 2.53 12.7 39.2 26.6 10.1 11.4 2.68 6.1 21.2 54.5 18.2 0 2.85 2.64 
3. Over-conservativeness 
by women results in a 
counterproductive result 
for the firm.  
10.3 35.6 41.4 10.3 2.3 2.59 16.5 34.2 32.9 8.9 7.6 2.57 9.1 21.2 60.6 3 6.1 2.76 2.61 
4. Women on the board 
ask for more audit work 
compared to men. 
10.6 34.5 41.4 11.5 2 2.61 10.1 36.7 30.4 7.6 15.2 2.81 6.1 36.4 45.5 9.1 3 2.67 2.70 
5. Women on the board 
results in a higher level of 
conflict. 
5.7 13.8 23 21.8 35.6 3.68* 10.1 7.6 12.7 26.6 43 3.85* 9.1 9.1 30.3 45.5 6.1 3.3 3.68 
1-5 are Likert scale interval; 1= Strongly disagree; 2= Disagree; 3= No view; 4= Agree; 5= Strongly agree 
* indicates a significant difference from the auditors’ group (using Kruskal-Wallis test)  
# indicates a significant difference from the audit committees’ group. 
Consistent outcome has been presented by ANOVA One Way test. 
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Table 7.7: Potential effect of large board size, perceptions analysed by respondents’ groups 
Regarding board size, 
to what extent do you 
agree about the 
following statements: 
Boards of directors (n=87) 
Agreement level (%) and response mean 
Audit committee members (n=79) 
Agreement level (%) and response mean 
External auditors (n=33) 
Agreement level (%) and response mean 
 
Overall 
mean  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
Mean 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
Mean 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Mean 
1. Large board size 
results in higher 
coordination costs. 
8 8 19.5 27.6 36.8 3.77 6.3 7.6 8.9 31.6 45.6 4.03 0 12.1 33.3 42.4 12.1 3.55 3.83 
2. Large board size 
results in more time for 
decision making. 
5.7 6.9 26.4 26.4 34.5 3.77 7.6 6.3 10.1 35.4 40.5 3.95 6.1 9.1 51.5 27.3 6.1 3.18 3.74 
3. Large board size 
results in more 
communication 
problems. 
5.7 8 24.1 27.6 34.5 3.81 7.6 5.1 13.9 40.4 43 3.96 6.1 6.1 51.5 30.3 6.1 3.24 3.76 
4. Large board size is 
ineffective in monitoring 
management. 
8 12.6 43.7 25.3 10.3 3.17 10.1 8.9 25.3 39.2 16.5 3.43 3 24.2 45.5 21.2 6.1 3.03 3.25 
1-5 are Likert scale interval; 1= Strongly disagree; 2= Disagree; 3= No view; 4= Agree; 5= Strongly agree 
* indicates a significant difference from the auditors’ group (using Kruskal-Wallis test) 
# indicates a significant difference from the audit committees’ group 
Consistent outcome has been revealed by ANOVA One Way test as well. 
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7.5. Audit committees and audit quality: perceptions of auditors, boards of 
directors and audit committee members  
 
The central mission of audit committees is strengthening the quality of financial 
information and therefore boosts investor confidence in financial reporting and the 
financial market in general. This section presents an analysis of the respondents’ 
views about the role of the audit committee (considering its activities as suggested by 
JCGC, 2008) in ensuring high audit quality as one of the most important tasks within 
their responsibilities. In particular, analysing the views of board members, audit 
committee members and external auditors about the extent to which audit committee 
effectiveness (through audit committees’ function, composition, diligence and 
resources) plays a role in audit quality. Little is known about function and resources 
in the literature (may use this in the conclusion). 
Statements 1-8 in Table 7.8 shows that most of the directors, including audit 
committee members, and external auditors believe that most of the audit committee 
functions (review and approve significant accounting policies, the internal control 
system, review and approve appointments, re-appointment and removal of external 
auditors, review of annual and interim financial statements, review the independence 
of external auditors, and review and approves fees for audit and non-audit services) 
have a positive effect on audit quality.  
The Jordanian Governance Code (2008) states that audit committees should be 
responsible for monitoring financial reporting, e.g. reviewing accounting policies, 
reviewing financial reports, internal control and the external auditing process. First, 
statements 1 and 3 Table 7.8 aim to examine the views of respondents about the 
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extent to which reviewing and approving accounting policies and financial statements 
by audit committees affects audit quality. The perceptions of respondents from the 
three groups (above 70% agreement) highlighted the importance of these functions in 
increasing audit quality. These positive views of respondents are in harmony with the 
notion that effective monitoring over financial reporting issues prevents an entity 
from misstatements and fraud occurrence (Beasley et al., 2009), and thereby ensures 
high audit quality. On the other hand, ineffective audit committee oversight increases 
the likelihood that management will behave opportunistically (e.g. manage earnings to 
obtain private benefits) when it has incentives to do this, and also decreases auditors’ 
motivation to broaden their audit scope and produce high audit quality.  
Second, statements 2 and 4 in Table 7.8 aim to examine the views of respondents 
about the extent that reviewing and approving internal control and risk management 
systems by audit committees affects audit quality. The perceptions of respondents 
regarding monitoring of internal control systems and audit quality obtained high 
agreement from the three groups (70%, with overall response mean 4). In that sense, 
this result is in line with the idea that effective internal control ensures effectiveness 
of the work functions throughout firms and therefore prevents a firm from earnings 
management (Jordan CGC, 2008; Cohen et al. (2004). So, monitoring and reviewing 
of the internal control system regularly by audit committees enriches their 
understanding of a firm’s operations and increases the chance of discovering 
misstatements or earnings management acts. In addition, they might gain greater 
understanding of the company’s business and operations (Bishop et al., 2000), and 
therefore ensure credible financial statements. On the other hand, it can be noticed 
that auditors provided greater recognition of the importance of reviewing risk 
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management systems by audit committees (72%) as auditors might benefit from this 
by the reduction of audit risk accordingly (Turley and Zaman, 2004). 
Third, one of the essential responsibilities of the audit committees – as recommended 
by Jordanian governance regulation – is overseeing the external audit function, 
including the appointment, re-appointment, removal, compensation and maintenance 
of the independence of external auditors. So, regarding the function of audit 
committees in reviewing and approving the appointment, re-appointment, and 
removal of external auditors, it can be noted (statement 8, Table 7.8) that most of the 
audit committee members (76%) agreed with the statement that reviewing and 
approving the appointment, re-appointment, and removal of external auditors by audit 
committees contributes to audit quality. This is consistent with the outcomes of prior 
studies that effective audit committee oversight, especially over auditor appointment, 
is expected to strengthen audit quality (Gendron and Bédard, 2010; Carcello et al., 
2002)  
Furthermore, effective audit committees should be very interested in maintaining 
auditor independence to protect shareholders’ interests at the end (JCGC, 2008; 
Cohen, 2002). Also auditor independence is required in order to assure audit quality 
by keeping the auditors away from management pressure (Firth, 1997). In this vein, 
the respondents (directors including audit committee members) believe in the 
importance of this attribute (this is consistent with the previous discussion about audit 
quality attributes –section 7.3) in delivering high audit quality (i.e. audit work free 
from subjectivity and bias), and also they believe in the importance of audit 
committees reviewing and approving the types and fees of non-audit services as a way 
of ensuring auditor independence. This is supported by the argument that non-audit 
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services increase the economic bond between auditors and clients, impairs auditors' 
independence and thereby negatively affects audit quality (Basiruddin, 2011; Santos 
et al., 2016). 
However, though the views of directors and audit committee members are quite 
similar, there is a significant difference (at level 5%) from auditors’ perceptions. So, 
the importance of these functions in auditors’ responses is insignificant, suggesting 
that they do not pay much attention to these functions (only about one third of 
external auditors agreed with these audit committee’s functions). Similar findings 
were found regarding the statement that the audit committee should review auditor 
independence, and review and approve audit fees. The most likely reason for this is 
that external auditors may have concerns about being threatened by the audit 
committee authority, and/or auditors might not fully agree with the notion that 
providing non-audit services could increase their economic dependence on the client 
and therefore impair their independence, as suggested by the local governance code. 
Pornupatham (2006) reported from his survey that auditors work towards securing 
their monetary revenue with no or fewer controls from the audit committee. 
Furthermore, two respondents from the auditors group mentioned that they do not 
believe that providing non-audit services affects auditors’ independence (see part 7.7).  
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Table 7.8: Audit committee activities/attributes and audit quality, perceptions analysed by respondent groups 
In your view, to what extent do you 
believe that the following audit 
committee (AC) features might 
contribute to an increase in audit 
quality: 
Boards of directors (n=87) 
Agreement level (%) and response mean 
Audit committee members (n=79) 
Agreement level (%) and response mean 
External auditors (n=33) 
Agreement level (%) and response mean 
 
Overall 
mean  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
Mean 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
Mean 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Mean 
1. AC reviews and approves 
significant accounting policies of the 
firm. 
9.2 10.3 9.2 19.5 51.7 3.94 8.9 8.9 3.8 29.1 49.4 4.01 6.1 6.1 15.2 12.1 60.6 4.15 4 
2. AC monitors and reviews internal 
control systems. 
8 10.3 11.5 21.8 48.3 3.92 7.6 7.6 5.1 25.3 54.4 4.11 9 3 9.1 24.2 54.5 4.12 4 
3. AC reviews and approves a 
company's financial statements. 
9.2 9.2 17.2 21.8 42.5 3.79 8.9 7.6 10.1 26.6 46.8 3.95 9 2 10 24 56 4.12 3.90 
4. AC monitors and reviews financial 
risk management systems. 
12.6 16.1 26.4 23. 21.8 3.25 8.9 12.7 11.4 24.1 43 3.80 6.1 9.1 12.1 21.2 51.5 4.03 3.60 
5. AC reviews the independence of 
the external auditor. 
9.2 8 14.9 20.7 47.1 3.89* 6.3 10.1 5 24.1 45.1 4.10* 15.2 15.2 33.3 21.2 15.2 3.06 3.83 
6. AC reviews and approves audit 
fees. 
9.2 9.2 16.1 24.1 41.4 3.79* 7.6 7.6 5.1 26.6 53.2 4.10* 12.1 15.2 36.4 27.3 9.1 3.06 3.79 
7. AC reviews and approves types 
and fees of non-audit service by 
external auditor. 
10.3 8 16.1 23 42.5 3.79* 5 10.1 6.3 20.3 58.2 4.16* 9.1 18.2 36.4 27.3 9.1 3.09 3.82 
8. AC reviews and approves the 
appointment, reappointment and 
removal of the external auditor. 
9.2 9.2 9 25.3 41.4 3.92 5 11.4 7.6 22.8 53.2 4.08 21.2 12 14.1 28 25 3.27 3.75 
9. Audit committee includes a 
member who has relevant financial 
experience. 
9.2 10.3 16.1 23 41.4 3.77 6.3 8.9 7.6 24.1 53.2 4.09 6 6 15 33 40 3.94 3.92 
10. AC is composed of independent 
nonexecutive directors 
6.9 10.3 13.8 25.3 43.7 3.89 6.3 7.6 6.3 21.5 58.2 4.18 9 3 15.2 21.2 51.5 4.03 4.03 
11. AC comprised of 3 or more 
members. 
13.8 14.9 40.2 18.4 12.6 3.01 12.7 21.5 30.4 20.3 15.2 3.04 12 6 30 43 9 3.30 3.07 
12. AC acquires credible timely 
information from the management to 
9.2 9.2 28.7 24.1 28.7 3.54 7.6 11.4 16.5 25.3 39.2 3.77 10 5 24 45 15.2 3.52 3.63 
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achieve its duty effectively. 
13. AC acquires enough monetary 
resources from the firm to achieve its 
duty Effectively. 
8 9.2 26.4 24.1 32.2 3.63 6.3 10.1 17.7 27.8 38 3.81 9 6 24 19 12 3.48 3.68 
14. AC meets 4 or more times a year. 11.5 18.4 44.8 13.8 11.5 2.95 12.7 26.7 35.4 12.7 12.7 2.86 12.1 6.1 42.4 36.4 3 3.12 2.94 
1-5 are Likert scale interval; 1= Strongly disagree; 2= Disagree; 3= No view; 4= Agree; 5= Strongly agree 
* indicates a significant difference from the auditors’ group 
# indicates a significant difference from the audit committees’ group 
The significant difference between the three groups of respondents has been analysed using the Kruskal-Wallis test (to find if there is a difference between groups but without indicating 
between which groups) and a post hoc test to find where the significant difference lies, i.e. between which groups. 
Consistent outcome has been revealed by ANOVA One Way test. 
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The Jordanian Corporate Governance Code (2008) emphasises the importance of 
audit committee composition, e.g. independence and financial experience. 
Independence, as the most important characteristic, often increases audit committee 
effectiveness (Gendron and Bédard, 2010), and effectiveness in turn enhances audit 
committees’ ability to oversee and ensure the quality of auditing (Cohen et al., 2008). 
The views of the respondents about the importance of this attribute in audit quality in 
the Jordanian market have been investigated in Table 7.8. The overall finding 
indicates that above 70% (with an overall mean score of 4.03) of all three groups of 
respondents agreed with the statement that audit committee independence contributes 
to higher audit quality, i.e. the presence of independent directors is less likely to be 
associated with misleading financial statements. This finding is consistent with most 
of the literature which showed the correlation between audit committee independence 
and credible audit quality (Carcello et al., 2002, Kamil and Elkhatib, 2013; Beattie et 
al., 2014). Zaman et al., (2011) stated that in order to avoid legal liability and to 
protect their reputation, audit committees should promote and maintain auditor 
independence, as well as effectively monitoring the auditing process by demanding a 
broader audit scope.  
The views of respondents regarding the existence of audit committees’ members who 
have financial expertise shows that all groups are strongly in favour of this audit 
committee attribute. This result is consistent with the argument that audit committees 
with more financial experience are better in understanding and appreciating external 
audit work, supporting external auditors and solving the disputes which may arise 
between auditor and management (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001). Results also show 
that there is no significant difference between the views of the three groups regarding 
audit committee composition (independence and financial expertise). 
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The local governance code (2008) recommends that the firms should put at the 
disposal of the audit committee all required facilities that it may need to perform its 
oversight duties effectively, including the authority to seek expert assistance 
whenever needed. Statements 12 and 13 present the extent to which audit committee 
resources (information and monetary resources) are important for audit quality.  
Credible, relevant and timely information is important as it helps an audit committee 
in conducting effective monitoring (SEC, 2003; JCGC, 2008). It is clear here that 
audit committee members gave more attention to these questions (67%). While most 
of the other directors and auditors agreed about the importance of these resources, 
their agreement is less (but not significantly less) than audit committees. This is likely 
to be because audit committee members who are in charge feel the importance of 
these resources due to their experience. These responses are consistent with the idea 
that management should provide audit committees with appropriate funding to pay 
any outside advisers, and ordinary administrative expenses of the audit committee that 
are necessary or appropriate in carrying out its duties. As discussed before, audit 
committee independence, and therefore effectiveness, might be compromised when 
the audit committee is dependent on management’s discretion to pay its relevant 
expenses and to pay outsourced consultations, especially when a conflict of interest 
with management is in place (Gendron and Bédard, 2010). 
Furthermore, while there is overall agreement on the role of audit committee size on 
audit quality, respondents do not feel strongly about this, i.e. it has obtained less 
attention than other characteristics. The effect of audit committee size (and the size of 
boards of director as discussed earlier) has no clear effect on board performance and 
previous empirical studies provide mixed and inconsistent results. Thus, though audit 
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committee size received more attention from regulators, as large size makes the audit 
committee more effective in fulfilling its monitoring role (Zaman et al., 2011), on the 
other hand, some of the literature stresses that the costs that stem from poor 
communication and coordination is likely to outweigh the benefits of additional 
members (O’Sullivan, 1999; Hackman, 1990). In conclusion, given the questionnaire 
responses, the monitoring role and committee size in Jordan seems not to have a 
positive relationship. 
In terms of diligence, audit committees should meet four times at least per year, as 
recommended by JCGC (2008). The findings about audit committees’ frequency of 
meetings show no significant effect, indicating that the number of meetings seems not 
to be a relevant indication of audit committee diligence (effectiveness). Instead, the 
respondents might believe that the number of meetings does not necessarily translate 
to effective monitoring over financial reporting and audit quality. This result could be 
explained by the institutional theory which proposes a firm may comply with the 
corporate governance practices just to simulate other firms, or to meet the regulations 
without substantial impact on these governance practices (Cohen et al., 2008). 
Therefore, the frequency of meetings may not necessary indicate diligence, it might 
be just to simulate other firms or to meet the code recommendations. Moreover, 
Gendron and Bédard (2010) pointed out that more frequent meetings may be seen as 
an indication of the existence of problems/weaknesses in the internal control system.  
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7.5.1. Interaction of the audit committee with external auditors 
 
The Jordan Corporate Governance Code (2008) recommends that audit committee 
members should be in contact with external auditors on a regular basis to be updated 
about all issues that are related to auditing work. This indicates the importance of the 
communication between these parties in reducing misstatements and producing high 
audit quality. So this section examines the extent to which the communication 
between both parties contributes to audit quality, based on the respondents' 
perceptions.  
Table 7.9 analyses the views of the respondents on communication between audit 
committees and external auditors. Almost two thirds of board of director respondents 
(67%) agreed that the audit committee should communicate with the external auditor 
on all key issues associated with the audit. Audit committee members and auditors 
gave a higher agreement for this statement (80%). This is likely to be due to the fact 
that audit committee members and auditors feel the actual importance of having a 
regular meeting together. Pornupatham (2006) commented that regular meetings 
between the auditor and the audit committee reduces information asymmetry between 
them and facilitates detection of earnings management, and therefore ensures high 
audit quality. Audit committee meetings with the auditor without management 
presence also obtained high agreement from all respondents, indicating such meetings 
are worthwhile. The Kruskal-Wallis test shows that the difference is not significant; 
all groups gave a high rate for these activities as important scenarios for high audit 
quality.  
Moreover, most board members and audit committee members paid more attention to 
the importance of reviewing and approving an audit’s scope and the plan of the 
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external auditors (67-80% agreement and mean 3.76-4.11 out of 5). However, only 37% 
of external auditors agreed with these statements, implying that they perceived these 
activities added no value to audit quality. Possible explanations for such a result may 
be because auditors are not fully happy in sharing their audit scope and plan with 
anybody as a matter of privacy, or perhaps auditors have a concern that their plan and 
control procedures are not compatible with what an audit committee needs, which 
therefore create problems between them. Pornupatham (2006) summarised in his 
survey that auditors do not like to share their audit plan with the audit committee as 
committee members may come from differing backgrounds and experience, and 
sometimes do not have financial/accounting experience and this therefore create 
difficulties since audit work contains audit terms and concepts that might require 
specific knowledge to be understood. 
In relation to whether informal interaction between an audit committee and external 
auditors has a positive effect on audit quality, above 74% of audit committees and 
auditors have highlighted the importance of this type of interaction. This result is in 
line with previous studies that stress the importance of informal interactions and 
communications between these parties (Gendron and Bédard 2006; Turley and Zaman 
2007. Turley and Zaman (2007) concluded in their survey that informal meetings 
between audit committee and external auditors assist in encouraging a productive 
climate that is conducive to raising concerns informally and “bouncing off” matters of 
interest.  
On the other hand, less than one third of directors (who are outside audit committee) 
gave importance to this informal channel of interaction. The most likely reason for 
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this is that directors have a concern that this informal relationship may compromise 
auditors’ independence (especially in a small community like Jordan).  
Overall, analysis of this section reveals that communications channels and interaction 
should be available between audit committee and external auditors in order to 
facilitate the audit process and therefore contribute to audit quality. As mentioned 
earlier, the governance regulation in Jordan emphasised the importance of such 
interactions and highlighted their importance on audit quality. However, given that 
this governance regulation is not compulsory so far in Jordan, most of the companies 
are not active in arranging and facilitating such communications. This therefore 
required further steps from regulatory bodies in such areas. Also, further steps should 
be taken to protect auditors’ independence even if they create a long term informal 
relationship with audit committees.  
 
 
7.5.2. Experience of audit committee members 
 
As audit committees are responsible for ensuring the integrity of financial reports, 
JCGC recommends that they should have sufficient knowledge and experience for 
their role; in particular one member should have financial expertise. Through the 
importance of financial expertise, this part moves beyond this kind of competence and 
extending the analysis to other kinds of competencies that are expected to play a role 
in increasing audit quality, i.e. do audit committee directors with financial, external 
audit, internal audit, legal or business operations experience bring benefits to the 
quality of audit? DeZoort and Salterio (2001) documented that different 
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experience/knowledge of audit committee members leads to differences in their 
judgements and their relations with auditors. 
It can be clearly noted from Table 7.10 that respondents from all groups have strongly 
supported the importance of these experiences. This suggests that experience in 
finance, accounting, external and internal audit and business operations is crucial for 
supporting the audit committee monitoring role. DeZoort and Salterio (2001) revealed 
in their survey that audit committee members who have audit knowledge are 
associated positively through their ability to support the auditor in a dispute with 
client management. Further, an audit committee’s auditing experience strengthens the 
internal control system (DeZoort, 1998). He found in his survey that audit committee 
members who have external audit experience make internal control judgments more 
consistent with those of external auditors than members who do not have this 
experience.  
Business operation experience also obtained greater recognition by the majority of 
respondents (response mean 4.24). This result is consistent with the notion that 
business and detailed operation expertise (i.e. firm-specific knowledge) may help 
audit committee members in fostering their monitoring competencies. Thus, this 
knowledge of business operation makes the directors more effective at overseeing the 
firm’s financial reporting process (Gendron and Bédard, 2010).  
Legal experience of audit committee also obtained much attention. Though its 
importance has rated relatively lower than other types of experience, it can be 
concluded that most of the respondents (response mean 3.64) have agreed on the 
importance of this experience. This result is consistent with previous empirical studies 
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that documented the importance of audit committee’s legal experience in increasing 
the integrity of financial statements. Krishnan et al., (2011) reported that a legal 
background for audit committee members makes them more vigilant about legal risks 
that are associated with inadequate, inaccurate or aggressive financial reporting, and 
therefore can help in ensuring audit quality. Furthermore, such members can provide a 
fruitful support in some accounting transactions that have legal implications, e.g., 
mergers and acquisitions. 
On the other hand, a couple of comments have been added by directors regarding this 
question. One of them is a concern that the emphasis on financial experience is at the 
expense of other important experiences. He stated: 
Being the current code (Corporate Governance Code, 2008) focuses 
on financial experience only, this might negatively affect the 
diversified abilities of audit committees’ members. Including 
members who have different types of experience could greatly 
improve skills of the team (audit committee).  
 
Another director also wrote: 
 I would say that a combination of financial, accounting, auditing, 
and business operation experience will build a strong and effective 
committee and thus definitely leaves impact on audit quality. 
 
It can be seen that these comments, in addition to responses in Table 7.10, indicate the 
importance of combinations of more than one kind of experience. As current 
regulations pay much attention to financial expertise, these results may have 
implications for future governance reform i.e. take into consideration a balanced 
portfolio of skills on the audit committee. 
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Table 7.9: Audit committee interaction with external auditor and potential effect on audit quality, perceptions analysed by respondent groups 
In your view, would 
interactions between the 
external auditor and the  
audit committee increase 
audit quality if: 
Boards of directors (n=87) 
Agreement level (%) and response mean 
Audit committee members (n=79) 
Agreement level (%) and response mean 
External auditors (n=33) 
Agreement level (%) and response mean 
 
Overall 
mean  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
Mean 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
Mean 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
Mean 
1. AC communicates with the 
external auditor on all key 
issues associated with the 
audit. 
6.9 11.5 13.8 27.6 40.2 3.83 7.6 8.9 3.8 32.9 46.8 4.03 3 9.1 9.1 42.4 36.4 4 3.93 
2. AC discusses and approves 
the scope of the audit plan 
with external auditors. 
5.7 10.3 14.9 31 37.9 3.85* 10.1 5.1 7.6 29.1 48.1 4* 12.1 24.2 27.3 21.2 15.2 3.03 3.77 
3. AC approves the external 
auditor’s evaluation of control 
procedures. 
6.9 10.3 16.1 33.3 33.3 3.76 8.9 5.1 5.1 27.8 53.2 4.11 9.1 18.2 33.3 15.2 24.2 3.27 3.82 
4. AC meets with external 
auditor without a management 
presence in order to discuss 
audit issues. 
5.7 10.3 16.1 33.3 34.5 3.80 6.3 6.3 7.6 27.8 51.9 4.13 9.1 9.1 24.2 33.3 24.2 3.55 3.89 
5. AC members have an 
informal channel of 
communication with the 
auditor 
6.1 27.6 28.7 17.2 10.3 2.80*# 8.9 6.3 7.6 24.1 53.2 4.06 12.1 6 9.2 33.3 39.4 3.82 3.46 
1-5 are Likert scale interval; 1= Strongly disagree; 2= Disagree; 3= No view; 4= Agree; 5= Strongly agree 
* indicates a significant difference from the auditors’ group 
# indicates a significant difference from the audit committees’ group 
The significant difference between the three groups of respondents has been analysed using the Kruskal-Wallis test (to find if there is a difference but without indicating between which 
groups) and a post hoc test to find where the significant difference lies, i.e. between which groups. 
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Table 7.10: Effect of different types of experience on audit quality, perceptions analysed by respondent groups 
In your view, is an audit 
committee more effective 
when it is composed of 
members who have 
knowledge and experience 
in: 
Boards of directors (n=87) 
Agreement level (%) and response mean 
Audit committee members (n=79) 
Agreement level (%) and response mean 
External auditors (n=33) 
Agreement level (%) and response mean 
 
Overall 
mean  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
Mean 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
Mean 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
Mean 
Finance 2.3 6.9 19.5 41.4 29.9 3.9 0 7.6 6.3 20.3 65 4.41 0 3 9.1 48.5 39.4 4.24 4.16 
Accounting 3.4 5.7 17.2 37.9 35.6 3.97 0 7.6 6.3 20.3 65 4.43 0 3 12.1 48.5 36.4 4.18 4.19 
External audit 2.3 5.7 8 8 76 4.49 1.3 3.8 4 17.7 73.4 4.58 0 3 3 21.2 72.7 4.64 4.55 
Internal audit 3.4 8 17.2 35.6 35.6 3.92 1.3 5.1 10.1 13.9 69.6 4.46 0 3 15.2 21.2 60.6 4.39 4.21 
Legislation (legal experience) 2.3 16.1 22 33.3 26 3.64 12.7 11.4 16.5 17.7 41.8 3.65 6.1 6.1 36.4 24.2 27.3 3.61 3.64 
Business operation 3.4 8 10.3 24.1 54 4.17 0 9 2.6 20.5 67.1 4.47 0 15.2 24.2 18.2 42.4 3.88 4.24 
1-5 are Likert scale interval; 1= Strongly disagree; 2= Disagree; 3= No view; 4= Agree; 5= Strongly agree  
* indicates a significant difference from the auditors’ group 
# indicates a significant difference from the audit committees’ group 
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7.6. Ownership identity and audit quality: perceptions of auditors, boards of 
directors and audit committee members  
 
The second research question seeks the views of directors, audit committee members 
and external auditors about whether different identities of owners have an effect upon 
audit quality in the Jordanian market. There is a paucity of knowledge about the 
perceived role of different ownership identities in ensuring credible auditing, given 
that previous studies have been primarily based on annual reports’ disclosures to 
examine the effect of ownership structure on audit quality39.   
Family ownership, financial institutions (banks), non-financial institutions, 
government and foreign investors (Arab and non-Arab) are common shareholders in 
the Jordanian market. Given that different types of owners have different investment 
policies and different degrees of motivations and abilities to exert effective 
monitoring over financial reporting (Lim et al., 2014), Table 7.11 analyses 
perceptions of the respondents about whether these six ownership types have an effect 
on audit quality.  
Family ownership obtained high agreement from the three groups (overall response 
mean 3.75) regarding the role of this ownership type in audit quality. This result is 
consistent with the notion that agency conflict is lower with family shareholders 
because they are more interested in maintaining the long-term value of firms, as well 
as their reputations, and consequently are less likely to behave adversely. In that sense, 
this is also supported by the comments that have been mentioned by respondents 
regarding family ownership structures, which generally focus on the fact that family 
                                                          
39
 After a careful reviewing of the literature, it can be said that this is the first study that examines 
effect of ownership on audit quality from perceptual viewpoints. 
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owners favour integrity of financial statements and they are less likely to allow any 
misrepresentation. One of the comments was, “family members are carefully looking 
after their reputation so they are keen on audit quality, because any material fraud 
may negatively affect their business and this also creates a concern of gloating by 
other competitors”. Another director also said, “Most families that control business 
are well known in society and therefore they try to maintain their social status”. 
Table 7.11 shows also that most of the respondents gave greater recognition to the 
importance of bank ownership identity in promoting audit quality (overall mean 3.6). 
The views of those respondents are in line with literature discussion about the positive 
role of banks in ensuring high audit quality (Morck et al. (2000); Tian, 2004). These 
studies reported that banks have the incentives and power to monitor financial 
reporting and penalise managers who report low earning quality, and therefore they 
are more interested in higher audit quality. Moreover, though the perceived role of 
non-financial institutions in audit quality obtained importance from all groups, it can 
be noted that it is less than that of banks. This result seems expected, given that the 
bank sector in Jordan is more developed and organised, and also, as concluded by 
(Matar and Noor, 2007), banks in Jordan are more committed to a corporate 
governance code compared to other sectors.  
Comments about institutional investment also highlight the importance of financial 
institutions in promoting audit quality as well-structured owners, more conservative in 
decision making, and they are more interested in their investment and therefore they 
exert effective monitoring over management. One of the comments was, “members 
who represent banks are relatively more vigilant and the quality of financial 
statements is a very sensitive issue for them”. Another comment was, “banks’ 
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regulations are very strict due to the role played by the Central Bank, and this in turn 
is reflected in the behaviour of the directors on the board”. 
Respondents also highlighted the role of government ownership in promoting audit 
quality. This finding is supported by literature (Faccio et al., 2006) that pointed out 
that government representatives are more interested in demanding high quality audit 
in order to protect firms’ assets, maintain their reputation or to raise capital. Moreover, 
this result is expected, as the behaviour of government representatives in the listed 
Jordanian firms is likely to be consistent with the overall government strategy 
regarding attracting investments, and then they are most likely to demand high-quality 
audit to maintain firms’ values and provide positive signals for potential investors.  
On the other hand, the comments mentioned by respondents about government 
ownership are focused on government investment being a strategic investment in 
important public companies like Phosphate and Potash, so therefore they are under 
strict monitoring procedures by the Audit Bureau, which audits companies the 
government is investing in. Also, the behaviour of government representatives is 
expected to be consistent with the overall government strategy regarding attracting 
investment, and then they most likely demand high audit quality to maintain firms’ 
value and provide positive signals for investors. Thus, members who represent these 
investments are expected to be more interested in the integrity of financial statements. 
One mentioned that, “government investment is considered as a national strategic 
matter and government representatives are working under effective monitoring, 
especially by the Audit Bureau”. 
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Investors from Arab countries are prevalent in the Jordanian market. As an answer for 
the question of whether this type of shareholder has an effect on audit quality, most of 
the respondents from all groups agreed upon this (overall mean 3.49). The same result 
was also reported with respect to another type of foreigner (non-Arab shareholders), 
indicating that there is a perceived role for foreign ownership in ensuring audit quality. 
This result is supported by previous studies (Ben Nasr et al., 2015; He et al. (2013) 
and is also consistent with the notion that foreigners with substantial ownership put 
more pressure on management to improve corporate governance and increase 
corporate transparency in particular, which therefore reduces information 
asymmetries (Jiang and Kim, 2004). On the other hand, the reported comments from 
respondents about foreign owners are focusing in particular on foreign owners being 
very interested in their profitability and the value of their investment, and 
consequently a credible audit is expected.   
Overall, it can be concluded that all ownership types in Jordan play a positive role in 
increasing audit quality, given the perceptions of audit committee members, other 
board members and external auditors. These positive perceptions, obtained from 
respondents, have a potential impact on the behaviour of investors and reduce their 
concern that large shareholders may exploit corporate assets. The Kruskal-Wallis test 
showed no significant differences between the three groups, indicating consistent 
perceptions regarding this question.  
The conclusion of this section is consistent with the argument that large capital 
providers have a significant role in monitoring and controlling managers’ decisions 
because of their ownership volume, and because they are better informed than 
individual investors, due to the analytical and information processing resources at 
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their disposal (Jensen, 1993; Mitra and Cready, 2005; Khan et al., 2011). The 
important monitoring role of large shareholders is more important in developing 
countries, as a means of governance by which shareholders can protect their rights 
and effectively control the company and the management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, 1986; Dharwadkar et al., 2000). Fan and Wong (2005) 
also concluded in their study that the existence of large shareholders in developing 
countries is associated with demanding more credible audit, because they are keen to 
employ high quality monitoring and bonding mechanisms to assure other shareholders 
that their interests are protected and to boost their confidence. These positive 
perceptions obtained from respondents have a potential impact on the behaviour of 
investors and reduce their concerns that large shareholders may behave 
opportunistically and exploit corporate assets. 
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Table 7.11: Ownership types and audit quality, perceptions of respondents analysed by respondents groups 
In your view, to what 
extent do you believe 
that the following 
ownership types might 
contribute to an increase 
in audit quality: 
Boards of directors (n=87) 
Agreement level (%) and response mean 
Audit committee members (n=79) 
Agreement level (%) and response mean 
External auditors (n=33) 
Agreement level (%) and response mean 
 
Overall 
mean  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
Mean 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
Mean 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
Mean 
Family ownership 6.9 11.5 8 35.6 37.9 3.86 6.3 12.7 11.4 41.8 27.8 3.72 6.1 24.2 9.1 30.3 30.3 3.55 3.75 
Financial institutions 6.9 10.3 20.7 39.1 23 3.61 5.1 12.7 21.5 40.5 20.3 3.58 3 18.2 12.1 45.5 21.2 3.64 3.60 
Non- financial institutions 7.2 11.5 26 43.7 11.5 3.41 3.8 12.7 29.1 39.2 15.2 3.49 9.1 15.2 21.2 42.4 12.1 3.33 3.43 
Government 11.5 17.2 21.8 29.9 19.5 3.29 13.9 10.1 17.7 40.5 17.7 3.38 12.1 12.1 15.2 42.4 18.2 3.42 3.35 
Arab-foreigners 6.9 11.5 19.5 43.7 18.4 3.55 6.3 17.7 20.3 41.8 13.9 3.39 3 18.2 21.2 33.3 24.2 3.58 3.49 
Non-Arab foreigners 5.7 12.6 23 37.9 20.7 3.55 5.1 16.5 22.8 41.8 13.9 3.43 6.1 18.2 18.2 30.3 27.3 3.55 3.50 
1-5 are Likert scale interval; 1=Strongly disagree; 2= Disagree; 3= No view; 4= Agree; 5=Strongly agree 
* indicates a significant difference from auditors’ group 
# indicates a significant difference from audit committee’ group 
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7.7. Suggested improvement to the current governance regulation in Jordan  
 
A number of prior studies argued that while meeting or adhering to the regulatory 
requirements is important, it is not sufficient to guarantee effectiveness (Martinov- Bennie, 
2007; Contessotto and Moroney, 2013). A number of survey studies identified numerous 
indicators of boards of directors’ and audit committees’ effectiveness not captured in 
regulation (Gendron and Bédard, 2006; Turley and Zaman, 2007; Cohen et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, the Jordanian governance code was initiated in 2008, indicating that the code 
still in its infancy and the governance regulation is still evolving. So, these points motivated 
this study to look beyond the current governance recommendations in order to gain a 
complete understanding of the characteristics that determine board of directors’ and audit 
committees’ effectiveness40 and, in turn, have an effect on audit quality.  
Consequently, this is achieved by asking the respondents about their suggestions for possible 
improvements/changes they would make to the current Corporate Governance Code (2008). 
More precisely, the improvements that related to boards of directors and audit committees 
which respondents believe are important to audit quality. It is worth to say in this vein that 
these targeted respondents have a consultative role in the formation of relevant regulations in 
Jordan. 
                                                          
40
 Based on the result of their survey study, Contessotto and Moroney (2013) pointed out that adoption of 
regulated best practices does not necessarily ensure audit committee effectiveness; it is important to look beyond 
regulated requirements. 
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As a result, the respondents
41
 made different recommendations in this vein. The areas they 
most focused on were: audit committee tenure, internal control systems, non-audit services, 
board dynamics, training and length of meetings. 
Based on the Jordanian regulatory framework, it is not allowed for the external auditors to 
most of non-audit services at the same time while they statutory audit work. According to the 
organising external audit profession (2006), in order to maintain auditors’ independence, it is 
not allowed for an external audit provider to offer contemporaneously any other services such 
as a bookkeeping service, liquidation consultations’ service or design internal control system. 
However, some services are allowed, such as an IT service, or feasibility study service.  
  
Loosening (relaxing) regulations about non-audit services is one of the important suggestions 
made by auditors for consideration in any future amendments of the Corporate Governance 
Code. One of them stated that: 
I do not believe that providing non-audit services in addition to the 
statutory audit for the same client actually affects auditor independence. 
Instead, it gives us (the auditors) more knowledge about the nature of 
clients’ businesses and thus contributes positively to the audit process and 
audit quality. So, we are looking for the relevant regulatory bodies to take 
this into consideration. 
 
Another auditor wrote: 
 
I would prefer it if the regulation related to non-audit services is changed 
because I do not believe in the alleged tie between providing consultations 
to a client and auditor independence. I believe that there is no tie 
whatsoever (between providing non-audit service and auditor 
independence).  
 
                                                          
41
 Some respondents, not all of them provided suggestions. 
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There is evidence from the previous empirical studies supporting this idea and reporting a so-
called knowledge spillover advantage through providing non-audit services. Antle et al. 
(2006), Arruñada (1999) and Simunic (1984) argued that the knowledge spillover happens 
because the same set of information is used in achieving those type of services, and the 
results in one service have a favourable effect on the other. For instance, an auditor who 
evaluates the internal control system, as part of his usual duty, has a better knowledge with 
which to advise on or improve the internal control system than another service provider. Also, 
other previous studies reported no relationship between providing non-audit services and 
auditor independence, and therefore no effect on audit quality (Firth, 2002; Whisenant et al., 
2003). However, the above points mentioned by auditors should be considered carefully, as 
auditors may work toward maximising their financial benefit by relaxing this particular 
requirement.  
In addition, the literature reported what so-called “contractual nature advantage” as another 
favourable impact of providing non-audit services contemporaneously with the statutory audit 
service (Arruñada, 1999). The contractual nature advantage “is connected with the fact that 
the exchange of professional services involves high transaction costs due to the informational 
asymmetry existing between supplier of and client for such services. Therefore, it becomes 
worthwhile to make use of the safeguards (brand name, reputation, conduct rules, control 
systems among professionals, and client confidence) already developed when contracting and 
ensuring quality in auditing, thereby reducing the total cost of providing such services 
(Arruñada, 1999: 514).  
It is worthwhile to mention that this result supports is supported by the findings of the first 
empirical model of this study (see table 6.6 in chapter 6). The regression result presents that 
there is no significant relationship between providing non-audit fees and audit quality. This 
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therefore indicates that providing non-audit service by same external auditor does not have 
significant relationship with audit fees. The result, again, indicates that there is no concern 
about auditor independence particularly regarding the economic bond between auditors and 
their clients. 
On the other hand, audit committee tenure increases members’ experience of the company’s 
operations and therefore may help them developing their monitoring competencies (Gendron 
and Bédard, 2010); respondents from the auditor group stated that long tenure for an audit 
committee member might affect his/her independence as this could create a close relationship 
with management. One of them raised the following important point: 
 
The important point in my mind to ensure the effectiveness of directors of 
audit committees is stating a maximum limit of years for their service 
within the same committee, because in Jordan they have long tenure and I 
have a concern whether those directors after a long period still have 
independence and still conduct effective monitoring procedures. They may 
behave in favour of management and against the auditors and this no doubt 
affects audit quality. 
 
There is evidence from literature that directors’ tenure could compromise their independence 
and thus make them less critical of the management (Vafeas, 2001; Vafeas, 2003). This 
therefore diminishes the quality of their monitoring of management and the reporting 
integrity. Vafeas (2003: 1045) proposed a management friendliness argument “suggesting 
that seasoned directors are more likely to befriend, and less likely to monitor, managers. In 
time, directors may be co-opted by management as directors become less mobile and less 
employable”. In this vein, it is worth noting that some regulations around the world take into 
account the potential adverse effects of long tenure for directors and therefore state a 
maximum limit for their service, e.g. UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance (Smith, 
2003) limits audit committee appointments to a maximum of nine years.  
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Furthermore, diligence is so important in indicating board effectiveness, and this has been 
captured through the literature using frequency of meetings as an indication of diligence. One 
of the directors (A) mentioned that it is worth looking at the duration of board meetings not 
only the number of meetings per year. Another one (B) also provided insight into the 
importance of the value and depth of the discussions inside the board. 
 
When talking about board meetings throughout a year, I would say that 
meeting duration should be taken into account not just the number of 
meetings (director A). 
 
 
From my point view, the nature and dynamics of the discussions in board 
meetings are extremely important. So, attention should be on what’s going 
on inside the board room rather than focusing on formalism e.g. board size 
and frequency of meetings (director B). 
 
 
Directors’ business knowledge also gained attention from respondents as a way of boosting 
their oversight effectiveness. A director pointed out that: 
 
The big challenge for directors is the extent to which they are up to date 
about a company’s business operations. I suggest that policymakers set 
instructions to ensure that directors are under a continuous improvement 
system so that they are not keeping on leading the company by the old 
mind/school standards. This therefore will create a more effective board of 
directors and no doubt will contribute to the quality of financial 
information. 
 
Another one has mentioned: 
Fresh directors who join the board do not know much about the company 
and its business nature, and this adversely affects their effectiveness. So, I 
would suggest that the governance regulation includes requirements to 
force companies to run supportive training programmes about, for example, 
a company’s operations, the legal requirements and relevant legislation. 
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Other competencies, such as the ability to work in small groups, negotiate and communicate 
effectively, have obtained recognition from respondents as important skills. In this vein, a 
director mentioned: 
 
The board of directors is seen as a team work, so if this team is not 
competent in communication and interaction skills, this will lead to a weak 
board and therefore it will fail to carry out its monitoring role effectively. 
Such skills should be taken into consideration for board members.   
 
 
The audit committees in Jordan are expected to play an important role in evaluating and 
supervising the internal control procedures to ensure its effectiveness, because effective 
internal control helps in preventing reporting failure and management cheating, and, in turn, 
helps the external auditing process (JCGC, 2008; Turley and Zaman, 2004; Lee et al., 2004). 
Effective monitoring and reviewing of the internal control system by audit committees 
enhances their understanding of the firm’s operations and increases the chance of discovering 
misstatements or earnings management acts. So, though JCGC highlighted the importance of 
internal control and added it to audit committees’ agendas, some directors pointed out that the 
internal control report is not appropriately prepared and sometimes is not prepared at all. One 
of the directors mentioned: 
Following up internal audit reports by the audit committee should be taken 
seriously and there should be a strict rule for this given the importance of 
these reports. Although the audit committee is responsible for internal audit 
and control, it does not prepare and review internal control reports 
appropriately, or does not do this function at all. 
 
Therefore, the aforementioned suggestion could be taken into consideration by 
regulatory bodies in Jordan because of its importance.  
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7.8. Conclusion 
 
The roles of boards of directors and audit committees are highlighted by the Jordanian 
regulations and in particular by the Corporate Governance Code as monitoring mechanisms 
to ensure high audit quality. This therefore helps in protecting shareholders’ interests. The 
Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) has spent time and energy in recent years attempting to 
improve the roles of boards of directors and audit committees to ensure that investors obtain 
relevant and reliable information (because enhancing investors’ confidence in the financial 
statements and financial market is a significant target for the regulators). The efforts of JSC 
in this vein are culminated in launching a Corporate Governance Code in 2008. This code put 
many responsibilities on the shoulders of boards of directors and audit committees as 
corporate governance players. 
The secondary data model (first part of this thesis) examined whether of board and audit 
committee composition (in terms of independence, size and meetings) affect audit quality by 
employing historical quantitative data. Other board and audit committee attributes beyond the 
quantifiable characteristics, are largely unexplored and they no doubt play a role in audit 
quality. The effect of these attributes on audit quality is difficult to measure using published 
annual reports, and therefore the best way to capture their effect on audit quality is through 
eliciting the views of the major players in corporate governance. Consequently, the study 
aims to complete the picture about the role of corporate governance mechanisms, as 
suggested by the local governance regulation, on audit quality.  
So the governance code recommends that boards of directors should be effective in carrying 
out their duties, e.g. authority over management and financial reporting, appropriate 
composition, diligence, and having appropriate knowledge resources. Also, the audit 
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committee should carry out its oversight role effectively, e.g. reviewing accounting policies, 
reviewing financial statements and internal control, acquiring relevant information from 
management, oversight of the audit process, interacting with auditors, etc. Given the 
regulators’ targets and hopes about the effect of these characteristics/attributes in 
strengthening financial reporting and ensuring audit quality in Jordan, this chapter offers 
more insight by examining whether these attributes have an impact on audit quality as 
perceived by board members, audit committee members and external auditors. 
Findings of the questionnaires analysing reveals that respondents gave high importance to the 
role played by most board of directors’ characteristics in achieving high audit quality. These 
characteristics are mainly recommended by the Jordan Corporate Governance Code (2008) 
and are supported by the previous literature, as discussed earlier. Organising a company's 
financial affairs, setting risk management policies, ensuring that the executive managers have 
appropriate qualifications and experience, reviewing and evaluating the performance of a 
company’s executive management by the board, in addition to board independence, are the 
activities/attributes that obtained strong agreement from an overwhelming majority of the 
respondents as having a contribution to audit quality. Thus, it can be concluded that role of 
board of directors, as perceived by the respondents, is to a large extent a contributor to audit 
quality. This conclusion supports the first hypothesis in the questionnaire survey model. 
However, respondents were not fully agreed on some board characteristics, e.g. board size 
and gender diversity. Separate questions have been asked to examine the potential effect of 
women on the board as well as the potential effect of board size. The results confirmed that 
having women on the board is likely lead to a higher level of conflict, and large board size 
results in higher coordination costs, time-consuming decisions and more communication 
problems. This may have implications for the selection process of board members. 
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Regarding the role played by audit committees in promoting high audit quality, respondents 
underscored most of these activities. As expected, given that it has a direct monitoring role 
over the entire financial reporting process, all audit committee functions, audit committee 
composition and audit committee resources have been rated as very important factors for the 
effectiveness of audit committee oversight, which in turn increases audit quality. Thus, it can 
be concluded that the role of audit committees, as perceived by the respondents, contributes 
to a large extent to audit quality. This conclusion supports the second hypothesis (related to 
the second model). 
Moreover, it can be concluded that all ownership types in Jordan play a positive role in 
increasing audit quality given the perceptions of audit committee members, other board 
members and external auditors. These positive perceptions may have an impact on the 
behaviour of investors in the financial market. The Kruskal-Wallis test showed no significant 
differences between the three groups, indicating consistent perceptions regarding this 
question. The result is consistent with the argument that large capital providers have a 
significant role in monitoring and controlling managers’ decisions due to their ownership 
volume, and because they are better informed than individual investors. This result supports 
the third hypothesis of the survey model. 
In terms of significant differences between groups, there is high consistency between their 
perceptions. However, the external auditors added more emphasis on the role of boards of 
directors in ensuring a high level of transparency than did other groups. Also, there was less 
agreement from external auditors that women increase levels of conflict in the boardroom; 
this view is lower than the other two groups, and the possible reason, as mentioned before, 
could be because they have less experience inside the boardroom than the directors. Auditors 
also provided low agreement about role of audit committees in monitoring their independence, 
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their audit plan and approve their fees. Furthermore, directors who are not from audit 
committee showed their concern about informal interaction between auditors and audit 
committee. Apart from these, all groups consistently perceive the importance of the board 
and audit committee attributes presented.   
Furthermore, the study has offered an important contribution by extending the investigation 
of boards of directors’ and audit committees’ roles in promoting audit quality to dimensions 
that, to the best of my knowledge, have not previously been investigated, and also highlighted 
the importance of other kinds of audit committee experience apart from what policymakers 
have emphasised, i.e. experience that can be voluntarily added to audit committees (e.g. audit, 
legal, business operation experience). Recommendations concerning some governance 
aspects have been put forward by the respondents. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter offers a brief picture of the entire thesis. It presents the summary of study 
motivation and aims, the main findings, contribution to knowledge, implications for 
policymakers, limitations and suggested avenues for future research.  
 
8.2. Review of the research questions 
 
The agency problem that arises between those who prepare financial information 
(management) and those who use it (owners) is the main motive for the external audit.  High 
audit quality is important to companies as it plays a significant role in enhancing the quality 
of financial statements, safeguarding the shareholders’ interests, and increasing the investors' 
confidence in the financial statements. This confirms that the theoretical legitimacy of the 
external audit function is reducing the agency problem, for example, by allowing 
shareholders and other outsiders to verify the validity of financial statements. 
Corporate governance regulation in Jordan highlighted the role of boards of directors and 
audit committees as important pillars of the corporate governance system. One of the 
expected roles of these governance mechanisms is the positive contribution to audit quality.  
Therefore, the essential aim of this study is to examine whether these corporate governance 
mechanisms fill this anticipated role and do indeed ensure high audit quality.  
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In addition, since legal protection for shareholders is relatively poor in developing countries, 
the concentration of ownership is important as an effective internal corporate governance 
mechanism to protect investors’ interests. This study, therefore, has a motive to examine 
whether the different types of controlling shareholders, who are common in the Jordanian 
market, have a positive effect on audit quality.  
Furthermore, given that the Jordanian corporate governance code is in its infancy; this 
motivates this study to look beyond the current governance recommendations to gain a 
complete understanding of the characteristics that determine boards of directors’ and audit 
committees’ effectiveness. This is achieved by asking these relevant respondents to consider 
possible improvements or changes to the current code. This particularly includes suggestions 
concerning the board of directors and the audit committee’s mechanisms that they feel are 
important in promoting audit quality, apart from what is already recommended in the current 
governance code.  
The aforementioned objectives of the study have been achieved through the following 
research questions:  
1. Do boards of directors and audit committees, as corporate governance mechanisms, 
have a significant impact on audit quality in a developing market like Jordan? 
2. Is the level of audit quality in Jordan related to the common ownership identities?  
3. What changes to the extant governance regulatory framework do respondents believe 
would most improve audit quality? 
A summary of the findings which provide answers to these research questions are presented 
in the following section (in addition to the detailed discussion in chapters five and seven). 
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Two different methodologies (secondary data approach and survey approach) are used to 
tackle these research questions. These different methodologies provide a deep knowledge and 
broaden the generalisability of the results. The secondary data-based model examined the 
quantifiable boards of directors’ and audit committees’ characteristics that are accessible 
through the published annual reports. These are: board independence, role duality, board size, 
frequency of board meetings, gender diversity on the board, audit committee independence, 
audit committee financial expertise, audit committee size and frequency of audit committee 
meetings. Furthermore, this part empirically examines whether audit quality is affected by the 
different ownership identities in the Jordanian market. These types of ownership are family 
owners, government, foreign owners (Arab and non-Arab investors), non-financial 
institutions, and financial institutions. 
The questionnaire survey approach aimed to provide a clearer understanding of the impact of 
boards of directors, audit committees and different ownership identities on audit quality.  To 
achieve this goal the questionnaire gathered the viewpoints of the important players in 
corporate governance: the members of boards, members of audit committees and external 
auditors. The way that these groups think can affect the impact of the Jordanian governance 
code recommendations and may provide useful feedback for the regulatory bodies in 
particular when considering current corporate governance practices.  
However, both research approaches have limitations: the secondary data approach suffers 
from the risk of omitted variables and it is also difficult to find strong and reliable proxy 
variables (Beattie et al., 2012), which in turn fails to provide a deep insight into the 
phenomenon under study. In addition, in a survey-based approach the sample size is 
relatively small, and this may decrease the scope for generalising the findings. Given this, a 
combination of these research approaches is considered a good methodology choice 
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(Rudestam and Newton, (2007). Moreover, using different data collection methods within a 
piece of research ensures the accuracy of data interpretation, enables researchers to obtain a 
comprehensive overview of a particular issue, to interpret the research findings, overcome the 
potential bias of a single method approach (Hussey and Hussey, 1997) and leads to greater 
validity and reliability.  
 
8.3. Review of findings 
 
The first model of the study addressed the first and second research questions using a 
secondary data approach. By using different estimation methods e.g. fixed effect, random 
effect and robust standard error, the first model of the study highlights the importance of the 
boards of directors’ independence, audit committees’ independence, family ownership, bank 
ownership and government ownership in ensuring high audit quality. However, gender 
diversity and board size show an adverse correlation with audit quality.  The likely reasons 
for this negative relationship are clarified by the perceptions of the respondents in the second 
model. The results indicate that a large board size leads to higher coordination cost, less 
effective communication and more time to taken reach decisions. More females in the 
boardroom leads to more conflict and therefore decrease board effectiveness.  
With respect to audit committees, the regression results show that more independent 
members and more members having financial experience are positively correlated with audit 
quality. Thus, these characteristics play an essential monitoring role to ensure the quality of 
financial reporting and to serve as an important governance mechanism.  
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These outcomes are consistent with agency theory propositions and in line with the notion 
that more independent members in the board create a more effective monitoring role. They 
seek to protect their reputation capital and to promote shareholder interests by purchasing 
differentially higher-quality audits. The finding of the impact of the different ownership 
identities is also in line with the argument that large capital providers ask for additional audit 
quality to monitor their investments and to complement their role in monitoring and 
controlling managers’ decisions. They also serve to assure minority shareholders that their 
interests are sufficiently protected. This, consequently, leads to there being less information 
asymmetry and so less agency conflict.   
Obviously, from the significance level of the reported results, the boards of directors’ and 
audit committees’ independence stands as the most important attribute that enhances audit 
quality. Therefore, the regulatory bodies can recognise the essential role played by 
independent directors as one of the most important components of the corporate governance 
system in Jordan. Also, firms’ directors can benefit from this result by using it as a parameter 
to assess how board and audit committee characteristics may affect financial reporting and 
audit quality. 
Since it is difficult to assess audit quality ex-ante because the amount of assurance provided 
by auditors is unobservable, and because there are different views as to what constitutes a 
higher-quality audit; the audit fee level is used in the first model as a proxy to capture audit 
quality. Previous literature and contextual factors support this proxy as the most appropriate 
one in the Jordanian context. Other proxies in the Jordanian context like Big-4 firms or 
industry specialisation are less relevance for the reasons discussed in section 4.2.2. Also the 
studies from this market revealed that audit fees are important to motivate auditors to do 
better work, and if an auditor who receives high fees delivers poor audit quality, this makes 
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him lose face and feel shame. In addition, in the questionnaire, there is a question asking 
respondents about the extent to which they do believe that audit fees, audit firm size, Big 4 
affiliates and audit specialisation are relevant audit quality indicators in Jordan. The answers 
gave much recognition to audit fees as a superior proxy for audit quality within the Jordanian 
environment. 
With respect to the survey part, the results of analysing 199 questionnaires reveal that 
respondents gave high importance to the role played by most boards of directors’ 
characteristics in promoting audit quality. These characteristics are mainly recommended by 
the Jordan Corporate Governance Code (2008) and are supported by the previous literature, 
as discussed earlier. Organising a company's financial affairs, setting risk management 
policies, ensuring that the executive managers have appropriate qualifications and experience, 
reviewing and evaluating the performance of a company’s executive management by the 
board, in addition to board independence, are the activities/attributes that obtained strong 
agreement from an overwhelming majority of the respondents as having a major contribution 
to audit quality. 
For the perceived roles of audit committee activities in promoting high audit quality, 
respondents underscored most of these activities. As expected, given that audit committees 
have a direct monitoring role over the entire financial reporting process; audit committee 
functions, audit committee composition and audit committee resources have been rated as 
important factors in the effectiveness of audit committee oversight, which in turn increases 
audit quality.  
However, the findings of the frequency of audit committees meetings show no significant 
effect, indicating that the number of meetings does not seem to be a relevant indication of 
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audit committee diligence (i.e. does not necessarily translate to effective monitoring over 
financial reporting and audit quality). Also, some of the audit committee’s activities; like 
reviewing auditors’ independence, approving non-audit fees, approving audit plan are 
perceived by the “auditors” as less important for audit quality. The most likely reason for this 
is that external auditors may have concerns about being threatened by the audit committee 
authority, and auditors might not entirely agree with the notion that providing non-audit 
services could increase their economic dependence on the client and therefore impair their 
independence.  
Moreover, given respondents’ views, it can be concluded that the different ownership types in 
Jordan play a positive role in increasing audit quality. These positive perceptions may have 
an impact on the behaviour of investors in the financial market. The Kruskal-Wallis test 
showed no significant differences between the three groups, indicating consistent perceptions 
regarding this question. The result is consistent with the argument that large capital providers 
have a significant role in monitoring and controlling managers’ decisions due to their 
ownership volume, and because they are better informed than individual investors.  
A number of recommendations, to the current governance code, have been put forward by the 
respondents. The areas they most focused on were: audit committee tenure, internal control 
systems, non-audit services, board dynamics, audit committees’ skills, meetings’ agenda and 
length of meetings, and training scheme for new directors. 
Thus, the findings of the study answer positively the research questions by confirming the 
significant role played by the corporate governance mechanisms (boards of directors, audit 
committees and the dominant owners in the ownership structure) in ensuring high audit 
quality. These findings indicate that the governance regulations can contribute positively to 
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audit quality even in developing countries i.e. the weak legal system and cultural differences 
compared to developed countries do not affect the role played by the governance mechanisms 
on audit quality. This conclusion is consistent with the notion that high quality governance 
systems are equally, or even more, important in developing countries that are attempting to 
develop their capital markets and to gain credibility among investors (Jordanian public 
companies are under continuous encouragement from ASE and JCS to comply with the code 
in order to achieve these objectives). This is also supported by corporate governance studies 
from different contexts, e.g. Yatim et al. (2006) from Malaysia, Rustam et al., (2013) from 
Pakistan, Zaman et al., (2011) from the UK; Carcello et al., (2002) from the USA; Bliss 
(2011) from Australia.  
Consequently, it can be concluded that the outcomes of this study are, to a large extent, 
consistent with the hopes and expectations of the Jordanian regulatory bodies. The overall 
findings indicate that the governance mechanisms set by JCGC (2008) to a large extent lead 
to effective monitoring over auditing (monitoring approach) and the role of these mechanisms 
is not just symbolic. This highlighted an active (rather than passive) monitoring role of the 
different governance mechanisms under investigation which is, therefore, consistent with the 
agency theory assumptions.  
In summary, the survey part examined the effectiveness of boards of directors and audit 
committees, as well as the role of ownership types on audit quality from perceptual 
perspectives that is to say from the views of the respondents involved. The first part of the 
thesis also targeted the same objectives but through a different research methodology, i.e. 
using historical data, and overall it is worth saying that the second part supports the 
inferences of the first part as both have provided consistent findings. Hence tackling the same 
issue with these types of investigations together paints a fuller picture, enriches data quality, 
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informs the debate and certainly offers significant insights into the various roles of corporate 
governance in Jordan in promoting high audit quality.  
 
 
8.4. Contribution to knowledge and implications for policymakers 
 
Although there is plenty of research on corporate governance in countries within the Anglo-
American and Continental European countries, those in the Middle East and North Africa 
region (MENA) get minimal attention. So the corporate governance research in this region is 
still underdeveloped. Therefore, corporate governance research in such an environment is 
recommended as it provides a valuable contribution to the literature.  
Since the majority of the relevant studies are conducted in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, these studies leave uncertainties regarding the direction and magnitude of the 
empirical relationship in a context like Jordan. These uncertainties come from the difference 
in the institutional characteristics of Jordan in comparison to these developed markets; such 
as the relatively less restrictive auditor’s liability, lower disclosure requirements, lower public 
enforcement, and other institutional differences.  
Given this, the context that has been considered in this study is institutionally different from 
the Western context, and at the same time is similar to developing countries, particularly 
those in the MENA region as they share a common culture, religion, language, tribal and 
family traditions and a colonial effect. Therefore, although this study is targeted at the 
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Jordanian market in particular, its findings can also be generalised to other countries that 
share the same contextual characteristics.   
The secondary data model provides a detailed and timely review of corporate governance 
characteristics and ownership structures for a unique database which is manually collected 
from a sample of 690 firm-year observations of non-financial listed firms in Jordan between 
2009 and 2014. This work contributes significantly to the existing body of knowledge, by 
providing more details about firm-level corporate governance structures in Jordan as one of 
the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries where corporate governance is still 
underdeveloped. 
Furthermore, the survey part offers an important contribution by extending the investigation 
of boards of directors’ and audit committees’ roles in promoting audit quality to dimensions 
that, to the best of my knowledge, have not previously been investigated, e.g. the role of the 
availability of monetary and information resources for directors, board compliance with law, 
board authority to review executive managers’ performance and to ensure that they are 
appropriately qualified, the formal and informal interaction of audit committees with auditors, 
and also the importance of other kinds of audit committee experience, apart from what 
policymakers have emphasised. In addition, little is known about other governance 
dimensions from perceptual viewpoints.  
As clearly mentioned by the respondents, the regulatory bodies should seek a balanced 
portfolio of skills within the audit committees, i.e. they should look beyond financial 
expertise and consider a wider set of experiences, e.g. audit, legal, business operation 
experience, not just focusing on financial expertise.  
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Moreover, given that the literature suffers from a tight focus on the composition of boards of 
directors and audit committees, e.g. independence, meetings, size, and given that the majority 
of previous studies have been conducted in developed contexts, this study contributes to the 
literature by moving beyond these boundaries and extending the investigation 
methodologically and geographically. In addition to the contribution to accounting and 
corporate governance literature, the findings regarding board gender diversity and board size 
may be useful for team effectiveness and heterogeneous groups’ literature. 
Obviously, from the reported results, the independence attribute of boards of directors and 
audit committees stands as the most valuable corporate governance mechanism. Therefore, 
the regulatory bodies can recognise the essential role played by independent directors as one 
of the important components of the corporate governance system in Jordan. In addition, firms’ 
directors can benefit from this result by using it as a parameter to assess how board and audit 
committee characteristics may affect financial reporting and audit quality. 
These overall findings can, therefore, be useful for regulators in terms of evaluating the 
impact of extant governance regulation on audit quality or in terms of considering them for 
future corporate governance reform, e.g. given that the corporate governance code in Jordan 
is still not obligatory, regulators may work towards improving the code and making it a 
compulsory requirement. Companies also may adhere to the code recommendations in light 
of its benefits. Moreover, the positive inferences gained about the impact of different 
ownership types on audit quality have a potential impact on the behaviour of investors and 
reduces their concern that large shareholders may exploit corporate assets. The final 
conclusion can assist financial market participants in Jordan to make better-informed 
investment decisions. 
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8.5. Limitations and future research  
 
Like any research project, this study is not without limitations. First, the study population is 
Jordanian shareholding companies. However, a number of companies are excluded due to 
their business nature and others have been excluded due to a lack of disclosure. In terms of 
different business nature, the study excluded financial companies as they are normally 
considered separately, due to differences in their businesses and regulatory environment. In 
this vein, future studies could be focused on financial companies, e.g. banks and insurance 
companies, given their vital role in the Jordanian financial market. 
In terms of disclosure problems, although there were 177 listed non-financial companies on 
the Amman Stock Exchange at the end of 2014, only 115 of them are considered in this study 
due to the data unavailability from their audit committees. While the corporate governance 
practices and disclosure levels, in particular, have evolved in recent years in Jordan, a future 
study could use larger sample of firms and therefore increase the robustness of results, as well 
as the level of generalisability. Moreover, increasing the number of the respondents, 
especially auditors, will provide broader and richer inferences regarding corporate 
governance mechanisms and their impact on audit quality. 
Second, the study relies on data published in annual reports, and self-administrated 
questionnaires. However, other research approaches such as interviews or focus groups could 
provide richer insights and a more accurate picture regarding boards of directors’ and audit 
committees’ effectiveness, as well as ownership types and the role of these mechanisms in 
ensuring higher audit quality.  
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Third, future research is needed to focus on the length of meetings, not just their number, the 
nature and tone of board discussions and on other competencies and professional skills, 
including the ability to work, negotiate and communicate effectively in small groups. In 
addition, directors should play an effective role, not merely voting on or approving what they 
receive from management, i.e. how a board effectively formulates actions and behaves in 
meetings is very important. So a good research opportunity could be going inside the 
boardroom and studying directors’ behaviour and their interactions, which will, therefore, 
provide a deep insight into directors’ interactions during meetings.  
Fourth, 95% of the respondents are male which is expected given the level of women’s 
participation in the workforce in such an environment. However, this creates a concern 
regarding the validity of the perceptions that came from the question about the role/behaviour 
of female in the board of director (i.e. the result should be considered with very cautious). 
Thus, future research could try to include more women in the sample in order to avoid any 
bias, or carry out an observation of the behaviour of female directors in the boardroom which 
could offer more rigorous inferences. 
Fifth, audit quality is difficult to measure as the level of assurance provided by auditors is 
unobservable. This proxy has a drawback as large audit fees paid may make auditors more 
economically dependent on their clients and affect their independence. Also, audit fees levels 
may reflect the negotiation power between audit firms and their clients rather than audit 
quality. Thus, given that the audit fees model is employed to capture audit quality, as audit 
effort and audit fees are highly correlated, using actual audit hours spent in the auditing 
process (instead of fees), where possible, is a better indicator of audit effort, e.g. analysing 
timesheets of auditors and finding out the time spent for each audit assignment.  
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Sixth, the scope of this study is non-financial listed firms on the Amman Stock Exchange 
(ASE). Non-listed firms form more than 90% of the total firms in Jordan, and given the 
importance of these businesses to the national economy, a new corporate governance code 
was enacted in 2013 for this type of firm. Future research might take into consideration the 
non-listed firms, e.g. private limited liability and other types of medium and small entities.  
Seventh, the result concerning audit committee experience also raised a motivation for future 
research to address other experiences that the members should hold like legal expertise, 
business operation, and audit. The existence of legal experts on an audit committee, for 
instance, makes them more interested to avoid litigation that could arise from fraudulent 
financial reporting, i.e. their legal background makes them more vigilant to avoid the legal 
liability threat. 
Eighth, there are a number of suggested improvements to the Jordanian governance code 
made by the respondents in the last part in chapter 7. However, these suggestions were 
provided by respondents individually (as a response to open-ended questions in the 
questionnaire) and they have not gained any approval or rejection from other respondents. 
Future research could take these suggested improvements into consideration and may 
investigate the extent to which they are important in promoting high audit quality. 
Ninth, future research can cover a comparative study of Jordan with other developed or 
developing countries to highlight the impact of different institutional settings, and increase 
generalisability. 
Finally, the results of the study and, therefore, the recommendations made should be taken 
into consideration with cautious until confirmed by other studies and using other qualitative 
research methods to obtain in-depth information about the matter under investigation.
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APPENDIX 1 (B): QUESTIONNAIRE IN ARABIC LANGUAGE 
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